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FOREWORD
R. Cargill Hall has written a history. Readers not familiar with the state of
writing about twentieth century technology and science may not realize his
achievement. Accounts-so-called histories-of recent technology and science are
often little more than simplistic narratives focusing almost entirely upon sequences
in hardware development or upon scientific idea explication. In commendable
contrast, Hall organized a coherent narrative and analysis of complex institutions,
people, ideas, and machines changing in character and in relationship one to
another over time.
His history of the Ranger Project is also critical and mature. He avoided
neither complexity and contradiction nor reasoned analysis and judgments about
episodes and people. He allowed for accident, unintended consequences, shifting
priorities, budgetary adjustments, and over-determined events. This is evidenced
by a frank account of six superficially ignominious Ranger failures, an analysis of
the effects of NASA management by committee, an appraisal of the impact of
high-priority Project Apollo upon Ranger, and a consideration of the consequences
of Ranger's being done at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a university rather than
an industrial laboratory. He comprehended how these and other factors generally
influenced the project and shaped the automatic machine, the exploring spacecraft,
at its hard core.
Lunar Impact transforms the records of a technological project into history
by applying the canons of historical scholarship. The techniques and modes of
interpretation are the general historian's. Because of this, Ranger emerges from the
study not simply as a machine designed and operated by technical specialists but,
more complexly and convincingly, as the focus of activities resulting from the
conflicting interests, the power struggles, and the contrasting objectives of
individuals, groups, and institutions. Viewed in this way, the writing of the history
of the Ranger project becomes a challenge similar to the writing of the history of
political campaigns and business enterprises.
The reader will recognize elements common to many kinds of history; he or
she may also note the development of themes often encountered in large-scale
technological and scientific projects. Most obvious is the tension between the values
and goals of science and of engineering. Throughout Hall's history one encounters
scientists striving to shape Ranger so that it could perform a number of complex
scientific experiments; the reader also meets engineers endeavoring to design a
machine realistically contrived to perform one or two priority tasks like
photographing the surface of the moon. Another significant theme concerns the
tension permeating the Jet Propulsion Laboratory between the academic spirit of
free enquiry and loose disciplinary structure, and the industrial laboratory style of
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project-oriented organization and highly directed problem-solving. These tensions
were severe, sometimes constructive and at other times frustrating. Hall succeeds in
seeing the situations in the perspectives of the various principals and principles.
Hall's book is also unusual and interesting because it reckons, as noted, with
failure, the frequently ignominious inadequacy of the early machines, launches,
and operations. Hall absorbed enough of the wisdom of experienced managers and
engineers not to be startled or shocked into rash pronouncements and value
judgments about failure. He learned that early Ranger was a high-risk endeavor,
venturing into treacherous waters in which a number of careers foundered. In
writing of failure, Hall had an advantage over his counterparts doing political
histories: he did not have to contend with the host of simplistic myths that
accumulate about the sites of political disasters. As yet, technology and science
affairs are not easily enough comprehended to attract the sensation seeker and the
simplifier.
On the other hand, Hall, unlike the political historian, did have the
formidable problem of making complex technology comprehensible to the
generally-informed reader. Wisely and considerately, he wrote about technical and
scientific matters with his professed audience in mind-historians, interested
laymen, and managers; he resisted the temptation to write for the highly sensitive,
deeply involved, and specialized readers of the NASA "comment cycle." Also his
technical and scientific information is related by him to general themes. The
personalities of salient scientists, engineers, and managers are delineated insofar as
these influenced the character of the technological artifacts and the scientific ideas.
Finally, the agency sponsoring this study should be commended. A large
publicly-funded administrative enterprise such as NASA understandably gravitates
toward sustaining public relations and strives for favorable public opinion. Hall's
book emerged from the NASA matrix surprisingly free of the constraining
influences. The engineers, scientists, and managers at NASA and at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory do not appear in this book as cutouts; they do emerge as
believable three-dimensional men involved in an extremely interesting and
significant episode in recent history.
Thomas P. Hughes
University of Pennsylvania
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PREFACE
Ranger was the first successful American project of lunar exploration. It was
an enterprise sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and executed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Including
authorization, design, development, and flights, the project spanned the years
1959-1965 and culminated in closeup television pictures of the moon. This project
produced most of the basic management techniques, flight operating procedures,
and technology for NASA's later unmanned lunar and planetary missions. It also
established methods for selecting scientific experiments and integrating them with
the spacecraft. The history of Ranger is thus essential to understanding the
evolution and operational form of NASA's continuing program of unmanned
exploration of deep space.
I have prepared this history with three particular audiences in mind:
scholars concerned with the history of American science and technology;
practicing managers involved in large government research and development
projects; and scientists, engineers, or laymen interested in the nation's space
program. I have arranged the story topically within chronological sections, and
paid considerable attention in the analysis to the bureaucratic problems of science
and technology as they were expressed and resolved by individuals. I have
attempted further to capture the adventure of probing the unknown and the
frequent drama in the interplay of the expectations of American scientists, popular
American interests in space, the satisfaction of engineering requirements, restricted
budgets, human frustration, congressional impatience, and institutional tension.
In the writing of this history, William Pickering, the Director of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, granted me full access to the JPL files and records, and
allowed me complete freedom to interpret the material as I wished. The NASA
History Office made available the pertinent NASA records at Headquarters in
Washington, D. C. I also made extensive use of interviews, which were taped and
transcribed, with virtually all of the key participants in Project Ranger. Although
allowance had to be made for subjective proclivities and faded memories,
sometimes in conflict with the written record, the interviews proved valuable in
recapturing the excitement of tense moments. They also furnished many of the
private thoughts and motives of the participants, providing color and substance
otherwise missing in the written record. Finally, I asked some of these same
individuals to read and comment on portions or all of the draft manuscript.
Though employed at Caltech/JPL, I served functionally as a member of the NASA
history program, where this "comment cycle" is typical. I found the comment
cycle helpful rather than inhibiting. At no time was my freedom of interpretation
infringed upon.
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From the beginning I had the encouragement and unstinting assistance of
the NASA History Office: NASA Historian Eugene M. Emme, Director of the
History Program Monte D. Wright, Publications Manager Frank W. Anderson,
and Archivist Lee D. Saegesser. At JPL, Laboratory Director Pickering and
Assistant Laboratory Director Walter H. Padgham supplied the resources and
patience needed to see the work completed. I am grateful to Richard K. Smith,
who criticized the early chapters, and to Rodman W. Paul of the Caltech Division
of Humanities and Social Sciences, who helped out in a variety of important ways.
I owe a special debt to Daniel J. Kevles, also of the Caltech Humanities Division,
who counseled with me throughout the work, criticized every chapter, and edited
the penultimate draft of the manuscript.
In this brief space, I can only acknowledge the generous additional support
I received from many other individuals and groups. Reference librarians at the
JPL and Caltech Millikan Libraries patiently answered innumerable queries, and
Caltech students past and present-P. Thomas Carroll, Lee W. Vibber, and Hallie
A. Poore-assisted in the research and footnoting. The following, in particular,
helped with interviews, critiques of the manuscript, or both:
John G. Albert
James R. Arnold
James D. Burke
Edgar M. Cortright
Clifford I. Cummings
N. William Cunningham
Lee A. DuBridge
Friedrich Duerr
T. Keith Glennan
Walter E. Jakobowski
Gordon P. Kautz
Clayton R. Koppes
Donald R. Latham
Alvin R. Luedecke
Homer E. Newell
Oran W. Nicks
Eberhardt Rechtin
Geoffrey Robillard
Harris M. Schurmeier
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Eugene M. Shoemaker
Homer J. Stewart
Thomas Vrebalovich
James E. Webb
Ewen A. Whitaker
James H. Wilson
The artist Robert Shepard rendered the print of Ranger used for the front
cover of this book, and it appears courtesy of the TRW Space Log. JPL artist
Arthur Beeman furnished the print of the deep space radio antenna that appears
on the back cover. All illustrations not credited otherwise are NASA/JPL figures.
Finally, heartfelt thanks are due Helena Rosen, who, over the past four
years, made the manuscript a reality, typing and retyping "adjusted" chapters
more times than either she or I care to remember. Needless to say, the final
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responsibility for this history, including its interpretations
inadequacies or weaknesses it may contain, is mine alone.
R. Cargill Hall
Pasadena, California
October, 1976
and
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Part I
THE ORIGINAL RANGER

THE
Chapter One
ORIGINS OF RANGER
"FROM what they say they have put one small ball in the air," President
Dwight D. Eisenhower declared at his news conference on October 9, 1957,
adding, "at this moment you [don't] have to fear the intelligence aspects of this. ''_
But despite the Presidential assurance, the Soviet satellite, Sputnik 1, launched a
few days earlier as part of the world-wide scientific program of the International
Geophysical Year, 2 had shattered confidence in American technical preeminence.
In the wake of the Soviet triumph, many Americans concluded that the United
States must undertake a vigorous space program of its own.
A MOON FLIGHT PROPOSAL
Shortly after the launch of Sputnik 1, William H. Pickering, 3 the Director of
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, advanced a novel idea. The
Soviet Union had merely hurled a satellite into orbit around the earth. Picketing,
along with a number of his staff at the Laboratory, wanted the United States to
meet the Russian space challenge by sending a spacecraft to the moon.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, or JPL, had been pursuing exotic projects in
its field for years. Begun in 1936 under the auspices of the Guggenheim
Aeronautical Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, it had
originated as a student rocket research project when the scientific community
generally regarded rockets as an indulgence best left to students. In 1940 the
Caltech rocket experimenters acquired an Army Air Corps contract and built
facilities in northwestern Pasadena, at the foot of the San Gabriel Mountains in
the Arroyo Seco wash. There they developed the first solid- and liquid-propellant
rocket motors for jet-assisted takeoff of military aircraft. The enterprise was
reorganized and named the Jet Propulsion Laboratory when, in 1944, after the
advent of the German V-2 rocket, U.S. Army Ordnance awarded Caltech a
contract to develop tactical ballistic missiles. 4
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Continuing to work for the Army into the 1950s, JPL engineers and
scientists designed and developed the liquid-propellant WAC Corporal sounding
rocket, the Corporal tactical missile, and the solid-propellant Sergeant tactical
missile system. The Laboratory also pioneered in the development of radio
telemetry and of various radio and inertial guidance systems for the Army's
Redstone rocket arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, where the director of research
was Wernher von Braun. All the while, JPL, whose facilities were owned by the
government, remained an Army establishment under the contract management of
Caltech. Its posture and atmosphere were free-wheeling, academic, and innovative.
By 1957 Director Pickering, a professor on the Institute faculty, presided over a
considerable laboratory complex nestled in the Arroyo Seco and populated by
some 2,000 employees.
Like the Laboratory, Pickering, too, had come a long way from his
beginnings--the small fishing village of Havelock, New Zealand, where he had
attended the same primary school as the famed pioneer in nuclear physics, Ernest
Rutherford. Displaying an aptitude for mathematics and science, Pickering was
sent to high school in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand, where he built and
operated wireless sets and performed extracurricular chemistry experiments in a
classmate's cellar. Lured to Caltech in 1929 by an uncle in Los Angeles, he
embarked on a career in electrical engineering, but by 1936 emerged with a Ph.D.
in physics and an appointment to the Caltech faculty. Applying his capabilities in
electrical engineering to one of the central research subjects in the physics of the
day, he joined Robert A. Millikan and H. Victor Neher in research on the
absorption properties of primary cosmic rays using instrumented balloon sondes.
During World War II Pickering organized and taught electronics courses at
Caltech for military personnel, which brought him into contact with the Radiation
Laboratory at MIT, including its director, the physicist Lee A. DuBridge. In 1944
he went out to JPL to design and develop telemetering and instrumentation
equipment for the long-range missiles. When DuBridge was named the new
president of Caltech in 1946, Pickering was busy perfecting the telemetry system to
be used in the Laboratory's rocket research vehicles. S He preferred to work at the
forefront of applied engineering research and development. Appointed the
Director of JPL in 1954, he began turning that preference into Laboratory policy
(Figure 1 ). By the time of Sputnik, JPL was equipped to contribute to the nation's
first response to the Soviet space challenge: the orbiting of the Explorer 1 satellite.
Pickering's laboratory supplied the solid-propellant upper stages of the launch
rocket, furnished the space-to-ground communications equipment and instrumen-
tation for the satellite, and helped integrate into it the radiation monitoring
experiment of James Van Allen.
But Pickering, spare, intense, reserved, and in a quiet way implacable, was
determined to mount a JPL program of lunar flights. To his mind, and to
DuBridge's, such flights were an appropriate entrant in the emerging Soviet-
American space race. Like rockets a generation before, lunar flights might once
have been a subject fit only for science fiction, but now they were on the reachable
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Fig. 1. JPL Director William Pickering in 1954
frontier of engineering science, exactly the frontier where Pickering wanted JPL to
be. Using the technology available, the United States could launch a simple, spin-
stabilized vehicle, similar to the Explorer satellite in design, on reasonably short
notice, possibly as early as June 1958. Three weeks after the launch of Sputnik 1,
Pickering, with DuBridge's support, had ready a JPL moon flight proposal.
Designated "Project Red Socks," the proposal declared it "imperative" for the
nation to "regain its stature in the eyes of the world by producing a significant
technological advance over the Soviet Union" in rocketry and space flight.
Pickering wanted the Department of Defense to approve JPL's embarking
immediately on a series of nine rocket flights to the moon. 6
Pickering and DuBridge got nowhere with their Red Socks lunar proposal
in the Defense Department 7 until early 1958, when it came under the
consideration of the new Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA, whose
responsibilities temporarily included the direction of all U.S. space projects. The
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new ARPA director and former General Electric Company executive, Roy
Johnson, was eager "to surpass the Soviet Union in any way possible "'s and he
could choose to do it from a host of unsolicited flight proposals. In fact, "after we
had been in business a short time," his deputy Rear Admiral John E. Clark
recalled, "it seemed to me that everybody in the country had come in with a
proposal except Fanny Farmer Candy, and I expected them at any minute. ''9
Because the Soviet Union had not yet launched a rocket to the moon, an
unmanned lunar program appeared to be the most promising approach to "beat
the Russians" in space.
With the President's approval, on March 27, 1958, Secretary of Defense
Neil McElroy announced that ARPA's space program would advance space flight
technology and "determine our capability of exploring space in the vicinity of the
moon, to obtain useful data concerning the moon, and to provide a close look at
the moon. ''_° Conducted as part of the United States contribution to the
International Geophysical Year, the lunar project would consist of three Air Force
launches using modified Thor ballistic missiles with liquid-propellant Vanguard
upper stages, followed by two Army launches using modified Jupiter-C missiles
and JPL solid-propellant upper stages. JPL was to design the Army's lunar probe
and arrange for the necessary instrumentation and tracking. ARPA directed the
Air Force to launch its lunar probes "as soon as possible consistent with the
requirement that a minimal amount of useful data concerning the moon be
obtained."t_
THE FIRST LUNAR FLIGHTS
The ARPA lunar program approved in March 1958, generally known as
the "Pioneer program," offered five flight opportunities, three for the Air Force
and two for the Army. Space Technology Laboratories, the West Coast-based
contract manager of the Air Force ballistic missile program, which was assigned
responsibility for the technical direction of the Air Force lunar missions, also
furnished the spacecraft. Shaped like two truncated cones back-to-back (Figure 2),
the fiberglass lunar probe, 74 centimeters (29 inches) in diameter and 46
centimeters (18 inches) long, carried 17.5 kilograms (39 pounds) of scientific
instruments, battery power, transmitter and antenna, and a retrorocket system
designed to slow the vehicle into lunar orbit.
In keeping with the original ARPA requirements, this spacecraft also
supported a small facsimile television system. But engineers at the Space
Technology Laboratories had barely completed the spacecraft design in June 1958
when the discovery of the first Van Allen radiation belt stimulated scientists to
issue urgent requests for more, improved experiments to measure charged particles
in near-earth space. Though retaining the television camera, the firm's researchers
directed the rest of the scientific instrumentation toward fields and particles in
space: a magnetometer to measure the magnetic fields of the earth and moon, and
a micrometeoroid impact counter to survey the flux and energy of micrometeoroids
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Fig. 2. STL Pioneer Lunar Probe (Courtesy TRW)
between these two bodies. To obtain more information on the distribution of
radiation in space, they installed a Van Allen-supplied ion chamber on flight two,
and augmented it with a proportional counter from the University of Chicago on
the third flight. 12 The final report summarized the extent of this thoroughgoing
change: "To the maximum extent possible, within the weight and power
restrictions, experiments were designed to obtain scientific measurement of the
environment in cislunar space. ''_3
The first lunar flight of the Air Force Thor-Able launch vehicle rose from
Cape Canaveral on August 17 and ended 77 seconds later in a pyrotechnic display
above the beach. This "catastrophic failure," the investigative report declared, was
caused when a turbo pump bearing seized in the main-stage rocket engine._4 The
embarrassing flight went officially unnamed by the Air Force, though informally it
became known as "Pioneer O." After corrective measures had been taken with the
main-stage engine, the Air Force launched the second vehicle on October 1 I, 1958.
This time a guidance system error caused an early shutdown of the second-stage
engine. Upon completion of burning of the third-stage engine, the velocity attained
was less than that required to escape the earth's gravity. The spacecraft separated
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properly from its third-stage rocket and continued to ascend to an altitude of
115,000 kilometers (71,700 miles), about one-third the distance to the moon,
before falling back to be incinerated in the earth's upper atmosphere.
This second flight, promptly christened Pioneer 1, though of course
precluding photography of the moon, did yield good scientific data from the
magnetometer and micrometeoroid detector. The ionization chamber measuring
radiation intensity developed a leak; much of its radiation information, at first
unintelligible, was subsequently unscrambled and recovered._5 The last flight in the
Air Force series, Pioneer 2, followed on November 8. The third-stage engine failed
to ignite, and the vehicle rose only 1,550 kilometers (963 miles) before falling
back to earth. It returned no significant experimental data. 16
While the Air Force lunar flights were underway, JPL completed design of
the Army's lunar probe, which would also separate from its fourth-stage rocket,
and of the necessary instrumentation and tracking facilities. The JPL design called
for a cone-shaped, fiberglass instrument package, 51 centimeters (20 inches) long
and 25.5 centimeters (10 inches) in diameter at its base (Figure 3)._7 The scientific
experiment consisted of a small camera weighing 1.5 kilograms (3.3 pounds),
capable of photographing the moon. The lunar image on 35-millimeter film was to
be developed by a wet process, scanned by optical means, transmitted from the
spacecraft via telemetry code, and reconstructed on earth by facsimile methods at a
ground receiving station. Snapped at closest approach, 24,000 kilometers (15,000
miles) from the moon's surface, the picture would provide a resolution of 32
kilometers (20 miles)._s Flight plans called for the first of the Army-NASA lunar
probes to carry and test a special shutter-trigger mechanism: photoelectric cells
would "see" the moon at a preset distance, and trip the shutter. The second flight
would then carry the complete camera on a looping trajectory around the moon,
with the aim of returning one good photograph of the far side. On the first of these
two probes, two Geiger-Muller tubes furnished by Van Allen to measure charged
radiation particles in space were added in place of the camera.
Data returned by United States IGY satellites Explorers 1, 3, and 4,
meantime, revealed more details of the high-intensity radiation surrounding the
earth. In the absence of heavy shielding, such radiation could fog the film in the
photographic experiment planned for the Army lunar probe. Consequently, the
Army canceled the camera experiment and, in August 1958, JPL began to develop
a small, lightweight, slow-scan television camera and magnetic-tape recording and
transmission system, all of which were to be functionally insensitive to radiation in
space, in time for flight in early 1959. _9
On December 6, 1958, the Army launched the first of its lunar probes,
Pioneer 3, on a trajectory that was supposed to carry it past the moon into solar
orbit. This probe, like its predecessor Pioneer 1, did not attain escape velocity
because the first-stage propulsion system ceased ignition prematurely. Aloft for 38
hours, Pioneer 3 ascended 101,000 kilometers (63,500 miles) before falling back to
earth. Nevertheless, sky scientists acquired valuable information from Van Allen's
two Geiger-Muller tubes. These data revealed the existence of two primary bands,
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Fig. 3. JPL Pioneer Lunar Probe
or shells, of high-intensity radiation about the earth at approximately 4,800 and
16,000 kilometers (3,000 and 10,000 miles) altitude, with radiation intensity near
the earth progressively diminishing between 48,000 and 96,000 kilometers (30,000
and 60,000 miles). 2°
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The data returned by Pioneer 3's radiation experiments, and the discovery
of the second radiation shell, heightened scientific interest in charged particles in
near-earth space all the more. A few weeks later, in early 1959, James Van Allen
and his associate George Ludwig of the State University of Iowa urged that their
radiation package be flown again in place of the television system on Pioneer 4 to
obtain more radiation data and to further refine information already secured. "We
happened to have," a JPL official later explained, "a bonanza in the original
Explorer by carrying Van Allen's experiment along and obtaining so much
information. You just couldn't go wrong by proposing to gain more information of
that type for the next several years. ''2m Space officials approved the change. Pioneer
4 would also be launched on a lunar flyby trajectory rather than on a circumlunar
trajectory for photographic purposes, so as to measure radiation between the earth
and the moon. 22
Pioneer 4, the last of the ARPA-initiated lunar probes, rose from Cape
Canaveral without incident on March 3, 1959, carrying scientific instruments
virtually identical to those of Pioneer 3. The only distinctive new feature was a
small amount of lead shielding, added to one of the two Geiger tubes to screen out
low-intensity charged particles. In this flight, the launch vehicle provided the
spacecraft earth-escape velocity, and the craft passed by the moon at a distance of
60,000 kilometers (35,500 miles). 23 The shielded Geiger counter showed a lower
level of radiation in the low-altitude shell than that detected by Pioneer 3, and
almost no radiation in the high-altitude shell. The second monitor, acting as a
counter and scaler, also detected both bands, but the peak radiation was slightly
broader in extent. These scientific data added further support to the hypothesis
that the earth's magnetic field acted as a trap for charged particles that
accumulated, slowly dispersed, and then built up again as a function of activity on
the surface of the sun. 24
All the same, ARPA's lunar program had failed to reassert American
superiority in technical affairs. Instead, the Soviet Luna l, launched a few weeks
before Pioneer 4, became the first unmanned craft to fly close by the moon. The
distinction of first photographing the far side of the moon was also claimed by
another Soviet machine, Luna 3, a short time later. But if the ARPA flight
objectives had shifted away from the moon to other scientific targets of
opportunity, the ARPA effort had after all been intended as no more than a quick,
flexible response to the challenge of Sputnik. Indeed, ARPA itself had been given
only temporary authority over space activities, lunar or otherwise. By mid-1958
responsibility for a coherent program of civilian space research had been vested in
the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration, familiarly known as
NASA.
SKY AND PLANETARY SCIENCE
The new NASA brought together a number of the government's disparate
facilities for space and aeronautical research, including JPL. Leaving all defense
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and military matters to the armed services, the new agency was awarded
responsibility for all civilian aeronautical and space activities, including, in the
language of its organic act, the "expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in
the atmosphere and space." A simple enough phrase, yet, as was evident from the
shifting objectives of the pioneer lunar flights, space science encompassed diverse,
sometimes conflicting subjects, generally grouped into two categories--planetary
science and sky science.*
Sky scientists sought to understand the mysteries of the upper atmosphere
and the fields and charged particles surrounding the earth. They emphasized
meteoritics, solar and cosmic ray physics, plasma dynamics, and the interaction of
the solar and terrestrial electromagnetic fields. 25 Planetary scientists, on the other
hand, were occupied with the origin, composition, and evolution of planetary
bodies in our solar system, including the moon. They wondered whether the earth
and its moon had condensed out of the same blob of stellar gas and dust, whether
the moon had spun off from the forming earth, or whether it had once been a
separate planet captured by the earth's gravitational field. They puzzled over its
surface features: whether its craters were caused by internal plutonic forces or by
the impact of planetesimals and meteors. They were eager to know the distribution
of the moon's mass, its magnetic field, the composition of its atmosphere and crust,
and the seismic properties of its interior. 26
By the late 1950s, sky scientists had a well-developed array of instruments
for pursuing their subject. They used Geiger counters and ion chambers, plasma
probes, magnetometers, and electrostatic analyzers to trap and observe charged
particles or to measure electromagnetic fields. For decades they had been lofting
their instruments into space by balloons; since World War II, by rockets. Over the
centuries planetary scientists had of course explored their subject with telescopes
and, after World War II, with radar. They also talked about visual imaging
instruments that would radio back pictures of the moon, discussed surface
sampling penetrometers, drills, and apparatus for materials analysis, along with
seismometers, magnetometers, and gamma-ray spectrometers. And finally, they
dreamed of actually delivering these instruments to the moon and planets with
automatic orbiters, soft landers, and possibly even soft landers with the ability to
return to earth. 27 In the late 1950s, unlike sky science, planetary science depended
upon a technology and, more important, complex interplanetary flight capability,
yet to be created.
When the space program got underway, the planetary scientists most active
in theorizing about the origins and evolution of the moon included the chemists
Harold Urey, a Nobel Laureate. James Arnold, and Harrison Brown; the
* Life science and astronomy, not treated here, would shortly become the third and fourth branches of
the space science tree. Life science evolved to include experiments with man and living organisms in
space, and the quest for extraterrestrial life forms. With space vehicles above the atmosphere,
astronomy, specifically that portion concerned with celestial phenomena at galactic distances, xvoulcl
begin to move from an observational to an experimental science.
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astronomers Gerard Kuiper, Dinsmore Alter, and Thomas Gold; and the
geologists Frank Press, Maurice Ewing, and Eugene Shoemaker. Most were
associated with universities, observatories, and other nongovernmental research
institutions. Their scientific experience derived from geology, geochemistry,
surveying and geodesy, or planetary astronomy. 2s In early 1958, planetary
scientists had begun to gather informally with engineers in Lunar and Planetary
Colloquia on the West Coast. 2_ Several of them, members of the National
Academy of Sciences, were appointed to the Academy's Space Science Board,
which was formed in June 1958 to advise NASA on its space science research
program) ° By the end of 1958, lunar exploration had been dubbed a meritorious
scientific objective for NASA by the Board as well as by the President's Science
Advisory Committee. 3_But planetary science was not nearly so well organized, well
established, or, most important, well placed in the new NASA as sky science.
Among the notable American scientists active in sky research were the
physicists James Van Allen. Hugh Odishaw, Lloyd Berkner, Homer Newell, Joseph
Kaplan, Marcus O'Day, John Townsend, Charles Sonett, and S. Fred Singer; the
astronomers Fred Whipple and Lyman Spitzer; the meteorologists Harry Wexler,
William Kellogg, and Verner Suomi, and the meteorologist-oceanographer
Athelstan Spilhaus. These men represented prestigious universities, observatories,
and research institutions. Moreover, a significant fraction were under contract to or
directly affiliated with government agencies that provided funds for ongoing upper
air research using rocket and balloon ascents. They had been largely responsible
for inaugurating the International Geophysical Year (1GY). n When NASA began
operating in late 1958, sky scientists were a cohesive group, well organized and
reasonably well publicized. Active in government-sponsored upper air and satellite
research projects for over a decade, they sat together on the various official and
semiofficial panels that counseled federal agencies on prospective projects, judged
experiment proposals, and allocated space for the experiments on rocket sondes
and IGY satellites. 33 "Many of these meetings," a participant remarked, "were
held consecutively with practically the only changes in the group being the
presiding officer and the secretary. ''34 Sky scientists, together with engineers,
largely staffed the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical
Year, located in the National Academy of Sciences, a subpanet of which selected
the experiments to be carried aloft by the Vanguard, Explorer, and Pioneer
spacecra ft. 35
It was largely individuals with such sky science backgrounds, linked
organizationally, familiar with each other, and experienced in sounding rocket
research, who first came to occupy space science positions in NASA. It was largely
a sky science program, both in practice and in a final recommendatory report, that
NASA inherited from its predecessor agency, the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics. 36 Of course, planetary science held a certain standing in the new
NASA from the endorsement of the President's Science Advisory Board and the
Academy's Space Sciences Board. But, all things considered, sky science held the
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upper hand in the space agency. And it was thus no surprise that planetary science
fared poorly in the ARPA-sponsored Pioneer missions, or in the first lunar project
authorized by NASA: Atlas-Able V.
Conceived at the Space Technology Laboratories and approved by NASA
Headquarters, the Atlas-Able was to be managed by the Space Technology
Laboratories and launched by the Air Force. Originally, plans called for two
missions to Venus, followed by two lunar orbiting missions; however, in the spring
of 1959, prompted by the Russian success with Luna 1, NASA reprogrammed the
Venus flights as lunar orbiters, tOO. 37 The Atlas-Able vehicle was to consist of a
liquid-propeilant Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile modified to support the
same Vanguard upper stages employed on the Thor-Able Pioneers, together with a
correspondingly larger and more versatile spacecraft. This spacecraft, like its
Pioneer predecessors, featured the technology of the day-a technology well suited
to the purposes of sky science. 3s The specifications submitted to NASA in January
! 959 detailed a spin-stabilized 122-kilogram (273-pound), aluminum-alloy
spheroid. Almost a meter (3 feet) in diameter, the machine was to incorporate
vernier rockets at each pole to decelerate it into lunar orbit. Four "paddle wheel"
solar arrays coupled with batteries would provide electrical power. Paint patterns
on the highly polished reflective surface and an arrangement of novel cruciform
temperature control vanes would dissipate the heat generated by the sun outside
and instruments within the spacecraft (Figure 4)39
The planned lunar orbits of the four flights could be expected to yield a
measurement of the mean moment of inertia of the moon. The small Pioneer
television camera designed by the Space Technology Laboratories "to get a crude
outline of the moon's surface" were to complement such a planetary measurement
on the first two flights. But because of launch vehicle failures, none of the Atlas-
Able V probes launched during 1959 and 1960 even left the earth's atmosphere.
Vagrant behavior of the very large liquid-propellant rockets-the transportation
system needed for planetary research-would remain a serious problem for all
American space flight projects well into the 1960s. But even had the Atlas-Able
rockets reached interplanetary space, lunar science would scarcely have benefited.
In short order, nonvisual sky science experiments had supplanted the television
cameras. In fact, of the nine scientific experiments carried on the last two flights,
only one, a magnetometer, was directed toward investigating the moon. One
science planner at NASA Headquarters aptly explained the latter missions: The
"payload instrumentation itself has no value for the lunar program, although it
can make an important contribution to the study of solar-terrestrial relationships,
serving as an anchored space probe, placed far enough away to be unaffected by
our own atmosphere. ''4° If in 1959 and 1960 obtaining a sufficiently powerful and
reliable space launch vehicle occupied NASA as a whole, acquiring effective
leverage in the agency's space research program was a major challenge for the
nation's planetary, especially lunar, scientists.
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Fig. 4. The Able Lunar Orbiter (Courtesy "['RW )
FROM INTEREST TO RESOLVE
The space program might at first have been directed to reassert American
supremacy in technical affairs, and sky scientists might have controlled the
important scientific posts, but within NASA at the end of 1958, planetary scientists
were already on the march. At Headquarters, the charge of all NASA flight
projects was vested in the Office of Space Flight Development, directed by Abe
Silverstein. Silverstein's Assistant Director of Space Sciences, Homer Newell,
established a sciences division staffed by part of the Naval Research Laboratory
upper air research group that had moved to NASA, and organized it to satisfy the
interests of sky science. 4L In November 1958 Newell created a companion
"theoretical division" to devote attention to basic research in cosmology,
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astronomy, and planetary sciences. To head this new division, Newell selected
Robert Jastrow, a physicist and sky science colleague who had come to NASA with
the Naval Research Laboratory upper air group.
Late in November, Jastrow, desirous of learning all he could about his new
assignment, "traveled across the United States to the Laboratory at La Jolla,
California, to visit a man who, I had been told, would be able to give me some
advice." Harold Urey, the Nobel Laureate chemist, opened his book on the planets
to the chapter on the moon, and explained the "unique importance" of the moon
for understanding the origin of the earth and the other planets. "I was fascinated
by his story, which had never been told to me before in fourteen years of study and
research in physics," Jastrow recalled. 42 He at once became a convert and
champion of lunar exploration. A week later in December, Jastrow brought Urey
and his new-found enthusiasm to a meeting with Newell at Headquarters. The
visitors pointed out that NASA did not have a firm program for lunar exploration
beyond the projects inherited from ARPA; they convinced Newell that such a
program should be undertaken. "The Ranger Project," Newell reflected some
years later,"was in effect born on [that] day... ,,43 Whatever the case, certainly born
on that day was the resolve that NASA should have a serious program of lunar
exploration directed toward the goals espoused by planetary scientists.
Even more important, perhaps, was the subsequent introduction of
planetary scientists into the planning structure of NASA. In January 1959, Newell
formed an ad hoc Working Group on Lunar Exploration. Its members included
Harold Urey, James Arnold, Frank Press, and Harrison Brown. Chaired by
Jastrow, the new lunar working group was to operate as a forum for the exchange
of views between scientists at NASA and in the academic world-an important
function intended by Newell-and it had charge of evaluating and recommending
to NASA the experiments to be placed in orbit about the moon or landed on its
surface. '_ From this time forward lunar enthusiasts had a voice at Headquarters-
and Headquarters soon expected to have a rocket capable of carrying the
instruments of planetary science reliably to the moon.
The vehicle was the Atlas-Vega space launch rocket (Figure 5). A liquid-
propellant Atlas was to be modified to accommodate upper-stage rockets; the
second stage would be powered by a General Electric Vanguard first-stage rocket
engine modified for high-altitude operation. For those missions requiring a high-
velocity increment, such as deep space missions, there would be a third stage which
was already under development at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Meanwhile,
along with developing the third stage of the general-purpose Vega launch vehicle,
JPL was mandated by NASA to conduct unmanned "deep space" exploration-
research at lunar distances and beyond. By the end of 1959, NASA would
specifically direct JPL to undertake a series of unmanned lunar missions. In the
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vanguard of the budding program of lunar exploration-even then embracing
tentative plans for manned landings on the moon4S-would be Project Ranger.*
Actually, despite Pickering's post-Sputnik bid for lunar flights, many JPL
engineers and scientists tended to favor investigating the planets and space
medium ahead of the moon. Flights past other planets more distant than the moon
offered the kind of technical and experimental challenge that appealed to them. In
Pasadena, prevailing opinion held that moon missions, whose launch opportunities
occurred every lunar month, could and should be deferred in order to capitalize on
the more infrequent planetary opportunities. 46 The inner planets, Mars and Venus,
appeared particularly attractive objects of inquiry because they approached the
earth more closely than did the other planets in the solar system, permitting a
maximum number of scientific instruments to be carried with less powerful launch
vehicles. The celestial period of closest planetary approach occurred approximately
once every 25 months for Mars, and every 18 months for Venus. The next launch
opportunity for Mars would fall in October 1960; for Venus, in December 1960-
January 1961.
On April 30, 1959, JPL issued to NASA a five-year plan for deep space
exploration. This ambitious prospectus emphasized planetary investigation in an
alternating series of flights. Individual projects were not identified, but the
prospectus outlined a series of progressively more sophisticated missions, together
with recommended scientific and engineering features. The proposed flight
schedule, qualified as "consistent with scientific potentialities and astronomical
dates," hewed closely to contemporary Vega planning, and was predicated upon
the rapid and concurrent development of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and scientific
instruments (Table I).47
JPL officials on the West Coast could emphasize planetary exploration, but
the NASA ad hoc Working Group on Lunar Exploration in Washington, which
confined its attention exclusively to the moon, 4s had finished evaluating the
scientific instruments it preferred for unmanned lunar missions. At its first
meetings in February, the lunar working group divided prospective missions
among uncontrolled impact, rough-landing-where experiments survived the crash,
* The conceptual distinction between program and project evolved at NASA Headquarters during 1959
and 1960. Basically, a program was accepted as a related series of undertakings to accomplish a broad
scientific or technical goal over a prolonged period. Attainment of the goal would be secured through
implementing specific projects with a scheduled beginning and ending. By the end of 1959 NASA
could describe its "lunar and planetary exploration program" as including "lunar and planetary
probes, orbiters, rough landings, soft landings, and mobile vehicles for unmanned exploration"
(NASA, Long Range Plan, December 16, 1959, p. 33). These specific program components began to
receive project names in the early months of 1960 (e.g., lunar rough landings became Project Ranger).
This definition of program and project was formalized in NASA General Management Instruction
4-1-1, Planning and Implementation of N.4SA Projects, January 19, 1961. By the mid-1960s, however,
with Apollo predominating in NASA affairs, and with the divorce in organization between manned
and unmanned flight projects in shared program areas, the original distinction became blurred. In a
sense, the program came to support a project.
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Table I. JPL Plan for Deep Space Exploration, April 1959
Goal I)ate Vehicle
1 Lunar nriss (eng. test) August 1961) Vega
2 a Mars flyby October 1960 Vega
3 a Venus flyby January 1961 Vega
4 Lunar rough landing June 1961 Vega
5 Lunar Orbiter September 1961 Vega
6 Venus Orbiter August 1962 Vega
7 Venus entry August 1962 Vega
8 Mars Orbiter November 1962 Saturn I
9 Mars entry November 1962 Vega
10 Lunar Orbiter and return Februar_ 1963 Saturn 1
11 Lunar soft landing June 1963 Saturn 1
12 Venus soft landing March t964 Saturn I
aFlights 2 and 3 to Mars and Venus had already been incorporated in Vega launctr schedules
issued by NASA. 49
soft-landing, and orbit. Members favored an early rough-landing mission.
Although technically more demanding than lunar impact, in which the craft and
all scientific experiments would be destroyed on hitting the moon, they judged
rough-landing more useful to science because it would deposit operating
instruments on the lunar surface.
Members of the group advised Homer Newell to support development of a
seismometer, batteries and communications system, and a protective rough-landing
capsule. They also recommended other nonvisual planetary science instruments
that could be operated during approach to the moon: a gamma-ray spectrometer to
detect and measure radioactive minerals during descent, a magnetometer to
measure the magnetic field in one direction during descent, and an X-ray
fluorescent spectroscope to assay surface material after landing, s° Newell's chief,
Silverstein, approved these scientific recommendations, and directed that they be
budgeted and scheduled for flight. Thereafter, members of the lunar working
group and their academic colleagues familiar with its deliberations submitted
proposals for the design and development of a number of these instruments
directly to Newell's shop) _ Despite the research preferences evident at JPL,
NASA's leadership favored an expanded lunar program, especially after the
Russians launched Luna 1, which bore instruments to measure the moon's
magnetic field, radioactivity, and fields and particles in interplanetary space and
carried metal pennants stamped with the Soviet coat of arms (Figure 6).52
Indeed, the January 1959 flight of Luna 1 provoked wide public discussion
of space flight advances that might reasonably be expected in the near future,
including photographing the hidden or far side of the moon and manned lunar
landings. It also helped secure Congressional approval of the Atlas-Vega launch
vehicle 53 and to focus attention at NASA on the deliberations of its lunar working
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Fig. 6. Luna I
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group. The chairman of the lunar working group, Robert Jastrow, told Newell:
"the national space program will be open to strong criticism if a very early and
vigorous effort is not made in the program of lunar exploration...The criticism
will be especially strong if it turns out that a slow-paced U.S. lunar program must
be contrasted with early Soviet achievements in this field. ''54 At Headquarters,
calculations showed that Atlas-Vega could be used for both rough landers and
lunar orbiting vehicles in the near future, and these moon missions were described
to Congress during the NASA authorization hearings. 55
In a meeting at Headquarters on May 25, 1959, Silverstein and Newell
determined to reprogram two Atlas-Vega flights as lunar orbiters, and, following
one Vega lunar rough-landing mission, to employ Atlas-Centaurs for two lunar
soft-landing missions. -_ In June, Silverstein ordered JPL to cancel the Mars flight
scheduled for October 1960 and to design its Vega planetary spacecraft for the
lunar orbiting mission. _7 Newell, meantime, formed a new Lunar and Planetary
Program Office to direct these missions, _8 and reconstituted the ad hoc Working
Group on Lunar Exploration as a standing committee known as the Lunar Science
Group. 59 As the summer began and Vega schedules commenced to slip-
threatening also to void the first launch opportunity to Venus--NASA
Administrator T. Keith Glennan endorsed an immediate and even more extensive
program of unmanned lunar exploration. Glennan, for the preceding 10 years
President of the Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, had been selected
by President Eisenhower as the first Administrator of NASA; the Senate had
consented to his appointment, and to the appointment of Hugh L. Dryden, since
1947 the Director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
and the postwar architect of American aeronautical research, as NASA Deputy
Administrator (Figure 7).
On July 23, Glennan, Dryden, and NASA Associate Administrator Richard
E. Horner joined key administration officials at the "White House Annex," just
around the corner from NASA Headquarters in the Dolley Madison House on
Lafayette Square, to consider the status and goals of the United States space
program. Meeting with them were George B. Kistiakowsky, who had succeeded
James Killian as Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology,
Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Karl
G. Harr, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations
Coordination, Charles Sullivan of the Department of State, and Foster Collins of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Glennan recommended that the nation
concentrate its deep space efforts on lunar flights to achieve the short-term
objectives called for in a policy paper recently prepared by the National Security
Council. His proposal was approved. A few days later, Silverstein instructed JPL to
cancel the mission to Venus scheduled for January 1961, and prepare a new Vega
flight schedule containing only lunar and earth satellite missions. _
Then, on September 13, the Soviet Luna 2 crashed on the surface of the
moon, and in early October Luna 3 took its photographs of the hidden side of the
moon and radioed them to earth (Figure 8). In the face of an active and very
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Fig. 7. NASA Administrator Keith Glennan (center), Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden (left), and
Associatc Administrator Richard Hornet (right)
22 LUNAR IMPACT_ A HISTORY OF PROJE(?I RANGER
Fig. 8. Luna 3
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successful Soviet program of lunar exploration, NASA revised its lunar program
plans further. In May 1959 the space agency had become aware that the Air Force
was developing the Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle; the second-stage Agena B rocket
was capable of restarting its engine in orbit. By October 1959 the two-stage Atlas-
Agena B had been evaluated as capable of carrying more usable weight into earth
orbit than the two-stage Vega, and to be almost equal to the three-stage Vega for
all but the highest-energy deep space flights. Early in November, while the NASA
Administrator mulled the situation of duplicated space launch vehicles,
representatives of NASA and JPL decided to replace all Vega earth satellite
vehicles with Air Force-furnished Atlas-Agena Bs. The six remaining Vegas were
to be used exclusively for lunar exploration, the group of flights to be divided
between lunar photography from orbiting spacecraft and the deposmng of
instruments on the moon in rough-landed capsules as recommended by NASA's
lunar science group. 6_Directed to lunar research, these missions would "contribute
to the understanding of the moon's origin and evolution, and provide data on
surface structure and environment. ''62 But four weeks later, on December 11,
coincident with an agency-wide reorganization, NASA Administrator Glennan
cancelled the entire Atlas-Vega project. In the interests of economy _nd improved
reliability, he had decided that the Air Force Atlas-Agena B would replace Atlas-
Vega as the interim launcher for all of NASA's initial space missions. 63
On December 21, 1959, Silverstein assigned JPL seven new flights in place
of the cancelled Vega missions. The first five, to be launched by Atlas-Agena B
vehicles, would reconnoiter the moon during 1961 and 1962. Among the
prospective planetary experiments, NASA now judged visual imaging most urgent:
to obtain high-resolution pictures of the lunar surface "in the period immediately
preceding impact" for use in an integrated and continuing lunar exploration
program. Photography from lunar orbiters, determined to be too complex for the
present state of technology, had been eliminated. But, responding to all of the
scientific preferences urged at Headquarters, Silverstein requested that JPL
examine the feasibility of carrying a basic group of sky science experiments on the
spacecraft for use in measuring fields and particles on the way to the moon-and to
reexamine proposals for depositing an instrument package on the moon that would
"survive impact and then transmit significant data. ''64
Silverstein's directive called for completion of this project within 36
months, including development of the new launch vehicle, attitude-stabilized
spacecraft, scientific experiments, and the communications and operational systems
formulated in Project Vega. This unmanned lunar project was acknowledged to be
a high-risk undertaking on short-term schedules, geared "to seize the initiative in
space exploration from the Soviets as well as obtain important scientific
information about the moon. ''65 It would also meet another need, publicly
expressed by JPL Director Pickering: to demonstrate the superiority of the
"American way" to uncommitted states in the international community. 66 At
NASA Headquarters, where such sentiment did not find its way into press releases,
Homer Newell privately confided in a memo to the file: "In the matter of Russian
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competition, it is clearly understood that whether it be stated openly or not, the
United States is in competition with Russia, and the stakes are very high
indeed..."67
At JPL, Clifford Cummings, the former Vega Project Director, suggested a
name for the lunar missions-Ranger. The name caught on rapidly at the
Laboratory and at NASA. 68 But naming the project marked only the beginning.
NASA had yet to forge a management structure capable of directing the efforts of
the diverse organizations now involved, JPL had to translate esoteric concepts into
functioning hardware, and planetary scientists had to validate claims to the
experiments that would be carried to the moon in Project Ranger. It was a tall
order to squeeze into thirty-six months.
Chapter Two
ORGANIZING THE CAMPAIGN
HE decision to adopt the Atlas-Agena B as NASA's interim launch vehicle
raised thorny questions. Which of the planned Air Force Agena B versions was
best suited for the Ranger lunar project? What were the technical prospects for
these Agena-based missions? And how would the Air Force effort for NASA be
organized and directed? To consider these important questions, in the closing days
of 1959 the NASA Director of Launch Vehicle Programs appointed an Agena
Survey Team. t
PROSPECTS AND SUGGESTIONS
The Survey Team had little difficulty concluding that the Discoverer version
of the Agena B could be adapted to the lunar mission, and that Ranger should
proceed using this vehicle. It was mandatory, the members emphasized, that the
civilian space agency acquire early experience with the next generation of
American spacecraft for deep space missions-vehicles attitude stabilized on three
axes and guided by means of midcourse and terminal (lunar or planetary
approach) maneuvers-before trying to develop still larger spacecraft. Moreover,
with Vega canceled, other available launch vehicles would not support the payload
weights required for planetary research; finally, and more persuasive, if NASA
elected not to use the Agena B for Ranger, then it could not hope to challenge
seriously the Soviet program of lunar exploration until the more advanced Atlas-
Centaur rocket became available in 1962-a two-year delay.
To the Survey Team, such a delay was absolutely unacceptable. It appeared
reasonable to expect Atlas-Agena B vehicles to perform useful spacecraft-
development missions during 1961 and 1962, and the members asserted that
Agena flights were "justified on this basis alone." The estimates of success for the
proposed lunar missions, nevertheless, were reserved. The two NASA lunar
objectives specified closeup reconnaissance of the moon and the depositing of an
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operating scientific instrument on its surface. The Survey Team found "a smaller
but still finite expectation that during five firings either or both [objectives]...may
be met. ''2 But the reason for this caveat was as much the untested state of the
spacecraft and ground control systems as of the launch vehicles.
Emphasizing this reservation and the importance of developing the next-
generation planetary spacecraft and their guidance systems, the Team judged a
lunar effort of five Agena flights to be a "minimum program." The first two of
these missions were not even to be directed to the moon, but rather launched for
the purpose of engineering development without the important features of
midcourse or terminal guidance. NASA could attempt a lunar impact only on the
third and following missions. The Survey Team's technical prognosis flashed a
clear caution signal to NASA: road under construction, proceed with extreme
caution, watch for falling rocks.
Management factors compounded the technical risk. Agena B meant more
project participants. And in the conclusion of its interim report issued on January
15, 1960, the Team members found the overall prospects for Ranger uncertain at
best. There simply was no assurance that additional agencies could or would work
in harmony and for a common purpose in building NASA's lunar program. They
informed Headquarters that the success or failure of the entire project would likely
depend not so much upon technical complications as upon the "difficult
managerial circumstances" anticipated. 3 These circumstances might be sur-
mounted if responsibilities were clearly defined and if the major participating
agencies could agree on the political importance of these missions. To ensure the
timely accomplishment of the lunar missions, and to tip probabilities onto the side
of success, the Team advised NASA to establish a tight management structure for
this effort-a management structure "with sufficient authority," in the words of the
report, to "assure rapid and effective action. ''4
It was one thing to call for the creation of a suitable management structure
for the program; but, given the old rivalries and new allegiances that swirled
within and around the infant NASA, it was quite another to establish an
effective one.
ASSIGNING TASKS TO PEOPLE
The Agena Survey Team's managerial apprehension in early 1960 stemmed
from the complex organizational and working relationships that it anticipated.
Project Ranger would incorporate four major groups, each with a separate
institutional identity, each confident in its own expertise, and each with its own
strongly held liking for bureaucratic independence. Each would also have a hand
on some part of the project's tiller.
First, and most recently formed, was NASA Headquarters, which expected
to direct the enterprise.
Second was Caltech's JPL, the space agency's contract manager for Project
Ranger.
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Third was the Army's von Braun missile team with its German World War
II experience in rocketry, still smarting as a result of government decisions that
favored Air Force control of intermediate-range missiles.
Fourth was the Air Force, which, with its launch vehicle contractors,
controlled the lion's share of military space and missile developments, but which
still nursed a deep resentment over a civilian space agency's preempting a field it
called its own.
The management framework for Ranger forged among these agencies was
indeed complicated; in fact, it was at first so complex that the overlapping skeins
of authority, running up and down as well as across the organizational charts,
almost defied understanding.
Titular responsibility for guiding the entire effort naturally rested with
NASA Headquarters. Reorganized at the end of 1959, the space agency's most
powerful office in terms of program content, scope, and dollars was the Office of
Space Flight Programs. Its director, Abe Silverstein, a dynamic, frequently
outspoken shirt-sleeves engineer, had served as Assistant Director of NACA's
Lewis Aeronautical Laboratory in Cleveland before coming to Washington with
NASA (Figure 9). He possessed an enormous capacity for work, and he had
Fig. 9. NASA Space Flight Programs Director Abe Silverstein
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gathered about himself a staff of talented young engineers. Until he returned to
Lewis as its Director in 1961, Silverstein's influence was pervasive. Not overly
concerned with the niceties of formal organization, he preferred to make or concur
in all office decisions. Indeed. Silverstein so tightly centralized decision-making in
his hands that even his superiors often felt they were left without any real choice of
alternatives.
Silverstein's proclivity for centralized decision-making had provoked
opposition among the staff at JPL. By the time Vega gave way to Ranger at the
end of 1959, JPL Director Pickering already had made clear his opposition to
Silverstein's managerial practices, insisting that decisions on questions of a
technical nature should be made by those at the field installation having mission or
task responsibility-this had been NACA and Army practice--and not in
Washington. 5
To meet Ranger and other deep space assignments for NASA and to bolster
JPL's technical responsiveness, Pickering had reorganized the Laboratory at the
end of 1959 and in early 1960. Lunar and Planetary Program offices appeared for
the first time on organization charts, superimposed upon JPL's functionally
arrayed and historic technical divisions. Picketing selected Clifford I. Cummings
and James D. Burke, Vega Program Director and Deputy Director, respectively,
for equivalent posts in the new Lunar Program Office. 6
A Caltech graduate who had come to JPL after receiving his B.S. degree in
physics in 1944, Cummings worked directly under Pickering on the Corporal
missile project before his appointment to head the Vega Program in 1959. Deeply
religious and forthright, he was a man of unquestionable integrity with a firm
belief in operating projects in a tightly structured, hierarchical fashion
(Figure I0).
During a fifteen-year career in missile research and development for the
Army, Cummings had learned to depend and insist upon an explicit chain of
command. To Pickering at JPL and Silverstein at NASA, he urged the importance
of establishing a clear definition of authority and responsibility for all of the
organizations involved in NASA's lunar program. 7
In the spring of 1960, Cummings devoted increasing attention to the
Centaur-launched Surveyor soft-landing project; he turned Ranger affairs over to
his deputy and long-time colleague, James Burke. By the fall of the year, still
serving as Cummings' deputy on the Lunar Program, Burke became the Ranger
Spacecraft Project Manager at JPL as well. s
Burke had graduated in mechanical engineering from Caltech a class or two
behind Cummings in 1945. After a stint as a naval aviator he returned to the
Institute for an M.S. degree, joining the Laboratory at graduation in 1949. With a
bent for the theoretical, Burke combined a swift grasp of complex systems and
supportive detail and an unusual ability to devise and integrate the most
promising mechanical and electrical features to achieve technical objectives. With
two associates, he had solved the major guidance problem, velocity control,
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Fig. 10. JPL Lunar Program Director Clifford Cummings
associated with solid-propellant ballistic missiles. 9 Soon recognized as one of the
Laboratory's most perceptive research engineers, he had rapidly advanced to
become deputy to Cummings on the Vega Program. Looking younger than his 35
years, often wearing an old naval aviator's jacket astride his bright green
motorcycle, Burke could easily be mistaken for a Caltech student instead of JPL's
manager of Project Ranger. Articulate, with a quick smile and hearty laugh, he
galvanized those who worked with or for him by force of logic, persuasion, and
sheer enthusiasm (Figure 11 ).
Burke the individual and JPL the institution remained responsible to
Silverstein at Headquarters for three out of four of Ranger's system components:
the new spacecraft, the deep space tracking and control network, and space flight
operations and data reduction. *° As the contract field center holding Project
Ranger as part of its deep space mission assignment for the space agency, JPL was
also accountable for the fourth component, launch vehicles. But authority in that
area rested at Headquarters in the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs, which was
directed by Major General Don R. Ostrander. Detailed to NASA from the Air
Force, Ostrander was to facilitate the agency's relations in the crucial matter of
launch vehicles with his fellow service officers who ran Cape Canaveral on the
East Coast and procured Thor or Atlas-Agena vehicles on the West Coast. On his
part, Ostrander had delegated the actual direction of NASA procurement of Agena
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Fig. I I. JPL Ranger Project Manager James Burke
and Centaur launch vehicles, including those for Ranger, to Wernher von Braun's
Army missile team at the newly-formed George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
in Huntsville, Alabama.
Thus, whatever JPL's accountability for all of Ranger, it actually shared
authority in the important area of launch vehicles with groups in Washington and
in the field. This functional alignment of tasks apportioned responsibility between
two field centers (Pickering's JPL and von Braun's Marshall) and between two
Headquarters offices (Ostrander's Launch Vehicles and Silverstein's Flight
Programs), thereby separating the spacecraft and launch vehicle components that
together made up individual flight projects. Burke appreciated the management
difficulties that might attend this division of responsibilities. So did the Agena
Survey Team-of which Burke had been a member-whose interim report
recommended to NASA a strong management structure for Agena flight projects.
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And so did an increasing number of NASA officials who were bothered by the
emergence of general management difficulties throughout the agency.
NEW MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT
New techniques were needed to organize and control the growing space
agency and its diverse flight projects. To meet these needs, on December 29, 1959,
Associate Administrator Richard Horner announced the creation of a Space
Exploration Program Council. NASA's leaders expected the new Council to
establish the management mechanism for implementing space flight projects, and
to reconcile in a timely fashion the differences between Headquarters and the field
centers managing the projects. With Horner as Chairman, the Council would
consist of only key center directors and Headquarters personnel: William Pickering
of JPL (deep space missions), Harry Goett of Goddard Space Flight Center (earth
orbiting missions), yon Braun of the new Marshall Space Flight Center at
Huntsville (launch vehicles) and, in NASA's two offices now sharing operating
responsibilities, Flight Programs Director Abe Silverstein and Launch Vehicle
Director Don Ostrander. _ At the first meeting in Washington, D.C., on February
10, 1960, Council members confronted the problem of managing NASA's Agena B
flight program.
Headquarters could not go along with the Agena Survey Team's
recommendation for a single flight project manager at one field center,_2 but two
alternative approaches, Horner announced, had been examined. The first called for
controlling NASA's flight project activity by two coordinating committees chaired
by Headquarters personnel, each with representation split between Flight
Programs and Launch Vehicles along lines that approximated the existing
Headquarters organization. In the second instance, a single committee or "Steering
Group" would direct the effort. This group would consist of a Headquarters
Chairman, but with representation from each of the three affected field
installations-JPL, Goddard, and Marshall. Since no other forms of organizing
NASA's unmanned space flight projects were candidates for consideration, Horner
recommended acceptance of the single steering group, together with appropriate
subcommittees and technical panels, as the least complicated and more desirable
management mechanism. _3Of the two choices offered, the assembled field center
directors opted for the single committee, though doubtless without enthusiasm,
since all preferred field center control over individual flight projects.
Various members at the meeting certainly wondered how the Air Force
would be fitted into the committee management scheme. Someone pointed out that
with a committee as final authority, yon Braun could expect problems in
coordinating Agena procurement through the Air Force representatives stationed
at the Lockheed plant in Sunnyvale, California. After discussion all around,
attendees agreed that a resident project engineer would be assigned to Sunnyvale
from the Huntsville staff to take care of matters involving the Air Force there.t4
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Other Air Force personnel concerned with Ranger would be appointed to
appropriate technical panels of the new coordinating committee.
In due course, on February 19, 1960, NASA Headquarters established an
Agena B Coordination Board. Chaired by William A. Fleming, Silverstein's
technical assistant in Flight Programs, the Board was to resolve "all technical
problems arising in the execution of the missions within its area. ''_5 In point of
fact, this interagency Coordination Board did not solve any of the important
problems of flight project management, but created new ones. In short order,
whenever a dispute arose over what participating organization was to do exactly
what part of the job, be it providing trajectory calculations for lunar missions or
tracking equipment during launch operations, it was labeled a technical problem
and referred to the Board for resolution. Month after month in 1960, questions of
roles in and jurisdiction over mundane tasks appeared and were carried forward
on the Board's agenda. As time went by, molehills assumed mountainous
proportions for Ranger's schedules and costs. 16
Burke's project office at JPL, and similar offices at Huntsville, the Air Force
office in lnglewood, California, and in Silverstein's shop at Headquarters, felt the
effects directly. Each of these project-related organs held responsibility for some of
the technical aspects or for overall guidance of Ranger. Inside or outside of the
Agena B Coordination Board, none of them possessed the necessary authority to
do its task.
ORGANIZING FOR RANGER: HUNTSVILLE AND THE AIR FORCE
Perhaps the most severe immediate problem resulting from this unusual
division of authority and responsibility surfaced in spring and summer 1960
between the former rivals in missilery, the yon Braun team at Huntsville and the
Air Force headquartered in lnglewood. The Huntsville staff was primarily occupied
with developing for NASA the Army-originated Saturn series of super launch
vehicles large enough to carry man into interplanetary space. To care for and
nurture the Agena and Centaur launch vehicles inherited from the Air Force, von
Braun appointed a long-time friend and coworker in the vineyard of rocketry,
Hans Hueter, to head a Light and Medium Vehicle Office. To manage Agena
Systems, Hueter obtained Friedrich Duerr. Educated in the classics, Duerr was an
electrical engineer from Munich who had joined the Peenemiinde rocket research
center in 1941, where he designed the electrical checkout and firing equipment for
the A-4 (V-2) missile. Like von Braun and Hueter, he had come to the United
States under "Project Paperclip ''_7 in 1945, had remained with the Army's missile
program, and eventually transferred to NASA. Duerr was a cultivated man in the
old world tradition. "Why," an impressed JPL engineer recalled, "he even spoke
Latin" (Figure i 2 ).
Hueter and Duerr were to procure, first, all Agena B vehicles used by NASA
and, second, all of the Agena's ground support equipment and the launch-to-
injection tracking and instrumentation. The second task would be worked out in a
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Fig. 12. Marshall Agena Systems Manager Friedrich Duerr
panel of the Agena B Coordination Board, with the Air Force and with
Ostrander's newly formed launch Operations Directorate at Cape Canaveral. By
agreement between NASA and the Air Force on the important first task, however,
the Huntsville office was expected to confine itself to supervising the procurement of
Agena B vehicles; _s the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in Inglewood would
handle the actual procurement. Though NASA provided the funds, the Air Force
would thus administer the contracts and direct Lockheed and General Dynamics-
Astronautics. The purpose was to minimize interference between NASA's space
program and the Air Force's own high-priority military satellite projects that used
the same Atlas-Agena launch vehicles.
This agreement went down hard at Huntsville. Accustomed to the tradition
of"in-house" development of missile and space systems,* the German-Americans
now found themselves responsible for work they could control only through the
*"In-house" refers to the Army practice of undertaking research and development of a weapon system
at a military arsenal. After building and testing the equipment, the design would be turned over to an
industrial firm for serial production. The Air Force, on the other hand, preferred to contract for the
complete package-research, development, and production-directly with an industrial firm.
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Air Force as a second party. Worse, it was a party that had bested them in the
struggle for jurisdiction over the Army's intermediate-range ballistic missile a few
years before, and disdained their arsenal procurement practices as obsolete. Von
Braun and Hueter requested a clarification of roles in May. Launch Vehicle
Director Ostrander replied that Marshall "will provide complete day-to-day
technical, administrative and financial supervision of the industrial contractors
participating in the various launch vehicle programs." _ But when directives began
to be dispatched from Huntsville to Inglewood and Sunnyvale under this mandate,
countercomplaints from the Air Force arrived at NASA Headquarters. z_
By summertime, Ostrander was obliged to express the equation anew both
to yon Braun and to Major General Osmond J. Ritland, the Air Force Commander
in Inglewood. Von Braun's group held responsibifity for the planning and execution
of NASA Agena projects, while the actual implementation of the projects was the
task of the Air Force. General Ritland, happy to agree with Ostrander's
clarification, z_ had detailed Major John E. Albert, in April, as the Air Force
representative on NASA's Agena Program. 22 Albert assumed responsibility for all
Air Force technical matters in Ranger, an assignment which rapidly led him to the
peripatetic schedule of the NASA, Air Force Agena, and Ranger team in offices
scattered from coast to coast. Quartered in Inglewood, he came in time to sign his
correspondence and orders as Air Force "Director of Ranger. ''23 But despite the
misleading title, Albert's solid expertise, direct approach to technical problem-
solving, knowledge of Air Force "rules of the road," and his genuine interest in
Ranger soon proved indispensable both to Burke at JPL and to Duerr at Marshall
(Figure 13).
The Ranger-Agena group in the Light and Medium Vehicle Office in
Huntsville, however, numbered no more than four men, including Robert Pace,
Duerr's "resident project engineer" assigned to the Lockheed plant. That number
would prove insufficient to "supervise" the far-flung Agena-related activities at
Lockheed and Cape Canaveral, much less in Inglewood, where, above the level of
Major Albert, Ranger and other NASA projects using Agena tended to be viewed
as impediments to the timely prosecution of Air Force work in space. Newly
embarked on a supervisory mission for NASA, with ill-defined responsibilities
and authority, understaffed in the crunch to get on with Saturn, Hueter and Duerr
found themselves unable to command further support for Agena affairs at the
Marshall Space Flight Center.
ORGANIZING FOR RANGER: JPL AND HEADQUARTERS
At JPL, Pickering's reorganization had provided separate Lunar and
Planetary Program Offices. The Ranger Project reported to the lunar organization.
To meet the special demands anticipated in space flight operations, new technical
divisions also appeared: Space Sciences, which coupled scientific experiments with
spacecraft; Systems, which integrated spacecraft engineering and ran test
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Fig. 13. Air Force Ranger Manager John Albert with James Burke
operations; and Telecommunications, which handled spacecraft tracking,
command, and control. JPL leaders reasoned that a small staff in each of the flight
project and program offices could draw on the personnel in the technical divisions
for the support they required. Project Ranger depended upon all of the JPL line
technical divisions, new and old. By 1960, direct divisional support of Ranger had
grown rapidly from 200 to nearly 600 engineers and technicians. Burke's project
office counted two men and one secretary.
Under the JPL management structure, Cummings and Burke allocated the
funds, planned, scheduled, and assigned Ranger tasks, and reviewed the progress
of these efforts. They did not, however, possess direct supervisory authority over
divisional individuals, groups, or sections. The divisions carried out the design and
development of the spacecraft, scientific experiments, and tracking net and flight
operations. They also directly monitored the various Ranger contracts. Each
division chief and his line subordinates not only supervised but selected and placed
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engineers assigned to Ranger. Division managers could and did substitute key
individuals at their discretion. By August 1960, as the Mariner planetary projects
got up to speed at the Laboratory, personnel turnover on Ranger reached critical
proportions. Cummings complained bitterly to all of JPL's division managers that
the "alarming rate of loss to the Lunar Program of the talented personnel who had
originally been assigned...and the breaking in of new and less qualified personnel
has been detrimental to the program...and incompatible with the priority...estab-
lished for the Ranger Project. ''24 The rate of turnover slowed, but the divisions'
closely guarded personnel prerogatives remained unchanged.
Key among the supporting divisions was the new Systems Division.
Directed by Harris M. Schurmeier, Burke's Caitech classmate and friend, this
division held three major flight project functions: systems analysis, which included
flight trajectory, orbit, and the overall analyses to establish midcourse and terminal
maneuvers; systems design and integration, which included spacecraft preliminary
design, subsystem integration, and design studies; and operations, which covered
spacecraft assembly and checkout, qualification and performance testing, quality
assurance, and spacecraft launch and flight operations. This single division
contributed the core of most engineering cadres for Ranger and JPL's other space
flight projects; other technical divisions supplied additional specialized talents. 25At
the outset, in February 1960, Schurmeier appointed Gordon P. Kautz as the
Systems Division's Project Engineer for Ranger. NASA's new spacecraft for deep
space exploration would be, Schurmeier assured him, a challenging assignment. In
fact, during the next five years, Ranger would become his life.
Kautz, a mechanical engineer, had graduated in 1941 from Fenn College
(now Cleveland State University) in Cleveland, Ohio. Like the entire student body
of this small engineering school, Kautz secured his diploma by means of the
Cooperative Plan, alternating work and study for a B.S. degree. Employed with
various eastern firms during the next fifteen years, he encountered Caltech's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory for the first time in 1955. Impressed by the competence and
spirit of those he met, he resigned his position and was hired at JPL. Soon after
the Ranger Project Office was formally established in October 1960, Burke named
him Assistant Project Manager (Figure 14). 2+As Burke's deputy, in the absence of
a concrete agency-wide project structure, Kautz found ways of tracking Ranger
developments across the board, including the major contractors involved. He
possessed a jugular instinct for potential trouble areas; Burke, on receiving
unexpected phone calls from Kautz, often associated his scratchy Ohio voice with
bad news.
Together, Burke and Kautz formed the linchpin of Project Ranger at JPL.
Their Ranger organizational arrangement, which was characteristic of all of the
deep space missions at the Laboratory, was assumed to combine the best of two
worlds. It avoided large, ephemeral, "projectized" offices while maintaining
permanent operating capabilities in the individual technical division, thereby
approximating the separation of disciplines found in university departments.
However, the small project office, short-handed, without direct supervisory control
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Fig. 14. JPL Ranger Project Assistant Manager Gordon Kautz
over personnel assignments or turnover, had to rely entirely upon the performance
of the divisions. If something suddenly needed additional attention on short notice,
the office staff, somehow, had to supply it. The work week of the Ranger
"Spacecraft Project Manager" and his deputy quickly rose to sixty hours and
more.
But in Pasadena the project staff and division personnel at least knew and
understood one another. The same could not as yet be said for those groups
beyond its confines, in the larger world of Project Ranger. By institutional default,
Burke and Kautz found themselves enmeshed in an agency-wide policy question
meant for higher levels than that of the project: Where did the field center
Spacecraft Project Manager's authority end and that of the NASA Headquarters
offices, Marshall, and the Air Force begin? When pressed by Cummings at JPL for
an answer, Silverstein at NASA insisted that the matter simply was not crucial;
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with everyone anxious to make Ranger a success, he explained, these questions
would work themselves out. 27
In July, Silverstein notified the Laboratory that his Lunar and Planetary
Programs Division within the NASA Flight Programs Office would be the group
directly responsible for the conduct of the project, and JPL's point of contact in
guiding Ranger developments. 28 The Lunar and Planetary Programs Division
originally had been formed in the autumn of 1959, as NASA Administrator
Glennan began emphasizing a moon flight program. It was headed by Edgar M.
Cortright, formerly from NACA's Lewis Aeronautical Laboratory. Silverstein and
Newell had moved this exceptionally capable aeronautical research engineer from
meteorological satellites and charged him with forming the new office (Figure 15).
Cortright promptly assembled a team, 2_ and so far as NASA Headquarters was
concerned, the Ranger project structure was now complete.
Fig. 15, NASA Lunar and Planetary Programs Chief Edgar Corlright
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The project management issue, nevertheless, was hardly solved. Cummings
at JPL, intent on comprehending the position and roles of the numerous agencies,
offices, committees, and panels involved, prepared what is probably the only
organization chart ever made of the early Ranger project (Figure 16). Whatever
the merits in capturing the elusive project organization on paper, the exercise
offered small comfort to those obliged to live inside that framework. When Burke
and Kautz operated beyond the confines of JPL, they lacked authority; diplomacy
and appeals to reason and national honor proved the only available means for
gaining compliance with requests for action. And these proved to be dull
instruments with which to cut the hard schedules established for Ranger.
LAUNCH VEHICLES: MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS MATERIALIZE
The managerial faults were rapidly exemplified in the launch vehicle
situation. Upon visiting Inglewood and Sunnyvale as early as February 1960, JPL
engineers asked for details about Agena to support spacecraft development. They
found that "official requests for and answers to NASA inquiries" were supposed to
be sent through circuitous Air Force-to-NASA Headquarters channels. "The
Inglewood and Sunnyvale people seemed perfectly willing to give us unofficial
answers to our questions, but stressed that these could only be considered tentative
answers." Incredulous, the JPL visitors asserted: "This situation could result in
some serious bottlenecks in our program unless the future working relationship can
bypass this long route. ''_° But that long route and working relationship had
already been agreed upon between NASA Headquarters and the Air Force in
Inglewood. During 1960 it could be shortcut to a limited extent by those working
at the engineering level, but it was not to be bypassed at Lockheed on task
assignments, change orders, or schedules)'
In March 1960 NASA and the Air Force agreed on Lockheed's task. The
firm would provide three major launch vehicle components: the Discoverer 32
model of the Agena B, made standard for NASA use; a spacecraft adapter to fit the
forward end of the Agena to which the Ranger spacecraft would be fastened; and
an over-the-nose metal fairing, or shroud, modified from a standard version used
for Air Force space missions, to protect the spacecraft during ascent through the
atmosphere. A letter contract for sixteen Agena Bs and this associated equipment,
issued through the Air Force on April 12, 1960, permitted work to proceed.33
Herschel J. Brown, Corporate Vice President and General Manager of
Lockheed's Missile and Space Division, selected Harold T. Luskin to manage the
NASA Agena program. In the charged, often rapacious atmosphere that
characterized space affairs in the early 1960s, Harold Luskin coupled technical
expertise with integrity and decency; he commanded nearly universal respect-even
affection-among members of the aerospace engineering fraternity. An American
astronautical pioneer in his own right, he had as a young man contributed a
chapter on spacecraft temperatllre control to the 1946 Rand earth satellite study.
Now he would have a hand in the NASA unmanned lunar program (Figure 17).
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f
Fig. 17. Lockheed Agena Manager Harold Luskin
However meritorious the selection of Luskin, the job did not come with a
viable organizational base at Lockheed. NASA Agena work remained part of the
Air Force satellite activities at the huge plant in Sunnyvale. His people few in
number and physically scattered, Luskin found himself in a position all too
familiar to Duerr in Huntsville and Major Albert in Inglewood: he had to meet a
set of special NASA requirements amid larger, ongoing design and production
efforts in which equally strong managers resisted change-from detailing personnel
to allocating office space-that might interfere with their own programs. At the
same time, established NASA-Air Force command complications were built into
the job. The Air Force intermediaries attached to the Lockheed Air Force Plant
Representative's Office stood between Luskin and NASA personnel, insulating the
NASA effort from the higher-priority, classified Air Force programs. Representa-
tives from JPL and Marshall found themselves unable to obtain Lockheed
schedules and other vital Agena information, or even to discuss certain questions,
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because they lacked what the military liked to call a "need-to-know." NASA
should submit its requirements, Air Force personnel insisted, and they would see
that the necessary Agena Bs and other equipment fitted together and were
delivered at Cape Canaveral in time for launch. 34
If Luskin needed any more difficulties, he got them in a major contract
change. Late in July NASA Headquarters determined that it had firm mission
requirements for only nine Agena Bs instead of sixteen. 3S On August 4, 1960, the
space agency notified Lockheed of this reduction in numbers. Negotiation of a
definitive contract, already well underway, halted. Agreement on a final contract,
expected in August, would not be realized until February 1961. Among a growing
number of Air Force satellite projects at Lockheed, the NASA work amounted to a
very small piece of the action; whatever institutional leverage Luskin possessed
with sixteen Agenas was reduced precipitously by an order for only nine. Luskin
soon found that he could not command the needed Agena support for NASA in
Sunnyvale.
First hardware deliveries testified to the dismal situation. In September JPL
received a mockup of the forward portion of the Agena, the spacecraft adapter and
nose fairing. Project engineers immediately returned all of the articles to Lockheed
because they detected "inconsistencies in design and construction. ''3+ Burke called
a meeting among representatives of the Air Force, Marshall, and Lockheed a few
weeks later to evaluate the status of all three components, including the
mechanization required to separate the nose fairing and the spacecraft from the
Agena. During the meeting it became apparent that numerous deficiencies still
remained. 37 Worse, any delay in applying corrective measures would jeopardize
the entire Ranger schedule.
Under pressure from Burke at JPL and the Hueter-Duerr team in
Huntsville, the Air Force agreed to a Board of Inquiry to investigate conditions in
the NASA Agena B program at Lockheed. lnglewood assured Hueter that top
management at Lockheed's Missile and Space Division would be directed to take
whatever "positive corrective action" might be required to maintain the NASA
Agena B program schedule. 3s Even before the Board convened, Burke, Hueter, and
Albert J. Kelley, Ostrander's representative in charge of the NASA Agena B
program at Headquarters, had no doubts about what was required. Among other
things, establishing an immediate NASA need-to-know at Lockheed was
imperative. 3+ Around Christmas, Hueter, writing for von Braun, reported the
findings of the Board of Inquiry to Herschel Brown at Lockheed. Hueter candidly
told Brown that the NASA program required more and better qualified engineers,
increased authority delegated to Luskin as program manager, improved
coordination among Lockheed design groups, and approval of direct engineer-to-
engineer contact with NASA organizations together with a NASA need-to-know. 4°
With the consent of the Air Force, Brown vigorously pushed through the
needed reforms. Luskin, whose NASA Agena office had been given its own
quarters and elevated to project status at Lockheed a few weeks before the findings
were released, acquired the personnel and authority he needed. On February 6,
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1961, the Agena contract was signed; then, on February 14, the Air Force
approved direct contact between NASA and Lockheed personnel in the new NASA
Agena B Launch Vehicle Program Management Organization and Procedures
agreement signed by the Deputy Administrator of NASA and the Air Force
Commander of the Air Research and Development Command. No longer an Air
Force foster child, NASA's Agena work would become a full-fledged member of
the Lockheed "family" with a legitimacy all its own.
With the new year, events in the launch vehicle department appeared
definitely on the upturn. Luskin's shop delivered the reworked spacecraft adapter
and nose fairing to JPL in January 1961. The equipment performed satisfactorily
in "match-mate" tests with the spacecraft4_-a hopeful sign that engineering and
management problems at the Sunnyvale plant were truly a thing of the past.
REORGANIZING FOR RANGER
All the while, officials elsewhere had been working to reorganize the entire
NASA Ranger management structure, still frustratingly awkward, along the single
project manager lines originally recommended by the Agena Survey Team. At its
core, the Ranger management problem remained one between the NASA
installations in the field and the Headquarters offices in Washington. Everyone
liked to agree with Silverstein that there was universal dedication to move ahead
with Project Ranger as rapidly and efficiently as possible. But events did not match
either expectations or good intentions. "Each didn't understand the other's
methods," Burke explained, "and there wasn't an agreed management under
which we could dispute points and have them resolved by higher authority. ''42 As
conditions on the project deteriorated in 1960, JPL continued to press the question
at Headquarters: Would authority for the technical control over flight projects be
delegated to the responsible space flight center, or would it continue to be
exercised by means of a Headquarters-chaired coordinating committee-attendant
difficulties notwithstanding?
The smouldering discontent was brought directly to Administrator
Glennan's attention on Bastille Day, July 14, 1960, at the third meeting of the
Space Exploration Program Council. At JPL, Pickering had consulted with his
lunar and planetary program directors preparatory to the meeting in Washington.
Cummings, mincing no words, urged his superior to "denounce the continual
fumbling over responsibilities and authority which has resulted in confusion and
delays in getting organized..." The Agena B Coordination Board "should be
dissolved and program directors clearly delegated full power to establish any
management arrangement which has not already been determined.'43 At the Space
Exploration Program Council meeting, Picketing, joined by his fellow center
directors Harry Goett and yon Braun, urged the "liberation" of NASA flight
projects from management by committee. But despite the problems encountered by
the committee in question, the Agena B Coordination Board, Glennan and his
Headquarters cohorts rejected the recommendation. 44
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But the Headquarters contingent was by no means unanimous. However
desirable they might regard a Headquarters-chaired coordinating board, the Board
itself had obviously failed to resolve many of the disputes over the task
assignments and responsibilities of the various project organizations in a timely
fashion. Glennan, moreover, opposed increasing the staff at Headquarters to
handle project details 45 and, contrary to Siiverstein, he held no brief against the
decentralization or delegation of authority. In the days that followed the July 14
meeting, Glennan permitted Albert Siepert, Director of the NASA Office of
Business Administration and an attendee at the meeting, to consider alternatives
for managing NASA flight projects, including direct delegation of the task to
NASA space flight centers.
The fortunes of centralized control declined further on September 1 when
Richard Horner, a proponent and architect of the Agena B Coordination Board,
resigned his position at NASA to return to the business community. As his
replacement for the agency's general manager, Glennan selected Robert C.
Seamans, Jr., a former professor of aeronautical engineering at MIT and the
manager of RCA's Airborne Systems Laboratory. Accustomed to delegating
authority as a matter of course, Seamans chose to involve himself at NASA
primarily with agency-wide management questions; Siepert now received active
encouragement, and the support of Glennan, in drafting a formal agency proposal
for flight project management.
During the next four weeks Siepert and an associate, Jack Young, prepared
A NASA Structure for Project Management. Completed shortly before NASA's
Fourth Semi-Annual Staff Conference-where agency policy, advance planning,
and management issues were to be reviewed, discussed, and, it was hoped,
resolved-Siepert's brief called bluntly for decentralization. A few days before the
conference convened in Williamsburg, Virginia, Glennan circulated the document
to all those invited to attend. The management proposal, he declared, elaborated
three general concepts "with which I agree":
I. That the approaching volume and magnitude of NASA projects
will make it impossible to follow our present ad hoc approach to
project management problems; a basic concept of project
management is needed.
2. That NASA intends to fix at the Space Flight Centers
responsibility for the execution of NASA projects.
3. That NASA needs to establish a method which assures a closer
link between technical project direction and associated business
interests. '_
The proposal specifically recommended approval of a NASA General
Management Instruction that defined project terminology and fixed the authority
and responsibility for flight projects at the space flight centers. Marshall Space
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Flight Center, providing launch vehicles and launch operations under Ostrander's
office, would support a project manager located at JPL or Goddard. Silverstein's
office would allocate the funds, establish objectives, and review project
developments. In the event of unresolved disputes, Associate Administrator
Seamans--not a coordinating committee-would decide the issue. On October 19,
1960, NASA's leaders took up Siepert's proposal and endorsed it. 47
On January 19, 1961, one day before leaving office with the rest of the
Eisenhower administration, Glennan signed NASA General Management
Instruction 4-1-1, Planning and Implementation of NASA Projects. Judged by many
to be the single most important management concept generated and adopted by
NASA in its formative years, the instruction abolished the Agena B Coordination
Board method of project management. It delegated to space flight centers direct
authority and responsibility over their assigned tasks. Its central feature involved
what was termed a Project Development Plan. As a controlling, written instrument
signed by all participating organizations, the development plan came to be viewed
at JPL as the "contract" or statement of commitment and understanding between
the Headquarters offices and all NASA field installations having responsibilities for
a system or major part of a project. '_
Coming about the same time as the resolution of Luskin's difficulties at
Lockheed, the new mandate for project control cleared the managerial way for
Ranger. Burke, now officially named Ranger Project Manager by NASA
Headquarters, ++ was eager to get on with the assignment. But an entire year had
elapsed since the Agena Survey Team first recommended decentralized project
management. And though a sensible organizational structure was indispensable,
achieving it had cost project officials valuable time that might otherwise have been
spent on the technical details of the spacecraft and launch vehicle. Their
development remained on schedule, at least on paper; however, only twenty-four
months remained in the lifespan planned for Project Ranger. Official schedules
pegged the flight of Ranger 1 in July 1961, a scant six months away. Time was
running out-fast!
Chapter Three
SPACE SCIENCE AND THE RANGER
MACHINE
LL through the managerial fracas, JPL engineers had been pushing ahead
with the design of the Ranger spacecraft. The origins of the evolving Ranger
machine went back to March 1958, when Major General John B. Medaris, Chief
of the Army Ordnance Missile Command, had authorized JPL to evaluate a new
launch vehicle based on the Jupiter and eventually known as Juno IV. Paper
analyses concluded that Juno IV could inject several tens of kilograms into deep
space trajectories. That prospect was enough for JPL Director Picketing. Eager to
leapfrog beyond the moon and begin exploring the inner planets before the
Soviets, he instructed Daniel Schneiderman, in charge of JPL's payload design
group, to define the technology and preliminary concepts for a Juno IV planetary
spacecraft, one that would weigh some 134 kilograms (300 pounds) and could be
guided to an encounter with Mars.t
A Pt.ANEI'ARY MACHINE FOR SPACE SCIENCE
John Small, Chief of Mechanical Engineering, assigned a few engineers to
work with Schneiderman on the new spacecraft design: James Burke, Walter
Downhower, Marc Comuntzis, and John Casani. For some weeks this group
devoted considerable time to the problem of radio communications. To
communicate adequately from planetary distances, the spacecraft would require a
high-gain antenna-in conventional terms, a narrow-beam "dish"-mounted and
hinged so as to point continuously at the earth. There, sensitive receivers, powerful
transmitters, and very-high-gain antennas would complete the circuit. All the
while, the spacecraft dish antenna would have to be kept pointing in the right
direction through an appropriate method of stabilizing the attitude of the
spacecraft itself. Early American spacecraft, such as the Explorers and Pioneers,
4t_
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had been stabilized by spinning the vehicle along its roll axis. For flights to the
planets, JPL engineers deemed it necessary to have complete control of the
spacecraft in all three axes, roll, yaw, and pitch. This would ensure precise pointing
of the experiments and the antenna, and maximize solar power collection and
thermal control (Figure 18). With full attitude control, the flight trajectory of a
planetary spacecraft could also be refined by igniting a rocket engine on board in a
"midcourse maneuver." A small rocket would be able to compensate for minor
guidance errors introduced by the launch vehicle, thus permitting the spacecraft to
approach more closely or even hit a celestial target. 2 In June 1958 a Pickering-
appointed JPL review team approved these preliminary design concepts)
Though the Juno IV program was canceled in October 1958, 4 the JPL
martian spacecraft continued to evolve, now to be used in Project Vega. In
addition to the features of a high-gain antenna and full attitude stabilization,
engineers designed the spacecraft so that its longitudinal axis would point
continuously toward the sun (except during midcourse or terminal maneuvers),
since it was uncertain whether the earth could be "seen" by onboard sensors at
planetary distances. This decision simplified the problem of maintaining thermal
equilibrium on the spacecraft and permitted the use of solar cells on fixed panels as
a primary source of electrical power. _ With the Vega launch vehicle, JPL's
Schneiderman and his colleagues also had more ample weight figures with which
to work. Assuming a parking orbit technique, in which the spacecraft is ultimately
launched into the solar system from earth orbit, Vega calculations yielded
spacecraft weights of 360 kilograms (800 pounds) deliverable to the vicinity of the
moon, and approximately 205 kilograms (450 pounds) to Mars or Venus. 6
But at the start of the space program, the additional spacecraft weight was
inseparable from the expensive and unproved Vega launch vehicle. The higher
launch costs would ultimately mean fewer flights. The unproved launcher would
also likely fail in some early misions; estimates of reliability for the individual
Vega stages ran at about 0.5. Each flight could be expected to have less than half a
chance of succeeding even if one were to neglect any failures that might occur in
the complex spacecraft. To enhance reliability, therefore, members of the JPL
design group decided to use a single spacecraft design repetitively. They identified
and combined functions common to all flights, with the resultant basic unit termed
a spacecraft "bus." Here the design would vary as little as possible for each
mission. The bus would provide electrical power, communications, attitude control,
command functions, and a midcourse maneuver capability. To the bus would be
added the scientific instruments and associated equipment that together comprised
a mission package. 7
Since nearby equipment could adversely affect many kinds of scientific
experiments (limits on fields of view, radio or magnetic interference, etc.), tall
structures and extendable booms were called for. Like a chrysalis, the craft with its
solar wings would be folded into a compact and rugged package inside the conical
aerodynamic nose fairing of the launch vehicle, then open out in space while
cruising to Mars or Venus. By mid-1959 these preliminary plans had been
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THE PLANES OF MOVEMENT THROUGH WHICH THE SPACECRAFT PASSES ARE
ILLUSTRATED BELOW. THE ATTITUDE OF THE SPACECRAFT IS ESTABLISHED AND
MAINTAINED BY COMMANDS EXECUTED BY THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM IN
CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS OF THE SPACECRAFT• THE ATTITUDE CONTROL
SYSTEM REGULATES THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SPACECRAFT IN THESE THREE PLANES
AND ACCOMPLISHES THESE MOVEMENTS BY IMPARTING SMALL AMOUNTS OF THRUST
TO THE SPACECRAFT BUS BY THE DISCHARGE OF NITROGEN GAS FROM COLD- GAS
JETS POSITIONED ON AND ABOUT THE HEXAGONAL FRAME OF THE SPACECRAFT, THE
DESIRED POSTURE OF THE SPACECRAFT IS DICTATED BY ITS SPATIAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SUN AND EARTH. IT MUST KEEP ITS SOLAR PANELS FACING THE SUN FOR
SOLAR POWER AND THE HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA FACING EARTH FOR COMMUNICATION.
THE SUN AND EARTH SENSORS, PART OF THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM,
CONTINUOUSLY GENERATE SIGNALS WHICH ARE COMBINED WITH INFORMATION
FROM THE RATE GYROS OF THE AUTOPILOTS. THE LATTER SUPPLY THE
INFORMATION DEFINING THE RATE OF MOVEMENT. THIS COMBINED INFORMATION IS
TRANSLATED BY THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM INTO COMMANDS TO THE
APPROPRIATE COLD-GAS JETS OR COMBINATION OF JETS. THIS CYCLE IS REPEATED
UNTIL THE DESIRED ATTITUDE OF THE SPACECRAFT IS ESTABLISHED AND
SUBSEQUENTLY CONTINUES TO FUNCTION MAINTAINING THIS POSTURE.
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communicated to NASA and described to Congress. 8 They would provide the basic
model for the Ranger machine (Figure 19).
THE VEGA-RANGER: WHERE PLANET AND SKY SCIENCE MEET
The JPL Space Sciences Division, meantime, drew up a program of
experiments for the Vega flights. Created in the reorganization that followed JPL's
transfer to NASA, this division drew together JPL experimenters in one group,
prepared instruments for flight missions, and processed the information returned
to earth for release to the experimenters. 9 As chief of the new division, Pickering
named Albert R. Hibbs, an articulate, exceptionally bright young physicist with a
Caltech Ph.D. One of the founders of the Lunar and Planetary Exploration
Colloquia and a participant in the Explorer and Pioneer IGY projects, Hibbs was
already well known within the community of space scientists and engineers.
When Glennan decided to emphasize the lunar objective in July 1959,
neither Hibbs nor his JPL engineering colleagues abandoned the martian
spacecraft. They preferred to stick with it even though on a 66-hour flight to the
moon batteries could suffice in place of solar panels, and a high-gain antenna was
unnecessary for communicating over a distance of 400,000 kilometers (a quarter
million miles). Adapted to lunar missions, the high-gain antenna, instead of being
used for long-range, narrowband communication, would now be used for relatively
wideband transmission such as television at lunar distances. The bus and passenger
concept, three-axis attitude stabilization, and solar power, its designers reasoned,
could be used to develop the technology required for the planetary flights
postponed to 1962. J0
The question of just what scientific experiments the Ranger machines would
carry was a matter for decision not only by JPL but by NASA Headquarters,
particularly Silverstein's office of Space Flight Programs. Silverstein had awarded
the responsibility for determining what scientific instruments would ride into space
to his quiet assistant director, Homer E. Newell. A crew-cut, 44-year-old scientist-
administrator, Newell was the son of an electrical engineer, who had helped him
provision a chemical laboratory in their home in Holyoke, Massachusetts. His
mother, an accomplished musician, inspired dinner-time exchanges concerning
events of the day. Newell, who earned his Ph.D. in mathematics from the
University of Wisconsin, joined the Naval Research Laboratory after World War
II. He was soon appointed head of the Rocket Sonde Branch, and then, a few years
later, Superintendent of the Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division. Together with
James Van Allen, Lloyd Berkner, and other members of the ad hoc Upper
Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel, he directed America's postwar assault on the
physics of the upper atmosphere, seeking answers to theoretical questions
involving earth-sun electromagnetic relationships. Revealing the type of science he
preferred, Newell assured the readers of his first book that "the ultimate technical
strength of the nation is to be found in the continuing accumulation of
fundamental knowledge" (Figure 20). _
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Fig. 20. NASA Space Flight Programs Assistant Director for Space Sciences Homer Newell
In October 1958, after serving as Science Program Coordinator for the IGY
Vanguard Satellite project, Newell moved ro Silverstein's office in the fledgling
NASA. He promptly established procedures for shaping the agency's space flight
program. In arrangements worked out in succeeding months, the Space Science
Board of the National Academy of Sciences contracted to provide advice on long-
term goals to NASA. While specific research objectives and operating policy were
of course prerogatives reserved to the space agency, Newell recognized that the
success of the research program would ultimately depend upon the support it could
command within and outside the agency, especially from those scientists engaged
in its work. He elected to employ small contingents of qualified scientists at
Headquarters and the field centers. In accord with the precedent of the IGY and
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sounding rocket programs, he chose to delegate the bulk of NASA's basic space
research, primarily to university scientists. NASA would tap the best scientific
talent available in the nation, and the best scientific talent, Newell hoped, could be
expected to provide vocal and articulate support for NASA's science program._2
Newell's office made known the opportunities for conducting space research
from NASA satellites and space probes to university scientists directly by
correspondence, in announcements at annual meetings of the various science
societies, and by means of special conferences convened for that purpose, including
the first national Conference on Space Physics sponsored jointly by NASA, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the American Physical Society in April 1959._3
Numerous proposals for experiments-both solicited and unsolicited-arrived in
short order. In fact, Neweli received far more proposals than could be
accommodated on authorized NASA space launch vehicles. Ad hoc space science
working groups assisted in selecting and developing the most promising of these
experiments for NASA flight missions. Composed of well-known university and
NASA scientists appointed by Newell, one group dealt with space radiation,
another with magnetic fields and plasmas in space, and the third considered
experiments for lunar exploration after Robert Jastrow and Harold Urey convinced
Newell of its importance. _4
By the fall of 1959, the Headquarters working groups and Hibbs' scientists
at JPL had agreed upon a rough priority of experiments to be carried on the six
authorized Vega lunar flights. Since the experiments of sky scientists did not
require a precise trajectory, the first two Vega test missions would be instrumented
to measure more closely the fields and particles between the earth and the sun.
Representations by planetary scientists ensured that the lunar flights to follow
would be confined exclusively to investigating the moon rather than the
interplanetary medium. This division of available vehicles proved congenial to the
interests of both science parties.
In November Hibbs submitted a precis of these deliberations to the JPL
Vega Project staff. Planning of the sky science experiments for the first two
launches, he informed Cummings and Burke, had reached an advanced stage.
Measuring solar corpuscular radiation-the solar atmosphere-and magnetic fields
was the objective preferred by these scientists. Second preference had been
assigned to investigating the neutral hydrogen cloud that surrounds the earth,
third preference to measuring cosmic rays, and fourth, to measuring micrometeor-
ites. Those identified as experimenters were James Van Allen of the State
University of Iowa, and others from the Naval Research Laboratory, Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), JPL, and
Caitech. The later lunar rough landing missions would carry the seismometer
being developed cooperatively for NASA by Caltech and Columbia University.
Additional lunar experiments would be designated in the near future, upon
completion of the Vega spacecraft design. _5
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But Glennan's cancellation of Vega occurred just as the spacecraft design
neared completion. After Silverstein then ordered the five-flight Atlas-Agena B
Ranger Project, JPL Director Pickering and Vega Program Director Cummings
faced a choice: considering only the spacecraft, JPL could begin anew on the
design of a less complicated lunar machine for use on the Atlas-Agena; or it could
proceed with the planetary craft, building on the work already accomplished.
Pickering and Cummings opted for the planetary vehicle. If that course was risky,
it nevertheless offered a rapid development of planetary flight technology and
experience, nearly on Vega schedules. Besides, the time and money already
invested, and the experience accumulated, would be saved. Moreover, if pushed in
a concerted fashion, the planetary machine might well return valuable data about
the moon in advance of the Soviets. And by using the Vega planetary craft for the
lunar missions, NASA could also accomplish the scientific program already agreed
upon by the ad hoc working groups at Headquarters and A1 Hibbs' Space Sciences
Division at JPL.
On December 28, 1959, representatives of NASA Headquarters met with
Pickering and his senior staff to review plans for Ranger. Pickering recommended
pursuing the Vega spacecraft and flight mission plans in Project Ranger. The
savings in time and money appealed to everyone, and so did the possibility of
surpassing the Soviets. _6 Headquarters personnel authorized JPL to proceed in
Project Ranger with what had been the Vega planetary spacecraft and flight
sequencing. By implication, they also sanctioned Vega's scientific experiments-sky
science ventures on the first two Ranger engineering test flights, planetary science
on the three lunar rough-landing missions. Newell assured his associates at NASA
that the five Ranger missions appeared to be "well thought out from the scientific
point of view. ''t7 Early in 1960 Headquarters officially approved the list of
experiments for all five flights (Table lI). TM
Capable of performing sky science experiments and of exploring the distant
planets, the Ranger spacecraft would be far more complex than a vehicle designed
for lunar missions had to be. The commitment to develop such a machine
demanded a major technological advance--from small spin-stabilized earth-
orbiting vehicles weighing tens of kilograms to a completely attitude-stabilized
planetary machine weighing hundreds of kilograms. The first earth satellites had
been equipped with small radios to transmit data to stations several hundred
kilometers below. The Ranger spacecraft would be able to accomplish tasks
automatically in response to a preset program, to process and transmit diagnostic
and scientific information, and to receive and respond to commands sent to it from
the earth-not just at lunar distances but at interplanetary distances of millions of
kilometers. Whether the decision to pin the fortunes of lunar exploration on the
development of such a machine within a little more than a year was wise or not,
officials at NASA and JPL recognized the task as a high-risk venture--one sure to
tax the technology and skills both in and out of the Laboratory in Pasadena.
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Table IL The Original Ranger Space Science Plan
Ranger test flights
Experimem Agency and sciemist
Solar corpuscular (plasma) detector
Photoconductive particle {trapped radiation)
detectors
Rubidium vapor magnetonreter
Vehicle charge
Triple-coincidence cosmic ray telescope
Cosmic-ray integrating ionization chamber
Lyman alpha scanning lelescope
(hydrogen geo-coronal
Micrometeorite dust particle detectors
Experimenl
JPL: M.M. Neugebauer, C.W. Snyder
Stale University of Iowa: J. A. Van Allen
GSF(': J.P. tteppner
Not specified
University of Chicago: J. A. Simpson
Caltech/JPL: H.V. Neher, tt.R. Anderson
Naval Research Laboratory: T.A. Chubb
GSt:C: W.M. Alexander
Ranger lunar flights
Agency and scientist
Single-axis passive seismometer a
Capsule temperature measurenrenl
Maximum deceleration at impact measurement
Gamma-ray spectrometer b
Television camera b
Caltech: Frank Press
Columbia University: M. Ewing
U.C. San Diego: ,I. R. Arnold
JPL: A. t'. Melzger
LASL: M.A. VanDilla
Experimenter Team representing various
agencies to he assigned
aCapsule to survive hard landing.
bspacecraft bus destroyed on impact.
CREATING THE RANGER MACHINE
On February 1, 1960, Dan Schneiderman issued the design concepts and
criteria for the Ranger spacecraft. _9 Since the Vega third-stage vehicle had
employed a hexagonal truss and six longerons, the Ranger spacecraft possessed
hexagonal symmetry (Figure 21). JPL experience in electronics packaging on the
Corporal and Sergeant missiles suggested the use of modular construction of
electronic equipment to withstand high levels of vibration. These modules would
be packaged in plain rectangular boxes, one bolted to each of the six sides (Figures
22 and 23). Above the 1.5-meter (5-foot) diameter hexagon would rise a "tower"
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Fig. 21. Ranger Spacecraft Preliminary Design
Fig. 22. Spacecraft Packaging
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Fig. 23. Typical Assembly Package
that supported the fixed low-gain antenna and various scientific experiments.
Conforming to design concepts that called for tall structures, the tower would
become a permanent feature on all early JPL lunar and planetary spacecraft. Below
it, two solar panels would be attached to opposite sides of the bus; a 1.2-meter (4-
foot) diameter high-gain dish antenna would be stowed directly beneath the
spacecraft. Both the solar panels and the dish antenna would be hinged at the
frame, designed to swing out from the bus after the spacecraft had been placed on
its trajectory in space.
This spacecraft was to be used on the first two test flights, which, with their
sky science purpose, were designated Block I. The three further flights, which
would photograph the moon and deposit seismometers on its surface, were
designated Block II. The three Block II spacecraft would incorporate the midcourse
engine and maneuver capability, and a tower to support the seismometer capsule
and its retrorocket. Prior Atlas-Agena studies had yielded an estimated weight of
360 kilograms (800 pounds) for the lunar spacecraft, comparable to the weight-
lifting performance expected of Atlas-Vega.
Systems Division Chief Schurmeier created a Spacecraft Design Specifica-
tions Book to guide the JPL design activity and to describe the mission objectives,
design philosophy, design restraints (weight, schedule, power, etc.), and functional
requirements (what each subsystem was intended to do, and their interactions).
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NASA, through Cummings and Burke at JPL, would provide project objectives
and guidelines; the Systems Division would integrate the complete design and test
the assembled spacecraft. Other JPL technical divisions would prepare Ranger's
detailed design, procure parts, fabricate components, and test each subsystem. To
conserve time and quickly demonstrate the technology for planetary missions,
changes in the spacecraft design were to be minimized.
As a surrogate of man in the cosmos, the Ranger spacecraft was to serve a
four-fold purpose: first, to deliver its scientific cargo to a celestial target within
certain tolerances, then position the experiments, perform the proposed scientific
program, and transmit the results back to earth. Priorities for Project Ranger,
released by Cummings on February 17, 1960, conformed to this progression. In
descending order of importance, he committed JPL to (I) develop the spacecraft
technology, (2) maintain schedules, (3) establish industrial support for NASA-JPL
planetary flight missions, and (4) support science. 2fjAlthough included on the test
flights, sky science thus initially held a low position in the scheme of project
activities as Cummings and Burke sought to create the technology first, then
pursue lunar investigations. In authorizing the eight experiments for the
engineering test missions, Silverstein agreed that sky science was not to interfere
with the creation of the spacecraft technology. 2_
But NASA had specified scientific investigations of the moon as the
objective of the Block II Rangers-to acquire more knowledge about our celestial
neighbor. 22 Approved in early 1960, the planetary experiments included a
television camera to return closeup photographs of the moon, a seismometer to be
deposited upon it, and a gamma-ray spectrometer to determine the chemical
composition of the surface material. 23 The midcourse trajectory and terminal
attitude maneuvers to be incorporated in these spacecraft would position the
television camera to take pictures of the moon, and permit release of the
seismometer capsule just prior to impact. However, in a compromise between the
scientific objective stipulated by Headquarters and the necessity to create the
required technology, technology remained the clear emphasis for the engineers
charged with Ranger's prosecution. As the project got underway, the priorities
established at JPL revealed the essential purpose of all five Ranger flights to be the
development of "basic elements of spacecraft technology required for lunar and
planetary missions.-24
Under direction of the Systems Division, design of the two test spacecraft
moved ahead smoothly, and was completed by May 1960 (Figure 24). 2s To reduce
complexity to manageable proportions, the engineers divided the spacecraft system
into functional subsystems that corresponded to the responsibilities of the line
divisions at the Laboratory. The Telecommunications Division, headed by
Eberhardt Rechtin, handled the spacecraft command, telemetry, and communica-
tions subsystem; Eugene Giberson and the Guidance Control Division looked after
attitude control, power, and central control; Geoffrey Robillard's Propulsion
Division was responsible for spacecraft pyrotechnic squibs and actuators, and-on
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Block II-midcourse propulsion; the Engineering Mechanics Division, led by
Charles Cole, developed the thermal control, structures, electronics packaging, and
cabling for the spacecraft; and Hibbs' Space Sciences Division dealt with the
scientific instruments and their control data automation subsystem. Apportioned so
that one individual could comprehend an entire subsystem, each one was assigned
to a "cognizant engineer" by the respective division chief; the cognizant engineer,
in turn, further subdivided the work and guided subsystem development.
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Fig. 24. Ranger and 2 Spacecraft Design
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The tasks to be accomplished by the respective Ranger spacecraft may be
seen most readily as a set of increasingly complex phases of operation, as shown in
Table III.
Ranger had to be designed to operate in free fall and the hard vacuum of
outer space. Lacking the protection of the earth's atmosphere, it would be
bombarded by radiation from the sun across the entire energy spectrum. Ranger
would also demand 100-150 watts of power to operate a host of electronic
components. This energy could be supplied continuously by the 1.86 square meters
(20 square feet) of solar panels weighing 18 kilograms (40 pounds) or, for up to
two days, by a 54-kilogram (120-pound) silver-zinc storage battery. But the
electrical power consumed by its onboard instruments would reappear all over the
spacecraft in the form of heat that had to be carried away if the instruments were
to continue functioning efficiently. After considerable effort, this problem was
solved: the final design minimized direct solar energy input and matched it with
heat radiated to space without involving any active elements of the spacecraft in
this task. Thus, heat levels would be controlled passively-by conduction and
radiation-through the use of aluminum and magnesium alloys in the structural
elements, by various coatings such as reflective paint and gold plating of electronic
boxes, and by carefully distributing heat sources throughout the spacecraft. The
electronic boxes themselves were vented so that all equipment operated in the
vacuum of space.
Telemetry would determine and record the health of the spacecraft. In all of
the subsystems, near-continuous measurements of voltage, current, temperatures,
Table Iil. Progression of Ranger Spacecraft Technology
Mission phases Blocks
Launch (spacecraft as passenger)
Postlaunch (active period, spacecraft separation, solar panels :,nd dish antenna
extended, acquisition of sun and earth)
Cruise (in tree fall, oriented to sun and earth)
Midcourse maneuver (active period, attitude change, engine burn, reacquisition
of sun and earth)
Cruise (:is above)
Lunar operations (active period, terminal :ltlilude maneuver. TV, seismomeler
capsule launch)
at'lights 1 ;ind 2.
bl:lighls 3, 4, m_d 5.
I a II b
I II
II
I1
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and pressures were to be sampled, channeled through a telemetry coder, and
transmitted by radio to receiving stations on earth, where engineers could evaluate
the data. But maintaining the health of the spacecraft, so dependent on
temperatures, required keeping the vehicle properly oriented in space. That
orientation would be determined by information received from photoelectric eyes,
and through a working nervous'system which included its own electronic brain
and gyroscopic sense of balance that directed the motion of the spacecraft by
expelling cold nitrogen gas. Especially heavy activity in spacecraft attitude control
would occur during initial acquisition of the sun and earth, in the midcourse turns
commanded by a central controller with the "muscle" provided by the cold gas
jets, and at midcourse motor burn when a special, powerful autopilot would steady
the spacecraft attitude by means of vanes in the rocket exhaust.
For its lunar mission, Ranger's brain would be a miniature central
computer and sequencer. This element began as a complex alarm clock on the
Block I spacecraft; it was to time and trigger events after launch and enable
Ranger to convert from its role as a rocket passenger to that of independent
spacecraft (i.e., open the solar panels, activate the solar alignment, and point the
dish antenna at the earth). With the midcourse maneuver phase added to refine
the lunar trajectory for Block II spacecraft, engineers coupled a computer to the
sequencer. Unlike the latter, the computer could receive such numerical
information from earth stations as the direction and size of rocket thrust required,
then initiate the maneuver on command.
The central computer and sequencer would receive its information from the
command subsystem using decoding components in the spacecraft and encoding
components on the ground. Other spacecraft activities would also be initiated by
communications passed through this system. The radio link was to consist of a
powerful transmitter on earth and a very sensitive receiver in Ranger. The same
radio system would contain a spacecraft transmitter that conveyed the diagnostic
telemetry and scientific experiment data to the earth receivers. Ranger's radio
would also operate at radar frequency, and the signal loop-which could carry
command, telemetry, and scientific data all at once-would provide accurate two-
way doppler tracking at the ground receivers. Before sun acquisition or during the
midcourse maneuver, commands to or data from the spacecraft would pass
through the low-gain antenna atop the tower; in the stabilized cruise mode and at
lunar encounter, the more powerful high-gain dish antenna beneath the spacecraft
was to be used. 26
Totaling 270-320 kilograms (600-700 pounds), Block I spacecraft
represented a complicated array of interdependent subsystems. The decision to fly
scientific experiments on these two engineering test missions precluded adding
many redundant or duplicate engineering devices such as a second central
controller or attitude control components. The design did include a backup low-
power transmitter with independent battery power supply; nevertheless, to a
greater extent than might have been preferred by its designers at JPL, the craft
depended upon successive functioning of unique components in series; that is to
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say, the proper operation of each subsystem largely determined the operation of its
neighbor. A failure in the attitude control or power subsystems, for example, would
have adverse effects throughout the spacecraft. To compensate, engineers planned
more redundant features for the lunar spacecraft. Among other changes to the bus,
they expected to add a second set of attitude control gas jets and a separate gas
supply, in addition to the backup low-power transmitter.
Of all the physical changes, a modified tower above the Block II spacecraft
was the most noticeable. The JPL-designed hydrazine monopropellant midcourse
rocket engine, another addition, would be tucked away out of sight beneath the
hexagonal bus. The tower supported the seismometer capsule and its retrorocket;
aimed at depositing the seismometer on the moon, the entire assembly was a major
subsystem in its own right. Like the spacecraft in inherent complexity, the capsule
subsystem had to be designed and developed at the same time as the bus. Short on
manpower and facilities, and responding to the wishes expressed at NASA
Headquarters to engage industry in the space program, JPL immediately sought
out an industrial firm to design and fabricate this science subsystem. Two weeks
after formal NASA approval of Project Ranger in February 1960, three companies
received contracts for competitive design studies of the capsule. On April 15 they
returned proposals to JPL for evaluation. Ten days later NASA Administrator
Glennan announced that the Aeronutronic Division of Ford Motor Company had
been selected to build the seismometer subsystem. 27
The Aeronutronic design was novel, its schedule ambitious. The firm
proposed to fabricate, assemble, test, and deliver by September 1961 the required
number of 134-kilogram (300-pound) capsule subsystems for a cost of $3.6
million. The design mounted the capsule above a solid-propellant retrorocket; a
radar altimeter would signal separation and firing of the capsule's motor at a
specified distance above the lunar surface. The full capsule, which was then to
separate from the motor, incorporated a crushable outside shell or impact limiter.
Inside, a spherical metal survival package floated in fluid to distribute and dampen
the structural loads at impact, and to allow erection of the package to local vertical
by moon gravity after the capsule came to rest. In addition to tiny batteries, the
survival package would contain the single-axis seismometer already being
developed by Caltech's Seismological Laboratory and the Lamont-Doherty
Geological Observatory at Columbia University. Erection to local vertical on the
moon would permit the sensitive axis of the seismometer to be positioned correctly,
and allowed deployment of a modest directional transmitting antenna. 28
The Aeronutronic firm appointed Frank G. Denison manager of its Lunar
Systems, the group formed to develop the capsule subsystem. A Caltech graduate
and former JPL Section Chief, Denison was well known at the Laboratory. He
would report to Burke and Kautz in the Ranger Project Office, and to Schurmeier's
Systems Division, which would integrate and test the capsule subsystem in the
assembled spacecraft. In June, Denison selected and JPL approved the subsidiary
contractors to fabricate the major components of the capsule subsystem: Hercules
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Powder Company, solid-propellant retrorocket; Ryan Aeronautical Company,
radar altimeter; and Rohr Aircraft, capsule support structure (Figure 25).
The Ranger spacecraft design had reached an advanced stage, with the
scientific content agreed upon and the principal contractors selected. Before, in the
minds of the participants at NASA and JPL, the name Vega had been associated
with a launch vehicle. In the months to follow the name "Ranger," besides acting
as a project designation, came to apply increasingly to a specific spacecraft genre.
Its design concepts and functions had grown from Juno IV in 1958 via Vega in
1959 to become Ranger in 1960. A machine capable of planetary missions
appeared destined to inaugurate NASA's program of lunar exploration.
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Chapter Four
RANGER'S LUNAR OBJECTIVES IN
DOUBT
N 1960 Jim Burke found himself enmeshed in the project-wide organization and
management imbroglio, and drawn increasingly away from spacecraft affairs at
JPL. More and more time was required to define and hammer out project
requirements and responsibilities among the participating organizations. Solving
such questions as who would provide needed launch equipment, the type, and
when and where it should be delivered often proved as frustrating for the project
manager as trapping quicksilver with one's fingers. But the recognized risks in the
management side compounded other, less obvious technical risks associated with
the new and unproved spacecraft.
A DIFFERENCE IN WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Even as NASA and JPL selected contractors to make components for the
spacecraft in mid-1960, questions of weight threatened plans for the Ranger Block
II final design. The difficulty suddenly appeared in the form of revised Atlas-Agena
performance figures. Original preinjection trajectory calculations-from launch to
the second burn of the Agena--had been obtained by NASA from General
Dynamics-Astronautics, the Atlas contractor, at the beginning of Project Ranger.
They had been used at JPL in determining spacecraft weights and for computing
postinjection trajectories-from the second burn of the Agena to the end of the
mission. On July 1 I, Lockheed submitted new ascent trajectory figures through the
Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in Inglewood, and these figures contained a
significant discrepancy: they specified 34 kilograms (75 pounds) less weight
available for the Ranger lunar spacecraft. 1 To determine the reason for the
difference in figures between General Dynamics and Lockheed, Burke ordered an
immediate investigation and, pending the outcome, directed Schurmeier's Systems
63
64 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJECT RAN(iER
Division to take all reasonable measures to lighten the spacecraft short of
removing planned equipment. 2
The uncertainty over spacecraft weights could not have occurred at a worse
time. A firm launch schedule for Ranger had just been issued by NASA,
committing the two engineering test vehicles to fly in July and October 1961, and
the three lunar missions in January, April, and July of 1962. _ Far more disturbing
than that, planning for the final design of lunar spacecraft to meet this schedule
was well underway, and could not continue in an orderly manner if the engineers
did not know the weights they had to work with. The test spacecraft needed only
some 300 kilograms (675 pounds), and were not adversely affected, but the lunar
spacecraft needed the entire 360 kilograms (800 pounds) that the Atlas-Agena B
had been projected to carry to injection. The capsule subsystem alone weighed 135
kilograms (300 pounds). Nevertheless, the critical disparity in trajectory figures
was not soon resolved.
The trajectory problem, like other launch vehicle management problems in
1960, was nourished by the still unsettled state of project management. At the
outset, NASA and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division had failed to designate a
single organization to perform all of the trajectory computations for Ranger
missions. With the new performance figures disputed, Lockheed's participants on
the Agena B Coordination Board urged that they be given this function. JPL
representatives Cummings and Burke, reluctant to delegate this important work
and skeptical of the Lockheed calculations, opposed such a move. The question
remained in the hands of the Board as summer turned to fall, and fall to winter.
Meantime, without a single set of confirmed trajectories, the allowable weight of
the Ranger lunar spacecraft remained in limbo. 4
While the question of Ranger trajectories deepened the paralysis of the
Agena B Coordination Board, JPL lightened the bus chassis for the lunar
spacecraft as much as possible. Magnesium replaced aluminum in covers, tubes,
and fittings. Engineers shaved the thickness of structural members, and directed
that minimum size wire and lightweight insulation he used in the power
subsystem. As an extreme measure, Cummings ordered holes drilled in the
electronic boxes to save a further few ounces, and parts of the craft began to
resemble Swiss cheese. Projections of the total weight expected for this machine
nevertheless remained above the limit of 325 kilograms (725 pounds) specified by
Lockheed, and by fall Denison had added his own reservations to the weight
question. The Aeronutronic capsule subsystem, he informed Burke, would probably
exceed the 135-kilogra m ( 300-pound ) limit.
Believing the Lockheed calculations questionable, Burke delayed ordering
any major changes in the final design. To members of the Agena B Coordination
Board, he made the point abundantly clear in October: the Lockheed data could
have been revised downward "somewhat arbitrarily by the Air Force," he
declared, "and may not represent the true capability of the [Atlas-Agena] vehicle."
Discord over who would prepare the complete lunar trajectories, he continued,
made it impossible for JPL to obtain a set of definitive trajectory calculations and
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to clarify the divergence in performance figures previously computed for the Atlas°
Agena B by General Dynamics and Lockheed. _
Despite prodding, two more months elapsed before the Ranger participants
agreed even to a statement of work for preparing trajectories. Signed by JPL, the
Air Force, Lockheed, and the NASA Agena office in Huntsville, the document was
issued on December 14, 1960. It called for the preinjection trajectory to be
computed by Lockheed in accord with JPL-furnished specifications. The
postinjection trajectory would be prepared by JPL. Finally, a third party, the Space
Technology Laboratories (STL) would integrate the two trajectories and generate
accurate firing tables under a separate Air Force contract. 6
This compromise did not actually provide the "definitive trajectory
calculations" JPL needed to determine a final weight for Ranger. Moreover, STL
could not promise the final set of trajectories for six months-hardly in time for the
launch of Ranger l-and that was contingent upon receiving the JPL and
Lockheed pieces of the work. Decisions on the Block II final design and weight
could not be postponed much longer. On January i 1, 1961, JPL engineers agreed
on the placement and way of mechanizing the last outstanding item on the lunar
spacecraft. The low-gain antenna would be located above the survival capsule,
mounted on a boom to be swung away from the spacecraft, permitting ejection of
the capsule subsystem near the moon. 7 For Burke in the Ranger Project Office, a
further delay on a decision of final weight of the lunar machine would amount to a
decision not to meet the Ranger 3 launch date in January 1962. Time had run out.
Burke and Cummings faced two uncomfortable choices. They could slip the
lunar flight dates month-to-month at the possible expense of seeing the Soviets win
more lunar laurels-while hoping for an increase in weight from the definitive set
of STL trajectory calculations-or they could freeze the spacecraft design at the
lightened weight specified in the Air Force-Lockheed figures regardless of any
allowable increase that might eventually be found, thus permitting the project to
remain on schedule. The Soviets helped Burke and Cummings make up their
minds when, on February 12, 1961, they launched a 450-kilogram (1000-pound)
spacecraft on a flyby trajectory past Venus. This spacecraft possessed three-axis
attitude control, oriented solar panels, a high-gain dish antenna, and made use of
an earth parking orbit-all of which Ranger was supposed to have demonstrated
(Figure 26). Though the mission was destined to fail, the Soviet attempt at a deep
space mission that JPL claimed as its own keyed Ranger participants to a "pinch-
hitter's" state of mind.
At the Laboratory, Jim Burke nailed a picture of his Soviet competitor,
Venera 1, to the wall directly in front of his desk. Next to it he pasted an old
proverb: "The better is the enemy of the good." He would call that aphorism to
the attention of those proposing design changes that involved major delays. Design
changes would continue to be minimized, delays proscribed. And while there was
some sentiment in Silverstein's office to postpone the Ranger flights, it was
strongly resisted at JPL. Pickering, Cummings, and Burke were saying with former
NASA Administrator Keith Glennen that schedule "postponements should be
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viewed with concern, not regarded as normal procedure.'8 In the face of the Soviet
challenge, flight schedules for Project Ranger remained firm. The lunar spacecraft
would necessarily have to shed more weight.
Four days after the launch of Venera 1, though still distrusting Lockheed's
performance figures, Burke notified the Systems Division that "...we must begin
removing items from the spacecraft." Original plans to include a redundant set of
attitude control gas jets had already been abandoned. Now Burke instructed
Schurmeier to remove the backup low-power transmitter and its battery, as well as
a set of engineering instrumentation gyroscopes (to be used to determine initial
sun-earth acquisition rates) and their associated equipment on all the lunar
spacecraft. In addition, he asked that the Systems Division "review the entire
instrumentation schedule and remove a portion of the [engineering telemetry]
equipment so as to save weight at the expense of creating a higher-risk situation,"
and "continue to insist that the capsule, which is currently overweight, must meet
its weight goal of 135 kilograms (300 pounds) or not fly" on Ranger. 9
Burke announced the decision to other project participants a few weeks later
at the ninth meeting of the Agena B Coordination Board. At an anticipated 330
kilograms (730 pounds), Ranger 3 would still be some.what heavier th_in available
performance figures allowed. Nevertheless, Burke insisted, "JPL believes that the
allowable weight may turn out to be more like 355 kilograms (790 pounds). ''_° In
April 1961, still holding to this opinion, the Ranger Project Office "froze" the
final design of the lunar spacecraft at the reduced weight.l_ Additional equipment
would be stripped from these machines only in the event that STL confirmed the
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available trajectory calculations. No more equipment would be removed on the
strength of suspect figures.
In fact, as Burke had surmised, no weight reduction campaign had ever
been necessary. On May 28, shortly before assembly of Ranger 3 began, STL
issued the definitive trajectory calculations for Ranger missions. To his superiors at
JPL, Burke glumly reported that an additional 74 kilograms (164 pounds) were
available for Block I and 52 kilograms (I 16 pounds) for Block II spacecraft,
resulting in confirmed total weights of 371 kilograms (824 pounds) and 378
kilograms (841 pounds), respectively. This increase in allowable weight was, he
explained, simply "unexploitable at this late date. ''n When assembled in the fall,
Ranger 3 weighed in at 327 kilograms (727 pounds). Rangers 1 and 2, already at
Cape Canaveral, each weighed 304 kilograms (675 pounds). For these particular
planetary spacecraft, all options for improving reliability through redundant
features had been irretrievably lost. The road to Ranger, recognized as a high-risk
avenue from the management standpoint in 1960, had been paved with still graver
technical risks in 1961 because the spacecraft was lightened to meet an erroneous
weight limitation. _3
PREPARING FOR THE TEST FLIGHTS
Between June 1960 and August 1961, while the Ranger officials in
Pasadena wrestled with the various problems of project management and
spacecraft weights, Rangers 1 and 2 were fabricated and tested. In performing
these tasks, JPL followed the pattern of missilery that relied on preliminary
engineering flight missions to test the entire space and ground components of the
system._4 For these first Ranger flights, however, JPL employed three versions of
the spacecraft to validate the final design: a spacecraft mockup, a thermal control
model, and a proof test modei._5 Engineers used the mockup, constructed in July
1960, to confirm the mechanical aspects of the spacecraft, including cabling and
the layout of equipment. The thermal control model was then assembled and tested
in a 2.7-meter (6-foot) diameter vacuum chamber, where conditions in outer space
could be approximated. Though lacking active electronic components, this model
held equipment containing resistors and other equivalent heat-producing sources,
and perfected the design for passive thermal control.
The proof test model would be as nearly identical to the actual flight articles
as possible but subjected to tests above the performance and stress levels expected
during the actual flight of Rangers l and 2. As the name implied, the proof test
model was used to shake down the design. All of the unforeseen and undesired
characteristics that appeared here in testing could be isolated, identified, and
corrected before assembly of the flight machines began. This particular test
program, though more severe, essentially duplicated that planned for the flight
Rangers. But most important were the qualifying tests of each component and
subsystem undertaken by the JPL technical divisions, and systems tests conducted
by the Systems Division (Figure 27).
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Fig. 27. Ranger Block I Proof Test Model and Nose Shroud Mockup
Although each spacecraft test was important, the systems tests were crucial.
Missiles had previously been tested at the subsystem level at JPL, then assembled
and launched at White Sands in a test of the "system." The idea of testing the
total spacecraft system prior to flight was new. This preflight check corresponded
as nearly as possible to all of the mission phases planned for Ranger, and was
divided roughly in two: mission sequencing and environmental tests. First, by
means of elaborate test consoles, cables, and radio-frequency links, engineers
exercised the proof test model, flight spacecraft, and scientific instruments through
their complete sequence of operations from launch to end-of-mission. Commands
would be sent to the space machine, events monitored against expected
performance, and discrepancies rectified by repair or replacement of parts (Figure
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28). Second, environmental testing meant evaluating the spacecraft in the specific
conditions encountered at launch and in space operations. Here, the spacecraft was
first mounted on a large "shake table." Such a table, weighing hundreds of
kilograms, vibrated the spacecraft at various amplitudes both in horizontal and
vertical planes, approximating conditions to be expected during ascent atop the
Atlas-Agena B. To test its thermal design and performance in a vacuum, the
spacecraft, less solar panels, was suspended and operated inside the 2.7-meter (6-
foot) diameter vacuum chamber. As in the other qualifying tests, its conductors
monitored or commanded appropriate functions by means of wire cables and test
consoles.
Thorough testing of the spacecraft, however, required facilities beyond
those available in 1960. A missile assembly building, used in JPL's programs for
Army Ordnance, doubled as the spacecraft assembly and mission sequencing test
area. Next door, another small building housed the shake table and small vacuum
chamber to be used for the environmental tests. With modification, these facilities
could serve the immediate needs of Project Ranger in makeshift fashion; they
would, nevertheless, be inadequate to accommodate other NASA lunar and
planetary spacecraft scheduled to be assembled at the Laboratory in 1961 and
1962.
Fig. 28. Ranger I in Systems Test Complex
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With the test procedures established in 1960, NASA and JPL officials
completed plans for the necessary facilities. By July, contracts had been issued for
the construction of (1) a spacecraft assembly facility to be used for assembly and
functional tests; (2) an environmental laboratory, for shock tests and testing on
larger shake tables and in the small vacuum chamber; and (3) adjacent to the
environmental laboratory, a cylindrical building to house an eight-story, 7.5-meter
(25-foot) diameter, vertical vacuum chamber in which the complete spacecraft
could be tested on simulated missions to the moon and planets. Contractors
completed the first two of the new facilities in mid-196 l, in time to accommodate
the Block II spacecraft. But the large vacuum chamber, because of problems
encountered with the artificial solar heat and light sources, would not be placed in
operation until November 1962. None of the five Ranger spacecraft could be tested
there. Thus, the importance of Ranger's first two test flights was emphasized. They
would serve as engineering missions in the vacuum of outer space to provide
equivalent data on flight performance that could not otherwise be obtained in
available ground test complexes.
In Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Programs, JPL's progress on the
entire project, including Ranger testing, was monitored and evaluated against
NASA guidelines by Oran W. Nicks. Born and raised on a ranch in the southwest
in the dust and depression of the 1930s, Nicks took an intensive two-year course at
Spartan College of Aeronautical Engineering in Tulsa in 1942 and 1943; then,
after service with the Army Air Forces, worked his way to a degree in mechanical
engineering at the University of Oklahoma in 1948. First with North American
Aviation on the West Coast, later with Chance-Vought Aircraft in Texas, he held a
succession of increasingly responsible positions. In March 1960 he joined NASA as
Chief of Lunar Flight Systems (Figure 29). Circumspect, disciplined, and practical,
Nicks possessed an instinct for fathoming complex situations rapidly and
accurately. The technical advances required to achieve Ranger's lunar objectives,
he believed, warranted more cautious reflection and a less open display of
confidence and self-assurance by his JPL colleagues. Technical prospects aside,
from past experience he could be sure of one thing. Regardless of their Caltech
credentials, the informality of JPL project personnel and the casual attire they
sometimes sported in meetings at Lockheed and Cape Canaveral provoked
unfavorable reactions among the colonels and generals of the Air Force who were
expected to make room for NASA's Ranger.
Beyond different backgrounds, James Burke and Oran Nicks differed in
their attitude towards schedules and testing. For Burke and his associates, meeting
schedules and costs-even if it meant lightening the spacecraft and removing tardy
or overweight scientific experiments-assumed first importance. Reliability would
be achieved through the sound design of the hardware. Testing necessarily had to
be compressed to fit the NASA schedules within available facilities. _6 Nicks, less
inclined to accept the swift schedules established in response to the Soviet
challenge, was more disposed to slip flight dates, even at the risk of increasing
costs, if he believed it was required to ensure that scientific experiments got on
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Fig. 29. NASA Lunar Flight Systems Chief Oran Nicks
board, or more adequately to test and qualify spacecraft components. 17 And if
Burke reasoned in 1960 that the JPL project office ought to direct Ranger activities
in the absence of a viable project management structure, Nicks became convinced
that that office had to be more responsive to directives from NASA Headquarters,
which, after all, paid the bills and was ultimately accountable to the Congress. 18
Nicks might remain skeptical and differ with Burke on the test philosophy
and importance of schedules, but actual experience in qualifying Rangers 1 and 2
for flight further heightened confidence in the soundness of the systems test
procedures and the spacecraft design among the project engineers-heightened it at
least until the question of sterilization arose.
WHEN AND HOW TO STERILIZE SPACECRAFT
With the first earth satellites in orbit late in 1957, Detlev W. Bronk, the
president of the National Academy of Sciences, openly expressed interest in a
subject heretofore discussed quietly among biologists. Would the Chairman of the
Earth Satellite Panel of the U.S. National Committee for the IGY, he inquired, act
as chairman of a planning committee to organize a symposium on the prospects
for biological research in space, and of detecting possible low-order life forms on
other celestial bodies in the solar system? He would indeed, and the Academy was
joined by the American Institute of Biological Sciences and the National Science
Foundation in sponsoring a symposium held in 1958._9
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Before planning had progressed very far, however, one member of the life
sciences fraternity expressed a formidable reservation. In a private memorandum
circulated in January 1958, Professor Joshua Lederberg, Chairman of the
Department of Medical Genetics at the University of Wisconsin, cautioned that
earth organisms aboard spacecraft that landed on celestial bodies might reproduce,
making it impossible forever to discover and examine indigenous extraterrestrial
life forms) ° The issue was debated in the National Academy of Sciences, then
before the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), which established a
special committee to study the question. That group adopted sterilization as an
important policy, and urged both the United States and the Soviet Union to
implement measures to avoid introducing earth organisms on other bodies in the
solar system. 2t
Thus, in September 1959, even before Project Ranger officially began,
NASA Administrator Keith Glennan received a letter from the National Academy
of Sciences advising the space agency to adhere to the ICSU policy and sterilize
United States space probes) 2 If he did not foresee all of the ramifications
spacecraft sterilization might entail, Glennan did appreciate its importance for
science and the prestige of the nation. With his approval, on October 15 Silverstein
issued an initial guideline to all NASA field centers. "As a result of deliberations,"
the directive read, "it has been established as NASA policy that payloads which
might impact a celestial body must be sterilized before launching." Center
Directors were informed that "of the several means of sterilization proposed,
NASA considers the use of ethylene oxide in its gaseous phase as the most feasible
agent at this time.'23
As a target of biological interest, the moon was considerably more doubtful
than any of the inner planets. Scientific opinion, nevertheless, was divided. _4 If
there were ice or water trapped somewhere beneath the surface, microorganisms,
insulated by the material above, might exist there. On that chance NASA
Headquarters included lunar spacecraft under the terms of the directive. First in
line for detailed application of the NASA sterilization techniques, as a prototype
unmanned planetary machine, was Ranger. z5
Problems of weight and mechanical "bugs" were one thing for Ranger's
engineers. Unfamiliar worries about real live bugs was something else again. To
sterilize surgical instruments, one simply boils them in water and keeps them in an
autoclave until ready for use. But how would they sterilize a 326-kilogram (725-
pound) spacecraft and keep it sterile from Pasadena to the moon? To be sure,
bathing a spacecraft in toxic ethylene oxide gas would drastically reduce the
number of organisms on exposed surfaces; however, the gas would not necessarily
reach bacteria between joints or trapped in electrical potting substances. While this
treatment might decontaminate a machine, it could not guarantee sterility. JPL
investigators suggested "one chance in ten (perhaps a hundred) of a viable
organism remaining on the probe [as] an acceptable infection tolerance. ''26 To
attain that goal it would be necessary to heat the components, or perhaps the
entire machine. Even then full sterility might not be achieved.
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Without firm specifications on the degree of spacecraft sterility desired, JPL
established procedures believed to be consistent with expectations of reliable
equipment performance. George L. Hobby, a research biologist in the Space
Sciences Division, was placed in charge of this work. Together with Burke, in
April 1960, he formulated plans to sterilize the three lunar spacecraft, z7 The plans
called for a three-step operation embracing fabrication, assembly, test, and
transportation. All components, including the lunar capsule subsystem components,
would be assembled, then subjected to heating at 125°C (257°F) for 24 hours. This
was a compromise of sorts, because at temperatures and times above these levels,
electrical equipment often failed, while below these levels some organisms were
found to survive. The sterilized components would then be assembled and the
machine tested in a segregated area in the new spacecraft assembly facility. All
surfaces joined during assembly were to be cleaned thoroughly with alcohol.
Finally, shipped to Cape Canaveral in a controlled environment and after
completing final prelaunch tests, the entire spacecraft would be "soaked" in
ethylene oxide gas inside the Agena nose fairing. Theory held that once the
machine was rendered essentially sterile, any subsequent contamination would be
on its surface and exposed to the lethal gas.
On May 25, 1961, a date coinciding with the distressing resolution of final
allowable weights for the Block II spacecraft, Cummings submitted JPL's suggested
program for sterilizing these vehicles to NASA. It conformed to the plans made in
1960 but noted that exceptions would need to be made for certain heat-sensitive
parts. 2s NASA Associate Administrator Seamans approved this program in June
1961 in time for the assembly of Ranger 3. 29 Without question, sterilizing
spacecraft would be an expensive, new, and unusual demand upon the project-and
another burden for Burke, who, in listing 16 competing requirements for Ranger,
put reliability first in priority, sterilization fourteenth. 3°
SPACE SCIENCE AND THE ORIGINAL RANGER MISSIONS
Meantime, further difficulties for Burke cropped up in reconciling the
experimental ambitions of space scientists with the engineering requirements of
the Ranger machine. In accord with NASA General Management Instruction on
the "Selection of Scientific Experiments," April 15, 1960, Headquarters exercised
final authority, through a Space Sciences Steering Committee, over what
experiments would fly on NASA vehicles. Subcommittees, arranged by discipline,
with membership drawn from scientists at Headquarters, field centers, and the
universities, evaluated and recommended experiments to the Steering Committee
for authorized flights. The Committee-with Newell as Chairman-reviewed and
approved these recommendations, then submitted the proposed experiments to
Silverstein for final approval. Once the experiments were selected, field centers
assisted in fabricating and qualifying instruments, integrating them in a spacecraft,
and processing the data returned from them. The experimenters were thus
expected to work closely with the field center space science division and project
74 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJECT RANGER
office in realizing flight objectives, and in analyzing and publishing the findings. 3t
But the management instruction did not specify the precise relationship between
the experimenters and the field centers, neither for NASA flight projects generally
nor for JPL and Project Ranger in particular.
Burke and the engineers assigned to Project Ranger at JPL could agree with
Newell, Hibbs, and Schilling on the ultimate role of Ranger as a scientific
mission-specifically, one to investigate the moon for planetary science. Burke dealt
directly with JPL's space sciences chief Hibbs on matters of science and the
spacecraft; Hibbs, in turn, worked out details with the individual experimenters
and supported them in designing, fabricating, and qualifying their instruments for
flight. Burke pledged Hibbs his full support and commitment to the lunar goals;
Ranger would fly for planetary science. 32 But Burke elected to insulate himself as
much as possible from the interested experimenters and focus his attention upon
the project organization and technology. To him, the demands of organization, of
developing the Atlas-Agena vehicle, the spacecraft, the tracking net, and flight
operations procedure all had to be met first so that the scientific goal could be
realized. The technology, including even the technology to accommodate the
experiments-had to take priority over the science.
Burke and his fellow engineers, all the same, could by no means ignore the
science on Project Ranger. The complement of scientific instruments affected
nearly every aspect of the Ranger machine, from the center of gravity to calibrated
magnetic characteristics. The space science instruments occupied volume, added
weight, consumed power, produced heat, and demanded data handling and
instrumentation that might otherwise be given over to redundant engineering
subsystems and telemetry in the spacecraft. The project team did plan for and deal
with these complications day to day as the spacecraft design evolved. Their efforts,
however, required a delicate balancing between project science and engineering.
They proceeded without disruption only so long as NASA's basic list of approved
experiments remained unaltered. But the scientists themselves were not easily
dissuaded from proposing alterations to a list on a mere scrap of paper, especially
since, as the first, large, completely stabilized spacecraft scheduled by NASA for
launch into deep space, Ranger offered rare research opportunities for
experimenters.
On April ! 3, 1960, shortly before Burke froze the final design of the two
test vehicles, a delegation of scientists from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
and the Sandia Corporation paid a visit to Pasadena. They came to explore
prospects for placing a Vela Hotel experiment on board the Ranger Block I
spacecraft. Vela Hotel was the code name for a project managed by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC); it sought to develop a satellite-borne X-ray and
gamma-ray monitoring system that could detect above-ground nuclear explosions.
In theory, its successful operation hinged upon the absence of a natural
background source of certain X-rays. Experiments first had to be conducted to
determine whether the sun was a source of microsecond bursts of such X-rays, and
the AEC scientists were eager to fly their experiments at the earliest opportunity. 33
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Informed of their mission, Burke received the scientific delegation at JPL
with grave misgivings. He showed his visitors the Ranger spacecraft, described the
flight system, and gave them material concerning the scientific experiments and
telemetry system. Patiently, he explained that science for Rangers 1 and 2 had
already been approved by NASA, and that "no additional experiments could be
accommodated in the program as now planned." The Los Alamos and Sandia
scientists were, of course, "welcome to examine any results [obtained] with our
instruments. ''3' Far from dampening interest among his AEC guests, Burke's
cautious briefing substantiated their expectations of the spacecraft's capabilities.
They understood that Ranger, pointed at the sun as a major reference in space,
was just right for Vela Hotel. NASA Headquarters determined science policy;
Headquarters might consider more science for Ranger.
Two days later Army Brigadier General A. W. Betts, the Director of ARPA,
dispatched a letter on the subject to John F. Clark, Schilling's deputy for the
Planetary Science Program. Betts moved quickly to his point: "Since both of these
[Ranger] vehicles are scheduled to penetrate the regions of space of prime interest
to Project Vela Hotel (outside the trapped radiation fields), it is requested that as
much space, weight, and telemetry as possible be made available so that detailed
planning and design may be initiated immediately. "'3S Clark discussed the issue
with Schilling, Newell, and Siiverstein, and General Betts received a qualified
answer. NASA asked that the AEC submit a proposal explaining how Vela Hotel
would be incorporated in the Block I spacecraft. Should the experiment turn out to
be impractical, it might then be refused. On May 3, 1960, the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory and the Sandia Corporation complied. Recognizing the
design of the NASA spacecraft to be well advanced, the proposal aimed at
minimizing interference. The AEC experiment would consist of a primary battery
power source, two radiation detectors, a data handling and logic module, and the
necessary packaging and shielding. 36All in all, with some reshuffling of equipment
on Ranger, adding the experiment appeared to be entirely feasible.
In early June Cummings summarized JPL's evaluation of the proposal for
Silverstein's Lunar and Planetary Program Director, Edgar Cortright. The 5.4-
kilogram (12-pound) Vela Hotel experiment, Cortright learned, was technically
compatible with the test spacecraft. 37 Within the Laboratory, Burke notified
affected division chiefs that "it is probable we will be requested to incorporate the
experiment." He directed them to begin altering the design for just such an
eventuality. Taking these steps now, he declared, "will ease the pain of
incorporating it considerably. ''38 On June 29 Silverstein approved the new
experiment on Rangers l and 2. 39
Besides Vela Hotel, there was one other change in the complement of
scientific instruments planned for Rangers 1 and 2. 4° NASA dropped plans for the
vehicle charge experiment in May, and substituted a small engineering friction
experiment in its place. Conceived by members of JPL's Materials Research
Section in the Engineering Mechanics Division, it would measure the coefficient of
friction in the vacuum of space of various metal discs rotated at a few revolutions
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per minute by a small electric motor. 4t Engineers expected the information derived
from this experiment to prove valuable in the design of bearings and gear surfaces
for future space machines. But it was not, strictly speaking, a "scientific"
experiment. At JPL, Burke and Hibbs gave preference in design, operations, and
data handling only to scientific instruments. Accordingly, they established the
following priority among experiments to guide project engineers: (1) solar plasma
detector, (2) magnetometer, (3) trapped radiation detector package, (4) ionization
chamber, (5) cosmic-ray telescope, (6) Lyman alpha scanner, and (7)
micrometeorite detector. +2 Last, and not listed, was Vela Hotel. The entire array of
experiments for the Ranger engineering test flights was now complete (Figure
30 ).43
If the experience with Vela Hotel proved "painful" to Burke, it also left him
skeptical of Headquarters' true commitment to Ranger schedules and of its
appreciation for the engineering demands of the project. To Burke, Newell's
science staff appeared entirely too willing to hazard launch schedules and defer
demonstration of the spacecraft technology in favor of still more science. "This
difference in viewpoint," he explained to JPL Deputy Director Brian Sparks,
"adds vigor to the technology-science controversy and encourages undisciplined
efforts by our own [JPL] science people to get Headquarters to order us to wait for
them if necessary."+4 Presiding over the birth of a new spacecraft, Burke began to
view his scientist-clients as overly enthusiastic members of the family-waiting
anxiously outside the delivery room with bat and glove, eager to play ball with the
infant machine before it was able to crawl, let alone run.
A few weeks later, in August 1960, Burke's suspicions were aroused again.
Effects of the discrepancy in ascent trajectory calculations on the weight of the
lunar spacecraft had just turned that design effort into an engineer's nightmare.
What was more, contract negotiations had broken down at Lockheed over the
reduction in NASA's order for Agenas. Project schedules appeared threatened
across the board. At that moment scientists at the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory and Sandia Corporation produced a new recommendation: they
wished to fly a Vela Hotel experiment on Rangers 3, 4, and 5.45
The Ranger Project Manager received the document with incredulity. Vela
Hotel had nothing whatsoever to do with the moon. Not a single planetary
scientist associated with the lunar Rangers would endorse the new proposal if it
meant that his own lunar experiment might be compromised, much less if it were
eliminated. Having seen Rangers l and 2 reworked to accommodate the AEC
experiment, Burke had no desire to repeat that exercise on the trouble-plagued
Block II spacecraft. Several other experiments, in fact, had been recently suggested
for these lunar machines by scientists at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Should
they now be combined with Vela Hotel and approved by NASA, the ensemble
would consume 9.5 precious kilograms (21 pounds), not to mention power and
telemetry support.
After conferring with JPL's Lunar Program Director Cummings, Burke
wrote to Cortright at Headquarters and told him that the problems of weight,
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Fig. 30. Scientific Experiments on the Block I Spacecraft
packaging, power, and space prohibited accepting this AEC proposal. '_ Cummings
also urged that the Goddard science proposals not be considered for flight on the
lunar Rangers. 4v Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory received a copy of Burke's
communication to Cortright. Made aware of the seriousness of the situation, and
failing to obtain support among other mission scientists, the scientists in New
Mexico withdrew their proposal. _ For the rest, Cortright, the aeronautical
engineer, concurred with Cummings. Further experiments would not be considered
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on the lunar flights that involved the important midcourse and terminal
maneuvers.
Engineers qualified the original lunar experiments approved by NASA's
Space Sciences Steering Committee without serious delays. The 3.6-kilogram (8-
pound), single-axis seismometer developed under the guidance of Frank Press,
Director of Caltech's Seismological Laboratory, and Maurice Ewing, Director of
Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory, was basically a
magnet suspended in a coil by a spring, and restrained radially so that it
responded only to motion parallel to its axis. Tested to withstand a 3000-g impact
force, floated in a viscous fluid inside the survival sphere, it would assume a
vertical position in response to lunar gravity after the capsule came to rest. 49
Although its designers did not anticipate significant tectonic activity on the moon,
the detection of microseismic activity would significantly contribute to man's
understanding of the thermal character of the lunar body, as well as indicate the
existence of crust, core, or both, and the density distribution with depth. S°
James R. Arnold, a chemistry professor at the University of California at
San Diego, first suggested the gamma-ray spectrometer for Project Ranger. 51After
approval by NASA, Arnold developed the instrument with Ernest C. Anderson
and Marvin A. Van Dilla of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Albert E.
Metzger of JPL. The heart of this device, a scintillation detector capable of
measuring natural radioactivity emanating from lunar surface material, was
mounted on the end of a telescoping 1.7-meter (6-foot) boom. Uranium, thorium,
and potassium emit gamma-rays (very energetic X-rays) in radioactive decay.
They are also among the elements that are enriched towards the surface of a
planetary body by differentiation if the temperature below the surface has exceeded
the melting point of the rock any time in the body's history. By detecting these
gamma-rays, it would be possible to determine the degree of differentiation that
had occurred on the moon's surface-and, therefore, whether the surface material
had formed by meteoritic accretion or volcanic eruptions. The instrument, turned
on four hours after launch and extended on its boom shortly after the midcourse
maneuver, would establish background counting rates (caused by proximity to the
spacecraft) to a high degree of accuracy, and also provide the first direct
measurement of an interplanetary or cosmic gamma-ray flux, if one existed. It
would continue operating until the lunar seismometer capsule ejected at 24
kilometers (15 miles) above the lunar surface, at which time the spacecraft was
expected to tumble, throwing its high-gain antenna out of lock with receiving
stations on earth.
The 5.9-kilogram (13-pound) television camera completed the list of
experiments first approved for the lunar mission. Activated 4000 kilometers (2500
miles) above the moon, the camera would transmit high-resolution pictures of the
approaching surface until the lunar capsule was ejected. JPL awarded the Radio
Corporation of America the contract to develop the vidicon sensor, based largely
on that firm's experience in the field, particularly with the cameras for the Tiros
meteorological satellite. The Space Sciences Division at JPL fabricated the f/6
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aperture optical telescope with a 102-centimeter (40-inch) focal length, while RCA
produced the slow-scan vidicon with its deflection and focus coils, and the
supporting electronics package. _2 Under the best of viewing conditions on earth,
the largest optical telescope could obtain a surface resolution of 300 meters (1000
feet) on the moon. The last of Ranger's anticipated 100 pictures, taken at 47
kilometers (29.5 miles) altitude, would achieve a resolution of approximately 3
meters (10 feet) or better with a 200-line system, and provide planetary scientists
the first closeup pictures of the lunar surface. In October 1961, NASA's Space
Science Steering Committee appointed the experimenters who would analyze and
interpret the data to be returned by the television camera: Gerard P. Kuiper, an
astronomer and Director of the Lunar and Planetary Laboratory at the University
of Arizona; a geologist, Eugene M. Shoemaker of the U.S. Geological Survey; and
a chemist, Nobelist, and prime instigator of NASA's unmanned lunar program,
Harold C. Urey of the University of California at San Diego. s3
One more scientific experiment added to the lunar missions in early 1961
caused hardly a ripple of concern in Burke's project office. Not so much added as
devised, it involved using in a new way the existing radar altimeter, which was
designed to function as a range meter to trigger separation of the lunar capsule
assembly from the spacecraft bus at a predetermined height above the moon. No
plans existed to telemeter this radar data from the spacecraft to the earth. Walter
E. Brown, head of the Data Automation Systems Group in JPL's space Sciences
Division, examined the radar altimeter in March 1961 and prepared a memo
urging that the Ranger encoder be modified to permit telemetering the radar data
to ground stations. He averred that "the correlation between the optical [TV] data
and the Ranger 3, 4, 5 radar reflectivity data will provide information about the
dust or surface layer." Specifically, such information on the properties of the lunar
surface could include its density, conductivity, and the thickness of the layer, useful
information for scientists and the Surveyor soft-lander scheduled to follow
Ranger. 54
An associate of Brown's, Harry Wagner, soon formulated a relatively simple
method for feeding the radar data into the telemetry system in such a way that it
would not interfere with information being transmitted from the gamma-ray
spectrometer. That satisfied James Arnold, who of course had no desire to turn off
his experiment in favor of data from the radar altimeter. With all hands pleased at
this outcome and with no weight or space penalties threatening the spacecraft,
Burke approved the necessary modifications to the telemetry system. 55 Members of
Newell's Space Sciences Steering Committee agreed as well, and NASA accepted
the radar reflectivity measurement as a new experiment a few months later,
naming Brown principal investigator (Figure 31). 56
By the end of 1961, at NASA Headquarters and at JPL, Rangers 3, 4, and 5
were set as lunar missions expressly for scientific purposes. But the production of
Atlas-Agenas, the trajectory squabbles, the miscalculated weight of the lunar
spacecraft, and the unusual testing and sterilization procedures fully occupied
James Burke. He thus viewed the redetermination of the scientific experiments for
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Rangers 1 and 2 as a gratuitous and vexing exercise. And he was more than ever
determined to ifisulate Ranger from what he considered to be "undisciplined
efforts" by the scientific community to interfere with established schedules and
with the efforts needed to perfect the spacecraft bus, launch vehicle system, and
flight operations.
Chapter Five
SUPPORTING THE FLIGHT
OPERATIONS
LL the while, other JPL engineers were conceiving and building an essential
part of Ranger's operational system-the part for tracking the spacecraft's
position, retrieving its engineering and scientific information, and recording that
information on the ground. Termed here collectively as support of flight
operations, this element, like the spacecraft, was intended for NASA's use in
subsequent deep space flight projects. It came in time to consist of three distinct
components.
First there was the Deep Space Network composed of the radio tracking,
telemetry, and command stations at different points around the earth, a control
center from which to direct the activities of these stations, and the earth-based
communications network that tied the stations and control center together.
Second, there was the mission operations function; this involved, among
other things, computing the space trajectory, receiving and analyzing telemetry
data for science and data on the condition and performance of the spacecraft, and
generating the commands necessary for Ranger to complete its mission
successfully. This activity and the Deep Space Network shared a common control
center at JPL.
Third, there were launch operations that involved the preflight testing of
the launch vehicle and spacecraft at Cape Canaveral, the actual launch itself, and
the immediate tracking support downrange from Cape Canaveral that was needed
before Ranger entered its trajectory in space.
THE DEEP SPACE NETWORK
Ranger's designers recognized and accepted the limited opportunities for
flight testing and the potential for improving the reliability of a spacecraft by
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flying a single configuration repetitively. They also recognized that the
requirements for planetary space flight would be more severe than those for lunar
flight; orienting the design toward the planetary goal was a logical, forward-
looking choice. This same reasoning had led to the JPL "bus and passenger"
concept, where the functions common to the spacecraft in general were separated
and maintained from flight to flight, with changes confined to those "passenger"
items peculiar to a given mission. The ground-based systems to support flight
operations were thought of in the same way. The design and components for each
tracking station were to be made to a single, interchangeable standard. New
technology would be introduced only after it had been successfully demonstrated at
a test site, and after special recording equipment for a given space mission had
been installed at the stations for use during the lifetime of that project. As
conceived and implemented, the Deep Space Network* would support all of
NASA's unmanned deep space flight projects.
Withal, the spaceborne and earth-based segments of the Ranger system
would operate to a single purpose. Scientific information concerning the moon or
the interplanetary environment was to be the end product. The scientific
experiments would act as the sensing elements, the launch vehicle and spacecraft as
the sensor positioners. The Deep Space Network, in turn, would perform the
function of position indicator and sensor output recorder. The Network would also
permit more accurate measurement of the position and motions of objects in space
and allow the efficient transmission to a spacecraft of a command signal to alter its
position. At lunar and planetary distances, very sensitive receivers and powerful
transmitters that could be pointed directly at the spacecraft would be required on
earth, since the weight and power of the spacecraft continued to be restricted by
the modest size of the available launch vehicles. In 1958, when ARPA approved
the first Pioneer lunar probes, Eberhardt Rechtin and his associates, Walter Victor,
Henry Richter, William Sampson, and Robertson Stevens among them, turned
their attention to these new demands.
Eberhardt Rechtin was the man ultimately responsible for providing the
radio tracking, telemetry, and command of the Ranger spacecraft. Pickering's
former student in electrical engineering, he had graduated from Caltech a class
behind Burke and Schurmeier in 1946. When he came up from campus to accept a
job at the Laboratory four years later, he held a PhD cum laude in electrical
engineering. Positive, forceful, energetic, and enthusiastic, Rechtin quickly
established a reputation for his ingenious solutions to technical problems. "He
could grasp the ramifications of a complex system and foresee benefits and
problems far down the road," a colleague remarked, "when many had difficulty
seeing the road itself." In 1958 Pickering named Rechtin Chief of the
Telecommunications Division. Two years later, as the programmatic aspects of
*Originally known as the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, the name was later changed to the
Deep Space Network when more functions were added. The latter term is used throughout the text to
avoid unnecessary confusion.
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deep space tracking became evident, he was appointed Program Director of the
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility* as well (Figure 32).
Under circumstances where a spacecraft far from earth rose and set each
day like other celestial bodies, two choices for a deep space radio tracking network
presented themselves: First, a single station could be constructed in the United
States, and the spacecraft could be interrogated during a single period each day
when it came into view. Second, a network of three stations, approximately 120
degrees apart in longitude, could be constructed around the globe. While the
second choice would involve possible international political complications, it meant
that the spacecraft's transmissions could be received and the craft itself kept in
view continuously. Before NASA's creation, in the early months of 1958, Rechtin,
his colleagues in the Telecommunications Division, and the engineers charged with
*The Deep Space Instrumentation Facility was composed of the radio tracking, telemetry, and
command stations around the world. It did not include the ground-based communications network
which linked them to the control center at JPL. All three elements, the stations, communications
network, and the control center, eventually made up the Deep Space Network.
Fig. 32. JPL Deep Space Instrumentation Facility Director Eberhardt Rechtm
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design of the Juno IV spacecraft, recommended the latter course, a course which
ARPA, and subsequently NASA, approved. 2
This decision eased the difficulty in the design of the thermal control system
for the spacecraft, and it helped make more reliable the performance of electronic
parts aboard the space machine. Continuous operation of the electronics afforded
engineers a constant heat distribution pattern with which to work in designing the
thermal control system. Turned on and left on, the electronic components were also
found to possess a longer lifetime than equipment operated intermittently. Three
radio tracking stations, moreover, when fitted out with both receivers and
transmitters, added flexibility to the system's ability to detect malfunctions and to
trouble-shoot any time a spacecraft encountered difficulty. Designers of the Soviet
deep space radio tracking system selected the first approach, the single tracking
station which would view their craft for a single period each day. Operated
intermittently, their interplanetary space machine was designed with an active
thermal control system (using convection), with most of the electronics
hermetically sealed and pressurized inside a tank (see Figure 26). Early failures of
the spacecraft on deep space missions caused the Soviets to move their design and
operation more closely to the American model, and to build a second tracking
station-though both remained confined within the broad borders of the Soviet
Union. 3
Members of a JPL team began examining sites for the global deep space
stations in 1958-59. They found the first one in March 1958, near Goldstone Dry
Lake in Southern California's Mojave Desert, 160 kilometers (100 miles) east of
JPL. The choice considerably facilitated acquisition of the land, since this area lay
inside the Army's Camp Irwin military reservation. 4 Team members selected the
remaining sites in 1959: Island Lagoon, another dry lake bed, near the Woomera
Test Range in East-Central Australia, and, for the last station, a shallow valley
near Johannesburg, in the Republic of South Africa. The U.S. Department of State
worked out arrangements with the respective governments for NASA to use these
overseas sites and for the construction and staffing of the installations. _ Reporting
to the national cooperating agencies, but technically and operationally to the
American network management, the indigenous staff at the Australian and South
African stations would furnish competent and enthusiastic support to this
international venture (Figure 33).
Commercial radio stations use as much as 50,000 watts of broadcast power,
but Ranger's small transponder would radiate only 3 watts. To acquire and sort
out this signal from among the random galactic background noise and man-made
radio signals bouncing around in the earth's atmosphere, the antennas at the
tracking sites had to be very large. They also had to be steerable-to point at the
spacecraft. Finally, they had to be equipped with extremely sensitive electronics to
receive the signal from space, and have sufficiently powerful transmitters to send
commands to the spacecraft. Two of Rechtin's colleagues, Robertson Stevens and
William Merrick, quite literally "lifted" an antenna design from the radio
astronomers to meet these demands. The standard dish was 26 meters (85 feet) in
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diameter, with an equatorial or polar mount based on astronomical requirements.
Both the dish and mounting designs suited the needs of deep space tracking, where
rates of movement were significantly less than a degree per second, and where a
distant spacecraft looked more like a star in the sky than did such rapidly moving
objects as missiles or low-altitude earth satellites (Figure 34). 6
The astronomical antenna, nevertheless, had to be modified for two-way
deep space communications. The engineers added a device that would
automatically point the antenna at the spacecraft. Once contact was made using a
precalculated ephemeris, the radio signal from the spacecraft itself would be used
to drive the antenna servo pointing mechanism. The parabolic surface of the
antenna would collect and focus the spacecraft signal upon a "feed" (signal
collector) above the center of the dish, which in turn would send it to a series of
sensitive amplifiers that boosted its intensity and processed the signal. To
command or interrogate the spacecraft with the transmitter, the process was
reversed. 7
In a further modification, the transmitter and receiver on earth were
coupled to a diplexer. The diplexer permitted simultaneous transmission and
reception via a single antenna, as shown in Figure 35. Earth-to-space transmission,
known as "uplink" to its practitioners, was provided by a 10-kilowatt transmitter
operating at 890 megahertz. The Ranger transponder received this radio signal,
phase-locked with it, stripped off the uplink command data, multiplied and
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Fig. 34. Twenty-Six-Meter Radio Antenna at Goldstone
modulated the basic downlink signal with engineering and scientific telemetry,*
and retransmitted it from space to earth at 960 megahertz. This mechanization
made it possible to determine the velocity and direction of the spacecraft by
comparing the frequency transmitted to the spacecraft to the frequency received on
the earth to obtain the doppler shift. The trajectory in space could be accurately
determined from the observed "two-way" doppler shift and the position of the
antenna with respect to the earth and the spacecraft. _ The large, steerable,
*Telemetry, the technique of transmitting instrument recordings over a radio link, was pioneered
during World War II. As rockets became more powerful and flew to greater altitudes and ranges,
engineers and scientists found it increasingly difficult to gather data about the vehicle and any
experiments it carried. Most rockets could not be recovered intact after flight testing with the result
that much valuable information was lost. With the advent of radio telemetering systems, however,
various functions of the rocket's performance, such as fin position, combustion pressure, skin
temperature, missile attitude, and critical voltages in electronic gear, could be monitored in flight and
the information relayed by radio to ground receiving stations, where it was recorded for analysis.
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Fig. 35. The Deep Space Network-Spacecraft Link
parabolic antennas and continuous two-way communications would become the
salient features in all NASA space missions and in military space communications
for command and control.
NASA approved, funded, and monitored Deep Space Network develop-
ments after that agency began to function in late 1958. Edmond C. Buckley,
Silverstein's Assistant Director for Space Flight Operations, supervised the effort
from the Office of Space Flight Programs. Later, when James Webb established the
tracking and operations function as a separate program in 1961, Buckley would
become Director of the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition. A graduate of
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, personable and articulate, Buckley brought to
NASA many years of NACA experience in the development of the Wallops Island
Launch Range, where he had been responsible for the tracking and instrumenta-
tion associated with free-flight research. Buckley and Rechtin respected and liked
one another, and got on well together. No major disagreements marred the
planning and creation of the Deep Space Network.
The ground communications network connected all of the deep space
tracking stations, the tracking radars downrange from Cape Canaveral, and the
control center at JPL. Each station was tied to the control center by two teletype
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circuits and one voice circuit. Over these circuits came the administrative messages
by phone and the time-labelled tracking, telemetry, and scientific data in digital
form suited to the computers housed at JPL. 9 The Goldstone station, JPL, and
Cape Canaveral would be linked on trunk tie lines in the United States. The small
tracking antennas downrange from Cape Canaveral, in Puerto Rico, and on
Antigua and Ascension Islands, were connected by means of a submarine cable, as
was the deep space station in Woomera, Australia. But while one could talk with
colleagues in Australia directly via a submarine cable, such a direct link to South
Africa did not exist in the early 1960s. Phone calls and teletype messages to the
Johannesburg station had to pass by submarine cable to England, then by trunk
line to Spain. From North to South Africa, across an entire continent, the calls
were patched together with high-frequency radio links and land lines. Both phone
calls and teletype information from Johannesburg to JPL returned in the same
manner. A good connection over the radio segments in Africa depended on stable
ionospheric conditions, and disruptions during certain times of the day were
common.
On July 4, 1961, NASA declared the Deep Space Network, including the
deep space stations, the ground communications system, and the flight control
center at JPL, to be operational, t° As preflight shakedown tests for Ranger 1
began, however, flight controllers encountered an unforeseen problem with the
voice circuits. They found the volume on these lines decreasing precipitously as the
date of launch drew near, making it extremely difficult for the controllers at JPL to
hear their counterparts in other parts of the net. Checks of the circuits failed to
reveal clues to account for this mysterious occurrence. Then one astute observer
interrupted his conversation and called out "operator." Several voices answered
simultaneously. The volume loss had resulted from an increasing number of
operators "listening in" as the moment of launch approached. Thereafter, routings
were employed that largely eliminated this difficulty, but it did little to improve the
poor quality of the high-frequency radio links across Africa. _ With commercial
communication satellites as yet unavailable to handle this international traffic, the
radio links would have to be tolerated until 1968, when a submarine cable
connecting South America with South Africa was finally completed.
SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS
"Space flight operations" would become the art of conducting, on the
ground by remote control, a mission being performed by a vehicle in space. It
would include determining and correcting the flight path, analyzing telemetry
from space, specifying and issuing commands to the spacecraft, and recording and
processing the scientific information from the mission. This specialized activity
would also be performed in a single flight control center that served both as the
"command post" and as focus of the deep space stations, the tracking stations
downrange from Cape Canaveral, and the ground communications net that tied
these elements together around the world.
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In May 1960, detailed studies of a system that could receive, evaluate, and
process the data returned to earth, and would permit control of the maneuverable
Ranger spacecraft in space, began at JPL. The plans were completed in November,
with the aggregate effort designated the Space Flight Operations System. The
system consisted of the equipment, computer programs, and groups of technical
and operational personnel required to support Project Ranger. Since the activity
involved all of the technical divisions in a combined effort, Systems Division Chief
Schurmeier was charged with staffing and directing the new function. He would
appoint a Flight Test Director to implement the system. The Test Director would
report to him on system matters in general, and to Burke as they affected Ranger
in particular. Together, they would work out the details of space flight
operations. _2
Just as the Ranger spacecraft was broken down into subsystems, space flight
operations were likewise divided into functional components, each reporting to the
Flight Test Director. There was to be a Deep Space Station Operations Manager, a
Central Computing Facility, a Scientific Data Group, a Data Reduction Group,
and a Spacecraft Data Analysis Team. The groups would consist of the cognizant
engineers and representatives from the technical divisions who had participated in
the development and testing of Ranger's subsystems. They would receive the
engineering telemetry and determine and analyze the state of Ranger's health. At
the end of 1960 NASA and JPL officials decided to house Space Flight Operations
in a control center at JPL, along with the computers and the main technical staff.
The building containing the computer facility would be modified to incorporate
the operations rooms needed for the Ranger flights. Systems Division Chief
Schurmeier named Marshall S. Johnson as Flight Test Director. Johnson had been
employed in 1957 as one of JPL's growing collection of computer wizards. The job
of Flight Test Director called for securing the cooperation of all of JPL's technical
divisions involved in the conduct of mission operations, a task of no mean
proportions. Johnson's knowledge, persuasive talents, and demonstrated willing-
ness and ability to tackle any assignment--or anybody obstructing an assignment-
marked him as a natural choice. One year later, in October 1961, he was named
Chief of a new Space Flight Operations Section as well. _3
The flight control center took shape in 1961 prior to the flight of Ranger I.
A large room was cleared next door to the computers to serve as the operations
center. Blackboards and pinboards, used to post current flight information, lined
the walls. Desks and phones were installed for the flight operations teams.
Perpendicular to the operations center, another room housed the Science,
Command, Spacecraft Data Analysis, and Trajectory Groups. With time, Johnson
and his crew integrated more rooms, added consoles containing closed-circuit
television (allowing each controller to view incoming data in the adjacent rooms),
and replaced the blackboards with rear projection screens, where information of a
more general nature could be displayed for all to see. Johnson somehow managed
to overcome the normal bureaucratic inertia and allegiances, forced people to face
problems early, worked around the inevitable man-made complications, and
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improvised the combination of hardware, "software,"* and people that made
space flight operations and the flight control center a functioning reality (Figure
36).
The new control facility, makeshift at best, was recognized as inadequate to
deal with several space flight missions operating simultaneously, a condition
projected for post-Ranger lunar and planetary flights. In February 1961, JPL
Director Pickering formed a committee to evaluate these future requirements. The
committee recommended construction of a new building, devoted exclusively to
deep space flight operations. In July, NASA Headquarters approved the plans. _4
This building, the Space Flight Operations Facility, would be completed on
schedule and placed in operation in early 1964. As Chief of the Space Flight
Operations Section, Johnson oversaw the design and construction of the new
control center. Seemingly never wearing a coat, dressed in open shirt and red
suspenders, he could be found at work any time. His idiosyncrasies made legends
at the Laboratory. NASA Space Sciences Director Homer Newell was among those
* Software means computer programs and operating routines.
Fig. 36. JPL Space Flight Control Center, 1961
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to acknowledge Johnson's efforts at the dedication ceremony: "Planner, cajoler,
threatener, union arbitrator, designer, budget parer, trouble shooter," Newell
declared, "you name it and he had to do it-and he did. ''u
Both the original flight control center and the one that replaced it swelled
the number of new installations created expressly for NASA's deep space missions.
And all of them, including the Environmental Test Laboratory, the Spacecraft
Assembly Building, the Deep Space Tracking Stations, and the Space Flight
Operations Facility, were to be employed first in Project Ranger. So, too, were the
procedures and facilities devised for launching NASA's Atlas-Agena B vehicles at
Cape Canaveral in Florida.
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
NASA's global deep space network and space flight operations could
control Ranger once the spacecraft had been injected into its space orbit. But the
United States Air Force had first to launch Ranger from the Cape Canaveral
Missile Test Annex in Florida, a facility controlled from the Missile Test Center at
Patrick Air Force Base, situated a few miles away at Banana River. In 1960 Major
General Leighton I. Davis commanded both installations. Davis was a spit-and-
polish West Point graduate and pilot who made it plain that the new space agency,
like the Army before it, was welcome at Cape Canaveral as a tenant, subject to the
Air Force regulations that governed all operations there.16
The Air Force group responsible for actually launching the Rangers from
Cape Canaveral was the 6555th Aerospace Test Wing. The 6555th oversaw the
checkout of the assembled vehicles on the pad, as well as the launch operations
proper. This arrangement was made explicit in July 30, 1960, when NASA issued
the Agena B Launch Program Management Organization and Procedures. The same
document set forth the organizational framework that NASA had selected for its
launch operations. Thus, as with launch vehicle procurement, NASA depended on
the Air Force both for the facilities and launch support for Project Ranger. And if
the organization to procure the vehicles was complex, the one created to launch
them was equally confusing. JPL's Lunar Program Director Cummings and
Ranger Project Manager Burke would have to "manage" Ranger launchings
through the Air Force launch organization, two NASA Headquarters offices,
several subsidiary offices, and the Agena B Coordination Board. This problem
would become one of the most difficult with which they had to deal in 1960 and
1961. t7
General Ostrander's Office of Launch Vehicle Programs comprised the first
headquarters group. In March 1960, Ostrander had created a Launch Operations
Directorate with offices at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville,
Alabama, and at Cape Canaveral in Florida. The German-American Kurt H.
Debus, a longtime associate of Wernher von Braun, directed the NASA launch
organization. Composed of elements of the Army Missile Firing Laboratory, the
Debus Launch Operations Directorate acted "as the directing field agency for
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NASA in all matters concerned with NASA launchings at the Atlantic Missile
Range..." Quartered at the Cape, Debus would have direct access to General
Davis and, through intermediaries, to von Braun in Huntsville. To assist in
coordinating activities and to plan and order the range support equipment needed
for Atlas-Agena launches, Debus established a subsidiary office at Cape Canaveral
called the NASA Test Support Office._S
Launch operations also involved Silverstein's Office of Space Flight
Programs. Silverstein did not choose to let details of launch operations escape his
attention, and in March 1960 he established an organization of his own at the
range, known as the Office of Flight Missions. This group served as Silverstein's
representative at the Cape, reported directly to him, and acted as the central point
of contact for the flight project offices, including Project Ranger. In Silverstein's
view, it would further serve to "coordinate range support requirements" and
provide "administrative and logistic support to all of the NASA elements. ''_9
By June 1960, JPL hands at Cape Canaveral complained vigorously that
this bifurcated arrangement was unworkable. "Effective action [here]," one
declared, "will have to await resolution of the administrative maze. ''2° The launch
program management organization and procedures document issued in July settled
the question of authority. Although it did not reduce the number of groups in the
multifaceted organization, it at least defined what each one was and how it related
to the others. Meantime, Burke directed Luskin's Agena organization at Lockheed
to prepare an engineering plan specifying the tracking, telemetry, data processing,
data transmission, and computational facilities and equipment required for the
support of Ranger. Eventually known as the Program Requirements Document, it
contained the needs for the launch hardware and software, hammered out among
the participants.
Resolving these and other launch details dragged on throughout 1960, as
proposals bounced back and forth between the various operations offices and the
technical panels of the Agena B Coordination Board. Agreement, and the
necessary subsequent action, were painfully slow. Under the existing procedures,
engineers from Debus' Launch Operations Directorate could act as "monitors" of
NASA's launch operations, but the 6555th Aerospace Test Wing "supervised" the
actual work. In the presence of hesitancy and confusion, Air Force representatives
bluntly informed NASA: "Just tell the Air Force what you want, and we will put it
in orbit for you.'2'
Like Hans Hueter and Friedrich Duerr in the Light and Medium Vehicle
Office at Huntsville, the Launch Operations Director Kurt Debus chafed in a role
where he held responsibility for activities he could not control. As the new year
began, NASA launch operations remained in the hands of the Air Force. NASA
Headquarters might not wish to press for more direct control over launch
operations, since such a move "could only be looked upon by the Air Force as a
lack of confidence on the part of NASA," as one official later commented, 22 but the
organization formed in response to that need seemed hardly adequate.
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From a low point at the end of 1960, matters improved in early 1961. The
Agena B Coordination Board was abolished in January, and in February Burke
learned that the Air Force had authorized procurement of the mobile antennas
needed to track the Atlas-Agena downrange from Cape Canaveral. At the same
time, the Air Force made available Launch Complex 12 and Hangar AE at Cape
Canaveral for NASA's Project Ranger. Headquarters had also moved to alter the
cumbersome organization for launch operations. The new NASA Administrator
James Webb, Deputy Administrator Dryden, and Associate Administrator
Seamans argued forcefully that the Air Force might properly furnish the launch
vehicles as the procuring agency, but that NASA, as the using agency, should be
wholly responsible from launch through the completion of a mission. A NASA-Air
Force agreement of July 17, 196 I, recognized NASA as a joint tenant with the Air
Force at Cape Canaveral and called for the eventual replacement of the 6555th
Aerospace Test Wing by NASA's own launch groups over a period of timefl 3 And
shortly thereafter, in early 1962, the entire NASA launch organization was
overhauled. Meantime, however, the first Atlas, Agena, and Ranger had been
delivered to Cape Canaveral.
Chapter Six
TEST FLIGHTS AND
DISAPPOINTMENTS
Y mid-1961, project personnel were preparing for the launch of Rangers 1 and
2. These missions were to demonstrate the engineering performance of the
spacecraft and its flight support operations, provide operating experience with the
Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle, and measure, by means of sky science instruments,
fields and particles along the selected trajectories, j Each spacecraft would be
launched into a low earth orbit from Cape Canaveral. Then, upon second burn of
the Agena stage, each would be injected into a highly elliptical orbit with an
apogee (or high point) of approximately one million kilometers (620,000 miles)
and a perigee (low point) of a few hundred kilometers. Of course, with no rocket
engine aboard, no midcourse maneuver could be made. But, swinging far out into
space beyond the orbit of the moon, with an operating life expectancy of five
months, the flights of Rangers I and 2 promised a great deal: for engineers, a first
opportunity to command and exercise this new breed of spacecraft in deep space;
for sky scientists, new knowledge of the space environment from measurements
conducted over a prolonged period (Figure 37). Indeed, by 1961, just enough
scientific data on the magnetosphere and outer space phenomena had been
returned by NASA's early Pioneer space probes and Explorer satellites to hint at
the fascinating electromagnetic interactions occurring between the earth and
the sun.
PLANNING THE ASCENT
The Atlas booster, which would deliver the spacecraft into near space, was
America's first intercontinental ballistic missile. Developed in San Diego for tlae
Air Force in the mid-1950s by General Dynamics-Astronautics, it measured 18
meters (60 feet) in length, and towered five stories high. Fueled with liquid oxygen
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Fig. 37. Space Trajectory Selected for Rangers I and 2
and kerosene, it weighed 117,000 kilograms (130 tons). The rocket engines,
supplied by Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation, produced 163,080
kilograms (360,000 pounds) of thrust at sea level--equivalent to the combined
power of six Boeing 707 jet liners. To increase the weight carried into space, the
Atlas designers had radically lightened the stainless steel skin and structural
members. The structure was so light, in fact, that it could not support its own
weight. To provide the needed rigidity, the vehicle was pressurized internally, like
a balloon. The engineers also determined to ignite all three main engines at launch
since they could not be certain whether liquid propellant rocket engines could be
ignited at very high altitudes and at very low pressures (see Figure 5 ).
The Agena booster satellite, stacked atop the Atlas, had been designed by
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's Missiles and Space Division. The model B to
be used in Project Ranger employed propellant tanks of increased capacity over an
earlier model, and a Bell Aerosystems rocket engine that could be ignited in space,
shut down, then reignited to burn a second time (Figure 38). This 7248-kilogram
(16,000-pound) thrust engine consumed two noxious liquid chemicals known as
unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and inhibited red fuming nitric acid. The
Agena B would hurl Ranger into its ultimate deep space trajectory. 2
There were two methods by which Ranger could be sent into its deep space
path: the direct ascent and the parking orbit. In the first of these, the spacecraft
would be launched upward through the earth's atmosphere, directly into orbit
toward its celestial target. In the parking orbit trajectory, the upper stage of the
launch vehicle and the spacecraft would first be placed into an earth satellite orbit;
96 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJECT RANGER
NOTE :
OVERALL LENGTH -- 25 TO 37 ft (DEPENDENT ON NOSE
MAXIMUM WIDTH -- 5ft SHROUD CONFIGURATION)
WEIGHT AT SEPARATION -- 17,000 Ib COMPARTMENT HOUSING SECONDARY
ENGINE THRUST - 16,0001b BATTERIES (WHEN USED WlTH SOLAR
ARRAYS) AND AUXILIARY POWER
EQUIPMENT --_ PAYLOAD
FWDEQUIP. RACK, HOUSING: _ _- COMPARTMENT
GUIDANCE AND ATTITUDE CONTROL EQUIP. _
FLT. CONTROL ELECTRONICS "_IFJ
RECEIVING, CMD, AND TRANS. EQUIP._ JAI_
FUEL FILL AND DUMP FITTING --k _---_----_Pl__/_ HORIZON
FUEL PUMP --_ _ S'/_J SFENRSORG
EXTENDABLE SOLAR \ \ /_\ _.._/"
ARRAY (2 PLACES' -_.,,__ _1_:_ F_U_E_L!UD_.MH) TANKHELIUM _ = iPRESSURIZATIONSPHERE---_ -__ OXIDIZER(IRFNA)TANK
TIIRRINI::: =_ _'__ OXIDIZER FILLAND UMPF,TT,NG
_;_ \ _ _ _- OXIDIZERPUMP
GAS REACTION JETS (2 PLACES) -_ _ _ _ ,,vr_A,,,HYDRAULIC
ULLAGE CONTROL ROCKETS (2 PLACES) _ _ A(_T'U'A'fSI_S
NITROGEN-FREON CONTR_DERS (2 PLACES) _ (1 OF 2)
Fig. 38. Agena B Satellite Configuration (For Project Ranger, the Agena Solar Panels Were
Removed and a Spacecraft Adapter Plate Was Substituted for a Portion of the Forward
Equipment Rack. )
then an additional rocket thrust would inject it onto its deep space orbit. In both
approaches the planner could alter the launch azimuth (direction) of the ascent
from Cape Canaveral to accommodate some of the changes in position of the earth
and a celestial target. But the parking orbit trajectory offered still further
advantages for deep space missions, and the "dual-burn" feature of the Agena
made a parking orbit feasible.
Dual burn meant that trajectory planners could alter the point of launch
above the moving earth and could, therefore, aim at a wider variety of points on
the lunar target. Thus, by varying the launch azimuth at liftoff and the coasting
time of the Agena in an earth parking orbit, it would be possible to compensate
continuously for celestial motions, and expand the time allowable for the launch
interval (called the "launch window"). This increased the chance of getting a
launch away despite any countdown problems that might occur in the first
operation of these large and complex vehicles.* To simplify the operations of the
first two Ranger test missions, and to ensure that the Agena second burn would
take place within view of the downrange tracking station on Ascension Island in
the South Atlantic, predetermined values were established for the launch azimuth
and the dual burn and parking orbit. For the lunar flights, however, both the
* Were a launch window missed because of delays, the flight had to be postponed for an entire lunar
month, until the target point and lighting conditions (necessary for photography and solar power)
presented themselves again in the same geometrY.
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variable launch azimuth and parking orbit coast times would be employed,
continuing Ranger's progression from the simple to the complex in design and
operation.
At liftoff, under autopilot and programmer control on the desired launch
azimuth, the Atlas would begin a gentle arc, tilting toward the horizontal above
the earth. With data of the vehicle's performance fed into a large digital computer
at Cape Canaveral after the two outboard engines had shut down and separated,
steering commands for the sustainer phase of operation could be generated and
transmitted over the earth-to-Atlas radio link. Then, upon shutdown of the Atlas
sustainer engine, the Cape computer would predict the performance required of
the Agena booster. Two commands (parking orbit coast time and second-burn
velocity-to-be-gained) would be radioed to and stored in the Agena. Another
command would shut down the two small vernier engines on the Atlas when the
proper velocity and heading were attained.
Upon separating from the Atlas, the Agena's aerodynamic nose fairing that
covered and protected Ranger from the flow of the wind would eject automatically.
The Agena B engine would then burn once to establish the parking orbit around
the earth. After the proper coasting period, the engine was to be reignited,
injecting the vehicle onto the final transfer trajectory. All of these latter events
would take place under the command of the Agena's guidance and control unit
(composed of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and infrared horizon scanners), without
further radio control from the ground. With the final trajectory established, the
Ranger spacecraft would be mechanically separated from the Agena by a set of
springs; a few moments later, several thrusters aboard the Agena were to be fired,
carrying the booster safely away from Ranger and the moon, onto an altogether
different trajectory (Figure 39).
Apart from the proper execution of the planned ascent, the success of the
Ranger missions would also depend upon the spacecraft performing its
appropriate routine in space, upon the proper operation of the deep space stations
and the JPL flight control center, and upon how well Ranger's engineers and
scientists had performed their preflight tasks.
PREPARING FOR LAUNCH
As expected, systems tests conducted with the Ranger Block I proof test
model at JPL revealed a number of subsystem discrepancies and electrical
interferences that had to be corrected on the flight hardware. However, by mid-
1961 the first spacecraft had passed through assembly and the qualification tests on
time and without serious incident. In May, Oran Nicks examined Ranger 1 and its
complete test history. Although short on redundant features, the design appeared
sound. Nicks authorized shipment to Cape Canaveral.
The allowable launch period for Ranger 1 extended from July 26 through
August 2, 1961; its daily launch window extended from 4:53 to 5:37 am EST. For
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the first time all of the hardware for a Ranger mission was brought together, and
all entered the last round of inspections and flight acceptance tests. Once the
countdown began, the project members would also for the first time participate in
an actual launch operation. In the weeks immediately preceding launch, Burke and
Schurmeier, together with Air Force Major Jack Albert, Marshall's Agena chief
Hans Hueter, and other participants, spent an increasing amount of time at Cape
Canaveral ironing out bureaucratic differences and seeing to final details.
The participants reconciled differences of opinion, and the Ranger vehicles
and flight operations complexes finished their test cycle in June and July. Moved to
Launch Complex 12 at the Cape in late June, Agena B 6001 was stacked atop the
Atlas 11 I D. Ranger 1, attached to an adapter plate and sealed inside the nose
fairing, was then connected to the forward end of the Agena, and engineers began
combined systems tests of the assembled vehicle. The ensemble satisfactorily passed
what was termed the Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test on July 13, and was
judged ready for launch. The Deep Space Network, meantime, underwent net
integration tests involving the deep space tracking stations, the JPL control center,
the JPL command center in Hangar AE, and the tracking stations downrange from
Cape Canaveral. Although encountering some problems, especially with
communications to South Africa, 3 these tests were also deemed successful. The
control center received the tracking, engineering, and scientific telemetry data from
all of the stations in the correct format and proper sequence. 4
To permit tracking Ranger in its initial parking orbit above the earth, a
small, mobile tracking antenna had been moved to the Johannesburg station.
Though it could not track radio signals at great distances, this 3-meter (10-foot)
dish antenna possessed a beamwidth of 10 degrees-ten times as wide as the large,
permanent antennas-and it could swing at a rate of 10 degrees per second-ten
times as fast as the big dishes could be moved. A small group led by Earl Martin of
JPL readied the mobile antenna and prepared to acquire and track the rapidly
moving Ranger above South Africa, as the Agena reignited its engine to inject the
spacecraft onto its deep space trajectory. Information provided by the mobile
tracking antenna and the tracking stations downrange from the Cape would enable
the big dishes in the Deep Space Network to locate and follow Ranger 1 as it
moved out and away from the earth on its space trajectory (Figure 40))
On July 26, 1961, everything was ready; at least everything that had been
thought of and tested by myriad engineers and scientists in a dozen organizations
around the world.
A LEARNING EXPERIENCE
The first countdown for the launch of Ranger 1 began on the evening of
July 28, three days late. Trajectory information required by the Range Safety
Officer was delayed, at a cost of one day; a guidance system malfunction in the
Atlas booster consumed another; and the third was lost when engineers found that
the guidance program to be fed into the Cape computer contained an error. The
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Fig. 40. Three-Meter Antenna at Johannesburg
countdown proceeded normally into the early morning hours of July 29. Power
interruptions occurred eighty-three minutes before launch, requiring momentary
holds to permit all stations to check and recover. Then, at 5:02 am EST, twenty-
eight minutes before launch, Cape Canaveral, aglow with lights and the hum of
launch activity, was plunged into darkness. Commercial electrical power had
failed, much to the increased consternation of launch officials when they learned
why: inadequate allowance had been made for changes in cable sag caused by
variations in temperature on the new power poles recently installed at the Cape.
The launch was delayed yet another day.
The second countdown was canceled on July 30 when engineers discovered
a leak in Ranger's attitude control gas system. After the faulty seal had been
repaired and the spacecraft returned to Launch Complex 12, the third countdown
commenced on July 31, only to be terminated once again when a valve
malfunctioned in the liquid-oxygen tank on the Atlas booster.
Early in the fourth countdown on August 1, ground controllers turned on a
spacecraft command applying high voltage to the scientific experiments for
calibration purposes. Immediately all stations reported a major spacecraft failure.
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An electrical malfunction had triggered multiple commands from the central clock
timer, and Ranger l "turned on" as it had been programmed to do in orbit. The
explosive squibs fired, solar panels extended inside the shroud, and all the
experiments commenced to operate.
Project engineers disengaged Ranger 1 from the Agena and hastily returned
it to Hangar AE. Meantime the launch was rescheduled for August 22, the next
available opportunity. Subsequent tests and investigations determined the
activating mechanism to have been a voltage discharge to the spacecraft frame;
although engineers suspected one or two of the scientific instruments, they could
not determine the precise source of the discharge with certainty. In the days that
followed they replaced and requalified the damaged parts, and modified the
circuitry to prevent a recurrence of this kind of failure. 6
If the frustrating delay in the launch of Ranger l embarrassed NASA and
JPL project officials, it also vexed Burke for quite another reason. As he viewed the
matter, the ultimate loss of one month was the direct result of an unorthodox
power discharge among the sky science experiments--cargo that was incidental to
and conflicted with the primary engineering test objectives. Several of the
experimenters, moreover, had already complained to him and to JPL Space
Sciences Division Chief Al Hibbs about another kind of conflict between the
instruments themselves. J. P. Heppner, the experimenter for the rubidium vapor
magnetometer, announced that he found the friction experiment generated a
magnetic field in excess of the background field for which his magnetometer had
been designed. 7 Since the friction device was actually an engineering experiment,
he argued that space science be served by removing it from the spacecraft. For the
sake of future bearing and gear designs in space machines, J. B. Rittenhouse and
his coexperimenters likewise insisted that the friction experiment be retained.
More certain than ever that the cargo should not be allowed to further jeopardize
or delay the test flight, Burke told Hibbs and the experimenters concerned that, at
this crucial point, no changes could be made in the science or engineering content
of the Ranger Block I vehicles. Under existing schedules, each experimenter had to
obtain the best data he could from his own instrument. 8
In the evening of August 22, 1961, the fifth countdown for the launch of
Ranger l commenced on schedule at Cape Canaveral. The weather, although dear,
was still warm and humid. At 6:04 am EDT, amid incandescent flame and the roar
of the Atlas engines, Ranger 1 lifted from Launch Complex 12 and rose into the
dawn sky, leaving in its wake a luminous, spectacular trail visible over the length
of the Florida peninsula (Figure 41 ).
Like other launch officials anxiously awaiting the first return of data from
the downrange tracking stations, Burke, now the formal mission director, moved to
the JPL command post in Hangar AE. As the minutes passed, early returns were
spotty and disconnected. Both a Department of Defense tracking ship in San Juan
Harbor and the station on Ascension Island, he learned, had fought for control of
the launch vehicle's radio beacon, with the result that data from the tracking ship
were not immediately available. Nevertheless, what little information did arrive
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Fig. 41. Launch of Ranger I
seemed encouraging. Both the Atlas and Agena appeared to have performed
normally, and an earth parking orbit had been achieved. First returns from the
Mobile Tracking Station in South Africa, however, were unclear. The spacecraft
had appeared over the horizon five minutes later than anticipated. As Ranger I
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streaked eastward across the Indian Ocean, data from the mobile station suggested
that the Agena B had not ignited a second time.
Ninety minutes after launch, Burke had solid-and bad tracking news
from one of the big dish antennas at Walter Larkin's Goldstone tracking facility in
California. The Agena second burn definitely had gone improperly. With a perigee
of 168 kilometers (105 miles) and an apogee of 501 kilometers (313 miles)
altitude, Ranger I was stranded in a near-earth parking orbit-a flight profile for
which neither it nor the deep space tracking net was designed. Disappointed at this
outcome, Burke remained temporarily at the Cape, and conferred with Marshall
Johnson by phone at JPL to see what could be done to achieve at least some of the
mission's engineering objectives.
With Ranger 1 in a near-earth orbit, the deep space stations around the
globe attempted a program of low-altitude satellite tracking. But the high angular
velocity and the poor "look" angles near the horizon on many of the orbital passes
severely taxed the capabilities of the large antennas (Figure 42). The polar-
mounted antennas at the Woomera station in Australia and the Johannesburg
station in South Africa were closed down for a portion of the flight. In the days
that followed, the small dish of the mobile tracking antenna in Johannesburg, and
one of the large dish antennas at Goldstone which used an azimuth-elevation
mounting, performed the lion's share of the tracking. 9
In space, meantime, Ranger 1 struggled to meet the unusual requirements
imposed upon it by force of circumstance. Telemetry data arriving at the JPL
control center disclosed that the spacecraft had separated properly from the Agena,
had deployed its solar panels and high-gain antenna, and that the attitude control
system had stabilized the machine in three axes. With its "top hat" low-gain
antenna pointed at the sun, the solar panels were generating power, and Ranger 1
could receive and act on commands sent to it by the Goldstone transmitter.
But, designed for deep space flight, Ranger I could not meet the sustained
demands of a near-earth satellite orbit. As it passed into the shade of the earth
every ninety minutes, the spacecraft lost solar power and orientation, and had to
realign and stabilize itself anew when it reemerged again into the sunlight. This
process used the nitrogen gas of the attitude control system at a prodigious rate.
On August 24, one day after the launch from Cape Canaveral, the gas supply was
exhausted and Ranger I began to tumble in orbit. With its solar panels no longer
aligned with the sun, the machine was left with nothing but its battery as a source
of power. For the next three days telemetry continued to be received from a
number of the scientific experiments and on the performance of the spacecraft
subsystems. Then, on August 27, the main battery went dead. The telemetry output
and all spacecraft functions ceased. Blind and inarticulate, Ranger i reentered the
denser layers of the atmosphere on August 30 and was consumed in a ball of fire
over the Gulf of Mexico. _0
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Fig. 42, Deep Space Tracking Coverage as a Function of Spacecraft Altitude
As disappointing as this first flight was, project engineers in Pasadena and
their associates at NASA Headquarters could find solace in the performance of the
Ranger machine in an unorthodox situation. Even though precious little
information had been returned by the sky science instruments_-to the greater
disappointment of the scientists-engineers considered the soundness of the basic
spacecraft design to be demonstrated._2
Postflight analyses of telemetry tapes indicated the cause of the engine
failure: the Agena B restart sequence had begun at the proper time, but terminated
immediately when a malfunctioning switch choked the flow of red fuming nitric
acid to the rocket engine. Nevertheless, sufficient oxidizer gas had been expelled to
add a velocity increment of approximately 70 meters per second (158 miles per
hour), assuring Ranger I a slightly higher orbit. _3 Steps were taken to fix the
miscreant switch and resolve other tracking problems that had occurred
downrange from Cape Canaveral. Perhaps more important, in the wake of the
difficulties that had cropped up during the launch, the Air Force, the contractors,
NASA, and JPL all made extra efforts to ensure that Ranger 2 succeeded on
schedule without any more embarrassing complications.
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THE SECOND LESSON
Ranger 2, Agena B 6002, and Atlas I I7D had been delivered at Cape
Canaveral as the Ranger I mission reached its premature conclusion. Preflight
preparations began immediately to meet the launch period planned for October 20
to 28, 1961. In the weeks that followed, each of the vehicles completed its
exhaustive preflight tests, culminating on October l l in a satisfactory Joint Flight
Acceptance Composite Test at Launch Complex 12. The Deep Space Network, in
turn, completed net integration tests on October 18. Project officials made special
efforts to preclude the downrange tracking and communications difficulties that
had occurred in Ranger's first flight. Again, every facet of Ranger launch and
tracking operations was brought to a state of readiness.
The daily launch window established for Ranger 2 was identical to that of
its predecessor. The countdown began promptly at 9 pm on the evening of October
19, and proceeded without incident into the early morning hours of October 20.
Two hours before launch mission controllers called a brief hold when telemetry
indicated irregular performance in the electronics associated with Chubb's Lyman
alpha scanning telescope experiment aboard Ranger 2. Officials conferred inside
the blockhouse. Since engineers quickly determined that the misbehaving scientific
passenger posed no threat to the mission's engineering objectives, Project Manager
Burke authorized the countdown to proceed. But little more than an hour later,
forty minutes before launch, electrical power to the Atlas guidance package failed.
As time in the launch window ebbed swiftly away, the cause of this more serious
difficulty could not be readily detected, and Burke, Debus, and Nicks decided to
postpone the launch. The difficulty, traced to a faulty splice in the power lead to
the Atlas guidance system, was rectified readily, t4 Meantime, another space flight
was to take place from Cape Canaveral the following day, and the officials
rescheduled Ranger 2 for a second countdown beginning on October 22, a forty-
eight-hour delay.
But J. P. Heppner, the magnetometer experimenter from the Goddard Space
Flight Center, did not want Ranger 2 to leave just yet. He had approached Burke
shortly before the first countdown and had again requested that the friction
experiment be removed from the spacecraft. Burke, who viewed himself in a
situation analogous to that of the captain of a ship threading its way through a
mine field in the middle of a storm, had no patience for a discomfited passenger
complaining about the champagne. Burke again refused.*S
That agitated Heppner more than ever. He had counted on two flights with
his magnetometer aboard Ranger. If the friction experiment, as he suspected, did
interfere with his measurements on the first mission, there would still have been
time to resolve the problem in some fashion before the flight of Ranger 2. Now he
could count on one flight only, and the offensive friction device with its interfering
magnetic field, moreover, remained on the spacecraft. He stood to lose everything
for which he had labored over eighteen long months. T. A. Chubb, though relieved
to have an opportunity to fix his own Lyman alpha telescope before another
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launch attempt, doubtless sympathized with Heppner. To them, project engineers,
in their eagerness to flight test the Ranger machine, seemed insensitive to the
needs of space science.
Bypassing project management altogether on October 21, in the day
between launch attempts, Heppner called and explained the disquieting situation
to colleagues in the science group in the Office of Space Flight Programs at
Headquarters. The next morning at the range, as preparations for the second
countdown neared completion, Burke received a phone call from Flight Programs
Director Silverstein. The launch of Ranger 2, Silverstein told him, would be
postponed until the conflict between the friction and magnetometer experiments
could be resolved, le
It was Burke's turn to be exasperated. Besides being annoyed with
Heppner's unorthodox maneuver, the Ranger Project Manager cared little whether
either instrument stayed or went. The purposeful interference with established
schedules and objectives simply threatened the flight. Burke notified Debus and
Nicks of the development, then hastily called a conference among the parties
involved. JPL Space Sciences Division Chief Hibbs presided at the meeting, in
which the scientists argued their respective positions once more. And everyone in
the chain of command, from Burke, Cummings, and Pickering at JPL to Nicks and
Siiverstein at NASA Headquarters, became involved in the decision. As events
turned out, neither experiment was removed. Rittenhouse and his associates agreed
to fabricate a new shield to cover the friction experiment, reducing its magnetic
field to a level which Heppner found acceptable. Working around the clock,
technicians completed and installed the shield in time for a second countdown
beginning late on October 23, at a cost of another day in Ranger 2's October
launch period. _7But the delay this exercise occasioned was insignificant compared
to continuing problems with the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle.
After the second countdown began, in the early hours of October 24, the
hydraulic system used to gimbal (swivel) the Atlas vernier engines developed a
leak, cancelling the launch. Then, as the third countdown commenced late in the
same day, more bad news arrived. Luskin at Lockheed informed Debus that
investigation of a recent Thor-Agena B failure at Vandenberg Air Force Base on
the West Coast indicated that an Agena engine hydraulic system had
malfunctioned. Pending an investigation and solution of this affair, officials agreed
that the launch of Ranger 2 should be postponed until the next available
opportunity beginning in mid-November. _ As Burke prepared to return to his
office in Pasadena he mused over events of the preceding week. In view of the Air
Force Agena failure at Vandenberg, Heppner's obstinacy a few days before might
actually have saved Ranger 2 after all.
The Agena hydraulic problem was found and repaired in the intervening
weeks, in time for the fourth launch attempt. On November 17 Major Albert,
Hueter, Nicks, and Burke gathered again for the countdown of Ranger 2, eager for
the satisfaction of seeing their efforts succeed after months of painstaking labor.
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Overhead the sky was clear and the temperature moderate-a welcome relief
from the heat and humidity of the summer months. Good fortune seemed to be in
the air as well, and the count, which began at 8:57 pm EST, proceeded normally
with only minor delays (Figure 43). Then, the familiar puff of white smoke and
the bellow that quickly swelled to a roar marked ignition of the Atlas engines. The
Fig, 43. Ranger 2 Countdown Progresses Beneath a Full Moon
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vehicle strained against its retaining bolts as the thrust reached 360,000 pounds.
Amid the flames and clouds of steam from the cooling water circulated in pits
below, the launch vehicle was released from Launch Complex 12 at 3:12 am EST
on November 18, 1961, and rose into the dark morning sky. Ascending along with
it went the audible shouts and silent prayers of the assembled engineers and
scientists.
With other project officials, Burke left the blockhouse and drove across the
Cape to the JPL command post in Hangar AE to await word from the downrange
tracking stations. Once again the first returns were auspicious. The tracking ship in
San Juan harbor and the station on Ascension Island reported that the Atlas had
performed as programmed, and the first burn of the Agena had placed Ranger 2 in
the desired parking orbit. The downrange stations and the communications links
also performed flawlessly. With the good news, hopes rose and the tension
increased proportionately. Then the mobile tracking antenna in South Africa,
which acquired Ranger 2 at 3:44 am EST, showed that the Agena second burn
again had not occurred: Ranger 2, like Ranger 1, was stranded in a near-earth
parking orbit. Worse, as it turned out, no additional impulse had been obtained in
the second-burn sequence, and the orbit of Ranger 2 was even lower and more
tenuous than that of its predecessor. Its working lifetime in space would be much
shorter.
Dismal though the situation was, a few embers of hope still flickered.
Unaware of the true orbit, those present in the command post learned that Ranger
2 had separated from the Agena, and that its central clock timer had initiated the
proper series of maneuvers and switching functions. The solar panels, high-gain
antenna, and particle analyzer boom had been extended, the commands to acquire
the sun and earth issued, and the high voltage to the scientific instruments turned
on. But just how much less could be expected from Ranger 2 became apparent
during its second and third orbital passes. Acting out its predesigned mission,
Ranger 2 began to look for the sun at the moment it entered into the earth's
shadow. The earth acquisition command, issued a few minutes later while the
spacecraft was still in the darkness, found Ranger unable to "see" the prescribed
celestial points of reference. Ranger's attitude control system did not recover, and
the spacecraft tumbled in orbit. Tumbling, Ranger 2 could not generate solar
power. It used internal battery power to transmit its diagnostic and scientific
telemetry to anyone who could track and listen.
Few could. The large and powerful dish antennas at the NASA-JPL deep
space tracking stations were unable to keep pace with the high angular velocities
and cope with the poor look angles. No backup commands, therefore, could be
radioed to the hapless spacecraft. Only the small mobile tracking antenna in South
Africa could successfully track and receive telemetry from the spacecraft, and even
it would not view Ranger 2 for long. On its fifth pass over that station, some seven
hours after launch, Ranger's orbit descended below the South African horizon. No
further tracking could be accomplished. Twenty hours after rising above the beach
sands of Florida on a stiletto of fire, in its nineteenth orbit, Ranger 2 died. No one
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heard the final sing-song tones of the analog telemetry on November 19, as the
cart-wheeling spacecraft dipped into the atmosphere and quickly incinerated. _9
THE AFTERMATH
The JPL command post at Cape Canaveral had taken on the cast of a
somber requiem when the bad news first arrived. Voices were subdued and
emotions held in check as controllers mechanically went about the tasks of
receiving and recording available telemetry. The next day, having paid their last
respects, project officials began to drift away to their respective offices around the
country. Tired and dispirited, Burke was among the last to leave, returning to Los
Angeles on November 19 to prepare for the postflight investigation-one that
would focus on the performance of the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle.
When development of the vehicle began at Lockheed in 1959, the Air Force
had publicly announced its intention to employ the upper stage Agena B in
numerous military satellite missions. NASA officials had selected the Atlas-Agena
B launch vehicle for Project Ranger in part for the reliability that they anticipated
would follow these Air Force flights. But the Agena B had not appeared in the Air
Force flight schedules as rapidly as NASA hoped; in fact, because Ranger had held
to schedule while other projects slipped, only one other Atlas-Agena B actually had
ever been flown before. Long-time Ranger hands recalled the NASA-Agena B
development difficulties at Lockheed in 1960. And the more recent miscalculation
of the Agena B's performance capability in mid-196 l-resulting in the lightweight
Block II Rangers-still raised hackles among engineers on every side. 2° Now, two
consecutive flight failures on top of the prior troubles generated disturbing
speculation. If the Agena B design were sound, either Lockheed was not doing its
homework or the civilian space agency had been assigned the costly and ridiculous
task of debugging the vehicle for the Air Force.
The implications were quite clear to Major General Osmond J. Ritland,
Commander of the Air Force Space Systems Division in Inglewood, California.
Two Agena failures in an important NASA space program quite obviously affected
the credibility and technical reputation of the Air Force and its contractors, not to
mention prospects for individual careers. The Air Force preferred to straighten
affairs in its own house before NASA pressed the issue. Two days after Ranger 2
met its fiery end in space, General Ritland fired off a stern memo to Colonel Henry
H. Eichel in charge of his launch vehicle office. He ordered Eichel immediately to
form an Agena Failure Investigating Board composed of NASA, Lockheed, and
Air Force personnel. He expected the board to conduct an investigation and return
with its findings and recommendations within nine days: no later than November
30. He wanted all necessary corrective action to be implemented before the flight
of Ranger 3. 2a If the General had anything to say about it, every Lockheed Agena
B supplied to NASA would meet or exceed performance specifications.
Colonel Eichel, matching his reputation for toughness, moved with
dispatch. The investigating board was named and notified; on November 27 it met
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at the Lockheed offices in Sunnyvale. Lockheed participants reported on analyses
of the Agena telemetry tapes during the first day of the two-day meeting. They
found the roll gyroscope in the Agena B guidance package to have been
inoperative at takeoff, most likely because of a faulty relay in the power circuitry.
The Agena's attitude control system had compensated for the roll control failure
through gas jetting, but the supply of attitude control gas was exhausted by the
time the Agena completed first burn. In a parking orbit without attitude control,
the Agena's roll motion had been converted entirely to pitch-yaw or "propeller"
motion. Second burn of the Bell Hustler rocket engine had failed since the liquid
propellants inside the Agena tanks had sloshed away from the engine intake
lines. 22
On the morning of December 4, 1961, the Air Force formally conveyed
these results to NASA. Luskin of Lockheed, Air Force Colonel Henry Eichel, and
Major Jack Albert presented the board's case and plans for remedial action in the
newly completed NASA Headquarters building in Washington, a block-long
marble veneer and glass edifice that contrasted sharply with the turreted and
weathered red brick pile of the Smithsonian Institution down the street on
Independence Avenue. NASA and JPL officials accepted the findings and
corrective measures. Luskin pledged to submit a report on the accomplished
changes in early January 1962, in advance of the flight of Ranger 3, as well as
review the entire reliability program for the NASA Agena B. 23 When the
conference broke up at lunchtime, Luskin, Eichei, and Albert were satisfied that
they had solved the Air Force-Ranger launch vehicle problem.
But the representatives of JPL, NASA Headquarters, and the Marshall
Space Flight Center reconvened after lunch. In light of past performance, they
deemed the approved corrective measures, though necessary and desirable,
insufficient. Cortright instructed Hueter to initiate a separate and detailed review
of Lockheed field operating equipment and procedures, with emphasis on
eliminating any differences in checkout procedure remaining between Air Force
and NASA space projects. TM NASA Headquarters, changing its attitude from
customer to consumer, had decided to undertake greater involvement in matters of
Agena procurement and preflight testing.
JPL, for its part, also altered preflight checkout procedures for the
spacecraft. Based on the experience with Ranger i, 2_ the Systems Division decided
that high voltages hereafter would not be applied to scientific experiments during a
launch countdown. To accomplish a midcourse maneuver, succeeding Ranger
spacecraft would incorporate a fueled rocket engine on the pad. Any high-voltage
discharge that ignited Ranger's squibs and other pyrotechnics here could have
severe repercussions, possibly destroying the spacecraft as well as the fueled Atlas-
Agena B launch vehicle. Burke agreed with this decision and with the rationale
behind it. The experiments, after all, would have completed "at least 15 systems
tests before [being] committed to flight; all of this after design type approval
testing and flight acceptance testing... If the equipment is so suspect that personnel
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would worry over its condition between the last systems test and launch, then it is
not reliable enough to be considered as flight equipment.'26
At least the engineers had the lunar flights in which to see Ranger
perfected, but the flight of Ranger 2 effectively slammed the door on any
substantial dividend for sky scientists. Placed in near-earth orbits, Heppner's
magnetometers had been saturated by the earth's magnetic field on both test
missions. Van Allen's cadmium-sulphide particle detectors likewise had been
overwhelmed by sunlight for the greater part of each mission, as were the light-
flash detectors of Alexander's cosmic dust experiment. Though the Lyman alpha
telescopes so carefully prepared by Chubb had returned some background
measurements, the pictures were mostly smeared, and little was known about the
direction in which the telescopes were pointing when the spacecraft tumbled. And
so it went. Ironically, among the few instruments to return any data of value were
the friction device and the AEC's Vela Hotel experiment in the flight of Ranger
1. 27 But if sky science had lost out on Rangers I and 2, at least lunar science, its
practitioners assumed, still stood to benefit from Rangers 3, 4, and 5.
Chapter Seven
A NEW NATIONAL GOAL
N April 12, 1961. a few months before the ill-fated flight of Ranger 2, theSoviet Union launched Major Yuri Gagarin on a one-orbit flight around the
world. The new Soviet space achievement brought to a head an increasingly salient
debate about the American space program, a debate whose outcome profoundly
affected the Ranger Project.
MAN ON THE MOON
The debate centered on whether the U.S. space program should stress
manned or unmanned exploration of space and the planets. For some time NASA
had been pushing ahead with Project Mercury, which aimed at the earth-orbiting
of manned spacecraft, and NASA leaders had long been discussing manned
projects to follow Mercury. As early as May 1959, NASA's Goett Committee had
recommended that the space agency undertake a manned circumlunar flight
mission, tentatively identified as Project Apollo, though the Eisenhower
administration had refused to budget anything for it beyond planning studies. But
in a report of mid-January 1961, John F. Kennedy's Ad Hoc Committee on Space,
composed largely of scientists and chaired by Jerome Wiesner, the incoming
President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, criticized the emerging
programmatic emphasis on man in space. By placing the highest national priority
on the Mercury manned earth-orbital project, the report declared, "we have
strengthened the popular belief that man in space is the most important aim of our
nonmilitary space effort." Accompanying national publicity had further
exaggerated "that aspect of [the nation's] space activity..." The report argued that
NASA needed to increase emphasis on space science, allot more missions for earth
applications, develop larger launch vehicles, and organize the entire space program
more effectively, i
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Elsewhere, in NASA's Lunar and Planetary Programs Division, Edgar
Cortright and Oran Nicks objected to engineering for man in space at the expense
of quality space science. As Project Mercury suggested, just to fly a man into orbit,
keep him alive, and return him safely to earth called for remarkable feats of
engineering-from complex life support systems to atmospheric reentry and
recovery systems. Compared with the effort that went into satisfying these
engineering demands, pure science was virtually invisible in Project Mercury. 2 On
March 31, the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences added
views of its own. In separate reports to the new administration the Board advised
that man in space could be an important component of the nation's exploratory
program, though it was "not now possible to decide whether man will be able to
accompany expeditions to the Moon and planets." The board went on to
recommend that planning proceed "on the premise that man will be included."
But to the board, man in space meant trained scientists seeking knowledge, not
engineer-pilots bent on showing the flag. 3 And the board continued with an
endorsement of unmanned scientific space exploration strong enough to make its
approval of manned flights seem a mere genuflection to public sentiment. 4
Nevertheless, the public at large seemed generally unconcerned with the
advance of sky or planetary science as such. In 1960, while scrutinizing the
proposal for Project Ranger, Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston, the
powerful chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent
Offices, interrupted the testimony of NASA Associate Administrator Richard
Horner to inquire just how far away the moon was from the earth. Horner replied
that it was a quarter-million miles distant. Nodding and holding up background
data furnished by NASA, Thomas read: "Your justifications continue: 'as our
nearest major body in the solar system, basically unchanged for billions of years,
the Moon offers unique potentialities for better understanding of historical and
contemporary phenomena of the solar system...' We know all about that,"
Thomas snapped. "If it has not been changed for billions of years, why not leave it
alone?"s
After Gagarin's feat, Thomas could agree with the sentiments of
Congressman James Fulton of Pennsylvania: that NASA should "stop some of this
WPA scientific business." Along with other Congressmen, Fulton declared
emphatically: "We are in a competitive race with Russia," a race that prohibited a
space program aimed merely at serving the needs of science. 6 In the White House,
eight days after the Gagarin flight, President Kennedy, sensitive to public
sentiment, directed Vice President Lyndon Johnson to take charge of surveying the
space program and determining where "we have a chance of beating the
Soviets...'7 In short order, Johnson drew up a report with the aid of, among
others, the Secretary of Defense and the new head of NASA, James E. Webb.
President Kennedy. announced the resulting decision to a joint session of Congress,
where, on May 25, 1961, he called for a national program to land a man on the
moon and return him safely to earth before the end of the decade.
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Amid the eagerness to best the Russians in what was now commonly called
the space race, the authorization for Project Apollo whisked through the Congress.
The outcome was a clearcut victory for an emphasis on manned over unmanned
space exploration, for technological spectaculars, some critics snapped, over sound
space and planetary research. Whatever the general accuracy of the critics, the
commitment to Project Apollo certainly raised havoc with the scientific planning
for Project Ranger.
RANGERS FOR APOLLO
Even before funds for the manned lunar landing were in hand, NASA
Administrator Webb, his deputies Dryden and Seamans, and Space Flight
Director Silverstein had decided that the unmanned scientific lunar program
would contribute to making straight the way for Project Apollo. s On the day that
Kennedy delivered his special message to Congress, Abraham Hyatt, NASA
Director of Program Planning and Evaluation, issued a Master Plan of launches
for the conquest of the moon. Instead of missions for scientific purposes, both of
JPL's lunar flight projects, Ranger and Surveyor, appeared listed as missions in
"direct support" of the manned lunar landing program. 9
When on June 8, 1961, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden
appeared before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, he
testified that provision already had been made to strengthen the nation's manned
lunar program by augmenting NASA's unmanned lunar flights. "We want to
know something about the character of the surface on which the landing is to be
made," he explained, "and obtain just as much information as we can before man
actually gets there. '"° In subsequent testimony, Silverstein supplied further details.
Project Ranger would be increased by four flights to secure closeup pictures and
possibly other data concerning the moon's topography. Planetary scientists might
obtain information and debate lunar hypotheses at their convenience, but,
speaking as NASA's chief engineer and a prospective manager of the manned
lunar landing program, Silverstein declared: "It is [now] vital for us to know what
the moon's surface is like." _ The legislators agreed. Several weeks later, Congress
appropriated funds for the additional Ranger missions.
Silverstein formally notified JPL of NASA's plans on June 9. Reiterating
the justification for extending Project Ranger, in a letter to Picketing he observed
that the manned lunar landing created the "need for early data on the surface
topography and hardness of the moon..." Four more flights would contribute to
meeting this goal, "afford a better opportunity for Ranger project success, and
make a corresponding contribution to national prestige during the early phases of
our lunar program." He instructed the Laboratory to examine improved high-
resolution television cameras and other instruments that could return information
on the hardness of the lunar surface, such as a penetrometer capsule. JPL's
recommendation, together with estimates of the cost and level of effort required,
was to be submitted to NASA Headquarters before the end of the month.t2
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High-resolution photographs of selected areas of the moon's surface, JPL
Lunar Program Director Cummings informed Edgar Cortright and Oran Nicks in
a meeting at Headquarters on June 21, would be the greatest single contribution
Ranger could make to Project Apollo. The landing gear of an Apollo vehicle
designed for the worst lunar surface conditions, he said, could easily claim 50
percent of the allowable weight. On a more favorable surface, however, the landing
gear could likely be reduced to less than 5 percent of that weight. Closeup pictures
taken by Ranger spacecraft prior to impact would permit engineers to design
Apollo's landing gear with increased confidence. For this purpose, the standard
Ranger bus could be modified to support a tower carrying a television subsystem
in place of the Block II seismometer capsule. Necessary information on the
hardness of the lunar surface could be obtained from the Block II radar reflectivity
experiment suggested by Walter Brown in March, from special accelerometers
contained in the Block II lunar capsules, from ground-based radar investigation of
the lunar surface, and from the Surveyor soft-landing missions now scheduled to
follow Ranger in 1964.
To implement this proposal, Cummings continued, JPL recommended
contracting for the complete television subsystem, much as the Block II lunar
capsule subsystem was designed and developed by the Aeronutronic Division of
the Ford Motor Company. For the new missions, however, if the flight schedules
projected by NASA to begin in January 1963 were to be met, no time could be
spared for the normal process of competitive bidding. A single firm should be
selected and a contract awarded immediately. JPL preferred the Radio
Corporation of America. Of the five potential sources, RCA alone possessed
experience in developing the space television cameras for the original Ranger and
Tiros projects. After further discussion, Cortright approved the television as
payload for the extended Project Ranger. Nine days later, Cummings learned that
Headquarters would approve the proposed sole-source contract with RCA for the
television subsystem. _3
No time was spared. On July 5, 1961, representatives of the Astro-
Electronics Division of RCA in Hightstown, New Jersey, met at JPL to define plans
for the payload. Photographs of the lunar surface, it was decided, would be taken
by a special television system with a shuttered vidicon. The participants assigned
top priority to high-resolution pictures. And complete responsibility for the
television subsystem, including details of its design, fabrication, and testing, was
delegated to RCA. JPL's Systems Division would monitor RCA's performance on
the contract with consultant support from the Space Sciences Division. On August
25, RCA accepted the JPL Letter Contract. The company agreed to furnish one
proof test model and four flight units of a television subsystem, each consisting of
a battery of "three or more" high-resolution TV cameras. _4 Four days later, on
August 29, NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans publicly announced
the expansion of Project Ranger from five to nine flights. The new Ranger
missions, he informed the nation, would return high-resolution pictures of the
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lunar surface as "part of the general acceleration of the program to land an
American on the moon by 1970. "'.5
This expansion brought with it changes in project staffing and controls. At
NASA Headquarters, Lunar and Planetary Program Director Cortright instituted
quarterly project review meetings. Supplementing the normal flow of communica-
tions, NASA and JPL Ranger personnel would meet-beginning in September and
following once every three months thereafter-to evaluate the progress and
problems of the project and make plans for any remedial action necessary. NASA's
knowledge of and control over project developments, Cortright and Nicks correctly
perceived, would thereby be strengthened. At JPL, new personnel assignments
were made. Cummings established a Ranger Project Policy and Requirements
Document, controlling parts selection, test, and quality assurance requirements
primarily for JPL's in-house spacecraft effort-from the design phase through
space flight operations. In addition, to assist Ranger Project Manager Burke, he
appointed a Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager, Allen E. Wolfe. _6
Wolfe had come to JPL in 1952 after military service, a stint with the
Army's Ballistic Research Laboratories at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, and a
wartime degree in electrical engineering from Caltech. At the Laboratory he had
participated in developing the instrumentation for various missiles tested at the
White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. Taciturn, Wolfe had acquired a
well deserved reputation for technical competence and coolness under pressure-a
characteristic perhaps most appreciated by those who had occasion to meet him in
a sociable game of poker. In the fall of 1960, Systems Division Chief Schurmeier
had appointed Wolfe Ranger Project Engineer, replacing Gordon Kautz, who had
moved over to the Ranger Project Office as Burke's deputy. Now, in August 1961,
as Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager, his sole responsibility was to guide
development of the spacecraft through all phases of assembly and testing, not only
for the follow-on missions but for the remaining Block II flights as well
(Figure 44).
With the missions approved, the principal contract awarded, and his staff
augmented, Burke instructed the JPL technical divisions to place orders for the
hardware necessary for Ranger flights 6 through 9. _ To be known collectively as
Ranger Block III, these spacecraft would be subject to design constraints and a test
regime similar to the ones imposed on their predecessors. Components for both the
spacecraft bus and RCA's television subsystem, for example, would be heat
sterilized before assembly, and treated with ethylene-oxide gas afterwards. But one
prior difficulty was removed. The engineers knew the allowable weight of the
spacecraft; at least 360 kilograms (800 pounds) could be allocated among its
various subsystems.
RCA completed design of the television payload in September 1961. _8
Weighing 135 kilograms (350 pounds), the subsystem was composed of three
major assemblies: a tower superstructure and thermal shield, a central box
containing the principal electronic components, and, located above the box near
the top of the tower, six television cameras and their associated bracketry and
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Fig. 44. JPL Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager Allen Wolfe
electronics. Two of the cameras would be equipped with 25-millimeter wide-angle
lenses, and four with 75-millimeter telephoto lenses. The four narrow-angle
telephoto cameras, positioned for overlapping coverage, would furnish a resolution
on the order of 0.1 to 0.5 meter (4 to 20 inches) in the final pictures. All of the
cameras were to be operated in sequence under a continuous recycling program
from turn-on to impact. While one camera was taking a picture, another would be
in a state of"readout"---converting the video data for transmission to earth-while
on another the images would be erased preparatory to taking further pictures.
Operated by a separate battery power supply, the television system was to be
independent of the Ranger power subsystem (Figure 45). Two transmitters, one
acting as a backup in the event of any technical malfunction in the other, would
ensure transmission of the information to earth. At the Goldstone tracking station,
the video data would be recorded on 35-millimeter film and magnetic tape. _9
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Fig. 45. Ranger Block I11 Television Camera Sequencing
In appearance, outside of the television package, Rangers 6 through 9
looked virtually identical to their predecessors. Made up of the same subsystems,
they featured trapezoidal solar panels, a midcourse propulsion unit beneath the
bus, a hinged high-gain dish antenna, and an omnidirectional antenna atop the
tower superstructure (Figure 46). To meet the short schedules, and adhering to
Burke's dictum, design changes beyond those necessary to accommodate the
television package would be minimized. The total weight of 360 kilograms (800
pounds), nevertheless, meant a net gain of some 23 kilograms (50 pounds) for the
spacecraft bus--as contrasted with the erroneous figure of weight assigned the
Block II lunar spacecraft. For the first time, weight could be used for redundant
engineering components. Most notable among them: two backup clocks to enable
Ranger to complete a mission even if its electronic brain, the central computer and
sequencer, should fail in flight. All of the television cameras were to be pointed so
that the normal sun and earth acquisition procedures of the Ranger spacecraft
would automatically position them to sweep the moon in most trajectories even
without accomplishing the planned midcourse or terminal maneuvers. 2°
On September 19, 1961, NASA Headquarters issued the flight schedule for
Rangers 6 through 9; they would be launched in January, April, May, and August
of 1963, respectively. 2_The urgency expressed by this schedule, Nicks explained to
Cummings, derived from the national commitment to Project Apollo and the delay
in the Centaur launch vehicle program, which postponed the flights of the
Surveyor lunar soft-lander project. Every effort must be exerted, he advised, "to get
the most from existing Ranger developments.'22 Privately, Nicks questioned what
"the most" might be. The Atlas-Agena B vehicles had experienced failures with
Rangers 1 and 2. The spacecraft and the ground-based Deep Space Network were
not yet proved in actual lunar flight-through command and execution of the
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Fig. 46. Model of Ranger Block I11 Preliminary Design
spacecraft midcourse and terminal maneuvers. The most that might reasonably be
expected, he confided to Cortright, was one success in Ranger Block II, and
perhaps two successes in the Block III flights. 23
At JPL, Cummings and Burke could concur with Nicks' reserved prognosis.
Burke, in fact, in discussion with his counterparts at NASA Headquarters, used the
figure of one complete success in each remaining block of lunar flights as a
reasonable expectation. Planning had begun at NASA and JPL to add still more
Rangers to increase the probability of success, building upon the technology to be
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demonstrated in these early flights. 24 But more important to both JPL men at that
moment were the changed justification and objectives of Project Ranger. The
original Ranger Block II, to be sure, would continue in the name of science. The
new Ranger Block III, however, was to fly in support of Apollo; engineers had to
have a closeup look at the surface upon which Apollo must land. Planetary
scientists could draw on these lunar photographs for what they could find in them.
As enunciated by the President, members of the Congress, and the NASA
leadership, the new national goal could hardly be misunderstood. 25 Cummings
explained its portent and ramifications for NASA-JPL unmanned flight projects to
Vice President Johnson on October 4: "Originally our lunar program had been
oriented toward scientific and technological objectives," he stated. "Now...the
emphasis has been changed so that support of the manned operations is the
primary objective, and space technology and lunar science are secondary. We
believe, however, that we can accomplish the space science and technology
objectives as planned, while at the same time providing essential support to the
manned effort. ''26
THE NEW ORDER
The downgrading of space science forced by the commitment to Apollo
bothered high NASA officials, including the head of the agency, James E. Webb.
The son of a county school superintendent in Oxford, North Carolina, Webb, aged
54, had already distinguished himself in half a dozen careers, including those of
aviator, lawyer, administrator, and statesman. He impressed Congressmen with his
ability to field questions, remember figures, and overwhelm with information.
"Listening to Jim Webb," one of them remarked, "is like taking a drink from a
fire hydrant!" Webb had long been familiar with the policy and politics of
scientific research and development, not least because before World War II he had
been an executive of the Sperry Gyroscope Company and after it, in the Truman
administration, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Figure 47).
Webb appreciated science qua science, and he understood the scientists'
contradictory aspirations to academic independence, peer-group determination of
scientific merit, and substantial governmental funding. In later months, prodded to
cut back NASA's space science efforts until Apollo was accomplished, Webb would
tell the President that he could not run a truncated program. But Webb, who had
endorsed the Apollo program to Kennedy, now had his priorities fixed on the
manned lunar landing, and he reorganized the space agency accordingly.
The realignment, effective November 1, 1961, was marked at Headquarters
by the following salient features:
I. All of NASA's field centers, including JPL and the new Manned
Spacecraft Center to be constructed in Houston, reported directly to
Associate Administrator Robert Seamans on all institutional matters.
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Fig. 47, NASA Administrator James Webb
2. The Headquarters program offices of Advanced Research Programs (Ira
Abbott), Space Flight Programs (Silverstein), Launch Vehicle Programs
(Ostrander), and Life Science Programs (Charles Roadman), were
abolished.
3. Four new Headquarters offices were created: Advanced Research and
Technology (Ira Abbott), Space Sciences (Homer Newell, formerly
Silverstein's deputy), Manned Space Flight (D. Brainerd Holmes, a new
appointee from RCA), and Applications (vacant). A supporting office of
Tracking and Data Acquisition (Edmond Buckley) was also formed.
These offices would also deal with the field centers on project matters.
Beyond acknowledging the significance now attached to the manned space
flight program (which existed previously as a subdivision within Space Flight
Programs), this reorganization made Seamans the general manager of the whole
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agency. JPL's lunar and interplanetary flight projects remained under the
functional direction of Newell's office, where Edgar Cortright moved up to become
his deputy. Oran Nicks became Director of the Lunar and Planetary Programs
Division in place of Cortright. 27
In the new Office of Space Sciences, the deemphasis of space science as such
troubled Homer Newell. 28 As an engineering tour de force, landing a man on the
moon might bolster a sagging national economy, reestablish a shaken faith in the
supremacy of American technology, or guarantee some short-term advantages in
international diplomacy. It definitely promised to dislocate the planning for the
scientific exploration of the moon; it even threatened to undermine the raison
d'etre of NASA's unmanned lunar program already in being or projected. First,
Apollo was physically separated from the rest of the lunar program, located in an
office for which Newell was not responsible. Second, Newell was expected to
represent the interests of space science in NASA, and to push for adding space
science in Project Apollo. Third, if he were successful in this endeavor, his own
unmanned lunar missions and the remaining experimenters hard at work on their
instruments would be in for more trouble. Why rough-land a seismometer on the
moon with Ranger, or soft-land a variety of instruments with Surveyor, or return
lunar surface samples with Prospector, when Apollo might perform these same
functions in a few years' time? Brainerd Holmes and other high officials in the
newly formed Office of Manned Space Flight, who would shortly petition President
Kennedy for supplemental Apollo appropriations, might have added, "Why,
indeed?"
Nevertheless, Newell intended to secure a significant return for space
science from all of the automated flights at the earliest opportunity, and to enlarge
that return from Apollo as the manned program progressed. He personally had
selected the name and emphasis for the organization he now commanded: the
Office of Space Sciences. Though it might be dwarfed in size, on the charts of the
reorganized NASA it would be at least recognizable on a par with the Office of
Manned Space Flight. Internally, Space Sciences was reorganized to combine the
science and engineering functions so carefully separated under Silverstein. In the
new Lunar and Planetary Program Office, Oran Nicks established individual
offices for Ranger, Surveyor, and Mariner R, a new JPL project recently approved,
to send a modified Mariner and Ranger spacecraft-hence the name Mariner R-to
Venus in 1962.
The individual offices included program engineers and scientists.* N.
William Cunningham, previously a staff scientist for Silverstein, was named
Ranger Program Chief (Figure 48). A wartime radio operator aboard naval
aircraft, who had later earned degrees in meteorology and physics at Texas A & M
College, Cunningham would guide Ranger developments with Burke in the Project
Office at JPL. His deputy and Program Engineer was Walter Jakobowski, a man of
*The word "program" was substituted in place of project to avoid confusion with and imply a
different lhnction from the Project Offices already existing at the field center level.
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Fig. 48. NASA Ranger Program Chief William Cunningham
inquiring temperament well suited to his role as troubleshooter. A Ranger
Program Scientist was not immediately named. Charles P. Sonett, a UCLA
physicist with a background in sky science and the Chief of Sciences in Nicks'
office, served in this capacity in the interim. NASA now had a management
structure with which to prosecute Project Apollo, and the Office of Space Sciences
had combined science and engineering in a program office for Project Ranger.
James Burke in Pasadena was pleased with the creation of a counterpart
Ranger Office at NASA Headquarters. At last, after two years, two individuals at
Headquarters were to be concerned with his problems alone. Moreover, from past
dealings on the scientific side of Ranger, Burke knew that Cunningham understood
the engineering constraints that science entailed and would be quick to foresee
other potential problems as well. Burke was even more pleased by the national
commitment to Project Apollo. The potential interference of space science
activities, he reasoned, would have to be contained during the monumental
engineering effort to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth. 29
That enterprise might well relieve some of the pressure for "more science" in
Project Ranger-especially since Ranger now was considered to be supportive of
the Apollo goal.
Chapter Eight
THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE AND
RANGER
ESPITE the redefinition of Project Ranger, Burke's problems with the
development of the spacecraft were hardly over. Indeed, in 1961, although
NASA and JPL had the policy and plans for a concerted attempt at sterilizing
spacecraft for deep space missions,_ the first results on Project Ranger proved truly
disquieting. The Aeronutronic Division of the Ford Motor Company, experiment-
ing with the new procedures, encountered increased component failures in the
Ranger seismometer capsule subsystem after heating to the JPL specifications. This
subsystem, the heart of the planetary science package on the Block II Rangers,
demanded far-reaching advances to protect the delicate instruments from the high-
impact loading and stresses involved in a rough landing on the moon. Even after
deceleration by retrorocket, the capsule would strike the lunar surface with a
residual velocity of 61 meters per second (136 miles per hour), with a force of
3000 g. The sterilized seismometer, battery pack, and communications equipment
had to survive that shock and operate at least for the two-week duration of a lunar
day.
LUNAR SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT: STERILIZATION IN PRACTICE
Frank Denison at Aeronutronic had expected a rash of technical difficulties
even without sterilization, and the expected development problems did materialize,
especially for the radar altimeter that was to trigger separation of the capsule
subsystem, the solid propellant retrorocket that would slow the seismometer
capsule, and in the capsule itself. In May 1961 Aeronutronic began drop-testing
sterilized lunar seismometer capsules encased in their balsawood impact limiters in
the Mojave Desert. Five capsules released from an aircraft over both fiat and rocky
surfaces produced disappointing results. Those that fell on rocks failed to operate.
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After modifications, engineers conducted more impact tests in October. The
seismometer operated after impact, but malfunctions occurred in the sterilized
electronic equipment inside the survival sphere. 2 Prospects appeared slim that the
capsule weight and performance requirements could be met in time for the
January 1962 launch date of Ranger 3, now only three months away. At NASA
Headquarters, dismayed with the progress to date, Oran Nicks ordered Cummings
and Burke to strengthen technical direction of the Aeronutronic work, and produce
a detailed recovery plan for the time remaining.3
On November 6, 1961, Aeronutronic reorganized its Ranger capsule project
team. Donal B. Duncan replaced Frank Denison in charge of capsule development.
Ranger spacecraft systems manager Wolfe led a contingent of JPL personnel to the
Aeronutronic facility in Newport Beach to assist in the recovery effort. For its part,
NASA Headquarters issued waivers of heat sterilization for some sensitive
electrical components in the survival sphere. In his recovery plan submitted to
Nicks on November 9, Burke affirmed that the outstanding technical problems
associated with the radar altimeter, retrorocket, and capsule were under control.
Tests in succeeding weeks, including impact tests of operating seismometer
capsules, supported that observation, 4 but the ability of the seismometer and
batteries to withstand the cold temperature of a two-week "lunar night" appeared
questionable. And if heat sterilization and glove-box assembly of the lunar capsules
inside clear plastic containers had proved a demanding and time-consuming task
for Aeronutronic, they were magnified when applied to the Ranger 3 spacecraft at
JPL (Figure 49). 5
Except for the lunar capsule handled separately at Aeronutronic, JPL's
technical divisions heat sterilized all of the subsystems for Ranger 3 in a special
oven in the new environmental test laboratory. Division Chiefs immediately
reported major problems-in particular with electronic components: the heat
rendered cabling brittle, reduced the tensile strength of soldered joints, and caused
capacitors to leak. After assembly in July 1961, Ranger 3 entered system tests. The
results were positively disturbing. "Component failure rates," JPL advised NASA,
"are much higher...than those recorded on the proof test model. This is almost the
exact reversal of the experience noted on the Ranger l and 2 program. The only
difference between the Ranger 3 proof test model and the flight spacecraft is heat
sterilization." The report continued: "Although no failures are directly traceable to
heat damage, it is felt that heat sterilization does shorten the expected life of
electronic components and circumstantial evidence seems to bear this out. ''6 At the
same time, engineers in the Systems Division noted that heating the Ranger 4 bus
had resulted in "warping the structure... This, however, can be compensated for
by suitable shimming." They had also found a wire in the ring harness "to be
parted near a splice. This damage occurred sometime during the sterilization
process. ' ' 7
Practical experience hardly encouraged confidence in the new procedure or
in its implications for reliability. Granted, the procedures had been devised after a
short test program with selected components in 1960; but, surprisingly, no one at
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Fig. 49. Sterile Assembly of a Scismometer Capsule at Aeronutronic
JPL or NASA had foreseen the deleterious results that heat sterilization could have
for the spacecraft when applied on a full-scale basis. Although lacking firm
evidence that this requirement caused the equipment failures, JPL now requested
and received more waivers from NASA Headquarters on heat sterilizing certain
crucial components. Among them were the capsule batteries, various transistors,
capacitors, explosive-actuated switches, and the retrorocket and spin motor
propellant, igniter, and squib. More and more it appeared that the moon would
have to tolerate some bugs from the earth.
Ranger 3 completed systems tests after all failed parts had been carefully
requalified and replaced. NASA accepted the machine for shipment to Cape
Canaveral in late November 1961. Cummings informed NASA Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans of those parts that had been excluded from heat
treatment, and of achievement in the NASA spacecraft sterilization program to
date. "The degree of decontamination attained," he explained, "is the result of a
major effort which has added substantially to the cost and to the risk of the
mission It is likely that the sterilization 0rocedures have compromised spacecraft
reliability; however, there is insufficient data to positively confirm this suspicion.
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Though complete sterilization has not been achieved, the total possible
contamination level [remaining] is known to be small."s
At a minimum, heat sterilization appeared to have affected the life
expectancy of many electronic components. After hours of subsystem and system
testing, no one could be certain exactly how many more hours of life remained in
Ranger 3. The lunar capsule and its retrorocket had just qualified for flight and
should properly undergo more tests. Furthermore, the failure of the Ranger 2
mission in November raised questions about the need for improving the Atlas-
Agena B launch vehicle to ensure its reliable performance. Existing flight schedules
simply did not afford time for this work. Should the launch of Ranger 3 be delayed
to provide it?
Burke discussed the matter with Cummings, Kautz, and Wolfe, as well as
with others at the Laboratory. The Atlas-Agena, scrutinized and modified, seemed
likely to perform properly. Burke and his fellow JPL engineers were also satisfied
that the spacecraft would work. The mission was, after all, a lunar flight of only
three days, and they could be sure of that much component lifetime. Prevailing
sentiment remained heavily disposed to launching Ranger 3 on schedule. Even if
the capsule subsystem itself failed to perform precisely as planned at the moon,
valuable experience would be gained for the first time with the spacecraft, by the
deep space tracking net, and in space flight operations-through exercising the
spacecraft in its midcourse correction and terminal maneuvers. 9 Two more flights
remained in which to secure the lunar science objective. Feeling an additional urge
to make haste, the JPL officials knew that the Soviets had yet fully to demonstrate
these important techniques on a deep space mission.
JPL Director Pickering summarized the situation for Seamans on
November 15: "The elaborate real-time operations involved in determining the
orbit, computing and executing the in-flight maneuvers and commands, and
returning the lunar TV data cannot properly be simulated without a flight," he
wrote. "We must weigh carefully the value of early experience in these areas
against a postulated improvement in the capsule subsystem" that might obtain by
delaying the mission. '° On December 28, 1961, one month after Ranger 2 had
burned to a cinder in the earth's atmosphere, in a meeting of NASA and JPL
officials at Headquarters, Burke presented the case for launching Ranger 3 on
schedule, regardless of the costs to science. He argued forcefully that the
advantages in proceeding to launch outweighed the potential disadvantages. The
launch vehicle, spacecraft, and deep space tracking net were ready. And should the
retrorocket or the capsule electronics fail at the moon, he asserted, NASA still
would have the engineering and operational experience gained in a flight there.
Oran Nicks, Director of the Lunar and Planetary Program Office, disagreed.
Because of the questionable performance of the capsule subsystem, he urged
delaying the launch to qualify this key scientific experiment. But Burke's position
carried as Cortright, Newell's Deputy Director in the Office of Space Sciences,
concluded that Ranger 3 would launch on schedule."
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Though science could still be acknowledged as the primary lunar objective,
the decision to launch Ranger 3 as planned was a victory for Ranger's designers
and engineers in Pasadena. They would have the opportunity to surpass the
Russians on the one hand, and to test the Ranger spacecraft and flight support
operations through a complete lunar mission on the other. Space science, at least in
the form of the lunar seismometer experiment, would have to take its chances.
Nicks accepted the edict, but thought it a distortion of the Block II objectives--
downgrading space science in favor of engineering.
AFTER THE APOLLO DECISION: WHAT SCIENCE AND WHERE?
On December 1, 1961, the Space Sciences Steering Committee in the Office
of Space Sciences reshuffled the experimenters for the visual imaging television
package aboard the remaining Ranger flights, 3 through 9. To Urey, Kuiper, and
Shoemaker, chosen a few months before in October, _z the Steering Committee now
added Ray Heacock and Edwin Dobies of JPL's Space Sciences Division. JPL
Space Sciences Division Chief Hibbs was appointed "convener" of the entire
group. _30ran Nicks informed JPL Lunar Program Director Cummings that by
this change NASA hoped to encourage these scientists to operate together as a
"team" from development of the television system at RCA through analysis of the
lunar pictures after the mission. He asked Cummings to integrate this scientific
cadre directly into the project management structure, and to show that assignment
in the Block III Project Development Plan. The blending of scientists and engineers
begun in the Office of Space Sciences in Washington was to be extended to the
field center project level. TM At the same time, the Office of Space Sciences also
considered the possibility of more science in Project Ranger.
The scientific loss in the first Ranger missions, along with the commitment
of the Block III Rangers 6 through 9 to Apollo, had brought Homer Newell
numerous complaints from NASA space science experimenters around the
country, t5 Even more distressing, perhaps, was the increasing tendency of the
aerospace trade journals, the press, and many space agency personnel to represent
all of NASA's unmanned lunar flights as engineering missions in support of the
manned lunar landing. _6With these conditions straining more than ever NASA's
relations with the nation's scientific community, Neweil determined to remain true
to the principle of inquiring science. JPL, among several other field installations,
reported to the Office of Space Sciences, not to the Office of Manned Space Flight.
As long as Newell had anything to say about it, wherever weight and space
permitted, science would be accommodated in NASA's unmanned lunar and
planetary projects. 17
But where to find the spacecraft for deep space missions with sufficient
weight and space available to meet the demands of experimenters in 1962-1963?
The postponed Surveyor lunar soft lander, experiencing development problems in
both the spacecraft and its Centaur launch vehicle, was out of the question. And
the head of the Mariner R project at JPL had successfully fought off attempts to
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add more experiments to this first planetary mission to Venus. But the four Ranger
Block III television spacecraft, on which Burke's project engineers were busily
programming extra weight and space for redundant engineering features, did
remain. Though their objective might be acknowledged as Apollo support, some of
the sky science experiments lost on Rangers i and 2 conceivably could be added
here. Granted, a time limit of sixty-Tfive hours on measurements during a flight to
the moon would be a severe drawback. Among those anxious for another change,
however, such data were much to be preferred to no data at all.
Out at JPL some months earlier, Burke and Hibbs had collaborated in
producing a proposal of their own for three sky science experiments to go along
with the primary television package on Rangers 6 through 9. Submitted to
Headquarters in August 196 l, the three experiments made up a package designed
to evaluate the radiation hazards to man between the earth and the moon's
surface. Supplementing the return expected from the television system, they would
thus support Project Apollo. zs The Space Sciences Steering Committee evaluated
the JPL plan on August 2 l, and asked Newell's Lunar and Planetary Programs
Division to conduct a review and return with recommendations.
On September 26, while the Steering Committee's request was still in
Newell's Division, the Ranger Block III Project Development Plan was issued. It
specified that the three secondary sky science experiments would be "considered"
for inclusion on Rangers 6 through 9. But at JPL Burke and Hibbs assumed that
the experiments slated for possible inclusion would be theirs, and they permitted
parts procurement and fabrication of these machines to proceed apace so as to
meet the established specifications and schedules. Then, early in 1962, because of a
shortage of skilled manpower at JPL, Burke and Hibbs decided that the three
experiments could not be completed in time for all of them to fly on Rangers 6
through 9. Ranger 6 would incorporate only one experiment along with the
television package, a Neher ion chamber. Ranger 7 would incorporate two, the ion
chamber and geiger counters. Rangers 8 and 9 would carry three, the first two plus
tissue-equivalent dosimeters if they could be prepared and delivered on time. On
February 5, Burke reported the change to Nicks at Headquarters.t9
Burke's news arrived in Washington just when the Office of Space Sciences
was deciding upon its objectives in the years ahead, especially the role of space
science in the unmanned lunar program. To Newell and his staff, Burke's
reduction in the number of sky science experiments for Rangers 6 through 9 was
tantamount to another downgrading of space science in favor of spacecraft
engineering. The reduction, after all, seemed to be justified only by a requirement
of meeting a flight-test schedule for the Ranger machine. Newell and his staff thus
saw the issue of whether to approve Burke's sky science experiment prospectus in
terms of a single fundamental question. Given existing and anticipated funds, was
it better to perfect the spacecraft and launch vehicles, then pursue science, or
should the technology and space sciences be pressed simultaneously? Taken up
during February, the question was, Nicks later recollected, most difficult to answer.
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Charles Sonett, Chief Scientist in the Lunar and Planetary Program Office,
pointed out that the Ranger spacecraft bus had been specifically designed to accept
a variety of add-on scientific instruments. The space, power, and weight available
on Rangers 6 through 9, he maintained, could in fact support more than the few
experiments recommended by JPL. 2° The Space Sciences Steering Committee,
moreover, had not given final approval to the space experiment recommendations
of Burke or scientists elsewhere. If only to relieve some of the pressure from space
scientists for more flight opportunities, the committee would likely endorse the
addition of some experiments on Rangers 6 through 9. Besides, not one Atlas-
Agena launch vehicle or Ranger spacecraft had as yet been proved through a
complete mission. No one could be certain which flight might succeed first. 2t Nicks
recalled that the scientist, "if he saw a spacecraft launch and work successfully, and
it didn't carry anything but engineering telemetry [would have] said: 'I was
right,...just look at the free trip I could have had.' On the other hand, if [the
scientist] worked very hard and got a good set of instruments on board and it went
splash in the ocean, he was frustrated because he wasted all that time. ''22
Newell, Cortright, and Nicks, sure that scientists should at least be given the
chance to acquire fundamental knowledge at the earliest time possible, concluded
that Rangers 6 through 9 as well as other Office of Space Sciences lunar missions
would develop the technology and support the interests of space science and
Project Apollo, all at the same time. A few months later Newell announced the
objectives of his NASA bailiwick: The Office of Space Sciences would be devoted
to the "scientific exploration and investigation of outer space." Its flight missions
would "contribute to basic knowledge," then "support manned space flight," and
finally, encourage "social, political, and economic growth," in that order. 23
On February 28, 1962, William Cunningham, newly appointed Ranger
Program Chief in Nicks' Lunar and Planetary Program Office, picked up the
phone and called JPL. He told Burke that the matter of secondary experiments for
Rangers 6 through 9 was still open. It would be discussed further by the Space
Sciences Steering Committee within the next few weeks. Meantime, JPL would
resubmit to the Steering Committee a formal proposal for the secondary
experiments it desired. 24
SCIENCE REASSERTED IN PROJECT RANGER
Burke was first dismayed, then incensed by what he perceived to be a
sudden 180-degree turnabout in the objectives for Ranger Block III. Although he
had steadfastly emphasized the immediate importance of creating and demonstrat-
ing the spacecraft technology, Burke had also acknowledged in Project Ranger the
eventual primacy of planetary science. The moon, after all, was the ultimate subject
of interest. 25 The new Ranger missions had been planned, represented, approved,
and thus far prosecuted as a single-purpose endeavor to return pictures of the
lunar surface for use in the design of the Apollo lunar lander. The three additional
sky science experiments had happily complemented that objective, but three extra
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experiments were all the project office had programmed to design and pay for.
Nevertheless, Cunningham had explained, more such experiments were now to be
considered. With all restraint apparently gone by the boards at Headquarters, it
seemed to Burke as if all science in Project Ranger was to be redetermined in the
laissez faire manner of the Ranger l and 2 era.
"The question of what auxiliary experiments Rangers 6 through 9 will
carry," Burke tersely notified JPL Deputy Director Brian Sparks, "has been
reopened by Dr. Sonett...The timing is bad because JPL schedule and documents
show the issue already decided, work proceeding accordingly. ''26 Any support that
Sparks or Pickering might provide in forestalling these plans would be
appreciated. To Cunningham, Burke reiterated the critical problem of timing.
Whatever experiments might be considered, whether they had anything to do with
the moon or not, the status of these spacecraft had, back in September 1961, been
fixed to meet the NASA flight schedule: 27
Spacecraft Design Freeze* Hardware Delivery
Ranger 6 Past 5-21-62
Ranger 7 Past 8-1-62
Ranger 8 4-1-62 10-8-62
Ranger 9 6-1-62 12-3-62
But the planning for more science continued at Headquarters.
On March 13, 1962, NASA's Lunar and Planetary Programs Office
evaluated all the proposals for more secondary experiments. A total of nine sky
science instruments had been submitted for consideration, including the three
recommended by JPL. Of these, only the JPL tissue-equivalent dosimeters were
found inappropriate for referral to NASA's Space Sciences Steering Committee.
The next day, the Steering Committee tentatively agreed to the entire ensemble of
eight experiments. 28 Burke talked again with Cunningham in an attempt to have
Headquarters reconsider the issue. Such a large number of experiments, he argued,
could be expected to create new weight and power problems on the spacecraft.
Adding them now would jeopardize existing schedules, project costs, and the stated
NASA flight objectives. Schedules and costs aside, there just wasn't the manpower.
Operating under a ceiling of 3500 total personnel at the Laboratory was straining
the Space Sciences Division as well as the other technical divisions to the breaking
point. :9 The large number of JPL engineers required to plan and integrate the
design changes for so many experiments simply did not exist. But Cunningham
could not be swayed. Afterward, Burke complained to Cummings: "Cunningham
says that all other [NASA] satellites are handled the Sonett way [through the
* Whi/e Rangers 7, 8, and 9 were planned as identical spacecraft, their designs could be altered slighl|y
to incorporate improvements, based on the dates of hardware delivery.
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SSSC]," adding bitterly, "if they wanted to do an exercise like this, they had half
of 1961...and now it is pretty late. ''3°
On March 20, 1962, Nicks formally advised Burke of the findings of the
Space Sciences Steering Committee, and requested him "to take steps to integrate
these experiments into the spacecraft bus." If the unsolicited Vela Hotel
experiment on Rangers 1 and 2 had aroused the project manager's worst fears, the
addition by NASA of eight "trinkets" on Rangers 6 through 9 confirmed them. To
Burke, Headquarters had determined upon a course of action for science without
regard for its engineering implications, and expected the JPL project office
obediently to carry it out. Two more aeronomy experiments, he learned moreover,
were also being considered. A final NASA decision on the precise number would
be made before the end of the month. 3t
By now news and rumor of these events were abroad at the Laboratory.
Burke found himself on the receiving end of distress phone calls and memos from
irate JPL engineers. Believing the project office had agreed to intemperate
demands, Charles Cole, Chief of the Engineering Mechanics Division, was blunt
and to the point: "We wish to remind you," he wrote crisply, "that the
engineering problems attendant to the location and installation of science systems
on the spacecraft are many (temperature control, structural and mechanical design,
and space availability) and the constraints are unusually severe. This Division has
not planned for the manpower or funds to carry on either an effort to ascertain the
feasibility of incorporating proposed additional experiments or the 'hard design'
required for approved experiments. ''32 Beset with technical problems in the Atlas-
Agena and light-weight Block II spacecraft, and trapped in the crossfire between
scientists and engineers on the Block III missions, Burke was emphatically angry.
On March 28, 1962, Burke attended a meeting convened at NASA
Headquarters to settle problems of integrating the secondary experiments on
Rangers 6 through 9. Lunar and Planetary Programs Director Oran Nicks, his
Chief Scientist Charles Sonett, and Ranger Program Chief Cunningham were
there along with the Deputy Chief of the JPL Space Sciences Division, Manfred
Eimer. 33Burke, purposefully composed, summoning all the logic and persuasion at
his command, suggested that Headquarters simply did not understand the severe
problems involved at the project level. With the available manpower and time
limits, he argued, so many scientific experiments could be added to the spacecraft
only at the expense of engineering reliability, which posed a direct threat to
mission success. Eimer followed, explaining that the JPL Space Sciences Division
would be forced to subcontract for manpower simply to supervise and qualify these
experiments for flight. Such use of inexperienced personnel would also increase the
risk in the science area. 34
For Nicks, incredulous, this was the last straw. Burke's intransigence and
continued resistance in the face of Headquarters decisions were inexcusable. The
leaders of the Office of Space Sciences had set as a policy the service of pure
science. That included flying scientific experiments while at the same time
developing the space technology. Good scientific results, precedent already
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suggested, could be secured even in the event of a partial failure of the space flight
hardware, and in any case Ranger had been purposely designed to permit add-on
experiments. But perhaps most disturbing, the Lunar and Planetary Programs
Director now faced what he considered a direct and crucial challenge: Who, in
effect, was in charge of the program, the space agency or the contractor? More to
the point as viewed by Nicks, if NASA wanted leopard skin upholstery in the
Ranger spacecraft and would pay for it, then that was precisely what JPL-Caltech
would provide. Mincing no words, Nicks told Elmer and Burke that the secondary
experiments would fly on Rangers 6 through 9. He did not request, but instructed
Burke to reexamine the problems and present a plan for integrating these
instruments on April 9, at the next Ranger Quarterly Review meeting. 3_Convinced
at last that his reasoning could not possibly prevail, Burke submitted.*
Led by Nicks, Sonett, and Cunningham, Headquarters was well represented
at the JPL Ranger Quarterly Review meeting. Burke and Elmer presented their
plan and reviewed the prospective problems of including the eight sky science
experiments on these Ranger missions. Manpower to support this work could be
contracted for with a local vendor. The existing flight schedule then could be
maintained, they averred, if NASA phased in the new experiments after the launch
of Ranger 6, as shown in Table IV. 36
After discussion all around, NASA personnel agreed to the plan. 37 Burke
told Nicks that despite past objections he would "proceed aggressively in the
attempt to get them aboard. However," he added, "by placing this demand on the
personnel and resources of the Laboratory, we may jeopardize not only other JPL
efforts but also the higher-priority [Apollo] objectives within the Ranger Project
itself." Unless directed otherwise, the main goal of the JPL project office would
"continue to be the production of high-resolution lunar pictures at the earliest
possible date...'38 To help meet that goal, he asked that Headquarters set a
priority among the sky science experiments, thus allowing project engineers some
basis for treating unforeseen "interference problems. ''39 But perhaps because
priorities are frowned upon in science, where each area of inquiry is claimed to be
equally worthy, Nicks and Sonett refused, saying that they would "review any
conflicts and settle each on its own merits. ''4°
On April 23, 1962, the Space Sciences Steering Committee gave final
approval to the sky science experiments. 4_Aware that Burke and his associates still
doubted the wisdom of the decision, Newell personally notified Pickering of the
Space Sciences Steering Committee's findings. The Steering Committee, he assured
Pickering, had "discussed the relative importance of these experiments to the
* Burke, it seems clear, essentially viewed the issue in terms of what it meant to the project rather than
what it meant as an institutional matter. Years later he reflected: "The Ranger [Block II] effort
already was in serious technical trouble. That was the key thing. And what skilled manpower we
could command was busy fixing the technical troubles that existed... But...I just couldn't understand,
I couldn't comprehend the thinking which would suddenly load on eight additional 'trinkets' with all
their demands and interactions right at the moment when we were perhaps approaching our first
[flight] payoff." (Interview of James Burke by Cargill Hall, January 27, 1969, p. 14, 2-1391.)
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Table IV. Ranger Block II1 Sky Science
Spacecraft I:xperiment Agency and scientist
Ranger 6
Rangers 7
8, and 9
Neher ionization chamber
Neher ionizali_m chamber
Geiger counter assembly
Electron flux measurement
Low-energy solar proton
detector
Dust particle detector
Search coil magnetometer
Electron-pr,, ,ton
spect romete r
Low-cnerg3. proton
measurement
Caltech/JPL: H.V. Neher, tt.R. Anderson,
W. S. McDonald
Caltech/JPL: H.V. Neher, lt. R. Anderson,
W. S. McDonald
Caltech/JPL: H.V. Neher, tl.R. Anderson,
W. S. McDonald
Applied Physics Lah_mllor,v: G. 1_. Pieper
Ames Research Center: M. Bader
GoddardSpace Flight Center: W.M. Alexander
JPL: E.J, Smith
University of California at L.A.: T.A. Farley
Space Technology Laborator3.: N. Sanders
GoddardSpaceFlighlCenter: G.P. Serbu,
R. E. Bourdeau
stated objectives of this lollow-on program. The primary objective of these flights
is to obtain data of significance to the manned lunar effort, and it is believed that
good measurements in cislunar space as well as in the lunar environment will be of
great value in this regard. It is certain," he added in closing, "that the Space
Sciences program will benefit from these added experiments." 42
MODIFYING RANGER FOR MORE SPACE SCIENCE
In the weeks that followed, JPL engineers designed a universal bracket for
the spacecraft bus capable of supporting most of the experiment sensors and their
associated electronics. Three of these brackets would encircle the hexagonal frame
of each machine. They subcontracted for the data automation system to receive
and process the scientific telemetry for transmission to earth stations: 3 Assisted by
the JPL Space Sciences Division, the experimenters set about the design,
fabrication, and bench testing of their separate instruments as rapidly as possible,
for the first flight units were scheduled to be delivered to JPL at the end of July
1962. 44
The time element, as it affected preparation of these experiments, remained
the source of justifiable concern. Several of the instruments, the Space Sciences
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Division cautioned in mid-June, might not meet flight acceptance standards under
this tight schedule. 45 When reviewed by JPL division representatives on June 25,
that outcome appeared highly probable. To protect the spacecraft against faults in
the hastily prepared instruments, the engineers recommended the electrical fusing
of each experiment separately. _ Despite objections from some of the experiment-
ers, Burke authorized this change in early July, at the same time rejecting the
proposal of another group of disgruntled engineers who pressed for a single fuse in
front of the power lead to all of the sky science experiments. If one of the
experiments shorted and went up in smoke on the way to the moon, he agreed, it
would not be permitted to take the spacecraft with it. 47 Television pictures of the
lunar surface, in the absence of Headquarters directives to the contrary, remained
the primary objective.
The electrical power needed for all of these scientific experiments, however,
proved to be a far more crucial problem than the potential malfunctioning of any
single one. On July 13 Burke learned from Spacecraft System Manager Wolfe that,
contrary to initial estimates, Ranger's two trapezoidal solar panels appeared
unable to produce sufficient electrical power to operate both the spacecraft and all
the scientific instruments. The project office faced a choice: an attempt could be
made to adapt the larger, rectangular Mariner R solar panels to the new Ranger
machines in the time remaining, or the number of secondary experiments would
have to be reduced. Given Headquarters' determined commitment to space science,
Burke could agree with Wolfe that the latter course had to be viewed as a "drastic
option "( Figure 50). '_
Pending the outcome of more definitive tests, and keenly sensitive to
Headquarters feelings at this point, Burke delayed notifying Cunningham of the
problem. To suggest now that scientific instruments might have to be removed
might be construed as another attempt by JPL to thwart explicit NASA orders. But
by the end of the month, a power shortage existed. As Burke explained to JPL
Deputy Director Sparks, available power was marginal for Ranger 7, and
definitely inadequate for Rangers 8 and 9, which-beyond the scientific
experiments-had also to support a 2300-megacycle communications ranging
experiment for the Deep Space Network. Under existing schedules, moreover, the
Mariner R solar panels could not be adapted in Project Ranger before the flight of
Ranger 9. Headquarters had to be informed of this development. If schedules were
to be met, the number of secondary experiments had to be drastically reduced. 49
This time Burke delegated the task. On August 2, Wolfe notified Ranger
Program Engineer Walter Jakobowski, his counterpart at Headquarters, of the
results of JPL's power review) ° A few days later Cunningham arrived at JPL to
evaluate the situation personally. He promptly concurred in the JPL findings.
Without the larger solar panels, electrical power for most of the experiments was
simply unavailable. Cunningham agreed to present a full report at the next
meeting of the Space Sciences Steering Committee, and also to include
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Fig. 50. Placement of Sky Science Experiments on Ranger Block III Spacecraft, Showing Solar
Panel Requirements
recommended priorities for the experiments based on their (1) value to Project
Apollo, (2) test performance, and (3) suitability for removal at a late date without
disrupting the primary mission objective. 5_
On August 23, 1962, Cunningham conveyed the disturbing news to John F.
Clark. Now Chief Scientist in Newell's Office of Space Sciences _2 and newly
appointed Chairman of the Space Sciences Steering Committee, Clark learned that
NASA could delay flight schedules until the Mariner R solar panels could be
modified and procured for use on Ranger 7, or, if it wished, the space agency
could remove some or possibly all of the secondary experiments• Cunningham
reminded the scientist that "acquisition of knowledge of lunar topography
sufficient for the determination of gross effects on lunar landing vehicles" was the
primary objective of this block of Ranger missions. As though encouraging a
choice of the second option, he observed that the fields and particles experiments
were "a secondary scientific objective. ''S_ In the matter of project priorities and
objectives, Burke clearly had an advocate at Headquarters.
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If the JPL project office had won the support of the Ranger Program Chief
in the matter of secondary sky science on Rangers 6 through 9, the entire episode
had unquestionably misdirected energies, raised undue expectations, and strained
relations all around. It had also cost irretrievable time that might otherwise have
been spent on Rangers 3, 4, and 5, plagued as they were with problems of weight,
a lack of redundant subsystem components, and heat sterilization with its effects on
fabrication and testing) 4 To be sure, the question of the secondary sky science was
placed on the agenda for reconsideration by NASA's Space Sciences Steering
Committee, but it would eventually be settled out of court by the lunar missions
that had already begun rising from Cape Canaveral towards the moon.
Chapter Nine
LUNAR EXPLORATION BEGUN
N 1962 planetary scientists around the country eagerly awaited the flights of the
Block II vehicles. Rangers 3, 4, and 5 would land seismometers on the moon,
analyze the chemical composition of the surface material, and transmit closeup
pictures. The results could profoundly influence long-held theories concerning the
moon's structure and evolution. At JPL, project engineers expectantly looked
forward to demonstrating the proper functioning of Ranger's ground and space
flight machinery-including the crucial midcourse correction maneuver.I And the
upcoming Ranger flights had their national and international ramifications.
Ranger 3 and her sister spacecraft were widely interpreted as "advance scouts for
the manned expeditions .... " as vital preliminary links in a still larger chain of
lunar affairs, z Ranger offered the nation a chance to advance from challenger to
champion in exploring the moon, the hope of restoring international confidence in
the supremacy of Yankee know-how, and the opportunity to bring to an end a
succession of nine humiliating American moon flight failures) Americans
concerned over the Soviet space lead awaited "The U.S. Moon Shots" of 1962.
PREPARING TO GO
In July 1961, JPL engineers assembled Ranger 3, the first of the Block II
lunar machines. Early in November they completed system testing, calibration, and
checkout of the heat-sterilized, lightweight spacecraft and its scientific instruments.
On November 15, NASA accepted the vehicle. Leaving Pasadena in a specially
fitted, air-conditioned van for southern Florida, Ranger 3 began its journey to the
moon. It arrived at Cape Canaveral on November 20, the day after the Ranger 2
mission ended ignominiously in the earth's upper atmosphere. At the
Aeronutronic Division of the Ford Motor Company in Newport Beach, California,
meantime, other engineers worked double shifts in efforts to confirm the
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flightworthiness of the lunar seismometer capsule in time for the scheduled flight
in January 1962.
Ranger 3's lunar target had already been selected. Lighting conditions at
the lunar surface were suitable for photography from a spacecraft in a near-vertical
descent for a few days during the moon's third-quarter phase. In the first month of
the new year, the usable days were January 22 through January 26. The
seismometer, though unaffected by photometric considerations, had to be directed
to a place on the moon's surface where the earth appeared high enough above the
lunar horizon to permit radio contact between the tracking stations and the
seismometer's transmitter. Certain locations were affected more severely by lunar
libration, or rocking of the moon in its orbit, which varied the earth-moon angle,
and could cause the loss of as much as half of the data from the seismometer. In a
compromise among the experimenters for both instruments, the point of impact
selected was just south of the lunar equator and west of the lunar prime meridian,
on the eastern rim of Oceanus Procellarum-the Ocean of Storms.
William Kirhofer and Victor Clarke in the JPL Trajectory Group worked
out the lunar transfer trajectories from Agena second burn to the completion of
Ranger's mission at the selected point of impact. The trajectories strictly limited
the permissible time for countdowns. Ranger's launch window on each of the
available days extended from 3:30 to 4:45 pm EST. During that period the earth
would rotate into a position for the flight to begin. Sixty-six hours after launch, the
earth would also be in a position for the Goldstone tracking station to view the
spacecraft at lunar impact. By using variable launch azimuths and coasting times
between first and second burn of the Agena in earth orbit, and by taking into
account the motions and the gravitational attractions of the earth, moon, and sun,
flight engineers could employ Ranger's midcourse engine to compensate for minor
variations in the flight path, and thus bring the spacecraft to the moon at the
specified time and location. 4
With so many conditions to be satisfied, however, just to achieve the lunar
trajectories could be considered a major accomplishment. Ranger 3 was to be
directed to a point in space where the moon would be three days later. If the
spacecraft were to hit the moon, not to mention the target of interest to the
planetary scientists, it would have to be delivered onto its ballistic path in space at
an altitude of 193 kilometers (120 miles) above the earth and a velocity of 10,959
±7 meters per second (24,500 ±16 miles per hour). Only slight deviations in the
Agena's altitude, direction of travel, or accumulated velocity would prevent Ranger
from being able to correct its flight path sufficiently to hit the moon at all
(Figure 51 ).
Agena B 6003 and Atlas 121D, the launch vehicle components that would
place Ranger 3 onto its trajectory to the moon, arrived at Cape Canaveral in mid-
December. After inspection and tests conducted by personnel from Lockheed and
General Dynamics-Astronautics, these vehicles were erected at Launch Complex
12, preparatory to the performance of integrated tests with the lunar spacecraft.
The entire ensemble completed the Joint Flight Acceptance Test on January 5,
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whereupon engineers removed the spacecraft to Hangar AE to begin final
preparations for launch. _
In the two weeks remaining before the first launch attempt, Ranger 3 was
disassembled, and its components were inspected for the last time. Reassembled in
the newly constructed Explosive Safe Area in Hangar AE in mid-January, the
seismometer capsule and retromotor, both balanced and checked out, were
installed together with Ranger's fueled midcourse engine, flight battery, and radar
altimeter. After successfully completing final systems tests on January 18, engineers
returned Ranger 3 to Launch Complex 12 and remounted it on the Agena. They
were satisfied that the spacecraft and launch vehicle were flight ready (Figure 52).
Their own plans and procedures established, Ranger's experimenters were
also ready. JPL Space Sciences Chief Hibbs had appointed Harold W. Washburn
as the Ranger Project Scientist for the Block II missions. Washburn, the conduit
between the project engineers and the experimenters, would coordinate their
,!
Fig. 52. Technicians Make Final Adjustments to Ranger 3 at Cape Canaveral
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activities during the lunar flights. In meetings at JPL and NASA in preceding
weeks, experimenters had acknowledged that closeup pictures of the moon's
surface would contain the greatest popular appeal. The television experimenters,
"recognizing the great interest of the public," agreed to release representative
photographs to the news media immediately upon receipt. Later, after processing
was completed, copies of all of the photographs were to be issued to approved lists
of scientists and scientific groups. 6 Whatever the popular attraction of any pictorial
returns, however, Washburn, Hibbs, and Burke evaluated the potential
contribution to knowledge of each individual instrument and determined the
standing each should have during flight operations. Wherever priorities could not
be avoided in an emergency, they gave first preference to data from the gamma-
ray spectrometer, second preference to the television camera, and third preference
to the seismometer. 7
Walter Larkin's Goldstone tracking station in California had installed
special equipment to receive the telemetry from the gamma-ray spectrometer and
seismometer experiments. A trailer containing RCA equipment to record Ranger's
television signals was also at the site and connected to the station. Eberhardt
Rechtin and his team of telecommunications specialists in the Deep Space
Network began to check out each of the radio tracking stations in the Deep Space
Network on January 10, finishing the operational readiness tests involving all of
the stations on January 19. The JPL space flight control center in Pasadena
transmitted, received, and processed simulated tracking and telemetry data in the
proper sequence and format. 8 The Deep Space Network was also prepared to
support the project scientists and engineers.
All of Ranger 3 's preflight activities continued on schedule through January
19, when launch crews began the task of pumping kerosene fuel aboard Atlas
121D. Upon completing the fueling task, however, they discovered a leak in the
bulkhead between the fuel tank and the liquid oxygen tank. While the fuel was
pumped back out of the Atlas, project officials hurriedly conferred. It was launch
vehicle problems all over again, only this time with Atlas instead of Agena. The
situation appeared to preclude the launch of Ranger 3 during January; the Atlas
would have to be returned to its hangar for repairs, and the launch postponed until
late February.
Air Force and Atlas contractor personnel, however, urged another, more
novel course of action. The repair, they suggested, might be made on the pad-
from inside the rocket-in time for a launch attempt on January 26. In any case,
nothing would be lost, and a month could be saved. Burke approved the proposal.
In the next few days engineers disconnected the center engine of the Atlas and
lowered it into the flame pit beneath Launch Complex 12. A wooden framework
was prefabricated, passed through the engine hole at the base of the Atlas fuel
tank, and assembled inside the 3-meter (10-foot) diameter tank by men wearing
oxygen packs and masks. Working twenty-four hours a day, the Atlas field crew
removed the ruptured bulkhead and restored the launch vehicle to a flight-ready
condition for the launch attempt on January 26. 9
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While General Dynamics-Astronautics engineers clambered around inside
the Atlas, JPL crews finished last-minute preparations for Ranger 3, still mounted
inside the nose fairing high atop the Agena. They performed final sterilization
between January 23 and 24, bathing the spacecraft in a toxic concentration of
ethylene oxide gas for eleven hours and purging it afterward with dry nitrogen
passed through a sterile filter. _° Whenever launched and whatever the outcome,
this United States machine would carry a minimum amount of earth bugs into
space.
But after the ingenious repair of the Atlas and the time spent in final
preparations, on January 26 only one hour and 15 minutes of the launch window
remained. When the countdown began at 10:45 am EST, everyone knew that any
further delay would postpone the mission.
A FIRST CHANCE AT THE MOON
The countdown went flawlessly. At 3:30 pm EST, Ranger 3 rose gracefully
into a warm, sunlit Florida sky. Spectators gathered there to witness the daytime
flight, and bathers on the beaches for miles around joined project engineers in
shouting approval. The United States was on its way to the moon (Figure 53).
Yet the vehicle had not left sight before the telemetry monitors knew that
something was awry. Commands generated by the Cape computer and radioed to
Atlas 121D went unacknowledged-the rocket's airborne radio guidance system
had failed. The Atlas continued to ascend under control of its autopilot, using
internal program information to establish the sequence of flight events. Unable to
command shutdown of the engines at the precise times, NASA and JPL officials
could expect a deviation in the planned lunar trajectory. The project officers drove
across the Cape to the JPL command post at Hangar AE to await further word
from the tracking stations downrange, including the Department of Defense ship
between Antigua and Ascension Islands. Within twenty minutes data from these
stations indicated that the Agena B had separated properly and its engine had
burned once, placing the vehicle in an earth parking orbit. Unable to respond to
commands from the ground, however, the Atlas had flown higher and faster than
planned. Like its predecessors, Ranger 3 was being accelerated into an unplanned
orbit.
The crew of the mobile tracking antenna in South Africa waited to receive
the values for the actual trajectory from Cape Canaveral. But communications
equipment in Florida malfunctioned, preventing the transmission. Using the time
of launch and planned trajectory figures, the station acquired Ranger 3 as it rose
over the horizon five minutes ahead of schedule, at 3:55 pm EST. The Agena B
had completed its second burn, although a further variation in the trajectory, later
traced to an error in the Agena's flight program, had also occurred.
Within an hour, the radio tracking station at Woomera confirmed these
facts. Fired into space with excessive speed, Ranger would pass ahead of and below
the moon at a distance of some 32,000 kilometers (20,000 miles). This kind of
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Fig. 53. Launch of Ranger 3
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miss-distance exceeded the corrective capabilities of Ranger's midcourse engine;
Ranger 3 would continue into orbit around the sun. Yet Burke and other project
engineers had some consolations. The spacecraft separated properly from the
Agena, acquired the sun and earth, deployed its high-gain antenna, switched to
solar power, and turned on the gamma-ray spectrometer experiment. Despite
problems with the launch vehicle, Ranger 3 was working. Except for an
unexplained drop in the signal strength of the low-gain antenna, NASA and JPL
controlled an operating Ranger on a deep space trajectory, t,
Confident in this knowledge, Burke left the Cape for the West Coast. That
same evening, tired and disheveled, he assumed command of the space flight
operations at the JPL control center. Together with his assistant Gordon Kautz
and Flight Test Director Marshall Johnson, Burke considered what they might do
with a spacecraft destined to hurtle wide of the moon. The deep space trajectory of
Ranger 3 might have supported the earlier experiments of sky scientists
handsomely, but it was of little value to the planetary experiments actually aboard
the spacecraft. Since the lunar seismometer could not be deposited on the moon, it
could never listen for a moonquake. The gamma-ray spectrometer, busily
establishing the radiation background generated by the spacecraft, would be
limited to measuring for sky science the gamma-ray flux in interplanetary space.
Among the lunar experiments, only the television camera might be used to good
effect. If Ranger 3 could be positioned properly using a terminal maneuver,
pictures of the moon, including portions of the backside hidden to view from the
earth, would be a distinct possibility.
Evaluating these and other matters, Burke, Kautz, and Wolfe decided that
Ranger 3 would be used to test all of the spacecraft functions, including the
midcourse and terminal maneuvers, and to obtain television pictures of the moon.
Although they would have liked to launch the lunar seismometer capsule and
ignite its retrorocket as a test, that course of action was not possible. The capsule
system had been intentionally designed to separate from Ranger only on command
from the radar altimeter. And since Ranger 3 would pass the moon at a great
distance, the altimeter could not detect that celestial object and trigger the
ejection. ,2
A few hours later, in the early morning of January 27, the Spacecraft
Command Group finished preparing the three stored commands defining Ranger's
midcourse correction maneuver. Sent to Goldstone, the commands were radioed to
Ranger 3 by the tracking station. The spacecraft confirmed their receipt and stored
them in the register of its electronic brain, the central computer and sequencer. A
final command to initiate the maneuver was transmitted at 2:00 am PST. Ranger
turned through the desired angles in roll and pitch, and the midcourse rocket
engine fired at the appointed moment and for the proper duration. The attitude
control system then reacquired the sun and the earth, returning the spacecraft to its
former attitude, and normal cruise operations resumed. Cheers and handshakes
were the order of the day in the JPL control center: for the first time an unmanned
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spacecraft had altered its course in flight upon commands from the earth
(Figure 54).
But as the sky lightened in the east above the San Gabriel Mountains,
postmaneuver tracking information relayed from the Woomera and Johannesburg
stations revealed Ranger 3 to be moving in a direction that was the mirror image
of the one anticipated. Members of the Spacecraft Data Analysis Team pored over
the available data in attempts to determine the cause of the unorthodox course
change. During the period of about thirty hours remaining between the midcourse
and terminal maneuvers, they analyzed the fault. A sign had been inverted
between the digital maneuver code used in the ground computer at JPL and the
spacecraft computer. While preflight tests had checked the magnitude and polarity
of the commands, they had not checked their meaning. In any case, the flight path
had been changed in such a way that Ranger would fly nearest the moon at the
end of the second period during which the spacecraft was in view of the Goldstone
tracking station, instead of earlier in the period as planned. That change limited
the time for picture taking.
Even though headed on an erroneous course, Ranger 3 continued otherwise
to perform flawlessly. Shortly after the midcourse maneuver, the gamma-ray
spectrometer was extended 1.8 meters (6 feet) by its gas-actuated telescoping
boom. To the delight of experimenters James Arnold and Albert Metzger, the
Fig. 54. Ranger Block II Midcourse Maneuver Sequence
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instrument began returning data on the gamma-rays in interplanetary space. The
next day, on January 28, as Ranger neared the moon, in the period termed "lunar
encounter," additional commands caused the protective cover over the television
camera lens to swing aside, and that instrument began to warm up.
At JPL, members of the Spacecraft Command Group prepared new coded
commands for the terminal maneuver--this time with the erroneous digital sign
reversed (Figure 55). At least the spacecraft could be turned so that the television
camera pointed directly at the moon. Beginning at 8:29 am PST, Goldstone
transmitted the commands to the spacecraft. The command to initiate the terminal
maneuver followed one hour later. Ranger 3 began to pitch in the proper
direction, confirming the diagnosis of a sign inversion. Midway through its
prescribed turns, however, Ranger's signal strength began to waver, momentarily
dropping below the threshold of the sensitive receivers at Goldstone. Ranger's
high-gain antenna, which pivoted and continued to operate during this maneuver,
was no longer pointing directly at the earth as it should. The spacecraft was out of
control.
Ranger's central computer and sequencer had failed, immobilizing the
earth and sun sensors. Under the control of its gyroscopes alone, the spacecraft
continued to turn. Goldstone intermittently reacquired the radio signal, but its
strength fluctuated greatly as Ranger 3 drifted aimlessly about its axis in space.
The television camera, nevertheless, began sending back pictures as it already had
been programmed to do. Because the high-gain antenna remained pointed away
from the earth, the video signal was extremely weak and obscured by noise. When
developed, the pictures showed that the camera system had operated; reference
crosses on the lens were clearly observable, illuminated by light apparently
reflected from the spacecraft superstructure. But the moon was nowhere to be seen.
Unaware at first of the true cause of Ranger's situation in space, the
controllers transmitted urgent backup commands to the spacecraft. Now brainless,
Ranger 3 could not process them. The unresponsive spacecraft swept past the
moon six hours later at a distance of 37,000 kilometers (23,000 miles), on its way
into solar orbit. Intermittent tracking continued for three more days, until January
31, when the attitude control gas ran out and the spacecraft began to tumble. The
mission was over. _3
REFLECTIONS ON A NEAR MISS
There were hardly enough hours in the succeeding weeks for engineers to
accomplish all that needed doing before the launch of Ranger 4. Final system tests
were completed on schedule at JPL, and on February 26 the spacecraft arrived at
its Cape Canaveral hangar. There it was readied for the series of preflight tests to
meet the launch period from April 21 through 26. Other members of the Project
Office in Pasadena, meanwhile, undertook an investigation of the flight of Ranger
3, since the success of Ranger 4 obviously hinged on identifying and resolving the
technical failures of its predecessor.
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Fig. 55. Ranger Block II Terminal Maneuver Sequence
On February 8 Burke sent the preliminary findings of the postflight
investigation to Oran Nicks at Headquarters. Burke itemized the malfunctions and
the corrective measures to be taken for future Ranger flights. The Atlas bulkhead
rupture during fueling, as well as the airborne guidance failure in flight, the
breakdown in communications between Cape Canaveral and the deep space
tracking stations, and the reversal of signs in the digital command codes prepared
for Ranger spacecraft would be precluded by new tests and revised procedures. The
exact causes of the drop in signal strength in Ranger 3's low-gain antenna and the
failure of its central computer and sequencer during the terminal maneuver
remained question marks. Attempts to duplicate these malfunctions with the
Ranger proof test model in simulated flight situations proved inconclusive. Minor
revisions were made to both pieces of equipment on the" basis of possible causes."
New components added to Ranger's electronic brain, Nicks learned, would not be
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heat sterilized._4 Heat sterilization was suspected to have contributed to the failure
of the central computer and sequencer.
One further difficulty, mentioned but briefly in the preliminary findings,
caused special concern to Burke and the project office. Ranger 3 had provided the
first opportunity for ground controllers to compute a deep space orbit, generate
commands for a midcourse maneuver, and direct the flight of a spacecraft.
Although JPL personnel who served on the control teams reported administra-
tively to Johnson and Burke for the flight operations, they worked "on loan" from
the technical divisions at the Laboratory. During the flight a number of the
division chiefs, anxious to know how the respective spacecraft subsystems were
performing, had entered the control areas. Too often they had interfered with the
flight operations by demanding time from and issuing orders to their functional
subordinates-orders that conflicted with the planned flight routine. Several of the
experimenters had also bypassed Ranger Project Scientist Harold Washburn to
deal directly with Flight Test Director Marshall Johnson, further complicating the
operations. '_
Burke and Johnson pressed for changes in procedure and in the
arrangement of space inside the temporary control center in Building 125 at JPL.
With the support of Laboratory leaders in the weeks preceding the launch of
Ranger 4, they added glass partitions in the control center, insulating control team
members from others nearby, and prepared lists of personnel authorized to be in
the various control areas, with entry to be monitored by security guards. Finally,
they redefined the authority and responsibilities of the various participants. The
Flight Test Director, not the division chiefs, would direct the control teams and the
spacecraft during a mission.
Because the spacecraft had performed well until the central computer and
sequencer failed at lunar encounter, the project engineers considered the
capabilities of the machine demonstrated. The next flight, they were sure, would
remove all remaining doubts. Even the experimenters who had yet to realize their
scientific objectives shared in that confidence. Having nearly succeeded, "we were
sure," James Arnold observed, that one or both of the remaining capsule missions
"would give us good data. ''_6 Their optimism found its way into the news media.
The U.S. would shortly have pictures of the moon and more. Scientists and
engineers in Pasadena "were less than disconsolate. They were pleased that most
of the complex mechanisms...had functioned perfectly in response to radio signals
over distances of hundreds of thousands of miles. ''_7 Ranger 3 after all was the
most sophisticated spacecraft yet launched by the United States, "as crammed with
electronic tricks as a barrel of transistor radios," Time magazine enthused. 's
Another flight, or maybe two, would see America on the moon.
But not everyone shared the confidence evident among project engineers
and scientists. Dissent surfaced within the engineering fraternity, particularly that
segment affiliated with the aerospace industry that preferred Air Force contracting
methods. The aerospace trade journal Aviation Week suggested that the Ranger
system, developed for NASA "in-house" by a university-affiliated laboratory, was
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too ambitious and not designed conservatively enough. The flight of Ranger 3 had
"greatly aggravated the continuing controversy over reliability vs performance."
The NASA-JPL pursuit of "very high performance" from Ranger had been at the
expense of its reliable operation. Improving the reliability of the spacecraft--by
adding backup systems, for example--called for increased weight. And more weight
on a spacecraft as crammed with electronic tricks as Ranger was surely
impossible._9 Ranger, the journal implied, would have been handled differently for
NASA by American industry.
The implications of prior launch vehicle failures, however, and the
miscalculated weight of the Ranger spacecraft that precluded redundant
engineering features, were nowhere evident in the reporting. Addressing himself to
these and other questions raised by the flight of Ranger 3, on February 7, JPL
Director Pickering publicly summarized the results of the postflight investigation
at a news conference. He explained the thinking behind the original Ranger design
and sequential pattern of flights: "'Because of the great complexity of the project-
necessarily great if we are to advance in this space flight area--three Ranger
[lunar] shots were planned to achieve a mission success." Furthermore, while the
most recent mission was not a complete "success, or even a moon impact, I can
safely say we face the next shot...with a great deal more knowledge and
confidence because of the facts learned from Ranger 3.''_° The project, Picketing
assured its budding critics, was in good hands, and making excellent progress.
ANOTHER CHANCE
At Cape Canaveral in March, project engineers subjected Ranger 4 to the
prescribed series of system tests. The launch vehicle, Atlas 133D/Agena B 6004,
began preflight tests at the same time; all of the Ranger elements moved steadily
toward a flight on April 21, the first day of the prescribed lunar launch period.
With minor adjustments in the lunar trajectory, the experimenters targeted Ranger
4 to rough-land its seismometer on the moon at nearly the same point as that
selected for Ranger 3: just south of the lunar equator on the eastern rim of the
Ocean of Storms .2h
By April 20, all of the preflight inspections and tests had been finished. 22
When Ranger 4 was placed atop the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle at Launch
Complex 12, the precautions and changes adopted after the flight of Ranger 3 had
been followed to the letter. The seismometer capsule sported a new saw-tooth paint
pattern designed better to maintain thermal balance during its flight to the moon.
Terminal sterilization of the spacecraft with ethylene-oxide gas had been
completed. The tracking stations in the deep space network were checked out, and
for the first time the 25-meter (84-foot) antenna at Johannesburg was equipped
with a transmitter making it possible to command as well as track Ranger 4 from
South Africa. Four tracking ships instead of one had been detailed to support the
flight of Ranger 4, deployed from the Caribbean to Ascension Island. Once again
everything was ready (Figure 56),
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Fig. 56. Technicians Prepare Ranger 4 for Launch at Cape Canaveral
Air Force and NASA officials postponed the countdown on April 21 one
day to permit another launch at Cape Canaveral; with fair weather forecast for
April 22, Ranger's participants were eager to proceed. Around the nation, Ranger
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interest was again at a high pitch. In widely quoted testimony before Congress just
a few weeks earlier, NASA Administrator James Webb had informed the country
that the Soviet Union would continue for the time being to dominate space near
the earth with its manned orbiting missions. "But for [manned] landing on the
moon and return," he stated, "we are ahead of them." And "if a thousand things
go right" with Ranger 4, the New York Sunday News summarily proclaimed, "the
U.S. will hit the paschal moon with a spacecraft that will blaze a trail for the first
American--and, hopefully, the first earthling-to follow to the moon. ''23
On Saturday, April 2, Ranger officials from NASA, JPL, and the Air Force
agreed to schedule the first launch attempt for Monday, April 23, having rejected
the preceding day, Easter Sunday, out of regard for people's religious sensibilities.
At Cape Canaveral on Monday, clear weather and mild winds made an ideal day
on which to undertake or watch a lunar flight. The countdown began in
midmorning and proceeded without interruption. Under new arrangements,
Ranger Program Chief Cunningham joined Burke in the JPL command post at
Hangar AE. The two men remained in constant voice communication with the Air
Force personnel conducting launch operations in the blockhouse at Launch
Complex 12. With all checks completed, the launch sequence began at 3:50 pm
EST, with the familiar puff of white smoke signaling start of the Atlas engines.
Ranger 4 rose, on its way to the moon.
Tracking antennas at Cape Canaveral monitored the performance of the
Atlas, the Agena, and Ranger until they passed out of sight over the horizon eight
minutes after liftoff. By that time the Atlas had staged and separated from the
Agena, and Agena first burn had begun. As the Agena coasted into low earth orbit
over the South Atlantic, the tracking stations downrange received a steady flow of
data. First returns looked good. They confirmed the start of Agena's second burn,
and the normality of Ranger's vital signs. The Cape transmitted trajectory data
properly to the Johannesburg tracking station in South Africa. As the Agena
swung to the southeast and out of view of the antenna on Ascension Island, the
picture was very bright indeed.
The mobile tracking antenna promptly located Ranger 4 as it rose over the
South African horizon twenty-three minutes after launch. The Agena had
completed its second burn; the spacecraft signal, however, indicated immediate,
serious difficulties. Though Ranger's transponder was radiating at the 960-
megacycle tracking frequency, all telemetry commutation was absent. The state of
health of the spacecraft could not be ascertained. Two minutes later Ranger 4
separated from the Agena and, as designed, tumbled very slowly on its lunar
trajectory. The moment passed when the machine was to extend its solar panels
and high-gain antenna and begin stabilizing itself. But without telemetry, flight
controllers lacked confirmation that these events had taken place. The fluctuating
strength of the transponder signal strongly suggested that the spacecraft was still
tumbling, its solar panels tucked up firmly against the superstructure and its high-
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gain antenna still stowed over the midcourse engine beneath the spacecraft. The
mission was in desperate trouble.
The station at Woomera acquired Ranger's transponder and began
tracking the spacecraft as it moved out and away from the earth. These data,
relayed to the JPL control center and fed into a computer, permitted an initial
trajectory to be calculated. This time the near-perfect performance of the Atlas-
Agena B had put Ranger 4 on a collision course with the moon even without a
midcourse correction maneuver. But the spacecraft remained inoperative. Burke,
who had arrived in Miami aboard an Air Force plane on his way home, approved
a series of trouble-shooting commands to be sent from the Johannesburg station in
an effort to fathom the spacecraft's true status. Commands to advance the
telemetry, to switch the transponder signal from the low-gain antenna to the high-
gain antenna, to change the high-gain antenna hinge angle, and to override the
spacecraft roll control system were all quickly transmitted. All of them proved
futile. At JPL the Spacecraft Data Analysis Team issued a grim prognosis: the
master clock in Ranger's central computer and sequencer had stopped. Without
that timer, the telemetry decommutator had ceased operating, all timed functions
had failed to take place, and the vehicle could not accept and act on commands
from earth. For all intents and purposes, Ranger 4 was dead. 24 At the Cape a
NASA official lamented: "All we've got is an idiot with a radio signal. ''25
The flawless performance of the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle made Burke's
own disappointment all the more bitter. Hitting the moon with an idiot Ranger
was no consolation. Burke knew there would be "nothing" for science, and little
for project engineers. Even the reason for the timer failure could elude detection.
Antennas at the downrange stations south of Antigua tracked only the launch
vehicle; their receivers were never equipped to monitor the 960-megacycle
spacecraft frequency. A six-minute and 17-second gap in coverage of spacecraft
telemetry existed between the time Ranger passed out of view of the stations in the
Caribbean and the time it was first picked up in South Africa. And the timer had
stopped some time during that period. Every single preceding Ranger spacecraft,
he recollected, had functioned in space given any opportunity at all-but not
Ranger 4.
As Ranger 4 moved inexorably toward its lunar rendezvous, NASA
Administrator Webb arrived in Los Angeles for a speaking engagement. Early in
the morning of April 26 he flew to the Goldstone tracking station in the Mojave
desert, where he joined Nicks, Pickering, Cummings, and Burke. There, the space
officials awaited word of a lunar impact and discussed the Ranger 4 mission with
representatives of the press. Electrical power from the spacecraft battery had run
out hours before, and Ranger's transponder had ceased to operate. Stations in the
Deep Space Network continued their radio tracking nonetheless, homing on the
50-miiliwatt signal produced by the tiny battery-powered transmitter in the
seismometer capsule. Helping to pass the time the Goldstone station staff supplied
their guests with the amplified sound of the seismometer's transmitter and closed-
circuit television pictures of the moon taken from earth. The transmitter's beep
154 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJECT RANGER
droned off into an inaudible hum as the spacecraft approached the moon and
accelerated under the pull of lunar gravity. The lunar pictures, provided by a
camera and telephoto lens aligned through the center of one of the large dish
antennas trained on Ranger from Goldstone, flickered silently on the monitors.
During the final moments the cross-sight was centered on the moon's leading edge.
At 4:47 am PST, sixty-four hours after launch, Ranger 4 skimmed over the leading
edge and, two minutes later, crashed out of sight of the earth on the far side of the
moon.
Success had eluded the project once more. Webb told the newsmen that the
mission still had contributed to the "long strides forward in space" made recently
by the United States. And, he added, this spacecraft was far more sophisticated
than Lunik 2, which deposited a Soviet pennant on the moon in 1959. Pickering,
putting the best face possible on an otherwise dismal outcome, observed that the
accuracy of Ranger's launch vehicle had been fully demonstrated. Ranger 5, he
was encouraged to believe, would bring this original phase of the project to a
successful conclusion before the end of the year. 26 Later that day, at a formal press
conference in Los Angeles, James Webb was even less restrained.
Taken in context, he explained, the flight of Ranger 4 had to be considered
"an outstanding American achievement." For the first time an American
spacecraft had reached the moon. The first American astronaut, Colonel John
Glenn, had orbited the earth two months earlier. Just the day before, on April 25,
moreover, the second Saturn rocket, the kind that would eventually convey man to
the moon, had been launched in a perfect test flight from Cape Canaveral. The
nation's manned lunar program, Webb insisted, remained right on schedule. 27 The
press and the public seemed to agree. "Ranger 4 Hits Moon, Scores U.S. Space
Feat," was a typical lead in the newspaper columns, z8 Though disappointed at the
failure of Ranger's electronic brain, The New York Times said that in this flight
"the fact that the moon was reached tells much about the increased power and
improved accuracy the United States has achieved in rocket technology. ''z9
Summing up the week's events in space, a major West Coast paper concluded: "At
last the cheers are drowning out the fears that we are 'losing' the space race"
(Figure 57). 3°
But Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev could not resist the temptation to
needle the American space agency just a little. "The Americans," he observed in a
press conference of his own, "have tried several times to hit the moon with their
rockets. They have proclaimed for all the world to hear that they launched rockets
to the moon, but they missed every time..." The Soviet pennant already deposited
there, he quipped, was getting lonesome waiting for an American companion. 3_
The Soviet Premier's well-targeted remarks were like salt in an open wound at
JPL. Pickering wasted no time reacting. "On April 26, at 4:47.50 am Pacific
Standard Time," he declared speaking for the Laboratory as well as for NASA,
"Ranger 4 was tracked by the Goldstone receiver as it passed the leading edge of
the moon. At 4:49.53 am it crashed on the moon at a lunar longitude of 229.5
degrees East and a lunar latitude of 15.5 degrees South. ''32 If the Russians wished
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Red, White and Blue Cross
Fig. 57. Red, White, and Blue Cross (Copyright, Los Angeles Times;
Reprinted With Permission)
to confirm that fact, they could dispatch one of their own astronauts to the spot
and investigate it first hand.
But however much space officials or the press praised Ranger at home, there
were growing doubts whether the project was living up to American expectations
for the space race or, for that matter, even up to expectations held for it by the
project engineers and scientists themselves.
Chapter Ten
WHICH WAY RANGER?
NLY Ranger 5, the last of the Block II machines, remained to secure the
primary objectives of lunar science. Beyond that, attention focused on the
objectives for Rangers 6 through 9. Simmering at NASA Headquarters and at JPL
during 1962 was the question: Would these missions indeed fly for science first
and support Apollo second, or the other way around?
FAMILY RELATIONS
Having reorganized NASA in late 1961, James Webb possessed a
management structure with which to prosecute both the nation's program of
landing a man on the moon and the other varied activities of the space agency.
Dividing the lunar program into manned and unmanned segments had made it
necessary to strike arrangements to coordinate the dichotomous enterprise. But in
January 1962 these arrangements had not yet been made, and they would not be
made before the end of the year. In the interim, Homer Newell and Brainerd
Holmes, the directors of the two responsible NASA offices, managed affairs as best
they could-in the interest of NASA and the country as each perceive d it.
In March 1962, after the pro-science modification of the Ranger Block III
objectives, Newell appeared before a Congressional Committee to speak in favor of
NASA's budget authorization for the coming year. His Congressional questioners,
less concerned than ever with any information that automatic spacecraft might
gather to shed light on the origin of the solar system, were considerably interested
in accelerating Project Apollo. They peppered him with queries about how much
support the unmanned lunar program was providing to the manned. Disturbed by
the reasoning that inspired these questions, Newell took time out to write a
personal letter to Representative Joseph E. Karth, the Farmer-Labor Democrat
from Minnesota's Fourth Congressional District in Saint Paul-Minneapolis, and
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the firm, personable Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space Sciences of the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics.
"Space science, in addition to laying the groundwork for future activity in
space," Newell told the Subcommittee Chairman, "is one area in the national
space program where we [already] hold a clear lead over the Soviets, and in which
we can continue to hold the lead if we maintain the vigor and breadth of our
effort." It was imperative, he averred, that Congress "support space science for the
sake of science, maintaining our faith that the practical benefits thereof will
assuredly accrue." Newell added that a broad rather than narrow science program
would best serve the admittedly crucial goal of a manned lunar landing. In any
case, he insisted, space science was the ultimate raison d'etre for all unmanned and
manned lunar flights. Aside from competition with the Soviet Union, "the single
greatest foreseeable reason right now for sending man to the moon and planets is
to explore and investigate them... TM
A month later, on June 7, at the first Senior Council Meeting of the Office
of Space Sciences in NASA Headquarters, 2 Newell told his assembled field
directors, including Pickering, that he intended to incorporate quality science on
every flight. But the field directors wondered whether Newell's office or the Office
of Manned Space Flight would determine and order the requirements for
unmanned support of Project Apollo. The Office of Space Sciences might set these
requirements, Charles Donlan of Langley Research Center observed, but it still
seemed intent on pursuing scientific objectives selected before landing a man on
the moon had been established as a national goal. "Space Sciences," he continued,
"was rather unbending in not getting scientific data which would assist the
manned program." Donlan had touched the nub of the entire problem: What
science would best serve Apollo and the overall NASA program? Apollo
desperately needed information on the hardness of the lunar surface and the
mechanics of soil erosion. A soil penetrometer experiment proposed by Langley for
future Ranger missions had been designed to meet these needs, Donlan asserted,
but it had already been rejected in favor of additional seismometer experiments.
While the information requirements of Project Apollo "may not be quite as
elegant in a scientific sense," he concluded, the Office of Space Sciences "should
support the entire NASA program."
Was it not possible, Pickering inquired, to use the available funds of the
Office of Space Sciences to support the ends and objectives of the manned program
and at the same time advance the scientific program? If not, then Donlan was
right: the Office of Space Sciences remained too heavily committed to pure science
in the face of the national goal to land a man on the moon. In Pickering's view the
objectives for Ranger Block III should be restored to those specified by Silverstein
in 1961, with support of the manned program coming first, at least until its
requirements were met. Still, Pickering continued, Apollo seemed too devoted to
engineering without regard to space science. Some "melding" and accommodation
between the two offices was called for.
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Though resolving some of the management problems between field centers
and Headquarters, the day-long meeting achieved no consensus on scientific
objectives. Unfortunate as the lack of unanimity might be, Newell preferred it to
altering the Headquarters scheme for unmanned lunar exploration. Newell and his
colleagues also sensed that any melding of the manned and unmanned lunar
programs in NASA would likely result in the total subordination of the Office of
Space Sciences to Project Apollo. So long as the Office of Space Sciences planned a
program and paid the bills, it intended to establish the scientific objectives for
unmanned lunar flights. "Pure science experiments," Nicks reiterated, "will
provide the engineering answers for Project Apollo." Besides, more immediately
important than any melding with Apollo was the poor reliability so far
demonstrated by the unmanned missions already budgeted. Ranger's overall track
record, 0 for 4, was worse even than Nicks' estimate of one success in every three
flights. Clearly, Newell and his deputy insisted to the Senior Council meeting, the
project required more effort. 3
Two miles away, in a rented building on 19th Street, Brainerd Holmes and
his colleagues in the Office of Manned Space Flight were busy deciding issues of
their own. Project Apollo was the cynosure of NASA and the nation, 4 where
everything--the Saturn rockets, the facilities that would house and launch them,
and the funding-was of Brobdingnagian proportions. And the most compelling of
the decisions faced by Apollo's managers in 1962, perhaps, pivoted on the method
of staging to reach the moon: Would the astronauts rendezvous in earth orbit or in
a lunar orbit? Until answered in July, that single question claimed the lion's share
of attention of Holmes as well as NASA's top leaders) The scientific priorities of
Newell's unmanned lunar projects, even if each of them did cost several hundred
million dollars, quite simply did not rate with these affairs in importance.
Holmes and deputies Joseph Shea and George Low pursued the objective of
landing a man on the moon with a singlemindedness of purpose. Every resource at
NASA's command had to be bent to this task, and that included the unmanned
lunar program. When Project Apollo needed data on lunar surface conditions from
the unmanned flights, Project Apollo officials expected to specify these data.
Bespeaking that need was the document Holmes issued on June 15, Requirements
for Data in Support of Project Apollo, which declared that "the basic requirement
for maximum United States accomplishment in the Apollo Project time period
dictates that all space activity provide maximum support..." The document called
for the unmanned lunar projects to furnish Apollo with three classes of
information during the next three years. First, environmental data on fields and
particles in space near the moon to assist in the design of spacecraft and ensure the
safety of the Apollo crew in flight and on the moon. Second, information on the
physical characteristics of the lunar surface to confirm spacecraft landing gear
designs. Third, photoreconnaissance and topographic data to permit early selection
of Apollo landing sites and aid in surface operations. Nowhere in the text was the
Office of Space Sciences mentioned. Rather, all NASA groups engaged in the
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unmanned lunar program were asked to "obtain the technological data specified...
on a priority basis.'6
The message was straightforward enough, but the peremptory manner of its
release and wording almost guaranteed ruffled feathers in Newell's shop, not to
mention the Office of Administrator Webb. 7 Not only had Holmes crossed well-
defined jurisdictional boundaries and demanded support, but he expected the
Office of Space Sciences to perform the bulk of this work and pick up the tab
without so much as a thank you. The repercussions rattled offices in Pasadena,
where JPL, unlike most of the other field centers, was affected directly. James
Burke was scarcely eager to repeat the discomposing experience of March, when he
had been caught between the factions contesting over Ranger for science or
Ranger for Apollo, between his manager-superiors at Headquarters on the one side
and the project engineers at JPL on the other. But the Requirements for Data in
Support of Project Apollo appeared to rekindle the issue of Ranger's primary
purpose. Could Project Ranger serve--and please-two masters at once?
Pickering, Cummings, Burke, and Surveyor Project Manager Eugene
Giberson considered that issue during the next week at JPL. If the unmanned
lunar projects were to proceed in an orderly manner, they agreed, the respective
Offices of Space Sciences and Manned Space Flight had to agree upon their
objectives and priorities. In their opinion, moreover, considering the national
commitment to a manned lunar landing, serving the immediate needs of Apollo
seemed the only realistic approach to take. 8 In the following days, that view was
reinforced by other pressing events. Despite the best of intentions, the secondary
sky science experiments crammed onto Rangers 6 through 9 threatened the
reliability of the spacecraft. 9 Plans for another block of five Ranger spacecraft
seemed close to approval at NASA Headquarters, and fabrication of these vehicles
would have to be contracted to an industrial firm if JPL was to avoid a manpower
crisis. The experiments for them had to be selected with clear objectives in mind.
In this connection, the Aeronutronic firm, which had all but completed work on
the original lunar seismometer capsules, wanted to know if it should disband its
team of personnel or prepare to make more of the hard-landing capsules for future
Rangers.
On June 29, 1962, Cummings flew East to discuss these questions with his
counterparts in the Office of Space Sciences. Project Ranger, Cummings said,
needed to be streamlined technically and in terms of objectives. Future spacecraft
should be contracted to industry, and the secondary experiments at least limited to
those supporting Apollo requirements. As a first step, he strongly urged the Office
of Space Sciences to take the lead and engage the active participation of the Office
of Manned Space Flight in the unmanned lunar program, if possible with financial
support, but at least in written ground rules for the conduct of Project Ranger.'°
Nicks and Cortright listened intently, but they ultimately rejected any role in their
theater for the Office of Manned Space Flight.
Newell's people knew that Project Apollo already needed more funds than
NASA had budgeted for it. Financial support of the unmanned program by the
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Office of Manned Space Flight thus seemed highly unlikely. Furthermore, the
active participation of that office was liable to squeeze pure science out of all the
lunar flights preceding Apollo-leaving as the final product only an engineering
residue. Evidently annoyed by JPL's willingness to risk that outcome, Newell and
his staff resented the Laboratory's resistance to their direction as well as its
enthusiasm for Apollo requirements. Besides, Ranger's distressing flight record to
date hardly seemed to match the reputation for excellence in science and
engineering of JPL-Caltech. If Pickering, Cummings, and Burke still doubted the
wisdom of those responsible for establishing Ranger priorities, Newell, Cortright,
and Nicks shared growing reservations over JPL's management of Ranger.
NASA'S LUNAR OBJECTIVES RECONSIDERED
JPL's difficulties were compounded in July 1962, when its first Mariner R
flight to Venus ended in disaster because a "hyphen" had been omitted from the
launch vehicle guidance equations. Shortly before the launch, Texas Democrat
Albert Thomas had questioned NASA plans to renew its contract with Caltech to
operate the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for another three years. This nonprofit
operation, he charged, allowed NASA to "end run" Civil Service pay scales for
nongovernment research talent. This method of government contracting for
research and development with an institution of higher learning, moreover, did
not seem to be producing the results expected of it. It might be better, he suggested,
to separate the Laboratory from Caltech and operate the installation as a NASA
field center under Civil Service regulations. Caltech President Lee A. DuBridge
promptly rebutted the suggestion in a letter to Webb, but the letter did not
completely satisfy Thomas. I_ On July 24, two days after the Mariner disaster,
Republican James Fulton admonished D. D. Wyatt, NASA Director of the Office
of Programs, on the poor record of unmanned space flight. The first Mariner R
alone cost the taxpayers close to $14 million. "We should," Fulton declared, "be
beyond this stage. ''_2
At 2:53 am EDT, August 27, 1962, another JPL Mariner R-it was
designated Mariner 2-rose from Launch Complex 12 at Cape Canaveral. Another
Atlas guidance malfunction occurred, momentarily appeared to doom the mission,
but was miraculously overcome just in time for the separation of the Agena second
stage (Figure 58). Soon Mariner 2 was on its way to Venus. In the following
hours, then days, the spacecraft obediently extended its solar panels and high-gain
antenna, acquired the sun and earth, stabilized in space, and flawlessly executed a
necessary midcourse correction maneuver. Postmidcourse trajectory computations
indicated a projected "miss distance" of approximately 41,000 km (25,476 miles),
well within the operating limits of two onboard experiments designed to measure
conditions in Venus' atmosphere and on its surface during the flyby encounter on
December 14, 1962.
The expected mission success blunted Congressional criticism, restored
confidence in and at JPL, and ratified the soundness of the basic Ranger design. At
WHICH WAY RANGER7 161
J
" _._- SPACECRAFT
HORNS
ATLAS
BOOSTER TEMPERATURE
CONTROL
SHIELD
SOLAR
PLASMA
DETECTOR
TEMPERATURE_
CONTROL
LOUVERS
RADIOMETER
• REFERENCE
MAGNETOMETER
SENSOR
OMNI
SECONDARY
SUN SENSOR
PANEL
COMMAND
ANTENNA
HIGH--q
ANTENNA
LONG RANGE
EARTH SENSOR
PARTICLE
DETECTOR
CHAMBER
'PRIMARY
SUN
SENSOR
Fig. 58. The Mariner R Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle
that moment, however, the international implications seemed most important.
Though the Soviets had orbited the first satellite and the first man around the
earth, now Americans led them in planetary exploration-at least on the way to
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Venus. ,3 But NASA insiders knew that the objectives and priorities for the lunar
Rangers 6 through 9 remained as clouded as ever. Both the Office of Manned
Space Flight and the Office of Space Sciences continued to insist that their own
requirements be served first. The position of Pickering, Burke, and Cummings at
JPL-engineering first, then science-received support on August 10, 1962, when
the Space Science Board of the National Academy concluded in a report: "As
[Apollo's] engineering tasks are accomplished .... scientific investigations and
missions will also be phased into the program; and, as flexibility and
sophistication are achieved, scientific investigations will become the primary goals.
Appreciation of these concepts is of critical importance to the acceptance of the
current Apollo program by scientists throughout the country...,,4 But however
welcome the Board's conclusion, it did not advance the JPL position at
Headquarters.
Although NASA Headquarters had tentatively approved extending Project
Ranger to include five more vehicles (Rangers 10 through 14), Newell's office had
them programmed for science first, Apollo support second. And despite the
shortage of personnel at JPL and an even more acute shortage of space, the
vehicles, Nicks informed the Laboratory, were "to be assembled and tested in-
house [at JPL], with some increased divisional contractor support allowed. ''is JPL
faced a manpower crisis in the months ahead as well as the likelihood of
prolonged contention at Headquarters over Ranger's objectives between the
manned and unmanned factions. The Laboratory's position in NASA's lunar
program was fast becoming untenable.
On August 15, 1962, Pickering, acting to force the issue, wrote a letter to
NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, with copies to Newell and
Holmes, alluding to the differences at Headquarters and their deleterious effects on
JPL. All of the questions raised by the extension of Project Ranger, he asserted,
related to a more basic one: "How should the unmanned lunar efforts be shaped to
produce maximum benefit to the manned flight program.'?" He went on:
I do not believe it appropriate for JPL to seek to exploit the
differing points of view within the Office of Space Sciences and
Office of Manned Space Flight in an effort to advance our own
point of view as to what constitutes a viable and useful program. I
would greatly prefer that you and I, Homer Newell, and Holmes or
Shea reach agreement and then instruct our people accordingly.
We at JPL are now in favor of a faster-paced and technically
simpler program than the ones that we have in the past advocated
or at least accepted .... and we strongly support the... [Space
Science Board] recommendation that lunar environmental and
engineering data for Apollo design be sought with urgency and
even, if necessary, at the expense of data having greater intrinsic
scientific value. 16
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If Seamans or Webb had been unaware of any differences before, they knew about
them now._7
Over a month later, Seamans called a meeting of Pickering, Newell, and
Holmes for October 11. _8 At the meeting itself, which included Nicks, Seamans
stressed that Newell and Holmes were to coordinate their respective unmanned
and manned lunar programs. Both sides agreed that the extension of Project
Ranger could contribute toward the goal of landing a man on the moon. At
Seamans' request, Nicks explained how Holmes' needs might be met through the
future Ranger television and capsule missions. Holmes asked that plans for these
missions be coordinated with his deputy, Joseph Shea. Finally, Seamans instructed
Nicks to act as the coordinator between the two programs, and to report on the
"probable contribution" that the unmanned lunar program would make to
Apollo. _9Having been asked by the NASA Associate Administrator to cooperate in
this area with the Office of Manned Space Flight, officials of the Office of Space
Sciences had no choice but to proceed as directed. Pickering, pleased, considered
the meeting a breakthrough. In Project Ranger, so everyone seemed to have
agreed, Apollo's requirements shared a priority at least equal to those of space
science. 2o
Holmes and Newell added further to this impression a few days later, when
they announced formation of a Joint Working Group of representatives from each
of their offices. The group was to be responsible for "recommending a detailed
program of scientific exploration to the Office of Manned Space Flight,
recommending to the Office of Space Sciences a program of data acquisition to
assure a timely flow of environmental information into the planning for manned
projects, and establishing and maintaining close liaison with field centers,
government agencies, and universities in the development of an integrated
scientific program for manned space flight. ''2_ Named Chairman of the Joint
Working Group: Eugene Shoemaker, coexperimenter on the Ranger television
system and a geologist with the U.S. Geological Survey. Agreement among all of
the affected organizations on the objectives for future Ranger missions now
appeared possible. Ranger 5 might also aid the manned lunar program
immediately; the scientific information it was supposed to transmit, especially the
television pictures and data from the radar altimeter, could help confirm the design
of the Apollo lunar lander.
ONE MORE TIME
Ranger 5's launch had been scheduled in June 1962, but the interposition
of the Mariner R mission to Venus had forced a delay until October, z2 which
allowed project engineers more time to solve the technical malfunctions of the
previous flight. Nevertheless, the reason for the failure of the central computer and
sequencer, as Burke had guessed, could not be determined with certainty because
of the missing spacecraft telemetry during the crucial period over the South
Atlantic. Adding to the puzzlement, the electronic brain had been operated for
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some 700 hours in tests at Cape Canaveral and JPL; this vital component had been
continually cycled as the spacecraft passed each of its tests without experiencing a
catastrophic failure, z3 Engineers who examined the available Agena and Ranger
telemetry tapes ascertained the approximate time of failure: it had occurred during
the few seconds between electrical separation of the spacecraft and Agena, when
the Agena umbilical plug was detached and the "power-up" command issued to
the spacecraft transmitter by the central computer and sequencer. The subsequent
performance of Ranger 4 pointed to the inverter or transformer units in the
electronic brain as the sources of the failure; the units had most likely short-
circuited. 24 The short-circuiting, in turn, was suspected to have been caused by a
tiny, undetected flake of aluminum or gold floating in the zero gravity and
touching two "hot" pins on the exposed umbilical separation connector. 2s
As a result of these findings, a number of changes were made in Ranger 5.
Diodes and fuses were added to isolate the "hot" lines in the connector. With
weight limitations no longer a problem, engineers added a backup clock to ensure
that the telemetry would be provided with synchronizing pulses even in the event
of a malfunction of the electronic brain. Another nitrogen gas bottle was added to
the attitude control system to decrease pressures in the cold gas system, and backup
pyrotechnics were added to the propulsion system to guarantee ignition of the
midcourse engine. 26 All of these changes were, of course, for the single purpose
that Ranger 5 would not fail.
The project office also changed the temporary space flight control facility at
JPL. The communications control room received new teletype and voice conference
systems designed to reduce operator errors. Closed-circuit television consoles were
installed in adjoining rooms to permit flight controllers to view incoming data. At
Goldstone and the deep space radio tracking stations overseas, the voice
conference circuits were modified to allow controllers to talk on several nets at
once. Patrick Rygh replaced Marshall Johnson, who had been assigned full time to
manage the design and construction of the permanent Space Flight Operations
Facility at the Laboratory, as Ranger Space Fhglat Test Director. Rygh, an
aeronautical engineer and graduate of Caltech, would work directly with Burke
during future Ranger flights (Figure 59).
One change was not made. Like its predecessors, Ranger 5 had been heat
sterilized, and that deeply disturbed the man charged with the sterilization
program, Rolph Hastrup. To his mind, there was no longer any question that heat
sterilization seriously degraded the performance and life expectancy of equipment
in the Block II machines. On July 25, 1962, he expressed these fears to George
Hobby, who had originally developed the JPL lunar sterilization procedures. "We
are...paying a substantial price...to sterilize all of our lunar spacecraft," Hastrup
asserted. "The application of sterilization procedures such as the dry heat cycle
presents a serious risk to reliability..." Whether instituted to placate scientists or
to perfect techniques to be used on planetary landers, Ranger's sterilization
requirements had to be relaxed, and the public "informed beforehand" so it
"would not be 'shocked' by the situation. ''27
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Fig. 59. JPL Space Flight Control Center Readied for Ranger 5 (Patrick Rygh is Seated at the
Center Console.)
Despite his initial advocacy of the procedure, heat sterilization was now a
sore topic with Burke, who was also increasingly concerned over its effects on the
performance of electronic components. But the die had been cast for Ranger 5. In
the project office, what appeared most important now was ensuring the
performance of critical equipment on Rangers 6 through 9. Burke and Ranger
Spacecraft System Manager Wolfe had a new spacecraft test model assembled
electrically equivalent to Ranger 6, and asked for more exceptions to heat
sterilization of crucial components. Pickering agreed. JPL requested and NASA
Headquarters granted more waivers, exempting from heat sterilization all of the
important electrical cable harnesses in these spacecraft, the six RCA television
cameras, and the critical electronic brains as well. Pickering also advised Newell
that the heat sterilization procedure was believed seriously to reduce the reliability
of the central computer and sequencer. He pointed to the possible significance of
the failure of Ranger 4 having been traced to the computer-sequencer array or its
related power modules. But any waiver of sterilization for the computer and
sequencer would cover only Ranger 8 and later spacecraft, since earlier spacecraft
modules had already been sterilized. 2s
Piecemeal waivers on important equipment, however, were not Hastrup's
idea of how to proceed. On August 30 he dispatched a nine-page memo to
166 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJECT RANGER
Cummings, expatiating further on the situation and recommending a more definite
course of action. Experience to date, he observed, warrants "complete reappraisal
of [U.S.] lunar sterilization policy." Many component failures detected in tests had
positively been caused by heat sterilization. Tight schedules and a minimum of
spare units often combined with component failures due to sterilization to force
testing of the spacecraft without some of its flight hardware. In' addition, in many
instances the repairs required by the failures had been difficult to accomplish and
had resulted in subsystems "basically less reliable than one which had not been
'dug' into."
The problems encountered in sterilizing Rangers 3 through 5, Hastrup
warned, were being repeated on Rangers 6 through 9 on all items not already
exempt from the dry heat cycle. The practices of "clean room" assembly in a dust-
free environment and terminal sterilization of the spacecraft with ethylene oxide
gas inside the Agena nose fairing should be continued, he concluded; however,
heat sterilization had to be abandoned to assure the performance of lunar
spacecraft. JPL should request NASA's permission to redetermine "the extent, if
any, to which the lunar program would ...l carry on the development of
sterilization procedures" for planetary exploration. _9 There could be no mistaking
Hastrup's alarm, but Cummings would not recommend so radical a change to
Pickering or to NASA Headquarters, at least not until the flight of Ranger 5
offered more evidence one way or another) °
The Ranger 5 spacecraft left for Florida on August 20, arriving at Cape
Canaveral on the day of Mariner 2's launching toward Venus. Atlas 215D and
Agena 6005 arrived shortly thereafter, and all three machines began the cycle of
tests leading to a launch on October 16. 3_ At the Cape, the attention of project
officials fixed on the Atlas and Agena. Except for the flight of Ranger 4, one or
both of them had malfunctioned on every single Ranger and Mariner mission. The
Atlas, most agreed, now represented the principal problem. "Testing and checkout
[at Cape Canaveral] have revealed that none of the six Atlases delivered to NASA
were flight worthy," Hans Hueter's staff asserted. "The problem is further
magnified by the fact that the last Atlas delivered was no better than the first. ''32
Atlas equipment discrepancies had delayed Ranger launches before, and all of the
project personnel worked hard to ensure that none remained in Atlas 215D before
the scheduled flight of Ranger 5.
Ranger's experimenters, the Deep Space Network, and the Space Flight
Operation Teams, meantime, finished their preflight preparations. Despite the
stated needs of Project Apollo, the objectives of space science still shaped this last
original Ranger mission, and NASA's experimenters planned their operating
priorities accordingly. In the event that the spacecraft missed the moon, obtaining
data from the gamma-ray spectrometer would take precedence over taking
television pictures of the surface. Further gamma-ray experiments, they recognized,
were not scheduled for some time to come; an improved television system, on the
other hand, would fly in 1963 on Rangers 6 through 9. 33
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Equipment checkout and net integration tests at the deep space stations
occurred while tracking of Mariner 2 continued. 34 After the launch of Ranger 5,
these stations would track for both missions simultaneously. On October 11, JPL
Deputy Director Brian Sparks issued guidelines for the space flight operations. In
any situation where the deep space stations could support only one of the two
missions, Ranger 5 would command priority. With one exception, all JPL
computing facilities would also be placed at the disposal of Ranger 5, and the
Control Area in the JPL Space Flight Operations Facility was to be used
exclusively by Ranger 5 flight controllers during that three-day mission. 35
Officials terminated the launch countdown of Ranger 5 on October 16 when
technicians discovered an electrical short circuit in the spacecraft radio transponder.
Detached from the Atlas-Agena, Ranger 5 was returned to Hangar AE for a spare
unit, in time for another launch attempt on October 17. It too was canceled, this time
by high winds from Hurricane Ella, which loitered nearby in the Caribbean. The next
day, October 18, was overcast. Surface winds, however, had decreased sufficiently for
another launch attempt to begin. The vehicle passed all checks. The Atlas engines
ignited at 12:59 pm EST, and Ranger 5 lifted from launch Complex 12 into a leaden
sky (Figure 60). The roar of the Atlas engines subsided as the vehicle soared out of
sight. Inside the JPL command post, Burke learned that the rate beacon in the Atlas
guidance system had malfunctioned. The rocket, nevertheless, continued on course,
responding to backup commands radioed to it from the Cape computer. The same
Atlas failure had caused the loss of Mariner 1, but the proper "hyphen" in the
guidance equations saved the day for Ranger.
The spirits of project officials rose as all information received from the
downrange stations proved positive. The launch vehicles separated, the Agena's
engine ignited, and Ranger 5 coasted into its planned orbital path over the South
Atlantic. Tracking ships, now equipped and located to preclude losing any Ranger
telemetry downrange, confirmed the normal functioning of the machine in space.
The mobile tracking antenna acquired the spacecraft as it rose above the
South African horizon a half-hour later, at 1:30 pm EST. Second burn of the
Agena engine had occurred successfully, injecting Ranger 5 into its lunar transfer
trajectory. A few minutes later the spacecraft was observed to separate from the
Agena, and at 1:46 pm the large dish antenna in Woomera contacted Ranger 5 as
it moved out and away from the earth. All the data continued excellent: Ranger
had extended its solar panels, acquired the sun, begun generating solar power, and
stabilized in orbit. In a short time Ranger's electronic brain would command the
craft to extend its high-gain antenna and roll in search of the earth, and normal
cruise operations would begin. Burke, Albert, and Cunningham conveyed the
encouraging news to waiting newsmen. "All of us," Burke said, "are keeping our
fingers crossed.'36
At 2:12 pm EST, the pleasure turned sour. At that moment the temperature
in the power switching and logic module of the central computer and sequencer
rose sharply; electrical power from Ranger 5's solar panels was lost. Though the
spacecraft switched to battery power, it performed erratically. The programmed
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Fig. 60. Ranger 5 Ignition
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command to turn on the gamma-ray experiment occurred, but Ranger's electronic
brain did not issue the command to "acquire earth." To make matters worse,
spacecraft telemetry now being received in the United States was garbled, making
detailed analysis impossible. The telemetry-to-teletype encoders at the deep space
stations in South Africa and Australia had both malfunctioned.
During the afternoon Burke, stunned, was on the phone with Space Flight
Test Director Rygh at JPL (Figure 61). The Spacecraft Data Analysis Team
reported that short-circuiting must have caused the loss of solar power. Even if that
were true, however, knowing it now was of little help. The battery furnishing
Ranger's electrical power would be exhausted within hours, ending operations of
any kind. Together Burke and Rygh determined on an immediate midcourse
maneuver to achieve lunar impact as an engineering test. Without earth reference,
however, no one knew the true roll position of Ranger 5, and insufficient time
remained to obtain it before the electrical power ran out. A midcourse maneuver,
\
Fig. 61. Officials Assembled for the Ranger 5 Postlaunch Press Conference at Cape Canaveral.
Left to Right: Friedrieh Duerr, Major J. Mulladay, Lt. Col. Jack Albert, Kurt Debus, William
Cunningham, and James Burke
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they decided therefore, would be conducted using only the sunline reference, and
certain turns were excluded.
Override commands extending the high-gain antenna away from its stowed
position over the midcourse motor were radioed to Ranger 5 at 8:00 pm EDT
from the deep space station in Johannesburg. The spacecraft reacted obediently.
The maneuver execute command followed at 8:29 pm. The crippled machine
acknowledged the message and began the novel thirty-minute maneuver sequence.
Minutes later the craft experienced further electrical shorting, and telemetry ceased
for 13 seconds, then came back on again. The midcourse maneuver could not be
completed. The battery was drained. Half-way through the midcourse maneuver
Ranger's radio transmitter fell silent, and, as its gyroscopes ran down, the
spacecraft began to tumble.
Two days later, on October 21, the deaf and blind Ranger 5 cartwheeled
past the trailing edge of the moon at an altitude of 720 kilometers (450 miles) and
accelerated into solar orbit. The stations in the Deep Space Network continued to
track the tiny battery-powered transmitter inside the seismometer capsule for a few
days longer, until that minute signal dropped below the threshold of the sensitive
receivers on earth. This time, the tense and shaken engineers and scientists at
NASA and JPL refrained even from announcing a near-success. 37
Ranger 5 was a disaster. So too, it seemed, was the project.
Chapter Eleven
IN THE COLD LIGHT OF DAWN
HE mushrooming Cuban missile crisis quickly diverted public attention from
the failure of Ranger 5. Ranger project participants, nevertheless, felt keenly
the blow of the abrupt and unexpected ending of the original Ranger flights.
Project scientists had learned from the gamma-ray measurements on these
missions of the existence of a cosmic gamma-ray flux, but nothing about the
moon, t which remained just as remote an object of scientific inquiry as ever.
Project engineers had failed in five flights to demonstrate the capabilities of the
JPL Ranger spacecraft.
These distressing results increased tension and provoked conjecture at
NASA and JPL. Had too many experiments been heaped on Ranger, forcing the
scientific cart before the engineering horse? Or did this automatic machine and its
associated systems possibly represent too ambitious and rapid an advance in
technology? Or had the spacecraft system been designed and tested improperly? Or
was it truly a victim of the sterilization program? Whatever the answers, one thing
was clear: a reappraisal of the entire effort had to be made, and so, on October 20,
Homer Newell told Pickering.
THE RANGER INQUIRY AT JPL
On October 22, his eye on the evaluation of Ranger by Headquarters,
Pickering formed his own special assessment committee at JPL. The members,
senior personnel not associated with Ranger, were to investigate the project,
contrast its operation with that of the Mariner R project, and submit to him any
recommendations for change by November 12. The JPL committee conducted
extensive interviews with Ranger and Mariner R as well as technical division
personnel, and submitted a seven-page, sharply critical report to Pickering.
The report declared that the weight-limited Ranger Block II spacecraft, like
the Mariner R spacecraft, did not possess redundant engineering features sufficient
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to guarantee flight operations after a partial failure. Successful operation had
depended upon the proper function in series of numerous components, and the
failure of any one among them would have disabled the machine. The detailed
excellence of subsystem engineering and hardware found on Mariner R, they
asserted, had not been achieved on Project Ranger. With adverse effects for both
Ranger and Mariner R, the report continued, engineers assigned to flight projects
from the technical divisions often lacked the required experience; in many
instances, their section chiefs were unresponsive to the needs and directives of the
project offices. Moreover, the committee investigators judged the section chiefs to
be "quite unfamiliar with either the project management or the details of the
subsystems developed and furnished by their sections." The whole arrangement
left the integrity of JPL spacecraft "heavily dependent on the inspiration, skill, and
attention of individual cognizant engineers. Little if any evidence of review of the
work of these engineers by responsible section chiefs was discovered."
The report also called attention to errors of detailed design and hardware
assembly common throughout the project, errors compounded by personnel
turnover, by attempts of the undermanned project office to delegate direction of the
technical sections to representatives of the Systems Division, and by inadequate
procedures for design verification, inspection, and failed-parts reporting. They
considered Project Manager Burke, moreover, to have spent excessive amounts of
time negotiating matters of space science, the launch vehicles, and launch
operations with NASA Headquarters and Air Force personnel when he should
have been attending to the JPL spacecraft. He had, furthermore, consistently
stressed meeting schedules, and the hurry-up atmosphere engendered in beating
the Soviets to the moon had reduced further the "motivation to pursue details
which could lead to engineering excellence." Curiously, the JPL committee paid
little attention to heat sterilization, its implications for component reliability, or to
the differences in performance between the sterilized Ranger and the unsterilized
Mariner R spacecraft. 2
On the basis of its findings, the committee concluded that Rangers 6
through 9 could not be expected to perform any more successfully than Rangers 3
through 5 unless JPL took "specific and forceful action":
1. Further flights should be delayed until the Laboratory named a new
manager for Project Ranger, completed a thorough spacecraft design
review, introduced new inspection, testing, and project management
procedures, and provided a revised plan and schedule to top
management.
2. The Ranger 6 flight should be abandoned, and that spacecraft converted
to a Design Evaluation Vehicle to be used for testing purposes.
3. Plans for the Ranger 10 through 14 spacecraft should be modified to
reflect the changes made in the design of Rangers 6 through 9.
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After the committee submitted its report on November 14, Picketing
learned that one member had refused to endorse the recommendation to replace
the project manager, arguing that Burke could not be held entirely responsible for
the conditions prevailing at JPL and NASA. Still, Burke's job was clearly in
question. 3
THE KELLEY BOARD INVESTIGATION
On postlaunch day, October 19, in the NASA Office of Space Sciences,
Homer Newell had reacted to the loss of Ranger 5 by instructing Oran Nicks to
compose a board of inquiry of individuals not presently associated with Ranger.
Besides determining the cause for the failure of Ranger 5, the board was to review
all operations of the project and the potential reliability of future spacecraft. 4 The
next day Newell explained his decision to Pickering and asked for "JPL's full
cooperation." The board, he continued, would report in time to decide whether
Ranger 6 should be launched as scheduled in January 1963 or delayed "to
introduce necessary changes. ''5 Some changes, the wording implied, were indeed
necessary.
On October 29, 1962, Newell named and established the Ranger Board of
Inquiry. Its Chairman, Albert J. Kelley, was to return by November 30
recommendations "necessary to achieve successful Ranger operation," including
but not limited to changes in management procedure, systems, components,
testing, quality control, reliability assurance, and operational procedures. 6 In a
separate memo to Kelley, Lunar and Planetary Programs Director Nicks stressed
the importance for science, Apollo, and the nation's prestige of Project Ranger and
hence, the serious nature of the investigative assignment. 7
Kelley, a former commander in the Navy with an ScD in instrumentation,
directed the Electronics and Control Division in NASA's Office of Advanced
Research and Technology and had chaired the Agena B Coordination Board
during the latter half of 1960. He knew Project Ranger and was widely respected
at Headquarters and JPL. The Board members appointed with Kelley represented a
number of important NASA Headquarters offices and field installations, as well as
one business firm.* During the next three weeks the Kelley Board, as it came to be
called, set about an exhausting schedule of conferences and interviews with Ranger
participants from coast to coast. The first stop on October 30 was the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory.
* Other members: John M. Walker, also of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology; Herman
Lagow, Goddard Space Flight Center; John Foster, Ames Research Center; Francis B. Smith,
Langley Research Center; Frederick J. Bailey, Manned Spacecraft Center; John Hornbeck, President,
Bellcomm Incorporated; Arthur H. Rudolph, NASA Office of Manned Space Flight; and James
Koppenhaver, NASA Office of Programs. NASA Ranger Program Chief and Program Engineer, Bill
Cunningham and Walter Jakobowski, served ex officio to assist the Board.
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The JPL staff that met the Board hardly displayed its usual self-confidence,
its accustomed readiness to consider no job too big or too complex to accomplish.
One long-time JPL hand recollected the common laboratory attitude: "We were
good and we knew it, and we did not hesitate to request permission [of NASA] to
take on another child while still nine months pregnant." Previously, in fact, the
easy self-assurance and esprit exhibited by employees of the Laboratory had often
irritated NASA personnel, who saw themselves patronized as tyros in the field of
rocketry and astronautics. 8 Now, for the first time, JPL had failed to deliver in a
key applied research and development program. And now it had to suffer the
further humiliation of an investigation by a NASA board of inquiry.
On November 30 the Kelley Board submitted its report to the Office of
Space Sciences. Kelley himself presented an oral summary of findings and
recommendations-they were supported unanimously-to Newell and his staff on
December 5, 1962. 9 While the investigation had not been confined to JPL
operations, the principal focus of the assessment was the JPL spacecraft. With
attachments and appendices, the Board's final report was ten times longer, and,
although similar in many respects, even more critical than JPL's own
investigation.
Clearing the scientific experiments of any direct culpability in Ranger's
failures, the Board fastened on the Ranger spacecraft itself, especially the extent to
which it was based on the design of a planetary machine. The members considered
such a design not "optimum for lunar missions," but rather "more flexible and
complicated... Ranger is sufficiently complex, and its mission sufficiently
demanding, that a high order of engineering skill and fabrication technology is
required in its design and construction to make it work successfully." That high
order, they observed, had not been achieved. Consequently, "the present hardware
comprising Rangers 6 through 9, as was the case of Rangers 3 through 5, is
unlikely to perform successfully." Going further, the Board indicted JPL's entire
approach to the project. The fast-paced, high-risk Ranger undertaking smacked of
the military method of research and development, where actual shakedown flights
substituted for data on a vehicle's performance that should be obtained in
elaborate ground tests. Proving the spacecraft technology was crucial, but the tests
should be conducted on the ground and not in flight. Board members labeled this
practice as a "shoot and hope" approach. _°
The Kelley Board also judged Ranger's heat sterilization program to have
contributed measurably to the poor performance of the spacecraft. "Even on a
system especially designed to withstand sterilization, this practice would no doubt
degrade performance... On marginally designed equipment, as in the case with
some parts of the present Rangers, the performance degradation due to
sterilization can be extremely serious. Under these circumstances the Board doubts
whether a program of testing and inspection to find weak or failed parts, and then
replacing them, will even lead to a high confidence that the spacecraft [Rangers 6
through 9] will be capable of completing the lunar photographic mission
successfully." _
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Besides the sterilization problem and the deficiencies in spacecraft design,
construction, system test, and checkout, the Board also determined that:
1. JPL had improperly organized spacecraft system management for large,
long-term projects such as Ranger.
2. The spacecraft did not possess sufficient redundant engineering features
to ensure reliable operation. Success hinged "entirely on the perfect
execution of every event in a long sequential chain."
3. Network drills conducted prior to Ranger flights were inadequate, and
the effectiveness of the deep space tracking stations was impaired by
poor voice communication channels.
4. The Atlas-Agena launch vehicle had demonstrated such a poor record of
reliability that "'current estimates place the probability of a successful
launch no higher than 0.5," or fifty percent.
5. Poorly stated and improperly understood, mission objectives added
"complexity damaging to mission success." At any one time the project
was supposed to (a) deliver a payload to the lunar surface in support of
Project Apollo; (b) carry out extensive scientific experiments; (c) be
essentially nonmagnetic so as not to interfere with the scientific
experiments; (d) be biologically sterile to avoid contaminating the moon
with earth organisms; and (e) develop technology useful to planetary
missions. _2
The Board's primary recommendations correspond to these findings:
1. Project management should be strengthened to provide adequate staffing
in the JPL project office and clear-cut lines of responsibility and
authority at JPL. Extraneous duties of the Project Manager, such as
serving as Deputy Director of the Lunar Program, should be eliminated,
and new procedures for design review, design change control, testing,
and quality assurance introduced.
2. Heat sterilization of all Ranger components should be abandoned
immediately. NASA should also reexamine all other methods of
sterilization to determine the need for them and their effectiveness.
3. To ease the JPL workload, an industrial contractor should be assigned to
fabricate Ranger 10 and all subsequent Ranger machines.
4. The assignment of further new flight projects to JPL, they suggested,
also could be withheld until the Laboratory resolved the Ranger
situation to NASA's satisfaction.
5. The job of procuring and launching Atlas-Agena vehicles for the space
agency should be assigned entirely either to NASA or to the Air Force.
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Whatever the choice, NASA had to institute more and improved
prelaunch inspection and monitoring of these launch vehicles.
6. The objectives for Project Ranger should be restated, and all other
activities not directly related to these objectives (e.g., sterilization and
the development of technology for planetary missions) should be
eliminated. _3
Within a few days of its submission at Headquarters, JPL received the
classified final report. The disquisition was much farther-reaching and more severe
than officials at JPL-or even NASA-had expected it to be. The JPL staff resented
the implication in the "shoot and hope" indictment that the Ranger spacecraft
were substandard at the time of delivery and that NASA had accepted them on the
outside chance that they might work when launched. They also found unfair that
the report ignored the facts that a race to the moon had required fast-paced
schedules, or that large environmental facilities for ground testing did not exist, or
that in 1960 NASA itself had accepted Project Ranger as a high-risk enterprise.
Still, notwithstanding the wide latitude for action reserved to JPL under the terms
of the NASA contract with Caltech, Headquarters did control the JPL purse strings
and could enforce any of the recommendations by withholding further space flight
projects from the Laboratory. Certainly there would have to be a prolonged delay
in the flight of Ranger 6, and major changes in the conduct of unmanned lunar
projects. On every side in Project Ranger, past sins of omission and commission
had come home to roost. And most of them, it seemed, were to be found perched
above the door of the JPL Project Office. 14
NEW MANAGEMENT AND NEW OBJECTIVES
On Friday afternoon, December 7, 1962, a secretary hurriedly left the
Lunar Program Office, her face a mask of grief. "The Lunar Program..." she
wept, "Cliff is out. Jim Burke too."
Personnel attached to JPL's Project Ranger and Lunar Program Office had
discussed and speculated on the pending changes. Burke, on his own, had already
ordered an immediate halt to the heat sterilizing of all Ranger flight hardware. _s
The flight of Ranger 6 had been postponed indefinitely. Revised procedures for
testing, design control, and quality assurance were in the offing. So were a design
review of the complete Ranger spacecraft and changes in the management
relationships between JPL's Project Office and the technical divisions that
supported it. But few had guessed that Burke and Cummings would be relieved of
command.
Five days later, Deputy Director Brian Sparks and a delegation of JPL
officials met with Neweil's representatives at NASA Headquarters to review the
findings of the Kelley Board and settle upon a course of action. Systems Division
Chief Schurmeier and Spacecraft System Manager Wolfe represented the Project
Office for JPL, while Burke waited outside the room. Heat sterilization and
IN THE COLD LIGHT OF DAWN 177
secondary scientific experiments had become controversial in NASA's unmanned
lunar program. Hammering out new project objectives and guidelines in this and a
final meeting on December 17, the participants agreed to (l) eliminate all
secondary sky science and communications experiments approved by the Space
Sciences Steering Committee for flight on Rangers 6 through 9; (2) discontinue
heat sterilization of Ranger components and terminal sterilization of the spacecraft
with ethylene oxide gas, and replace Ranger hardware previously heat sterilized;
(3) displace the development of technologies for the planetary program to a
byproduct and not an objective of Project Ranger; (4) postpone the flight of
Ranger 6 until JPL and NASA were satisfied that the launch vehicle and the
spacecraft would succeed.
JPL, on its part, would accord Ranger the highest priority of any flight
project underway at the Laboratory. It would conduct a complete design review of
the Ranger spacecraft, inventory sterilized and unsterilized hardware, introduce
changes in project management, testing, and quality assurance practices, and
prepare detailed project organization charts, a project recovery plan, and
recommendations for phasing in an industrial contractor for subsequent Ranger
spacecraft. NASA would fund all of these changes, which would obviously cause a
major increase in the project's final cost. Finally, and most important to the future
of the project, it was agreed that Rangers 6 through 9 would have a single
objective: to acquire pictures of the lunar surface "significantly better" than those
obtained from the earth, and of the greatest possible benefit to Project Apollo and
the scientific community. Although a definition of"significantly better" remained
to be worked out, in the event of any dispute in which "the scientific objectives are
found to compromise the information needed for the manned program, every
consideration will be given to meeting the Office of Manned Space Flight needs. ''_6
While Newell, Cortright, Sparks, and Schurmeier put the finishing touches
on the Ranger reprogramming at NASA Headquarters, Mariner 2 flashed past the
planet Venus. During December 14 the craft radioed to earth scientific findings of
the temperature and properties of the Venus atmosphere and surface. With all of
Mariner's objectives attained, the world-wide acclaim boosted sagging morale at
the Laboratory and provided Pickering a welcome if brief respite from the
repercussions of the Ranger investigation. A few days later, on December 18,
Pickering announced the replacements for Burke and Cummings. Robert Parks
would direct the Lunar and Planetary Programs at the Laboratory (Figure 62).
Reporting to him as the new Ranger Project Manager would be Harris M.
Schurmeier. _7
It was with mixed emotions that Schurmeier, universally known as "Bud,"
succeeded his Caltech classmate and friend as Manager of Project Ranger. The two
men had been undergraduates, naval aviators, and graduate aeronautical engineers
together. Both had come up to the Laboratory from Caltech in 1949, lived a few
houses from one another, and shared skiing, sailing, and soaring in Southern
California. But whatever Schurmeier's personal reservations about replacing
Burke, he rapidly established himself as the Project Manager on the job.
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Fig. 62. JPL Lunarand Planetary Program Director Robert Parks
Inquisitive and determined, he possessed a hard streak of common sense, a fine
feeling for making decisions at the proper moment, and an ability to use the
talents of those who worked with" him to the best advantage. As the former Chief
of JPL's Systems Division, where the diverse elements of Ranger were reconciled,
Schurmeier was familiar with the task at hand (Figure 63).1s
The task itself was formidable, with morale a shambles and the project in
disarray. The sterilized and unsterilized components of Rangers 7 through 9, in
various stages of assembly, had to be separated and identified. Rangers 10 through
14 were now to be assigned to an industrial contractor. Prior flight plans and firm
schedules had evaporated. Burke elected to remain with JPL and on the staff in the
Ranger Project Office. "That eased the transition in command considerably,"
Schurmeier recalled, "and much of what we accomplished in succeeding months I
owe to Jim. He was absolutely dedicated to making Ranger work, and he had what
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Fig. 63. JPL Ranger Project Manager Harris Schurmeier
it took to stay and help when another would have turned his back and walked
away."
Early in 1963, shortly after William Pickering and a Mariner 2 float had
lead the Rose Parade through the streets of Pasadena, Schurmeier, his assistant
Gordon Kautz, Burke, and Spacecraft System Manager Wolfe took the first steps to
right the overturned project. They composed a Ranger System Design Review
Board of JPL engineering Section Chiefs to evaluate the spacecraft, find any weak
points in the system and subsystem designs, and recommend changes to eliminate
them and to improve reliability. Burke could applaud the ground rules Schurmeier
issued to guide members of the board. Chief among them: "A few TV pictures of
the moon, better than those taken from earth, is the only mission objective. No
advanced development experiments or additional scientific instruments will be
carried! ,,_9
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The elimination of the eight sky science experiments from Rangers 6
through 9 had released 22.5 precious spacecraft kilograms (50 pounds) which the
project engineers could use to incorporate redundant engineering features.
Schurmeier intended that every possible measure would be taken to increase the
reliable performance of all Ranger components. No longer to be geared for success
on razor-thin margins of weight and power, the spacecraft was to be able to
achieve its picture-taking objective even in the event of a partial failure in flight.
Schurmeier wanted the design review and other measures completed and
evaluated by the end of January. He also instructed Patrick Rygh, Ranger's Flight
Test Director, to identify the steps necessary to improve space flight operations.
Similar orders were dispatched to Hans Hueter's launch vehicle team in Huntsville,
and a detailed evaluation of the Atlas-Agena booster began. In New Jersey,
Bernard P. Miller, RCA's Ranger manager, evaluated the television payload and
proposed improvements in those areas where testing indicated weaknesses, or
where the design had been compromised to meet the extremely tight Ranger
schedules. Ranger 6, converted to a design evaluation vehicle, started to undergo
extensive testing. JPL engineers microscopically reinspected all Ranger flight
hardware for possible weaknesses in workmanship and packaging. 2° Once more, in
the project and program offices around the country, things began to hum.
Changes in management and operating practices at JPL assisted the work of
Schurmeier's Project Office. Pickering sharply curtailed the feudal independence of
JPL's technical divisions. Section Chiefs could no longer transfer their personnel
from one assignment to another without the consent of the affected project
manager. The divisions also lost their prerogative to set and maintain separate
standards for quality assurance and flight acceptance testing of components; new,
Laboratory-wide standards were established. To ensure that these standards were
met, Pickering combined the functions of quality assurance and reliability in a
single office under the direction of Brooks T. Morris. With these actions and
control over design changes strengthened, JPL's Section Chiefs found themselves
involved directly in project activity and held accountable for any poorly designed
or malfunctioning equipment produced by their engineers. Finally, Pickering
announced that Ranger enjoyed the highest priority of any flight project at the
Laboratory. Hereafter, Schurmeier could be sure of the authority he needed to
command action at JPL. 2_
At NASA Headquarters, Newell and his deputy Cortright completed their
own planning for the new Ranger and, on December 19, publicly announced the
changes. 22 They also furnished Congressman Joseph E. Karth, now Chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Advanced Research and
Technology that approved authorizations for Newell's office, more of the detail on
the findings and recommendations of the Kelley Board. And they sent final
instructions on the plans for Ranger to Pickering at the end of the month, z3 Most
of the trauma for project engineers, at least, was over.
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But many scientists affiliated with the project were angry. Rangers 6
through 14 were all programmed by NASA to fly television cameras to take
pictures of the moon's surface. None would carry nonvisual planetary experiments
such as gamma-ray spectrometers and seismometers that might yield data on the
chemical composition and internal structure of the moon. Prominent among the
discontented planetary scientists was the Nobel Laureate Harold Urey, a Ranger
television experimenter, and prime instigator of NASA's lunar exploration
program. In late October 1962, Urey wrote to Newell to complain about the
"enormous emphasis on TV photography... I understand the importance of TV
photographs from the engineering standpoint, but I do think they have small
scientific value." So did a number of other planetary scientists, who wrote the
White House, the NASA administrator, and the Ranger Program Office to say so. 24
Wherever the protests were sent, they eventually made their way to the
beleaguered director of Space Sciences, Homer Newell. For all Newell's past
determination to maintain a program for space science, he recognized that space
science was in no bargaining position now, not after the persistent flight failures
on the one side and, on the other, the hard engineering requirements of the
manned lunar landing. Newell responded to the planetary scientists by patiently
explaining the situation in Project Ranger. The best designed experiments, he told
Harold Urey, were useless if the spacecraft failed to deliver them to their target
and transmit the results back to earth. Besides, Newell added, putting the best face
he could on the matter, a close-up look at the moon would be of"real scientific
consequence." In the future, Neweli told Urey along with all the other scientific
dissenters from the pro-Apollo emphasis, he hoped--and expected-that NASA
would reestablish a program better balanced in the interests of planetary science. 25
Since Project Ranger's inception in late 1959, both engineers and space
scientists had acted forcefully to see that their views prevailed. Lacking a consensus
on what aspects of the project needed to be accomplished first, they had sought to
do everything at once. Engineers had compromised reliability by attempting to
fashion simultaneously a new-generation launch vehicle as well as a sterilized
planetary spacecraft, by conducting test and flight operations without adequate
facilities, and by compressing everything into an extremely tight schedule to "beat
the Russians." Burke, moreover, had not insisted on accountability and uniform
procedures of quality control from the JPL technical divisions, nor had JPL
Director Pickering supported him enough in his project dealings with the technical
chiefs or with NASA Headquarters. In Washington, Homer Newell and his
lieutenants had added mightily to the difficulties by insisting that ambitious
scientific objectives be met while the technology was under development, by
equating Burke's objections essentially with attempts to thwart policy decisions,
and by vigorously adding experiments over the project manager's valid technical
protests.
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Both groups had lost. Ranger 5 proved an agonizing personal defeat lor
James Burke and his engineers, and a decisive programmatic defeat for Homer
Newell and space science. The aftershock of that failure, in fact, would reverberate
inside the space agency for years to come. Without exception, every single
unmanned lunar spacecraft launched thereafter in the 1960s would fly first in
support of Apollo, and second in the interests of planetary science. 26
Part II
THE NEW RANGER

Chapter Twelve
HOMESTRETCH ENGINEERING
N the months following the Kelley Board investigation, all four Ranger system
components-the spacecraft, space flight operations, the Deep Space Network,
and the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle--were modified and requalified. Mission
success dominated project thinking, as every conceivable measure was taken to
improve the reliability of the entire system before launching Ranger 6 to the
moon.
REDESIGNING FOR IMPROVED RELIABILITY
The principal item under fire was JPL's Ranger spacecraft, and first on the
agenda in Pasadena was a reevaluation of its design. On February 5, 1963, Project
Manager Schurmeier, his assistant Gordon Kautz, Spacecraft System Manager
Wolfe, and members of the JPL Ranger Design Review Board and Senior Staff
met to consider the Board's recommendations. While sticking to the basic design
of the Ranger spacecraft, they agreed to use the newly available weight for ten
major alterations to improve and assure the reliable performance of Rangers 6
through 9:
1. Change the spacecraft bus structure from magnesium to aluminum
alloys to improve thermal efficiency.*
2. Substitute the electrically segmented, rectangular solar panels used on
Mariner 2 for the smaller, trapezoidal panels previously used on Ranger.
* The darker magnesium alloy had been adopted during the Block II weight reduction efforts in 1961
(see Chapter 4). Although lighter in weight, it absorbed solar energy, and the exposed members had
to be wrapped in aluminum foil. The brighter though heavier aluminum reflected and radiated heat
and sunlight much more efficiently.
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3. Add a second 1200-watt/hour battery, doubling the backup power
capacity and assuring time to conduct a midcourse maneuver even if the
solar panels were completely disabled.
4. Add a second I/4-watt transponder to the radio frequency equipment,
permitting both the high-gain and low-gain antennas to be supported by
a separate unit.
5. Fabricate new central computer and sequencer units, without heat-
sterilized components, together with a backup timer capable of initiating
certain vital commands if the electronic brain malfunctioned.
6. Retain the backup clock, first flown in Ranger 5, to ensure telemetry
commutation in the event the normal synchronizing pulses generated by
the electronic brain were lost.
7. Add a duplicate attitude control gas system, including gas bottles,
piping, and jets.
8. Modify the squib firing assembly (used to unlatch the solar panels and
trigger some other crucial functions) to permit existing redundant
ignition wiring to be driven separately by the two spacecraft batteries.
9. Add a larger midcourse rocket motor, able to compensate for larger
trajectory errors caused by the launch vehicles.
10. Make mandatory "conformal coating," that is, complete coating with a
plastic substance of all exposed terminals and points in the spacecraft
electronic modules, to preclude any electrical shorting caused by
undetected flakes or debris floating in the zero-gravity environment of
outer space.
Bernard Miller ano tlae RCA contract team at that firm's Astro-Electronic
Division in Hightstown, New Jersey, already had submitted a proposal for changes
in the design to the bank of six television cameras that were to return pictures of
the lunar surface. 2 RCA had urged that the two full-scan and four partial-scan
cameras and their related electronic subassemblies be separated into two
independent electrical chains, each operating on separate circuits; thus, some
pictures would be taken even in the event of a malfunction in one chain. In
addition, to protect against the failure of Ranger's electronic brain to command
operations of the television subsystem at the proper moment, a backup timer to
turn on the subsystem might also be added. If the spacecraft attitude control system
were still properly pointing the cameras toward the moon, the transmission of
pictures would thereby be assured. 3 Collectively these recommended changes and
those pertaining to the spacecraft had the effect of separating and duplicating
nearly all key spacecraft functions. Schurmeier and Kautz heartily endorsed them.
If they were put into effect immediately, and if time were allowed to complete
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retesting all Ranger's system components, the slip in the project schedule might be
held to eleven months. Ranger 6 would be ready for launch in early December
1963 (Figures 64 and 65).
In a meeting on February 12 and 13, JPL's plans for modifying the
spacecraft and the procedures for testing and requalifying it were presented to
NASA Headquarters. Schurmeier and Kautz received approval for all of the design
changes and for a first launch in December as well. But there was some opposition
to the swift pace of the plans among Cortright, Nicks, and Cunningham. What
concerned them was the potential risk of using the Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle
on such short schedules. Eleven months seemed hardly enough time to guarantee
the performance of that machine and iron out the operating differences still
remaining between NASA and Air Force launch offices. The early Ranger and
Mariner flights had painfully demonstrated, after all, that without a dependable
launch vehicle the best of spacecraft and scientific instruments meant nothing. 4
LAUNCH VEHICLES REVISITED
The concern voiced by Cortright, Nicks, and Cunningham was widely
shared at Headquarters and among the JPL engineers who had followed launch
vehicle developments in the past. In fact, since NASA had authorized use of the
Atlas-Agena B in January 1960, the difficulties encountered in procuring and
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launching them had proved a constant source of contention. It remained the one
Ranger system component that JPL did not directly control. And though Friedrich
Duerr and Hans Hueter in the NASA Light and Medium Vehicles Office at the
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville had been given charge of this
procurement, the Atlas and Agena remained Air Force, not NASA, products. At
Huntsville, the interest of Marshall's Director Wernher yon Braun continued to be
riveted on developing the nation's manned lunar launch vehicle, the Saturn. _
Lacking support in the years that followed, the strenuous efforts of Duerr and
Hueter had been proved insufficient for the task at hand. Frequent confusion over
roles and the tension created between the NASA and Air Force offices and
committees responsible for procurement on the West Coast and launch operations
at Cape Canaveral had further contributed to delays, technical mixups, and hard
feelings all around. Caught up in an interagency dispute over launch vehicles much
larger than Ranger, neither the vigorous complaints of Duerr and Hueter nor those
of Burke and Cummings had ever had any remedial effect. 6
By the time Ranger 5 was launched in October 1962, the performance of
the Atlas-Agena B in flight, as well as the methods used to procure and launch that
combination, had welled into problems of major proportions for the space agency. 7
After the Kelley board recommendations in December 1962, NASA Administrator
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James Webb acted to settle the nagging launch vehicle issue once and for all. First,
he removed responsibility for monitoring the Atlas- and Thor-Agenas from
Marshall Space Flight Center, and reassigned that function to the Lewis Research
Center in Cleveland. Second, he pressed the Secretary of Defense to allow NASA
to perform all of its own launch operations at Cape Canaveral, and to procure
Atlas and Agena launch vehicles directly from the contractors without the Air
Force's interceding.
Webb and his deputies Dryden and Seamans recognized that moving the
management of these Air Force-produced launch vehicles from Marshall to Lewis
would involve introducing new personnel into Ranger and other flight project
organizations at midstream. The new people would need to learn on the job. But a
change could be avoided no longer, and the Lewis Research Center was
responsible for only one other NASA launch vehicle project, the Atlas-Centaur,
transferred earlier in 1962. Webb believed that Abe Silverstein, now the Director
of the Center, and his staff would devote to this task the kind of attention and
resources it desperately needed. 8 By the same token, additional personnel would be
freed at Marshall to help develop the important Saturn rockets needed for Apollo.
Silverstein appointed a long-time Lewis hand and trusted colleague,
Seymour C. Himmel, as Agena Systems Manager. Himmel, a mechanical engineer
and long-time employee of the Lewis Research Center, was a stickler for fine detail.
With Silverstein's active support, he moved quickly to learn all there was to know
about the Atlas-Agena and to make his presence felt among project participants.
Enjoying a well-staffed office in Cleveland, Himmel increased the numbers in the
Field Representatives Branch at Lockheed in Sunnyvale and at a similar office at
the General Dynamics-Astronautics plant in San Diego to monitor all work on the
launch vehicle. Within six months-by the end of June 1963-his staff in Cleveland
and on the West Coast swelled from 32 to 67.
The JPL engineers had no difficulty establishing a close and important
working relationship with the eager engineers from Cleveland. Although Himmel
at Lewis monitored the procurement and launch of all Atlas-Agenas for NASA, in
Project Ranger he reported to its manager, Schurmeier. On March 1 I, Schurmeier
informed Himmel of JPL's recommendations for improving the Atlas-Agena B.
Nearly all of them focused on the Atlas booster, in particular the trouble-plagued
General Electric "Mod III G" airborne guidance package which controlled Atlas'
ascent. New, definitive specifications and requirements for building and testing the
Atlas, "more stringent than the original USAF Weapon System requirements of
several years ago," were among the most important changes to be made. The G.E.
guidance equipment, Schurmeier advised, had to be modified and tested to
withstand a higher vibration environment in flight, and, if the cooperation of the
Air Force could be secured, it would be advantageous to fabricate electrical wiring
harnesses for the Atlas using the high standards employed on the Atlas-Mercury
manned flight project. 9
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In a three-day Launch Vehicle System Review held at the Lewis Research
Center between June 3 and 5, Himmel and his staff recommended final changes to
the Atlas-Agena. To improve confidence in the Atlas-Agenas in protective storage
and those yet to be built, they recommended that improved flight equipment be
substituted for items with known weaknesses, all of the vehicles modified to one
standard configuration, and the procedures used to qualify them for flight
tightened. NASA Ranger Chief Cunningham and JPL Project Manager
Schurmeier approved the Lewis program. Members of JPL's Launch Vehicle
Review Board, nevertheless, still shared the reservations expressed earlier at
Headquarters by Cortright and Nicks. Could these improvements, though
necessary, be accomplished in time for the scheduled launch of Ranger 6 in
December?
Harry Margraf expatiated on this subject in his summary report to
Schurmeier. The launch vehicle improvement program, he observed, had to march
in cadence with the Air Force Space Systems Division. If the Air Force dragged its
feet in Inglewood, the effort would be delayed. The program would also face
uncertain hazards from the possible deleterious effects on the launch vehicles of
prolonged storage, from the organizational changes already made or anticipated in
the management of NASA launch vehicles and launch operations, and because
Ranger was to act once again as groundbreaker-using the modified configuration
before anyone else. No other Air Force or NASA flight projects would share "any
of the potential risks involved in flying 'first time' improvements or the burden of
obtaining additional flight environmental data for [Atlas D-Agena B] vehicle
configurations." It was the judgment of the JPL review board, he concluded, that
the Ranger Project Manager "consider the proper and complete implementation of
the Lewis plan to be a minimum prerequisite for the launch of Ranger 6, and if at
some later date the need for more time becomes apparent, the Board would
recommend that Ranger 6 be rescheduled accordingly."_°
Even as Schurmeier considered these risks and decided to proceed with the
launch vehicle improvement program for Project Ranger, NASA Headquarters had
already acted on the question of launch operations. In meetings with
representatives of the Department of Defense and the appropriate Air Force
commands, NASA Administrator Webb and his associates successfully negotiated
an Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Regarding Management of the Atlantic Missile Range of DOD
and the Merritt Island Launch Area of NASA. _ This bilateral treaty between the
United States military and civilian space agencies called for major changes in the
conduct of launch operations at Cape Canaveral. It was a breakthrough for NASA.
The Air Force would continue as the single manager of Cape Canaveral
under the terms of the agreement, but complete responsibility for logistics and
administration in the Merritt Island launch areas would be assigned to NASA.
Most important, however, all of the prelaunch activity, the launchings, and the
postflight evaluations were to be performed solely by NASA for NASA missions
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regardless of whether they took place at Cape Canaveral proper or the adjacent
Merritt Island complex. Hereafter NASA, not the Air Force, would command its
launch operations. The 6555th Aerospace Test Wing would disappear from NASA
organization charts, and so would most of the interagency offices, panels, and
committees that had so often hamstrung orderly launch operations for Ranger and
other NASA flight projects. Himmel's Agena Office would select the NASA
organization to manage future Atlas- and Thor-Agena launches from Cape
Canaveral. The Field Projects Branch of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center,
reporting to Himmel, would supervise all launch operations; the Lockheed and
General Dynamics-Astronautics personnel who prepared the launch vehicles and
conducted the actual operations, would now report to the Field Projects Branch
instead of to the Air Force.
In the spring and fall, Himmel's hand was further strengthened. On June
14, 1963, the Air Force contract with Lockheed for procurement and modification
of Ranger Block III Agena vehicles-those remaining to be built-was transferred
to NASA. Then, on August 9, the USAF and NASA executed a new Memorandum
of Understanding. Superseding the one of February 14, 1961, this agreement gave
NASA full responsibility to procure and direct modifications to its Atlas and
Agena vehicles, j2 Himmel's Agena Office would no longer "monitor" procurement
by the Air Force Space Systems Division, but directly supervise this activity at
Lockheed and General Dynamics.
Himmei now had the authority to match his responsibility for procuring,
modifying, and launching the Atlas-Agena. Secure in the knowledge that direct
control over all four Ranger system components, for the first time, would rest in
the JPL Project Office, Schurmeier could proceed with requalifying the flight
machinery.
REQUALIFYING RANGER: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
However encouraging to Schurmeier the new agreements between NASA
and the Air Force, the eleven-month delay in Project Rar/ger was a setback for
Manned Space Flight Director Brainerd Holmes and his colleagues hard at work
on Project Apollo. They had counted on closeup photographs of the moon early in
1963 to confirm a landing gear design for Apollo's lunar module, t3 Now the best
they could hope for was some pictorial return at the end of the year. Adding to the
pressures, on April 2, 1962, the Soviet Union launched the 1350-kilogram Luna 4
toward the moon. Russian news releases hinted strongly that the robot spacecraft
was a precursor to manned flight and might land. A Russian astronomer
proclaimed that Luna 4, two years ahead of NASA's Surveyor soft lander, "would
send back detailed reports on the most topical issue-what the moon's surface is
like." Actually, on April 5, the spacecraft missed the moon and continued into
solar orbit without returning pictures of the surface. "Radio Moscow cancelled a
special program entitled 'Hitting the Moon' and broadcast music instead." That
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old devil moon, Newsweek reported, "appeared to be plaguing Russia as it had the
_14
United States' Ranger program ...
In the Office of Manned Space Flight, meantime, Holmes authorized the
Grumman Aircraft Corporation in Bethpage, Long Island, the contractor for
Apollo's landing module, to proceed with the design of the landing gear in accord
with the best available estimates of the moon's surface slopes and soil composition.
In June, a deputy, George Low, explained the situation to an inquiring Senator
Clifford Case of New Jersey. Apollo, Low insisted, would continue to rely on data
furnished by the unmanned lunar program to confirm or modify existing designs.
In a short time, he declared, "we hope to obtain much more information about the
surface of the moon from the unmanned Ranger surveillance program." If the
United States was to be confident that it could land the first man on the moon,
Ranger had to make good, soon._5
Pressured or not by external considerations, Schurmeier, Kautz, and Wolfe
had learned well the lessons of the Burke era, and they were not about to repeat
them. Ranger 6 was proceeding on an extremely tight schedule, Wolfe warned JPL
Ranger personnel. "It is intended that this will only be reflected in a lowered
confidence in meeting the existing launch date, and not in lowered reliability of the
spacecraft. ''16 Until the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, the tracking network, and
the spaceflight operations were all requalified to the satisfaction of NASA and JPL
project officials, Ranger 6 would not fly.
To assist in this work, earlier in the year the staff in JPL's Ranger Project
Office had been increased from three to five. Marjorie J. Boyle, an experienced
statistician and Stanford graduate with a high tolerance to Ranger's pressure-
cooker environment, assumed the duties of controlling and budgeting financial
resources for the project. Donald R. Schienle, a business administration graduate
student at the University of Southern California, took over the details of
scheduling the multifarious activities in Ranger's four system components.
JPL engineers evaluated, modified, and checked out two more of the
principal system components-the deep space tracking stations and space flight
operations supporting Project Ranger--in the latter half of 1963. Schurmeier
formed another JPL Design Review Board in May to examine their configuration,
capabilities, plans, and procedures, and recommend solutions to any deficiencies
that were found. The Board completed its review in early August and issued two
reports that outlined and guided the remedial action taken at the Laboratory. The
bulk of the changes made to the tracking net and spaceflight operations involved
more stringent operating procedures, improved reporting of failures uncovered
during tests, and a greatly expanded series of preflight tests. All of these network
tests involving the JPL Control Center and deep space tracking stations overseas,
moreover, were now to be run for nonstandard missions-in which a partial failure
of the launch vehicle or spacecraft was simulated IV-as well as normal missions.
Beyond new documentation and test procedures, changes were also made to
the telecommunications equipment in the tracking and command network. Data
phone lines were installed between Cape Canaveral and JPL. Ranger's composite
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analog telemetry signal would no longer need to be recorded and sent by plane to
Pasadena for scrutiny hours later, but could be received by the Spacecraft Data
Analysis Team during the countdown and the early phases of flight. A third
teletype circuit was added between JPL and each of the tracking stations, which
were equipped with new telemetry decommutators and teletype encoders, replacing
those that had malfunctioned during the flight of Ranger 5. Finally, with the
installation of a 200-watt transmitter at the tracking station in Woomera, all three
deep space stations could send commands to the spacecraft.
While Ranger Space Flight Operations Director Rygh certified these
alterations in extensive tests, Schurmeier and his staff busied themselves
requalifying the spacecraft using JPL's new reliability and quality assurance
procedures. The Ranger test models and flight spacecraft, besides using preferred
parts, or similarly screened commercial parts, now benefited from more frequent
design reviews, uniform standards of testing, and improved documentation to
guide the work. _s The detailed reporting of any anomalies or problems
encountered in tests, in particular, operated to good effect. These "problem/failure
reports," known as PFR's, were circulated widely at the Laboratory and helped
generate competition among engineers and section chiefs who sought to prove the
quality of their technical judgment, analyses, and corrective action. Collectively,
they had determined to erase prior bad marks by adopting the attitude: "By God,
my piece of equipment will not fail. ''_9
Early test results bespoke the improvements. By mid-June a Life Test
Vehicle completed thirteen sixty-six-hour lunar missions inside JPL's new 7.6-
meter (25-foot) diameter space simulator, with but one subsystem failure, and
validated the integrity of the basic design. A proof test model incorporating all of
the changes in the spacecraft bus and television subsystem made after the flight of
Ranger 5 then began its round of system and environmental tests, demonstrating
that the performance of the new Ranger spacecraft met or exceeded specifica-
tions. 2° When assembly of the Ranger 6 flight spacecraft began on July l,
Schurmeier was confident that problems of design, fabrication, and testing at JPL
were truly things of the past (Figure 66).
Troublesome problems, nevertheless, dogged work on Ranger's television
subsystem at RCA's plant in New Jersey. JPL Television Project Engineer Donald
Kindt and two colleagues, detailed to RCA to oversee development of the payload,
kept Schurmeier and Kautz apprised of these potential threats to Ranger's
schedule and performance. Most perplexing among them, perhaps, was the uneven
resolution and erase characteristics exhibited by the vidicon tubes produced for
Ranger's television subsystem. Running short of time to complete the flight
package for Ranger 6, RCA issued subcontracts to three other tube manufacturers
for additional support. Specialists from these firms found that the external masks
on the sensitive surface of the vidicon tubes caused shadowing and affected
resolution.
In the spring of 1963 RCA's Ranger team settled on another tube design
employing a laminated vidicon faceplate with the mask sandwiched between two
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Fig. 66. Assembly of Ranger 6: Installation of the Midcourse Motor
layers. Although this helped to eliminate shadowing and improve resolution, it still
did not end all of the differences in performance between individual, seemingly
identical tubes. Other disturbing differences, RCA engineers now learned, resulted
from system interactions that often could not be detected before a complete
television package--six cameras--was assembled and tested. Standard quality
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control procedures in the fabricating process did not measurably improve the
puzzling situation. As summer turned to fall, the production of high-performance
vidicon tubes with uniform quality still seemed to be as much an art as it was a
science. 2
Electrical arcing and short-circuiting in the television subsystem was
another, potentially more serious problem. Among Ranger's engineers, arcing in
electronics was the single most feared agent of flight failure. Thermal-vacuum tests
at RCA in February revealed arcing in the cables and connector associated with
the redesigned television package's 60-watt power amplifiers. Early investigations
pinned the cause on changes in the design of the amplifiers that "increased the
power-output of this assembly." Plans were made to modify the affected cables and
test them to a 90-watt power level before installation. Despite these and other
modifications, however, arcing persisted. 22 At the Ranger Television Quarterly
Review meeting on May 2, RCA's Ranger television manager Bernard Miller
pledged to purchase high-power test equipment and devote maximum attention to
the problem. The procurement and test cycle, nevertheless, would require 45 days,
which closely approached the scheduled delivery of the flight package for Ranger 6
at the end of July. 23Schurmeier agreed to slip the delivery date to August 15, to
provide RCA the time needed to complete the test program and qualify the
television subsystem.
As if these development problems were not enough to occupy the hard-
pressed television engineers, especially severe vibrations and noise at launch,
Miller speculated, might step a relay and turn on one or both channels of the
television subsystem. If not turned off, the batteries powering the television
cameras would be depleted long before reaching the moon. 24 Donald Kindt and
others at JPL analyzed Miller's theory in succeeding weeks. The vibration and
noise necessary to activate the television channels, they concluded, were above the
levels so far encountered or expected during launch. Nevertheless, the JPL project
office made precautionary plans to transmit a series of real-time commands to the
spacecraft from the Johannesburg station, shutting off the television subsystem in
the unlikely event that it had been turned on early in the flight. 25
The flight package with its six cameras, meantime, completed the extra
high-power tests at RCA and was accepted for shipment to JPL in mid-August.
The arcing difficulties had been traced to the "four-port hybrid," an electrical
device that combined the radio frequency signals from both TV transmitters and
routed them to a common antenna. The observed corona effects had been
eliminated by redesign. JPL's TV subsystem engineer, Kindt, and his RCA
associates were satisfied that the arcing problem had been solved and that the basic
design of the split TV system was a sound one. Ranger Spacecraft System Manager
Wolfe agreed, and, in the interests of time, waived a final design review of the
RCA TV subsystem (Figure 67). 26
But no answer to the erratic picture yield of the vidicon tubes had proved
altogether satisfactory to JPL or RCA. This nagging difficulty had been skirted by
fabricating additional tubes and then selecting the best and most uniform of the lot
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Fig. 67. The Television Subsystem Is Readied for Tests at JPL
for Ranger 6. NASA's Ranger Program Chief Cunningham, however, remained
concerned over the chances of procuring enough acceptable tubes in time for the
flights to follow. After conferring with Schurmeier at JPL, he recommended that
NASA delay the schedules of Rangers 7, 8, and 9 to ensure "that these missions
have at least as good a TV system as Ranger 6. ''27 Nicks and Newell agreed; all
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Ranger pictures for Project Apollo and for science were to be comparable in
resolution and detail. On September 10 they amended the Ranger Block III launch
schedule to allow time to fabricate more vidicon tubes: 2s
Ranger 6 Early December 1963 (no change)
Ranger 7 Postponed from January to February 1964
Ranger 8 Postponed from March to May 1964
Ranger 9 Postponed from April to July 1964
At JPL, Ranger 6 and the flight television subsystem began the final round
of qualifying tests--on schedule. But a new problem, uncovered by Himmel's
Agena team in Cleveland, now derailed all launch plans. JPL personnel first
learned of the problem on September 14, during a review of the Atlas guidance
improvement program at Lewis Research Center. Two serious test failures in the
General Electric guidance components had resulted from short circuits caused by
loose gold flakes in certain diodes. The diodes in question, each the size of a grain
of rice, acted as tiny electrical switches, permitting current to flow only in one
direction. If shorted, they permitted current to move in either direction with
potentially disastrous consequences. Hundreds of these same diodes, unhappy JPL
engineers realized, were already installed in Rangers 6 and 7.
Schurmeier was incredulous. How, he asked, could flight equipment, almost
certainly containing many contaminated diodes, have passed all JPL tests without
failure? The event touched off a major investigation to answer that question, assess
the extent of the damage to Ranger 6, and establish plans to remedy the situation.
This investigation, completed in early October, showed the incidence of gold-flake
contamination in these diodes to be so high that most equipment containing them
was unfit for flight. The flaking originated from poorly bonded excess gold cement
at the attachment of a silicon wafer that supported the post inside the diode. The
condition had escaped detection, Schurmeier learned, because system and
environmental tests did not-in fact could not--continously measure the reverse-
current resistance of every diode, and if a temporary short occurred while forward
voltage was applied, there was no measurable effect. Finally, no tests could
simulate the zero gravity of outer space, where the gold flakes would float inside
the diodes? 9
Schurmeier had no alternative. All of the suspect diodes purchased from
Continental Devices and contained in critical locations in the Ranger spacecraft
had to be replaced. He directed that this work begin, and that procedures for
ordering, inspecting, and sample-testing diodes and other electronic parts used in
the Ranger spacecraft be revised to prevent any recurrence. On October 18,
Pickering, Parks, and Schurmeier told NASA officials in a meeting at
Headquarters that to assure success of the lunar missions, the flight dates of
Rangers 6 and 7 had to be postponed until all of the questionable diodes were
replaced in these spacecraft and in the General Electric guidance components used
on the Atlas launch vehicles.
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Homer Newell and his Ranger associates in the Office of Space Sciences
agreed to the proposal. Three days later they postponed the launch of Ranger 6
two lunar months (from early December 1963 to late January 1964), and that of
Ranger 7 one month (from February to March 1964). The flight dates of Rangers
8 and 9 remained as posted on September 10. Newell instructed JPL to use the
additional time to replace the diodes, procure additional spare flight equipment,
and finish corrective action on all outstanding problem/failure reports. 3°
Project Apollo and Ranger's scientists would simply have to wait a few
months longer for closeup pictures of the moon.
Chapter Thirteen
SPACE SCIENCE: A NEW ERA AND
HARD TIMES
HE reprogramming decisions of December 1962, along with shifting the
scientific emphasis of the Block III missions once more toward support of
Project Apollo, saddled NASA Space Sciences Director Homer Newell with a
number of pressing tasks. There was the unpleasant duty of notifying sky science
experimenters that their instruments were eliminated from Rangers 6 through 9.
There was the requirement of completing, then implementing, the remaining
experiment--the RCA television cameras. And finally, there was the necessity of
setting, if the revised project was to mesh neatly with the complete NASA lunar
program, the number and scientific content of the Ranger spacecraft planned to
follow these flights.
GUARANTEEING SUPPORT TO PROJECT APOLLO
At the Senior Council Meeting of the Office of Space Sciences on January 3
and 4, 1963, Newell acquainted all of his field center directors with the changes in
policy made in December. Six months before, he had assured them that the
requirements of space science would take precedence over those of Project Apollo
in all of the unmanned missions for which he was responsible._ Now, because of
intervening events, he said, the Office of Space Sciences would further support the
manned lunar missions by removing from the unmanned flights whatever
secondary experiments might interfere with this goal. Ultimately, NASA intended
to rely upon manned technology to explore the moon for science. 2
On January 21 Ranger's experimenters were notified of the scientific
cancellations on the Block III missions. Ranger Program Chief Cunningham
handled the task as diplomatically as possible in a meeting at JPL, announcing
that although sky science experiments were to be eliminated from Rangers 6
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through 9, the experimenters and their instruments would remain a part of the
project. NASA Headquarters intended to reschedule them as soon as possible in
later Ranger missions. Although "the majority of the experimenters were
understandably disappointed," Cunningham informed Newell, "they appeared to
appreciate the program problems" entailing the cancellations2
The imaging objective of Rangers 6 through 9 and the tentative
requirements for Project Apollo were defined soon afterwards. On January 28
Ranger television experimenters Harold Urey, Gerard Kuiper, Eugene Shoemaker,
and others convened at JPL to consider these matters in view of the preceding
changes. The best photographs of the moon taken through telescopes on earth
afforded a resolution at the lunar surface on the order of 300 meters (1000 feet).
"Significantly better" pictures of the surface taken from Ranger spacecraft, the
group decided, demanded an improvement by at least an order of magnitude, or
by a factor of ten. But pictures with a resolution of 30 meters, though of value to
planetary science, would not afford the closeup detail of surface slopes needed to
confirm the landing gear design of the Apollo lunar module. For that purpose the
experimenters settled on a best resolution at the surface of 1.8 to 3.0 meters (6 to
10 feet) in the final frames. That much resolving power was claimed for the
telephoto cameras in RCA's television subsystem, and that was to be the goal. The
experimenters advised NASA and JPL project officials that the trajectories
prepared for the first day of each Ranger launch period should permit achieving
this resolution without any terminal maneuver of the Ranger spacecraft. 4 If the
needs of Project Apollo differed greatly from this anticipated imaging goal, it was
up to Apollo's managers to specify them.
On March 1 the Office of Manned Space Flight issued a completely revised
Requirements for Data from Unmanned Spacecraft in Support of Project Apollo,
this time based on prior consultation and cooperative planning with the Office of
Space Sciences. 5 The data needed from Newell's unmanned lunar missions were
carefully defined. Ranger's television resolution at the moon's surface was deemed
sufficient to confirm the design of the landing gear. Beyond considerations of
design, however, Apollo required other "critical" information about the intensity
of radiation and the distribution of micrometeoroids in cislunar space, and on
lunar surface features and contours, to determine actual probabilities of failure.
NASA, the report noted, could only proceed confidently if there was "less than one
percent probability.., of disaster" involving the loss of a crew.
Because design of Apollo's command, service, and lunar landing modules
already had begun but could be altered to some extent later, the time to provide
this information was extended until the fall of 1965. And, rather than ordering
compliance, the Office of Manned Space Flight tactfully "requested that the Office
of Space Sciences review the document and state its plans for obtaining the
data..." If all of the information could not be obtained in time, the Office of Space
Sciences could state "the limits of expected capabilities...so that new means of
obtaining data may be generated or, as a last resort, the requirements for support
from the unmanned program may be changed.'6
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Newell and his Lunar and Planetary Program Director Oran Nicks were
reasonably confident that the unmanned projects could provide Project Apollo the
specified data. However, the slow progress of planning for Apollo's scientific
experiments and objectives, particularly at the Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston, the field center responsible for the manned lunar mission, increasingly
concerned them. 7 Having committed the Office of Space Sciences to support Apollo
engineering, at least for the near future, they expected a quid pro quo: Apollo's
astronauts to explore the moon for science. In Washington, the Office of Manned
Space Flight might agree, but its manned Spacecraft Center had yet officially to
endorse that objective.
At the Manned Spacecraft Center there was little evidence of any scientific
planning. Holmes and Low at Headquarters set down the policies and plans for
Project Apollo, Center Director Robert Gilruth and his associates in Houston were
responsible for allocating and supervising the enormous engineering tasks of
manned lunar flight and completing the designs of Apollo machines. As specified
in the Requirements Document, engineering for Apollo allowed no tolerance for
failure. The colossal repercussions for NASA and the nation that would follow the
loss of a crew were simply unacceptable; guaranteeing the safety of the astronauts
dominated all considerations. Consequently, Gilruth seemed to be saying to space
scientists: "Wait until the Apollo machine is perfected and the hazards to man are
calculated before discussing any program of experiments."
The continued neglect of science in Project Apollo offended others who
counted themselves among the nation's scientific spokesmen. Increasingly in 1963
some influential scientists began to criticize Apollo's pervasive engineering flavor.
Caltech President Lee A. DuBridge, speaking before a Panel on Science and
Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in January,
declared it imprudent to send jet pilots to the moon just to "look around." If they
were to return without any scientific information, the program would not be
"worth l percent or even a tenth of a percent of our national budget..." Space
science was the proper goal. NASA and the Congress, he observed, had to have "a
broader and deeper view toward the space program than only to beat the
Russians...to the moon. ''s The former president of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science Warren Weaver and the chemistry Nobelist Linus
Pauling joined with DuBridge to berate the competitive aspects of the program
and the low station accorded science, and to discuss other uses that could be made
of Apollo funding.
Philip Abelson, Director of the Geophysical Laboratory at the Carnegie
Institution and editor of the influential Science, the journal of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, published a mordant editorial on the
subject. Surveying the rationale advanced to justify Apollo, he pronounced the
propaganda value of placing a man on the moon vastly overrated. "Interest in
lunar exploration will be sustained only if there are important military
implications, exciting scientific accomplishments, or technological fallout." The
advantages of a military base on the moon or new technology for civilian uses, he
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asserted, did not justify the immense costs of the program. Scientific exploration of
the moon, though certainly justified, had "been accorded a secondary priority in
the lunar program. This has been indicated in the attitude surrounding
presentation of the new budget to Congress and underlined by the decision not to
have a scientist in the first lunar astronaut crew." Unmanned vehicles, on the
other hand, could explore the moon at a cost "on the order of 1 percent of the cost
of the manned variety... A reexamination of priorities," he insisted,"is in order."
Warming to the task in a speech at the University of Maryland a few days later,
Abelson declared that science had been "used" by NASA "as a 'front' for
technological leaf raking" in Project Apollo. 9
Of course, in the spring of 1963, Apollo did have its influential scientific
friends. Physicist James Van Allen, astronomer Lyman Spitzer, chemist Willard
Libby, and geneticist Joshua Lederberg, among other luminaries who had worked
with Newell's team, _° supplied a testimonial statement in support of the manned
lunar landing. But their colleagues merely pronounced pro-Apollo scientists
"captives" of the space agency. Worse, the Office of Space Sciences commanded
neither the funds nor the flight opportunities necessary to satisfy both sides in the
escalating scientific contention over Project Apollo. _ Even Holmes' declaration
that Apollo's mission objectives included "manned scientific exploration of the
moon ''_2 failed to allay the suspicions of the unmanned enthusiasts. After two
years of Apollo planning, scientists like Urey expected action, not words, from the
space agency. NASA Administrator James Webb, hoping to discourage what he
judged to be intemperate attacks, fueled them instead by publicly criticizing,
among other scientists, Caltech President DuBridge and Warren Weaver, Vice
President of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. These gentlemen, he said, set single
motives for exploring space above all other considerations; their misgivings were
thus "magnified out of all proportion to reality. ''t3
Deprived of a major role or voice in Apollo, many scientists had begun to
perceive its awesome budget as a malignant tumor, consuming such other, more
favored scientific endeavors as unmanned lunar exploration. Future Ranger
missions were still programmed for scientific purposes. If some measure of
scientific favor and healthful balance could be restored, it remained for Homer
Newell and the Office of Space Sciences to achieve it.
PLANNING IN THE FACE OF CHANGE
Plans made at NASA Headquarters in the summer and fall of 1962 called
for five additional RCA television missions, Rangers l0 through 14, to be
launched in 1964, followed in 1965 by at least four more hard-landing capsule
missions, Rangers 15 through 18. Designated Blocks IV and V, respectively, these
JPL-built spacecraft were scheduled to be flown to points on the moon of interest
to Ranger's scientific clients. On October 3, 1962, the Office of Space Sciences
authorized JPL to begin the design of flight hardware for the Block IV vehicles,_4
but a week later, on October I l, the objectives were modified.
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Meeting at Headquarters on October !1, Seamans, Newell, Holmes, and
Pickering placed more emphasis on Apollo's requirements for lunar data._5 When
Neweil publicly announced the extension of Project Ranger a few days later, he
observed that the additional television missions would "increase the probability of
obtaining lunar surface detail information that could be used in the manned
landing system design. ''_6 The proposed hard-landing capsule missions still under
study remained committed to scientific objectives. The Office of Space Sciences
instructed the Aeronutronic Division of the Ford Motor Company, having already
developed the seismometer capsule for the original Rangers, to commence work on
a prototype capsule that could hard-land a small photo-reconnaissance television
camera on the moon's surface. 17
More Ranger missions might furnish lunar data for Apollo's engineers as
well as planetary scientists, but neither of these groups was expected to pay for
them. Homer Newell and the Office of Space Sciences had to arrange for the
funding. Prospects for obtaining that money in Congress unquestionably dimmed
on October 18, 1962, when the flight of Ranger 5 brought the entire project into
question. The subsequent delay and requalification of the Block III Rangers 6
through 9, furthermore, increased the costs of this portion of the project from an
anticipated $64 million to $118 million, and cut heavily into existing funds that
might otherwise have been programmed for the follow-on missions. Without
doubt, if the needed funds were to be had, Congressman Karth and his colleagues
in the House Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Advanced Research and
Technology would have to be assured that Ranger's problems were solved.
Newell, Cortright, and Nicks considered these and other matters during the
Ranger reprogramming meeting at NASA Headquarters on February 12 and 13,
1963, when they approved of the changes and plans proposed by .IPL for
prosecuting Rangers 6 through 9. They were unquestionably anxious for the
success of these and other flights to follow. But the Ranger spacecraft was no
longer the novel design it had been in 1959 and 1960. And as the Kelley Board
had pointed out, the serial production of some eight or ten more Rangers was a
task best suited to an industrial firm rather than a university-affiliated research and
development laboratory. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, results thus far seemed to
indicate, had had a hard enough time designing and building the first five
machines.
At JPL, Sparks and Schurmeier agreed with their NASA colleagues to
engage an industrial firm both to furnish engineering support on the Block III and
IV Rangers and to fabricate all of the Block V spacecraft. Although the large
number of temporary trailers located at JPL would have to be increased even
further to house the necessary contractor personnel, industrial capabilities could be
expected to alleviate the manpower shortage at JPL, permit Schurmeier's project
office to devote maximum attention to rebuilding the Block III machines, and meet
the demands of producing and qualifying large numbers of Ranger spacecraft.
At the Ranger Quarterly Review in Pasadena on February 19, more of the
details were defined, and the Block IV schedule of activities was established:
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mission objectives were to be available on March 4, spacecraft preliminary design
on April 15, and final drawings were to be finished and the procurement of
hardware initiated on July 1, 1963. The rationale for so large a number of lunar
impacting television missions planned for Ranger, already a sore point with many
planetary scientists, was also reviewed-and found wanting. NASA and JPL
officials decided to reduce Block IV from five to three television flights (Rangers 10
through 12), to be launched in July, August, and September 1964. The number of
Block V hard-landing capsule spacecraft, to be built by a contractor, was increased
from four to six (Rangers 13 through 18), all to be launched in 1965. ms
In keeping with the planning to date, Pickering furnished Headquarters
with the Laboratory's proposal "for bringing an industrial contractor into the
Ranger Program." It called for the competitive selection of a qualified firm, and,
in the first phase of a two-phase contract, the assignment of their personnel at JPL
to provide engineering support in Project Ranger during the fabrication and
testing of the Block III and IV vehicles. If the work was judged acceptable, the firm
would become the spacecraft system contractor in Phase 2, responsible for the
assembly, test, and launch of the six Block V vehicles. JPL would continue to
provide technical direction through Schurmeier's project office. Given the
proposed launch dates, Pickering advised NASA, a Source Evaluation Board made
up of NASA and JPL personnel had to be formed "as soon as possible" to select
the contractor. _9
Time was indeed crucial, and not only for the reason of Ranger's schedule.
Newell and Cortright had to appear before Congress in two weeks to testify in
favor of the fiscal 1964 authorization for the Office of Space Sciences. The naming
of a contractor to assist JPL would complete action on the Kelley Board
recommendations for Project Ranger and buttress the case for proceeding with
Ranger Blocks IV and V, but soliciting bids and awarding the contract on a
competitive basis as urged by JPL could not possibly be accomplished before the
hearings began. Newell and Cortright consulted NASA Deputy Administrator
Robert Seamans. Time could be money in this instance, and together they decided
on a sole-source award to the Northrop Space Laboratories in Hawthorne,
California.
Northrop was presently building Ranger's attitude control system and the
central computer and sequencer for the Block III spacecraft; in the opinion of
NASA's leaders, it was also a qualified firm, and was conveniently located near
JPL. Moreover, a number of Northrop engineers recently released when a missile
contract had been cancelled by the Air Force were available for immediate
assignment, and Northrop Corporation's Senior Vice President Richard E. Horner,
responsible for the division in question, had once been NASA's Associate
Administrator, and knew JPL. 2° Of course, more disinterested observers might
have seen the sole-source contract as a dubious practice in the public interest, but
this consideration was overlooked as NASA officials sought immediately to
complete the actions called for by the Kelley Board.
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On March 5, Pickering was summoned to NASA Headquarters in
Washington. There Newell and Seamans informed him of NASA's decision to
proceed with a sole-source award. Surprised and dismayed, Pickering protested.
JPL was not opposed to contracting the Ranger work-indeed it had proposed such
a move a year earlier and had no special objection to Northrop-but this kind of
Headquarters fiat, he asserted, had never before been exercised under the terms of
the NASA-Caltech contract and operating agreement. It left the Laboratory with
no voice whatever in choosing the firm with which it must work, and it put NASA
at some disadvantage in pricing the contract. Seamans and Newell were unmoved;
Pickering's objections were overruled. NASA intended to direct the unmanned
lunar program, and Northrop had been selected as the firm to participate in
Project Ranger.
Upon returning to Pasadena, Picketing hesitantly considered appealing the
decisionfl _ After talking further by phone with Cortright and with his own
advisors, however, he dropped the idea. It could only strain relations even more
between the space agency and its one contract-operated laboratory. Aware of the
reluctance to proceed on the West Coast, Newell dispatched a terse letter to
Pickering on March 8: Confirming the decision reached in the meeting at
Headquarters on March 5, "the Jet Propulsion Laboratory is directed to
immediately issue to the Northrop Corporation...a Letter Contract," to be made
final "as expeditiously as possible, establishing the Northrop Corporation as
Ranger spacecraft system contractor" for the follow-on missionsfl 2
That afternoon NASA publicly announced the selection of the Northrop
Corporation. The estimated $2-million Phase l contract, the statement declared,
assured JPL industrial assistance in the "work related to the Rangers to be
launched through the end of 1964." Eventually, NASA expected Northrop to be
"assigned complete spacecraft system responsibility for the Ranger program in a
Phase 2 effort, beginning with Rangers to be launched in 1965. ''2_ In Pasadena,
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory issued Letter Contract 95059 to the Northrop
Corporation.
MAKING A CASE FOR MORE RANGERS
In the spring of 1963, when the space agency was asking for a budgetary
increase from its current $3.7 billion to a new $5.7 billion, Newell and Cortright
faced tough questions about Project Ranger in the appropriations hearings before
Joseph Karth's subcommittee. The questions focused on the performance of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. The problems uncovered in Pasadena appeared to be
"probably as much management as technical" in nature, Chairman Karth
observed. Exactly what management problems, he inquired "were brought to your
attention by the Kelley report .... and what has been done about it? ''24 Cortright
reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Kelley Board, and recent
changes at JPL, and did his best to defend the overall performance of the
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Laboratory. The award of a contract to the Northrop Corporation to assist JPL in
Project Ranger, Cortright affirmed, completed action on these recommendations.
Committee members, nevertheless, remained skeptical. Newell and
Cortright were faulted for the delay in engaging industrial support for Project
Ranger until four months after the Kelley Board report became available. 2s When
they left the hearing they could not be certain that the $90 million requested for
Project Ranger in fiscal year 1964 would be approved. Indeed, NASA officials
appearing before other committees and subcommittees in the House of
Representatives found themselves on the defensive as well, and by the end of the
week reports were circulating that the agency might face a reduction in its budget
for the first time. 26
Reservations about Ranger and its objectives were not confined to
Washington. In the spring of 1963, some project engineers in Pasadena had also
begun to join experimenters who openly questioned the wisdom of more Ranger
television missions. Deloyce Alcorn, recently appointed JPL Block IV Spacecraft
System Engineer, raised the issue with Ranger Spacecraft System Manager Wolfe.
Considering the proposed objectives and the design of the Block IV spacecraft,
Alcorn mused, "the apparent reason for the missions is becoming less and less
clear. The scheduled launch dates dictate [that these] spacecraft incorporate only
slight improvements and the addition of three or four experiments. If there are one
or two successful Block III flights, the value of Block IV is extremely questionable.
If there are no successful Block III flights, does it make sense to launch more of the
same machine? ,27
Ranger's objectives had often been a sore point with Burke, and they were
fast becoming a source of concern to his successor, Schurmeier. On March 18
Program Chief Cunningham sent JPL the wording of the objectives preferred at
NASA Headquarters. The mission objective of Ranger Block III was to return
"television pictures of the lunar surface which will be of benefit to both the
scientific program and the U.S. manned lunar program. These pictures should be
at least an order of magnitude better in resolution than any available earth-based
photography. Should the requirements of the manned lunar program conflict with
the scientific requirements, every consideration will be given to meeting the
manned lunar program needs." The fundamental objective of the Block IV Ranger
missions was "to acquire significant new knowledge of the moon. Specifically, the
objective is to obtain by means of high quality television photography and by
means of non-visual techniques, new and useful data concerning the lunar
topography, environment, and composition."2s
Schurmeier was satisfied with the Block 1II objectives, which hewed closely
to the wording agreed upon at NASA Headquarters in December 1962. But he was
disturbed that the objectives for the follow-on Block IV did not specify support of
Project Apollo, as expressed in the public announcement of these flights. 29Without
such a specification, these missions might also become a center of friction between
Ranger's scientists and Apollo's engineers. On April 1, 1963, Schurmeier
submitted to NASA Headquarters his own attempt at wording the objectives. The
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television pictures returned to earth by the Block IV Rangers 10 through 12, he
insisted, should be recognized as benefitting "both the scientific program and
manned lunar program."3°
During the following week Cunningham and Nicks considered JPL's
recommendation. Although space science had been the motive for extending
Project Ranger and proposals for secondary experiments already had been
solicited, the original announcement of the Block IV missions could not be denied.
On April 8 Schurmeier welcomed the final wording approved by Nicks:
The primary objective of the Ranger Block IV flights is to obtain
television pictures of the lunar surface which will be of scientific
significance, and which will contribute to the United States
manned lunar landing program. These pictures should be of
higher quality than those of Block III and should provide coverage
of as many sites as possible within the Ranger spacecraft
capability.
The secondary objective is to obtain by means of non-visual
techniques significant new and useful data concerning the lunar
topography, environment, and composition. 3_
A few days later, in choosing the nonvisual secondary experiments for the
Ranger Block IV spacecraft, NASA's Space Science Committee passed over sky
scientists in favor of their planetary colleagues. The Committee selected James
Arnold's gamma-ray spectrometer and Walter Brown's pulse radar as the scientific
passengers to complement the RCA television cameras. In making known their
choice to Homer Newell, however, Committee members expressed misgivings over
"the subordinate role in which the non-visual experiments have been placed" in
the "objectives established for these flights" by the Office of Space Sciences. 32
As though responding to these misgivings, Newell observed a few days later
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that opinion was divided over
the merits and motives of NASA's space science program. The program was now
viewed variously as advancing knowledge, sowing the seeds for future applications,
or supporting either the manned flight program or military efforts. Newell,
consistently in character, asserted: "Such discussions [imply] that the science
program would be different if the motivation was different. However, it is our
conviction that the kind of research that best supports any of these objectives is a
good, sound, scientific program.'33
On April 25 Newell added to the fretful Ranger experimenter Harold Urey
that it was too soon to tell conclusively whether pictures of the moon's surface
would prove of greater scientific value than nonvisual experiments. "We have
asked the Space Science Board [of the National Academy of Sciences] a number of
times for its recommendation in this area, and each time the answer has been that
first priority should go to obtaining pictures." Undoubtedly, there would be
"many questions about the lunar surface that will not be answered by the taking of
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pictures, and that, indeed, in the long run will be more important scientifically
than the early pictures are likely to be. These measurements," Newell pledged,
"will most certainly be made in the course of the [Ranger[ program, and they will
be made just as soon as we have the opportunity to do so."
Newell also explained to the Ranger scientists that they were to be given
greater opportunity at JPL to influence the design and use of their experiments.
That included Arnold and Brown on the nonvisual gamma-ray experiment and the
radar surface properties experiment, as well as the experimenter team associated
with the television cameras on Ranger Block IV. "In this block of Rangers, then,
we will be placing greater emphasis on scientific measurements, and it is our
understanding that the experiments selected are those that you and our other
advisors would like to see done.'3'
The next day Newell notified JPL Director Picketing of the additional
experiments selected by the Office of Space Sciences for Ranger Block IV, and of
his desire to see that these instruments not be subordinated to television
photography in the conduct of the missions. "While I concur in the importance of
the television system," he said, "it should be recognized that we have not de-
emphasized the importance of obtaining scientific measurements which can be
provided by non-visual experiments. In light of these reservations, we will want to
discuss possible modifications of the existing [Block IV] objectives with your
Ranger Project management."3s
Schurmeier was truly disturbed. Inconstant project objectives modified at
the insistence of Ranger's scientists, he was certain, had contributed mightily to
Burke's woes a year before. Jack James, the Mariner R manager, could
unreservedly agree with the sentiments that Schurmeier expressed in an immediate
telegram to his NASA counterpart, Cunningham:
The mission objectives are the guiding statement for all elements
of the project. They should be clear, concise, and unambiguous. If
they are unclear or fail to resolve known issues, then various
people or organizations will necessarily interpret them differently
and as a result, confusion, inefficiency, misunderstanding, and
often hard feelings will reign.
If there are multiple objectives they should either be stated in the
proper priority order or if they are equal it should be so stated...
As problems arise throughout the course of a project...the mission
objectives are referred to as an aid-in fact the controlling
criteria-for the proper tradeoff in specific decisions. 36
If the Office of Space Sciences failed to appreciate this rationale and intended to
change the Block IV objectives, then, Schurmeier was also certain, Project Ranger
could expect serious trouble once again. But if Schurmeier hoped for help from
Cunningham, he hoped in vain; by late spring of 1963 Ranger Block IV was
beyond all help from NASA or JPL.
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LUNAR ORBITER AND CONGRESS INTERVENE
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For some time Edgar Cortright, Newell's deputy at Headquarters, had been
keenly interested in a lunar orbiter-a spacecraft placed in orbit about the moon,
capable of mapping its surface and conducting other scientific experiments.
Original plans had called for JPL to modify the automatic Surveyor lunar soft-
landing machine to meet the requirements of an orbiting vehicle. However, these
plans had been scrapped during the reprogramming meetings in December 1962
when JPL reported that the technical demands of such a conversion militated
against Surveyor orbiter, and that the Laboratory, furthermore, was in no position
to provide the manpower needed for another flight projectfl 7
On April 25, 1963, considering the prospects of future unmanned flight
projects, Cortright argued to Newell that the time was ripe for beginning a lunar
orbiter. The Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, he observed, could
provide the management "and is highly motivated to do so." Also, the Apollo
project might plan a lunar photoreconnaissance mission if the Office of Space
Sciences did not, 38 and, as far as surface coverage was concerned, one successful
orbiter would be worth "dozens of successful Ranger TV impacters." Under the
circumstances, Cortright recommended that Ranger Block IV be canceled and that
Block V be continued at a reduced level of effort, as a backup in case the Surveyor
Project faltered and it became "necessary to press Ranger into service at some
later date." Among other advantages, this course would save $50 million in fiscal
year 1964, permit the start of a lunar orbiter, and cushion the budget shock in the
event of a "Congressional cut.'39
In Pasadena, where manpower was still very much at a premium,
Schurmeier faced difficulties of his own in meeting commitments on the approved
Ranger Block III, let alone Block IV. Even with 63 of an eventual 125-man
contingent of engineers from the Northrop Corporation already in residence by
the end of May, he had barely enough men to requalify Rangers 6 through 9 at
JPL and RCA. These Rangers commanded priority; Schurmeier and JPL Lunar
and Planetary Program Director Robert Parks agreed that if they were to be
completed on schedule, Ranger Block IV had to be delayedfl °
On June 17 they made that recommendation to Newell, Cortright, and
Nicks during a budget review meeting in Washington. Though unaware of the
thinking at Headquarters, Schurmeier and Parks' findings coincided neatly with
Cortright's suggestions. A few days later Schurmeier announced the resulting
decision to all project personnel. "As an outcome of the current budgeting and
reprogramming activities being conducted...with Headquarters," he said, "it has
been mutually agreed that the Ranger 10 schedule will be slipped six months. The
timing of flights subsequent to Ranger 10 has not been established... A
moratorium should be placed on Block IV work. All possible effective effort should
be applied to Block III.'4' With or without industrial support, Block IV was barely
alive.
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On June 27 the ax fell on the quivering remnants. Karth's subcommittee
sent the budgetary authorization for the Office of Space Sciences on to the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics. The report recommended that Ranger's
fiscal 1964 budget be slashed from the $90-miilion requested to a sum of $65-
million. "Of the five Ranger spacecraft already launched," Representative Karth
stated in announcing the disallowance, "none has been a...success. The so-called
Kelley report on the Ranger Project casts grave doubts upon the adequacy of the
management of this project, both by NASA Headquarters and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory... The subcommittee feels that in view of the poor record of Ranger to
date, Congress should be given reasonable assurance of success before going
forward full speed with more spacecraft."4z
Newell and Cortright knew that the full Committee and the House itself
could be expected to endorse Karth's report. They also believed that the Senate was
unlikely to restore the funds-a belief soon substantiated when the Senate
concurred in the House authorization. On July 2 and 3, JPL officials again flew to
Washington to present their recommendations for the future of Project Ranger.
Given the increased costs, the anticipated budget cut, scheduling difficulties, and
the similarity between the two blocks of television missions, Schurmeier and Parks
advised canceling Ranger Block IV. However, they urged continuing the Block V
hard-landing capsule missions with launches in 1965 and 1966. Cortright, Nicks,
and Cunningham presented that same recommendation to NASA Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans a few days later, on July 9, advising as well that a
lunar orbiter project be authorized. Seamans agreed. Indeed it was most desirable,
he said, that NASA "have both a Ranger Block V and an Orbiter Program.'43
On Monday, July 15, Newell formally notified Pickering. The extremely
tight fiscal situation and the potential of the Surveyor and Orbiter programs, he
explained, caused NASA to direct the Laboratory to "terminate all efforts [on] the
impacting TV missions beyond Block III." Maximum effort would be devoted to
Rangers 6 through 9, with the intent of achieving a flight success by early 1964.
Work on Ranger Block V could proceed; however, he also instructed JPL to
"evaluate the implications of terminating the Ranger Project after Block III .... and
to prepare a plan to handle this eventuality... ""
Shortly thereafter, NASA announced commencement of the Lunar Orbiter
Project, to be managed by the Langley Research Center. Designed to photomap
the moon's surface at a resolution equivalent to the best Ranger pictures, Lunar
Orbiter would both benefit science and permit Apollo's managers to select
appropriate landing sites. One successful orbiter would furnish "1/2-million times
the area coverage of a Ranger TV impacter." Orbiters rather than Rangers were to
"take over [moon] flight photography in 1965 and beyond."4_
Planetary scientists expressed no overt dismay at the passing of the Ranger
follow-on television missions. James Arnold and Walter Brown both anticipated
selection of their nonvisual experiments for flight in Ranger Block V. But the
mood in Congress offered small comfort for the future, and Ranger's pathetic
record still engendered recrimination among scientists and engineers. Science
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summarized: "The House Committee's rough handling of Ranger certainly reflects
a new militancy in judging NASA's plans and performance .... five straight failures
not only embarrassed the space agency and frustrated the scientists who had
worked hard on the Ranger experiments, but also disappointed the scientific
community at large. ''_
Chapter Fourteen
MORE MISSIONS FOR SCIENCE?
HETHER planet or sky, the long-promised return for the nonvisual
experimenters in Project Ranger now had to be met by Block V or not be
met at all. "It was clearly anticipated," to be sure, that these flights would conduct
"most of the scientific program of Ranger. ''_ But with Apollo demanding an ever
larger share of the NASA budget, earmarking the funds for more scientific
Rangers was becoming an increasingly worrisome problem.
BLOCK V UNDERWAY
On May 6, 1963, Schurmeier's office issued the Project Description,
Spacecraft System Contract, Ranger Block V that described the tasks and
requirements expected of the spacecraft system contractor, Northrop Space
Laboratories. At the same time, the project office asked the parent corporation to
prepare a proposal for the second phase of work covering design, fabrication,
assembly, test, and launch of the Block V machines. On June 10 Northrop
submitted the proposal and program plan, estimating the total cost for six
spacecraft to be $72.4 million, including a 6.8-percent fee for the company. JPL
officials judged the tentative plan acceptable and, pending definition of some
spacecraft technical details and negotiation of a precise cost, authorized Northrop
to begin Phase 2. 2 With this approval, Ranger became the first major spacecraft
contract Northrop held with NASA--a solid foot in the door of the growing
civilian space market. 3 That the firm's performance undoubtedly would affect
future business with the space agency went without saying. The Northrop
management, determined to take every measure to assure the satisfactory
completion of this project, selected as its head V. William Howard, a former
associate professor of mechanical engineering at MIT who had successfully
managed a number of missile and aeronautical projects for the company's Ventura
Division (Figure 68).
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Fig. 68. Northrop Manager of Project Ranger William Howard
After the cancellation of Block IV on July 12, Northrop engineers at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory assisted in requalifying Rangers 6 through 9. Although
reporting administratively to Howard, they acted as functional members of the
project team, receiving day-to-day direction from JPL supervisors in the Systems,
Telecommunications, Engineering Mechanics, and Quality Assurance and
Reliability Divisions. And while becoming familiar with the project in Pasadena,
they also prepared to assume responsibility for the complete Block V spacecraft
system. Howard and other Northrop engineers, meantime, busied themselves with
this important second phase: planning and implementing Ranger Block V.
In his project office in Hawthorne, Howard began a Ranger spacecraft
system design evaluation. This work involved analyzing the Ranger spacecraft,
determining its potential for successfully performing the Block V mission of hard-
landing a capsule on the moon's surface, and recommending changes to the design.
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The final product, a set of spacecraft "Design Evaluation Recommendations," was
to be returned to JPL in November. Schurmeier provided guidelines that limited
what could be submitted; time did not permit the creation of a new spacecraft. The
existing design would be modified only as required to improve reliability and
complete the mission: With a final design approved by JPL, a firm program plan
and performance specifications could be issued, and a definitive cost negotiated. All
of these details, Howard knew, had somehow to be wrapped up by the end of the
year if Northrop hoped to meet a first launch date in 1965. Before any design
could be made final, however, Howard also had to know exactly what scientific
experiments would be carried and the specific objectives for these missions-
matters controlled by NASA and JPL rather than by Northrop.
A few months before, when space science and Apollo support momentarily
appeared on a collision course once again in Project Ranger, Schurmeier and
Burke had hurriedly prepared mission objectives in consonance with their concern
for engineering. The primary objective of the Block V Rangers 10 through 15"
they informed the JPL division managers, should be "to obtain [lunar] data which
will be useful to both the scientific and manned lunar landing programs... The
secondary objective is to obtain...lunar composition and environmental data
which will support the capsule experiments and subsequent missions. ''S Premature
and quite unacceptable to scientists, these objectives could not hope for Newell's
sanction, for he had already pledged Block V as a scientific venture. In fact JPL
Space Sciences Division Manager Meghreblian immediately rejected them. The
question of proper objectives, he counseled Schurmeier, could safely wait until the
experiments had been submitted, evaluated, and selected:
On August 5, 1963, after an initial evaluation at JPL, Meghreblian returned
to Schurmeier with his own recommendation. Penetrometer or photofacsimile
capsules might provide information on the bearing strength of the surface or
pictures in situ, but developing reliable capsules in the time available he judged
technically risky and unwise. The primary mission objective for Ranger Block V,
he suggested, should "be the successful landing and operation of a seismometer
capsule" on the moon. The secondary objective should "be acquisition of data
concerning lunar surface composition by means of gamma-ray spectrometry and
surface topography by means of television photography and radar probing."7
Schurmeier quickly approved this choice of experiments and objectives
recommended by JPL's science manager, and transmitted the message virtually
word for word to Ranger Program Chief Bill Cunningham in Washington. Ranger
Block V would become an updated, unsterilized copy of the Block II missions-for
planetary science.8
By the fall in Pasadena, Ranger Block V, with its six capsule missions, had
begun to consume efforts equivalent to if not greater than the four visual imaging
* When NASA cancelled the Ranger Block IV missions, the six Block V vehicles were renumbered
sequentially in their place, beginning with Ranger 10.
MORE MISSIONS FOR SCIENCE.q 215
missions. Schurmeier and Kautz continued to concentrate upon the first-order
problems of requalifying Rangers 6 through 9. Kenneth C. Coon, as electrical
engineer and graduate of the University of Minnesota, was appointed Block V
Spacecraft System Manager to oversee developments at Northrop. But even with
Coon's able assistance, the growing demands of the capsule flights threatened to
overwhelm the small staff in Schurmeier's project oflicefl Burke's attention had
been spread among three different blocks of nine spacecraft in 1961, a situation
that Schurmeier now sought to avoid. Pickering and Parks accepted Schurmeier's
proposed changes, and on August 9 they divided Project Ranger in two:
Schurmeier remained in charge of the Block III visual imaging missions; a new
project manager was named for the Block V capsule missions-Geoffrey Robillard,
a solid-propellant engineer and manager of the JPL Propulsion Division (Figure
69). With Ken Coon, he was to furnish technical direction to and monitor the
performance of the Ranger team at Northrop Space Laboratories. Both Howard
and Robillard were to continue to report functionally to Cunningham at NASA
Headquarters in Washington.I°
At NASA Headquarters meantime, Cunningham and Nicks considered the
Meghreblian-Schurmeier recommended scientific experiments for Ranger Block
V. Using the seismometer and the other instruments first flown on the Block II
machines made sense; they were planetary experiments designed to investigate the
composition of the moon's surface and internal structure. Little time would be
required to requalify them for flight, and efforts could be devoted to improving
their reliability. The cost to NASA of using equipment already developed was
negligible compared to starting something new. Both agreed on the advantages
and, following JPL's lead, they rejected twelve proposed sky science instruments in
favor of the planetary experiments already tried. _1
On August 26 Nicks carried this message to the Space Sciences Steering
Committee's Planetology Subcommittee. Academic members of the Subcommittee
serving as consultants to NASA also concurred in the choice: "A lunar spacecraft
of the Ranger configuration should be primarily concerned with the many
questions about the moon itself and not attempt to make sweeping measurements
of the space between the earth and the moon. ''_2 A week later Nicks presented
what was by now the Subcommittee's recommendation to the full Steering
Committee. Information about the moon from the proposed planetary experiments,
Nicks assured the commmittee members, could be obtained in two successful
flights. Two more flights could be held in reserve as backup missions and, if
desired to save funds, the last two of the six planned capsule flights could be
canceled. The Space Sciences Steering Committee ratified the Ranger Block V
experiments recommended by NASA's Director of Lunar and Planetary Programs,
by its Planetology Subcommittee, and by JPL (Table V)._s
When Newell confirmed this recommendation, Howard and Robillard on
the West Coast could proceed to finish the spacecraft design and propose firm
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Fig. 69. JPL Ranger Block V Project Manager Geoffrey Robillard
Table V. Ranger Block V Planetary Science
Experiment Principal Investigator
Single-axis passive seismometer a Frank Press, Cattech Seismological
Laboratory
James Arnold, U.C. San Diego
Walter Brown Jr., JPL
Gerard Kuiper, University of Arizona
Gain lrla-r a,v spect ronleter b
Surface scanning radar b
Approach television b
a Capsule to survive hard landing.
bSpacecraft bus destrt_y'ed on impact.
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mission objectives. But Newell's Office of Space Sciences was also engaged in a
detailed program and budget evaluation; one week passed, then two weeks,
without formal notification from NASA Headquarters. On September 18 Newell
approved the experiments selected by the Space Sciences Steering Committee he
chaired,14 and conveyed the news to JPL. These experiments, he wrote Pickering_
were to be flown "on Rangers I0 and 11, with Rangers 12 and 13 to be planned
as backup" missions. JPL and Northrop still had time to complete the payload
design and integration to meet "the desired flight schedule." Nevertheless, in view
of the recent funding cuts and the ongoing evaluation of NASA's space science
commitments, "we are withholding letters to the Principal Investigators notifying
them of their selection pending a review of the revised FY 1964 program..."_5
Ensuring adequate funds for Ranger Block V, the letter implied, was still a source
of real concern at Headquarters.
Adding to the uncertainty, the prospects of more missions for science were
darkened by general difficulties cropping up for NASA in 1963. The Air Force was
demanding a manned role in space of its own, and various Congressmen,
including Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, were declaring loudly that on
grounds of national defense it ought to have one. Congressmen of both parties
were also beginning to seriously question the legitimacy of the rapidly burgeoning
NASA budget. .6 In April President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to
examine the space program and determine the ways and to what extent it could be
reduced without affecting Project Apollo. Responding to that request for Newell's
Office of Space Sciences, Nicks claimed that, as Apollo support missions, Ranger
and Surveyor were exempt from interference. Funds planned for the Pioneer and
Mariner planetary projects could be reprogrammed for Apollo, Nicks observed, but
such a course would have serious repercussions for unmanned space exploration
and the U.S. scientific community._7
Although Webb and his deputies Dryden and Seamans had strongly
defended the President's manned space flight program in Congress and before its
detractors on the President's Science Advisory Committee, they also agreed that
the NASA program as a whole should not be driven to the single purpose of
landing U.S. astronauts on the moon. They viewed the President's suggested
trimming of other NASA work in favor of Apollo as ill-advised. 18A few weeks
later in a meeting with Kennedy to discuss the agency's plans and goals, Webb
told the President that NASA's triumvirate believed strongly in continuing an
active and diversified program in aeronautics and astronautics. He personally was
unwilling to remain and "run a truncated program." Furthermore, Webb
explained, NASA's leadership did not agree with Brainerd Holmes, who also
wanted to obtain more money for Apollo by returning to Congress for a
supplemental appropriation as recommended by the White House. .9 "We wanted
to establish the principle that we went out and fought for the President's Budget,
and then we lived within it," Webb later recalled. "We had to do that once a year,
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and we couldn't do it two or three times a year. ''2'} President Kennedy listened
attentively to his space administrator, and in the end agreed with him. Apollo
might have to be cut back, but Webb would continue to run a diverse NASA
program.
In October 1963 Wehb tightened his control of the space agency through a
reorganization. Although Homer Newell became Associate Administrator of the
Office of Space Science and Applications, and his responsibilities measurably
expanded, this change had little effect on the makeup or duties of his staff in space
sciences. Newell and his lieutenants counted on the reworked Ranger 6 nearing
completion at JPL, for launch in January 1964, as the next increment in the
steadily improving record of flight success. NASA issued the schedule for the Block
V Rangers built by Northrop Space Laboratories on October 18; it called for
Rangers 10, I l, and 12 to be launched in the second, third, and fourth quarters of
1965. 2_At Headquarters, Nicks and Cunningham had now to guarantee financing
for them. At JPL and Northrop on the West Coast, Robillard and Howard
continued their efforts to finish the Block V design, flight objectives, and a host of
other details before the end of the year.
NONVISUAL SCIENCE: ALL OR NOTHING AT ALL
On October 23, 1963, the Aeronutronic Division of Philco-Ford at Newport
Beach received the contract to build four seismometer capsules for the Block V
machines. Issued by the JPL Space Sciences Division, the contract called for
Pasadena-based scientists and engineers to monitor this work. Under a separate
contract with Caltech, the Pasadena group would also monitor the development of
an improved single-axis seismometer. These scientific components were to be
integrated and tested at JPL, then supplied as government-furnished equipment to
Northrop for installation on Rangers 10 through 13. Northrop would directly
supervise the development of all other spacecraft components, including the
capsule support structure and retrorocket system at Aeronutronic, and would
assemble and test the complete spacecraft. At the end of the month, Howard's
office submitted the design evaluation recommendations for these spacecraft and
the performance specifications for the subsystems to Robillard at JPL. 22 A final
design awaited only review and approval of the Northrop recommendations for
the spacecraft and the scientific payload.
But by the end of October, it was not at all clear to Robillard and Coon how
the NASA-selected Block V experiments could be fitted onto the new spacecraft.
These experiments had been maintained on the light-weight Block II machines by
removing all redundant spacecraft engineering features and increasing the risk of
flight failures. 23Now, Headquarters expected the Laboratory to allocate some 158
kilograms (350 pounds) to carry an improved set of the same experiments, while
Northrop was proposing numerous design changes, also expected by Headquarters,
to increase the backup engineering features on Block V. Although these machines
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would be heavier than their Block II predecessors, the weight, power, and space
requested separately by Ranger's engineers and scientists were already in conflict.
At the beginning of November Robillard explained the impending collision
of demands between science and engineering to Gerard Kuiper, principal
investigator for the approach television. Since the Block IIl flights each carried six
television cameras for visual imaging, Robillard observed, perhaps the television
cameras might be the items eliminated on the Block V capsule missions with the
least discomfort to all concerned. Long an outspoken champion of the importance
of visual imaging in planetary exploration, the Dutch-born astronomer from the
University of Arizona was immediately aroused. Not one picture of the moon had
as yet been produced in the Ranger project, he asserted. If the Block V project
manager insisted on making television a candidate for removal after it had been
approved by the Space Sciences Steering Committee, Kuiper warned, he would
take the matter to higher authorities at NASA Headquarters. But, wherever the
issue might be taken, Robillard knew something had to be eliminated before he
and Howard froze the spacecraft design. Another showdown between scientists and
engineers in Project Ranger appeared inevitable. 24
Robillard had already issued the mission objectives for Block V. Based on
discussions with Bill Cunningham, the objectives were divided between two
mission assignments, leaving Headquarters the option of replacing some of the
planetary experiments with sky science experiments on later flights: 2_
The first mission of the Block V Ranger flights is to land an
operating package containing a single-axis seismometer on the
surface of the moon, to obtain information regarding seismic
activity on the lunar surface, and to obtain gamma-ray measure-
ments, lunar radar reflectivity measurements, and photographs of
the lunar surface from lunar altitudes greater than about 20 km.
The second mission objective of the Block V Ranger flights is to
obtain other information from the surface of the moon and in the
vicinity of the moon.
The six flights will be divided between the first and second
missions. The first two flights are assigned to the first mission. The
third and fourth flights are tentatively assigned to the first mission,
and the remaining two flights to the second mission.
If funds could be found for all six flights, nonvisual sky science experiments might
also be accommodated.
Funds-that was the ultimate rub. Since work had begun on the new capsule
missions, finding the money to pay for them had been the outstanding problem
confronting Nicks and Cunningham. The problem became more acute on October
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24, when Newell advised his staff to consider the possibility of canceling these
flights. Such a move, he said, would free some $30 million in fiscal 1964 funds
urgently needed to begin the Lunar Orbiter project, retrofit the hundreds of
contaminated diodes on Rangers 6 and 7, and, it was hoped, bail out the hard-
pressed Surveyor lander project where costs were skyrocketing. Moreover, the
funding levels for all NASA projects in fiscal 1965 had to be decided upon before
the end of 1963. The Office of Space Science and Applications could not postpone
a decision on these scientific missions much longer. 26
In Washington on December 2, Nicks and his associates presented a plan to
expand NASA's unmanned scientific lunar and planetary programs to Webb,
Dryden, and Seamans. By reprogramming some funds, Nicks said, NASA could
"increase the probability of scientific returns [in the lunar program] without
requiring the initiation of new projects. ''27 NASA's ability to provide these returns
in the present unmanned lunar program, Planetology Program Chief J. R. Allenby
said, had been impaired by "two major constraints": first, the obligation to certify
landing sites for Apollo, "which, if the lunar surface is extremely complicated,
could require that nearly all of our currently planned vehicles be used in mare
areas to outline a safe site;" and second, the limited weight and power of
contemporary spacecraft, which made it impossible "to satisfy for the foreseeable
future the scientific needs of a variety of specialities..." Moreover, rather than
immediately answering questions, each successful flight, "especially in the early
stages, may only raise puzzling problems that will require increased data from
points covering the entire lunar surface"-beyond the mare regions of prime
interest to Apollo. Thus, if a few more lunar flights in the existing unmanned
projects were to be approved, the value of the program to science could be greatly
increased. 2_
Each of NASA's lunar program chiefs urged that more flights be added to
the Surveyor lander and Lunar Orbiter projects. More flights in Project Ranger,
Cunningham asserted, were not requested, but the funding for those already
planned was certainly needed. For a very modest increase in the planned
investment in Block V, more experiments could be added, and the wishes of more
scientists granted. "If this money is to do the most good," Cunningham advised
Webb and his deputies, "the contracts [for the additional scientific experiments]
would have to be let by February 1," 1964. 29
Money to meet the needs of Ranger Block V might be nearly invisible in
the space agency's budget, but all of Newell's unmanned lunar and planetary
project proposals combined meant that his segment of NASA's program would
about double in size and demand a share "on the order of 10 percent of the NASA
budget" in the years ahead. If NASA hoped to land a man on the moon by 1970,
retain a diverse program, and meet the fiscal guidelines issued by Budget Director
David Bell, the agency simply could not afford these laudable scientific objectives.
Moreover, the chances of obtaining more funds were poor, in part because of the
growing Congressional dissatisfaction with the size of the NASA budget, in part
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becausethenewPresident,LyndonB.Johnson,waspubliclypromisinga special
emphasison economyin goverment.Beforethe weekwasout, JamesWebb
informedNewellthattheproposalsfor anexpansioni theunmannedlunarand
planetaryprogramcouldnotbeconsidered.
About the same time, on December 9, Howard's office at Northrop Space
Laboratories submitted to JPL its proposal for the development program of the
Block V spacecraft system) ° The next day, on December 10, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara announced that the Air Force would begin work on a Manned
Orbiting Laboratory to carry two Air Force astronauts in late 1967 or early 1968
to explore the problems and potential of manned military operations in near-earth
space) _ McNamara's announcement, the liberal and influential New York Times
observed editorially, "makes it more imperative than ever that a new hard look be
taken at what we are trying to do [in space], the wisdom of the choices made, and
the adequacy of our resources to the total effort. ''32
Newell, Cortright, and Nicks had already taken a hard look at the resources
available to the Office of Space Science and Applications and decided: existing
fiscal conditions dictated that part of that program be trimmed immediately. On
Friday the 13th, Newell wired Pickering:
Since we are now reasonably certain of the final FY 1964 NASA
appropriation by Congress, as well as the maximum probable level
of support in FY 1965, it has become necessary to conduct an
extensive review and evaluation of all programs in order to arrive
at a budget which will meet our program requirements and still
remain within the funds which will be available to us. One of the
decisions resulting from this evaluation was to terminate
immediately all activities associated with the Ranger Block V
program..._3
In the final analysis, Cortright observed, "it was purely funds that cancelled the
work.'34
The decision eased the tight money situation in the Office of Space Science
and Applications and the manpower shortage at JPL, where the engineers returned
to their respective technical divisions or were quickly reassigned to other NASA
deep space flight projects. But shortly before Christmas, 200 unlucky Northrop
engineers received layoff and termination notices. And the nonvisual planetary
scientists who had worked and waited and hoped on the assurances of
Headquarters could hope for nothing more at all from Project Ranger.
"The first thing sacrificed is always science," Harold Urey snapped irately
during an interview at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science in Cleveland, Ohio. Though some lunar pictures might
yet be returned by Ranger, scientists possessed "no possibility now of finding out
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anything about the composition of the moon's surface until about 1966 or 1968."
As to the popular purpose of NASA's Apollo, "namely, putting someone on the
moon," the Nobel Laureate added tartly, "any man or woman with an attractive
personality would do.'35
Chapter Fifteen
SIX TO THE MOON
LL that remained of Ranger was flights 6 through 9. All that remained of the
original scientific equipment were the television cameras-the visual imaging
"experiment." Some months before, in early 1963, the RCA television system for
the Block III Rangers had been modified to improve its prospects for taking
pictures of the moon's surface. And about the same time, for the flight of Ranger
6, certain organizational changes had been introduced in the management of the
crucial visual imaging effort.
ORGANIZING VISUAL SCIENCE FOR RANGER BLOCK Ill
JPL space sciences manager Meghreblian appointed Charles Campen, an
engineer and physicist who had helped establish the Aeronautical Chart and
Information Center for the Air Force, as the Block III space sciences project
representative in Schurmeier's Ranger Office. Thomas Vrebalovich, an aeronauti-
cal engineer with his PhD from Caltech, who succeeded Harold Washburn as
project scientist, assisted and represented the NASA-appointed TV experimenters
full-time at JPL (Figure 70). Raymond Heacock continued to serve as the space
sciences project engineer, making certain that the television system met the
requirements specified by the experimenters._ All three provided increased support
at JPL for Ranger science activities.
But establishing an easy working relationship among project engineers and
scientists, the three men quickly learned, was not so simple. Ranger's television
experimenters remained in a novel and, in the view of some, not altogether
desirable position. Collectively, they were a "team" of experimenters rather than
sole proprietors of individual instruments. 2 Although chartered to support them,
Campen, Vrebalovich, and Heacock acted as intermediaries, buffering relations
between the experimenters and Schurmeier's project office. RCA designed, built,
and tested the "experiment" itself, which was of course the television system,
--2
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Fig. 70. JPL Ranger Project Scientist Thomas Vrehalovich
under the supervision of JPL, thereby removing its development from the direct
control of the experimenters. Project engineers even calibrated the optics. Thus,
unlike their colleagues who designed and supervised the fabrication of
spectrometers or magnetometers under contract to NASA, Ranger's visual
experimenters were left with few responsibilities save those of specifying attainable
imaging characteristics at the outset, selecting the targets of interest on the moon
before each flight, and-they hoped- analyzing the pictorial returns afterwards.
The often-tenuous connection between NASA-appointed experimenters and
the engineers who ran the space agency's project offices was well known to Homer
Newell. He fully intended to rectify the real isolation of the visual experimenters
from the Ranger Project Office, which was a source of particular concern. On April
23, 1963, Newell took up the matter in a letter to Harold Urey. With Ranger 5
having concluded the Block II missions, Newell said, NASA Headquarters expected
to rename the television experimenters for Rangers 6 through 9. In these flights "it
is our intention to eliminate situations...in which experimenters are for some
reason insulated from the actual work going on." Those scientists appointed "shall
have the opportunity to influence the conduct of the experiment. Indeed," he
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concluded,"in ourviewit isan inescapabler sponsibilityof the experimenter to
ensure himself that the results will be valid, and it is a responsibility of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory to see [that] the experimenters do have [that] opportu-
nity... "_
Newell's views were communicated to others among the original Ranger
television experimenters. 4 The astronomer Gerard Kuiper wrote to Cunningham
on June 18, expressing pleasure in the plans, and announcing that he hoped
shortly to begin a separate assessment of the RCA television design. Such an
assessment could be performed by a "competent engineer [and] a small staff of
one, two, or three men" hired by and reporting to the experimenter team. "l
would assume," Kuiper declared, "that we would work closely with the companies
building the equipment so that our evaluation and studies are truly independent of
the work at JPL... A nearly passive role as was that of the TV experimenters in the
past," he added, "is unproductive." Kuiper promised to submit a formal cost
proposal for this work to Headquarters just as soon as he returned from a meeting
in Europe. 5
The promised activity deeply troubled Schurmeier in Pasadena. He had his
hands full requalifying the Ranger flight components and dealing with those
problems already surfacing in the redesigned RCA television system. 6 With the
design frozen, no time remained to consider any "independent" assessments by
the experimenters. NASA could rename the experimenter team and expand their
duties, but, Schurmeier advised Cunningham, to avoid complications Headquarters
should carefully define the experimenters' role in relation to the project manager-
and do so without delay.
During the next few weeks in Washington Cunningham devoted much of
his attention to this sensitive and potentially schedule-busting issue. On July 10,
with Oran Nicks and JPL's Campen and Schurmeier, Cunningham issued a policy
statement on the organization and role for Ranger's visual experimenters. The new
team, composed of "coexperimenters," would be chaired by a "principal
investigator" responsible for "organizing the efforts of, assigning tasks to, and
guiding the other members of his team." Led by the principal investigator, the
team would engage in "planning the functional testing and calibration" of the
television system, "assist" in preparing the space flight operations plans, and
determine the "scientific merit" of flight options in the event difficulties were
encountered during a mission. Finally, the principal investigator would supervise
the scientific analysis and dissemination of the lunar photographs, and preparation
of the reports to NASA describing the results obtained. The JPL project scientist
would assist him in these duties-but beyond those specified, the principal
investigator held no other functions in Project Ranger.7
This response to prior pledges of an expanded role for scientists hardly
pleased Gerard Kuiper. Not only did he judge the role of the principal investigator
to be too restrictive, but it had been formulated by others while he was in Europe.
Schurmeier, on his part, sure that Kuiper would be named principal investigator
for Ranger Block III, was also reasonably sure that, once named to the post, Kuiper
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would reject the July 10 policy statement. Worried, Schurmeier analyzed the
difficulty for Pickering. If Kuiper pressed for a separate assessment of the television
system, the conduct of project affairs was certain to be disrupted. Any "situation
where there is direction of the TV system that is independent of JPL and the
project," Schurmeier asserted, "is completely unworkable because the TV is such
an integral part of the spacecraft and the mission." The problem had to "be
resolved clearly and in a timely manner," and to this end Charles Campen had
prepared another definition of the role of the principal investigator for review and
possible adoption, s
While Picketing, Schurmeier, and Burke went over Campen's proposed
redefinition of roles in Pasadena, Newell announced the names of the
experimenters selected for the visual imaging flights. Newell had discussed the
choice of a principal investigator with Eugene Shoemaker and Gerard Kuiper. All
had agreed on the assignment: Kuiper, the Director of the Lunar and Planetary
Laboratory at the University of Arizona, 9 would serve as principal investigator on
Project Ranger; Shoemaker was promised the same assignment in the Surveyor
soft-lander project. With that accomplished, Gerard Kuiper endorsed a list of
Ranger coexperimenters (Figures 71 through 75 ): _0
Eugene M. Shoemaker, U.S. Geological Survey
Harold C. Urey, University of California at San Diego
Raymond L. Heacock, JPL
Ewen A. Whitaker, University of Arizona (a colleague of Kuiper's in the
Lunar and Planetary Laboratory)
Though an important step, naming the team of experimenters hardly solved
the problem of knitting a solid relationship between the team and the project. The
pertinent NASA General Management Instruction did not contain the terms
"principal investigator" or "coexperimenter" and, hence, offered little guidance.
Under the terms of another Management Instruction, Schurmeier himself had the
responsibility and authority to direct Project Ranger. _ The precise roles and
prerogatives of a principal investigator and his coexperimenters within the wide
umbrella of Schurmeier's authority had to be settled--before the flight of
Ranger 6.
The experimenters as well as project engineers agreed that revision of the
management instructions guiding flight projects and their scientific activities was
urgently needed. But insufficient time remained to accomplish that difficult feat.
Kuiper, who had been unwilling to accept the statement of role for the principal
investigator formulated in his absence, now agreed with Schurmeier that everyone
should meet and negotiate a "Memorandum of Agreement" to establish his
respective responsibilities. Such a document would define responsibilities of the
project office, the NASA Headquarters program office, and the experimenters. It
would be ratified by each group, signed by a representative of each, and serve to
six [o I ttLMOON 227
Fig.71. Block 111Principal Investigator Gerard Kuiper
order their relationships for the duration of Project Ranger. On July 31 and
August 1 Kuiper, Cunningham, and Schurmeier met at JPL and hammered out a
draft agreement. _2 With minor alterations, it was signed by all three men on
September 1 I, 1963.
This agreement between scientists and engineers acknowledged that the
project manager possessed "direct responsibility for complete project execution."
Along with the authority granted by Headquarters in July, the principal
investigator was to "establish the requirements" in space flight operations for the
kind and format of data processing provided to experimenters, and act as "the sole
arbiter" of the unanalyzed visual data for everyone within NASA and JPL who
had an official function to perform "for a period not to exceed three months after
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Fig. 72. Block III Coexperimenter Eugene Shoemaker
completion of the mission." The principal investigator and the coexperimenters
were also granted "direct access to information at the TV Subsystem Contractor
(RCA)," but, in return, "all contact must be coordinated with the [JPL] Space
Sciences Division Project Representative;...all direction of the Contractor will be
done solely by JPL." Finally, in the event of a dispute, the Ranger Program
Manager at Headquarters would investigate any "appeals from the Principal
Investigator" and refer them to the NASA Director of Lunar and Planetary
Programs for a "final decision."t3
Though much still remained to be done before the launch of Ranger 6,
Headquarters and JPL had at least reached a modus vivendi for visual science in
the Block III missions._4
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Fig. 73. Block llICoexperimenter Harold Urey
READY TO GO
By early December, project engineers had put the finishing touches on the
Ranger 6 spacecraft and its six television cameras (Figure 76). All of the critical
diodes had been replaced and systems tests completed in good time to meet the
lunar launch period extending from January 30 through February 6, 1964. On
December 6, Pickering wrote to Newell, informing him of the progress made and
suggesting that NASA Headquarters "appoint a small review group, independent
of JPL, to examine the entire Ranger 6 system .... " including the launch vehicle
and the Deep Space Network, and to certify its flightworthiness. A group
composed of members of the Kelley Board, Pickering said, would meet the
requirement of independence and also "minimize the amount of time required of
the Ranger Project staff [to acquaint them] with the details of the project. ''_5 A
cachet from such a board, he recognized, would not only serve to verify JPL's own
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Fig. 74. Block I11 Coexperimenter Raymond Heacock
findings but provide insurance against political attacks should Ranger 6 also meet
with disaster.
The letter arrived in Washington on Monday, December 9, at the beginning
of an extremely busy and crucial week for the Office of Space Science and
Applications. Given available and anticipated resources, Newell, Cortright, and
Nicks had to decide on those flight projects to be continued, started, or
terminated-decisions that would lead to the cancellation of" Ranger Block V by
Friday. An evaluation of the flightworthiness of Ranger 6 was important, but at
that moment it could not compare with charting the future course of NASA's lunar
and planetary programs then underway. The leaders of Space Science and
Applications may also have sensed the political ramifications of Pickering's
request. Whatever the case, Newell decided against a special NASA review board,
and instructed Cunningham and his assistant Walter Jakobowski to represent
Headquarters at the Ranger 6 flight acceptance review meeting.
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Fig. 75. Block II1 Coexperimenter Ewen Whitaker
On December 17 Cunningham and Jakobowski met in Pasadena with
representatives of the project office and members of the JPL Ranger Design
Review Board. All evaluated the status of and test records for all Ranger system
components, including the new RCA television system to be flown for the first
time, to make certain that each was flightworthy and that a high confidence could
be placed on a successful mission at the end of January. Everyone agreed: Ranger
6 was ready to go. _6 Two days later Ranger 6, carefully packed inside its air-
conditioned van, left JPU The spacecraft arrived at the Florida launch site on
December 23 and joined the Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle to begin the final round
of preflight tests. But however extensive the preflight care, the ultimate scientific
return and the true and only test of the Ranger Block III vehicles, Cunningham
explained to Webb, would come "in the last ten minutes of the sixty-six-hour trip
to the moon," when the television cameras would be turned on.t7
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Fig. 76. At JPL Technicians Make Final Adjustments on Ranger 6
While the spacecraft and launch vehicle moved toward Cape Kennedy, ts
Ranger's scientists selected its photographic target on the moon. They consulted
Apollo representatives at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston on the choice,
Vrebalovich recalled, but "learned that the design of Apollo's landing gear was
already frozen;" anything space science might find out about lunar surface slopes
in 1964 "could only confirm or deny that design." Apollo's engineers in Houston
"frankly didn't care where we put Ranger 6...so the first choice of a target was
our own. ''19 In October 1962 Apollo officials had succeeded in their claim to
support from NASA's unmanned lunar missions. Their assistants in Houston now
seemed entirely indifferent to the potential scientific and engineering product of
Project Ranger, making of that claim a mockery.
In large measure, the Ranger scientists based their choice of a target on the
lunar lighting conditions to be encountered during the January-February launch
period. All of the Block III television missions had to be directed to areas on the
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moon near the terminator, or shadow-line, where the best contrast for picture-
taking was to be found; however, there was a threshold. If a target was too near
the terminator, the light would become so poor that closeup pictures were useless.
Somewhere, in a north-south band parallel to the terminator, there existed an
"ideal" impact distance that guaranteed the best contrast for television
photography.
Some months before, Donald E. Willingham had devised a means of
finding that ideal distance. An electrical engineer recently graduated from Purdue,
Willingham was the experiment representative of Project Ranger. Together with
Thomas Rindfleisch, a young mathematician in the JPL Space Sciences Division,
Willingham developed a formula known as the lunar "figure of merit," which told
the experimenters just how far away from the terminator a spacecraft had to land
on any given day to achieve optimum contrast in photography. 2° Using the figure
of merit scheme, Gerard Kuiper and his Ranger coexperimenters selected the
Julius Caesar region in Mare Tranquillitatis as the lunar target during the first few
days of the launch period. At the coordinates 8.5 degrees north latitude and 21
degrees east longitude this region also fell within l0 degrees of the lunar equator,
the area of prime interest to Project Apollo. Although little actual interest in the
target was apparent in Houston, in keeping with the mission objective, Ranger's
scientists had nonetheless factored the manned flight requirement into their first
target choice. 2_
Like the experimenters and project engineers, the Deep Space Network was
also ready to go. The man at JPL in charge of this function, Eberhardt Rechtin,
had been appointed Assistant Laboratory Director for Tracking and Data
Acquisition a few months before. In his new position Rechtin directed all of the
deep space tracking stations, the interstation communications net, as well as the
processing of data sent to the Space Flight Operations Facility at JPL. But the
special teams that conducted flight operations and the facility itself remained a
responsibility of the JPL Systems Division. 22 The friction and the occasional
confusion that sparked along the periphery between these two powerful
jurisdictions, as well as NASA plans for two and three flights to be handled
simultaneously in the years ahead, caused Pickering to make further changes in the
organization. On December 24, 1963, he announced the formal creation of the
Deep Space Network "combining the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility
tracking stations, Interstation Communications, and all 'mission-independent'
portions of the Space Flight Operations Facility." For Ranger 6 and thereafter,
except for the ephemeral flight operations teams and special, mission-dependent
project equipment in the control center, Rechtin would have charge of all three
ground components in space flight operations. :3
The testing of these components concluded on January 24, 1964, with a
final operational readiness test. Both normal and abnormal flight conditions had
been simulated, engineers subjected to unexpected equipment failures and
communications breakdowns, and emergency procedures perfected. Personnel at
the overseas tracking stations and the JPL Space Flight Operations Facility
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performed well; 24 the deep space net was judged ready to track and command
Ranger 6 in every foreseeable situation.
As the first launch opportunity on January 30 neared, Cunningham and
Schurmeier spent more and more time at Cape Kennedy. The test results pleased
both men. Ranger 6, atop its Atlas-Agena B rocket at Launch Complex 12,
completed the joint flight acceptance composite test at midmonth. The only
significant problem encountered was a slow response of the spacecraft's roll
gyroscope-a discrepancy quickly rectified. While the Atlas-Agena B continued
launch readiness tests under the guidance of Himmel's engineers from the Lewis
Research Center, JPL engineers disconnected Ranger 6 and returned it to its
hangar for one more system test. 2s
Elsewhere around the country special preparations had been made for the
flight of Ranger 6. NASA officials had established a "mission status room" at
Headquarters, where up-to-the-minute news of the flight could be furnished to
government leaders, press briefings held, and lunar photographs released to the
news media. 26 On the West Coast, Picketing notified JPL employees that word of
the mission's progress would be disseminated by flash bulletins, spot announce-
ments over the public address system, and, at lunar encounter, by an announcer in
JPL's von Karman auditorium, where representatives of the world's press and
television would be gathered to view the first closeup pictures of the moon's
surface. 27
Unquestionably, at the beginning of 1964, Ranger 6 was specially
important to Gerard Kuiper and the Ranger experimenters eager for a cioseup
look at the moon. It was also specially significant to Congressmen anxious for an
American lunar "first" after twelve previous failures; to a Democratic President,
who insisted that the nation's defense and space capabilities were second to none;
and to Homer Newell and his associates in the Office of Space Science and
Applications, who sought redemption in a flight success before the fiscal 1965
budget went to the Hill early in February.* And it was a special mission for
Pickering and his colleagues in Pasadena, who were determined to erase the five-
flight "Ranger black mark" on the otherwise untarnished escutcheon of Caltech's
Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
* Indeed, in January 1964 NASA officials hastily directed that Ranger 6 "be called Ranger A prior to
launch. Similarly, what have been Rangers 7 through 9., . will be called Rangers B through D. If
this Ranger is successfully launched, it will be named Ranger 6" (NASA document, Information
Plart Ranger A,' 2-1800). This nomenclature was generally ignored by the news media and, to avoid
confusion, it is not used here. Commenting on the confusion anticipated, Life magazine observed
tartly: "Instead of numbering all the Rangers consecutively, thus keeping accurate count of the
failures, [NASA officials] designated the next one Ranger A instead of Ranger 6. If it failed, the next
try would be Ranger B. Only when the launch came off successfully would it be called Ranger 6. By
this trick they hoped to soak people's memories in alphabet soup to convey the impression that there
had been only five failures before the final success" (James Hicks, "' Many A Slip Twixt Earth and
Moon And Measles Too," Life, August 14, 1964, p. 36a).
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THE FLIGHT OF RANGER 6
Launch operations began in the early morning darkness on Thursday,
January 30, 1964. The countdown proceeded smoothly as Schurmeier and
Cunningham observed the completion on time of each benchmark from their
command post in Hangar AE. Communications lines across the country permitted
launch operations and immediate postlaunch events to be monitored also at the
JPL Space Flight Operations Facility in Building 125, and there, William
Pickering, Robert Parks, and Gordon Kautz listened attentively to the proceedings.
A new room upstairs in the JPL control center, carefully fitted out to meet the
needs for viewing and analyzing photographs of the moon, awaited the
momentary arrival of Ranger's experimenters.
The Florida dawn revealed an overcast sky and the stirring of a gentle
onshore breeze. The prognosis for the weather from sea level through the
stratosphere was, nevertheless, favorable. The count reached zero at 10:49 am EST,
and the Atlas mainstage engines ignited. Those nearby heard the familiar thunder
and felt the reverberations as Atlas 199D and its precious cargo disappeared into
the overcast. Telemetry data flowing into the Florida command post and the
control center in Pasadena were entirely favorable.
Right on course in the first leg of the lunar mission, the Atlas performed
flawlessly, certifying the effort previously invested by Himmel and his Agena team.
But two minutes after launch, upon shutdown and separation of the Atlas
mainstage engines, project officials were startled to observe the telemetry
monitoring the RCA television system in Ranger 6 unaccountably turn on and,
sixty-seven seconds later, just as inexplicably turn off again. While the Atlas
continued its programmed chores through burnout, Schurmeier and Cunningham
scrutinized the Ranger telemetry returns. All of the spacecraft's subsystems
appeared to be operating satisfactorily, and the tension eased.
Downrange, 160 kilometers (100 miles) above earth, the rocket engine of
Agena B 6008 ignited for the first time, inserting the vehicle into an elliptical earth
orbit. As the Ranger-carrying Agena swung eastward over the South Atlantic
twenty-five minutes after launch, the second burn was recorded. The ensemble,
now moving at I 1,820 meters per second (24,270 miles per hour), rose above the
horizon of the South African Tracking Station at 11:19 am EST, and Ranger 6
separated from the second-stage Agena launch vehicle. The television telemetry,
South Africa reported, had turned on properly-no other malfunctions could be
detected. Within minutes Ranger 6 extended its solar panels and high-gain
antenna, acquired the sun and earth, and stabilized in attitude. Wary project
engineers in Florida and California began shaking hands-once again NASA and
JPL had an operating Ranger on its way to the moon.
Schurmeier left the command post and caught a plane for the West Coast,
arriving at JPL late in the afternoon. There he met with Robert Parks, Ranger
Flight Operations Director Patrick Rygh, and other members of the project staff to
consider plans for the midcourse maneuver and, among other matters at hand,
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discuss the curious telemetry events at launch. Initial calculations showed that the
Atlas-Agena guidance had functioned in near-perfect fashion. Ranger 6 was
traveling a path only a few thousand miles wide of the intended point of impact,
an error well within the correction capability of Ranger's midcourse motor. After
engineers confirmed its precise course, midcourse maneuver commands would be
prepared and transmitted.
But the question of the telemetry malfunction remained unanswered. Had
the event adversely affected the television system? Telemetry now arriving at the
Space Flight Operations Facility plainly stated that normal conditions prevailed.
To perform a checkout now, Schurmeier would have to order the entire television
system turned on. And, if for some reason the system failed to turn off, the battery-
driven television cameras would be left without power when Ranger 6 reached the
moon. Schurmeier and his lieutenants weighed the evidence and agreed: such a test
with its attendant risks was unwarranted; the mission would proceed according to
the flight plan.
Early Friday morning flight controllers verified and transmitted the
commands for a midcourse maneuver, instructing Ranger 6 to adjust course
toward its lunar target in the Sea of Tranquility. The spacecraft responded at the
designated time, pitching and rolling into the specified attitude, and the midcourse
motor burned properly. A few minutes later onboard sensors reacquired the sun
and earth, and, still speeding moonward, Ranger 6 resumed normal cruise
operations. Another milestone had been successfully passed. Pleased members of
the orbit determination group went to work at JPL analyzing the new trajectory.
Except for the single anomaly during launch, it was so far a textbook flight.
Later that day Schurmeier and Cunningham met briefly with newsmen to
discuss the midcourse maneuver and prospects for the mission. The JPL project
manager drew a circle about the Julius Caesar region on a large map of the moon,
and explained that the circumference would shrink in the hours to follow as
engineers refined the trajectory data. But a first look at the flight path, Schurmeier
said, indicated that Ranger 6 would land "near" its intended target. Now midway
through the mission, he seemed willing to endorse the terse hope already expressed
to newsmen by JPL Director Pickering: "I am cautiously optimistic. ''28
As Ranger 6 approached the moon on February 2, Cunningham,
Schurmeier, and Rygh reviewed the actions to be taken at lunar encounter. In an
adjacent room, Pickering and Parks were joined by Newell and Cortright from
NASA Headquarters; all watched the activity on the floor of the control center and
listened intently to Richard Heyser at the Goldstone Tracking Station announce
the time remaining and describe the events to be completed. Representatives of the
news media and other project personnel in the JPL auditorium listened to Walter
Downhower. Chief of the Systems Design Section, Downhower had volunteered to
perform Heyser's function publicly as the "voice of mission control" for Ranger 6.
In a few minutes he was to be the focus of national attention as all awaited receipt
of the first closeup pictures of the moon.
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The velocity of Ranger 6 increased as it plunged towards the Sea of
Tranquility. Trajectory data had revealed that the machine would impact within a
few miles of the planned target. Analysis of the spacecraft attitude showed that the
alignment of the camera axis relative to the moon was within acceptable picture-
taking tolerances. Schurmeier and Rygh discussed the option of a terminal
maneuver to improve the resolution of the final pictures with Gerard Kuiper and
the Ranger coexperimenters. So close to success, the scientists elected not to
attempt it. They would not chance a possible last-minute malfunction. Accordingly,
Schurmeier ordered the two full-scan television cameras and their associated
transmitter turned on automatically by the TV backup clock timer, and the four
partial-scan telephoto cameras and their transmitter by a real-time command from
the ground.
At impact minus eighteen minutes the spacecraft dutifully signaled that the
two full-scan cameras had begun a five-minute warmup period. A few minutes
later it flashed similar word for the four partial-scan cameras. The two sets of
cameras were to switch automatically to full power and begin transmitting pictures
at impact minus thirteen and ten minutes, respectively. Personnel at the Goldstone
Tracking Station switched on the video receiving equipment. "Thirteen minutes to
impact," Downhower announced from his broadcast booth to a waiting world,
"there is no indication of full power video." Then, after a pause, amid growing
murmurs in the audience below him: "ten minutes to impact, we are still awaiting
transmission from the spacecraft of full power video."
From the JPL control center Schurmeier hurriedly directed that backup
commands be transmitted from Goldstone to the spacecraft in an attempt to turn
on the television system. Minutes later, however, Heyser reported no confirmation
of the action from the otherwise chattering Ranger 6. A final command also
proved futile. In the JPL auditorium, Downhower continued to report the time
and, with growing anxiety, repeat the phrase: "We still have no indication of full
power video." The sing-song tones of the Ranger 6 analog telemetry which filled
the auditorium at JPL abruptly ceased. "We have our first report of impact,"
Downhower exclaimed at 1:24 am PST on February 2, and, for the last time, "still
no indication of full power video" (Figure 77).
Stunned officials in Washington recoiled at the next words piped into the
auditorium at NASA Headquarters when a technician inadvertently switched lines:
"Spray on Avon Cologne Mist and walk in fragrant beauty...'29 In Pasadena,
Cunningham pushed his chair away from the console in the control center and
stood up. "I don't believe what's happened," he said, repeating the words again
and again as he left the room looking straight ahead. Pickering, who had walked
onto the floor shortly before impact, turned to those nearby, declaring "I never
want to go through an experience like this again-never!" Schurmeier wondered
silently to himself how many more project managers Ranger might yet claim.
Across the Laboratory a subdued group of newsmen and employees began
to stir inside yon Karman Auditorium. Walter Downhower relaxed his grip on the
microphone, arose from his chair, and went home. At least he could avoid the
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Fig. 77. The Audience in Von Karman Auditorium Hears Downhower Describe the Final
Moments in the Flight of Ranger 6
postflight press conference (Figure 78). But during the drive he turned on the car
radio and was treated to a replay of his own voice broadcasting the final moments
in the life of Ranger 6. He listened in disbelief-once more through to the end.
Downhower would never again agree to serve as the voice of any NASA space
flight project. 3°
Logged as the twelfth successive American lunar flight failure, Ranger 6
blemished an impressive record of space successes cited by President Johnson a few
days before. 3_ It also opened a week in which NASA officials appeared before
Congress to testify in favor of a $5.3 billion budget-much of it earmarked for
manned and unmanned lunar exploration-for fiscal year 1965. Under these
circumstances, in the days immediately following, the news media were most
temperate in their public accounting of the disaster. The Ranger spacecraft was
acknowledged to have performed flawlessly even if the television cameras had
failed.
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Fig. 78. Homer Newell, William Pickering, and Harris Schurmeier Answer Newsmen's Questions
at Ranger 6 Postflight Press Conference
Chapter Sixteen
THE WORST OF TIMES
MID the more temperate media reaction, William J. Coughlin, the pro-
business editor of Missiles and Rockets _ pronounced Ranger 6 a "one-hundred
percent failure." JPL's record on Project Ranger, he insisted, was a disgrace; more
offensive, NASA had paid the California Institute of Technology a $1.2 million fee
in fiscal year 1964 to staff and operate the nonprofit laboratory responsible for the
lunar debacle:
This may be exactly the heart of the problem. An academic
environment is neither comparable nor conducive to the kind of
hard-driving industrial atmosphere required to make complex
space hardware function in a highly reliable manner. A price of
$1.2 million for a leisurely university atmosphere and little else is
exorbitant...We think Congress should reopen the whole question
of the JPL-Caltech relationship. 2
Of course Ranger 6 had not been a complete failure, but to other close
observers, the television difficulty had also raised serious doubts about the
supervision of Ranger by Homer Newell's Office of Space Science and
Applications. And like Coughlin, many insiders wondered about NASA's methods
of contracting for and managing research and development efforts through an
institution of higher learning. Coughlin had branded the project itself a loser.
Those in the space agency who could, carefully avoided any direct association with
Ranger. A few publicly declared Ranger's lunar pictures dispensable; Apollo, they
asserted, could proceed without the assistance of NASA's unmanned missions. 3
With the very justification of the remaining Ranger flights now called into
question, the future of the project hung by the most tenuous of threads. Should it
be canceled or completed in 1964? The answer to that question depended upon
another investigation of the project by JPL and NASA officials, and upon the
response from Congress (Figure 79).
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Fig. 79. "You're Shy-I'm Shy 28 Million Bucks" (Courtesy Fort
Wayne [Indiana] News-Sentinel)
THE RANGER 6 INQUIRY AT JPL
On Sunday morning, a few hours after the impact of Ranger 6, William
Pickering appointed a JPL-RCA board of inquiry to investigate the malfunction of
the television system. Television project engineer Donald Kindt, placed in charge,
was directed to find the cause of the failure and recommend action to prevent its
recurrence on Ranger 7. The next day, on February 3, 1964, Pickering appointed a
second investigative body composed of JPL section chiefs and chaired by the
"voice of Ranger 6," Walter Downhower. This group was to check on the
"completeness" of the Kindt-led project investigation and act as "a review board
to evaluate [its] conclusions and recommendations. ''4 Pickering expected to have
the findings and recommendations in time to modify Ranger 7 before its scheduled
launch at the end of February.
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The JPL investigation began auspiciously, with words of encouragement
from Representative Joseph Karth, the subcommittee chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, who commented to reporters that it
seemed reasonable for the project to continue. If only two of the three remaining
Rangers were successful, he said, the effort would be "worth the money and time
spent on it." Committee Chairman and California Democrat George P. Miller sent
a personal note to Picketing reaffirming faith in NASA and JPL, and offering his
opinion that the performance of Ranger 6 and the accuracy of its flight path truly
had made that mission "an accomplishment of the first order. ''5 To be sure, both
men had become closely associated with and approved funds for Ranger over the
years. With Laboratory morale at its nadir, the Congressional encouragement was
most welcome.
Kindt and the JPL investigators quickly isolated the time of the failure: the
sixty-seven seconds when the television telemetry had unaccountably turned on
during ascent through the earth's upper atmosphere. Electrical arcing in that
critical pressure region,* they determined, had destroyed the high-voltage power
supplies to the television cameras and their transmitters. But what caused it, and
the enigmatic cessation and subsequent normal operation of the television
telemetry on the way to the moon, defied simple explanation. Opinion at JPL was
divided over several possible causes and, consequently, over what remedial action
to take.
On February I l Pickering notified NASA Headquarters of the impasse and
its potential negative effects. JPL's investigation had not uncovered a single
"definitive cause" of the television failure, he informed Newell, and the next
Ranger launch should be postponed. "A firm decision on the rescheduling of
Ranger 7 must await results of a study effort of several possible preventive steps
and the effort and time required to mechanize them." Newell and Ranger's
managers in Washington had no choice but to agree. 6
A few days later, on February 14, the JPL investigating board issued its
final report. 7 Although providing more details, it came no closer to a consensus on
the precise chain of events or their cause. Low battery voltages proved that power
had been used by more than simply the cruise mode telemetry during part or all of
the sixty-seven seconds. The television system, it was concluded, had indeed come
on prematurely, perhaps because the internal command switch had advanced
several steps, or because of shorting across exposed pins contained in the external
umbilical connector on the Agena nose fairing. In the latter instance, arcing
between a battery pin and the nearby pin of the sensitive television command
circuit used to monitor the television system on the launch stand could have
activated the system. But neither electrostatic discharge nor any other mechanism
that might trigger arcing across these pins had been uncovered. The most probable
explanation, the JPL board therefore concluded, was that the system "turned on by
* Gaseous breakdown to a state of electrical conduction occurs most readily at the densities and
pressures prevailing in the upper atmosphere.
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a movement of the command switch into its warmup mode... Following the turn-
on, three additional movements of the command switch returned it to position
zero, disconnecting the arcing components from the battery and conditioning the
command system for a normal sequence of events ...'8
On the basis of these findings, the board recommended to Schurmeier's
project office six measures to prevent a recurrence of the failure on subsequent
flights:
1. Modify the Ranger television turn-on circuitry to lock out any possible
turn-on signal. Mechanical separation of the spacecraft from the Agena
vehicle in earth orbit should activate the circuitry, permitting turn-on to
be accomplished. (A second option included eliminating the four-step
command switch and replacing it with a different one.)
2. Reduce to a minimum the number of electrical leads from the Agena
nose fairing umbilical connector through the spacecraft to the television
system. (All leads that could trigger a turn-on were to be eliminated or
have resistors added.)
3. Modify the Ranger television telemetry to transmit data on system
performance during the warmup period near the moon.
4. Conformally coat all exposed terminals in the television system, and pot
or sleeve any exposed connector pins to minimize the possibility of an
accidental short.
5. Perform a pin retention test on all connectors.
6. If found necessary, provide venting of the television subsystem
assemblies. 9
The investigative report and its technical recommendations, approved by
Downhower's watchdog group, were then turned over to the NASA board of
inquiry that would make the final recommendations for Ranger's future.
THE NASA INQUIRY: DISPARATE FINDINGS
NASA's Ranger 6 Board of Review was formed on February 3, 1964, by
Associate Administrator Robert Seamans rather than by Homer Newell, whose
Office of Space Science and Applications was responsible for the faltering Ranger.
A brief news release stated that the NASA board would review, independently,
"the failure analyses and corrective procedures being developed by JPL," and
make "appropriate recommendations on the conduct of the remainder of the
Ranger flight program. '''° The four men whom Seamans named to the Ranger 6
board had little or no direct association with the project or the Office of Space
Science and Applications. Francis Smith was the respected chief of the instrument
research division at NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia.
Herman LaGow, a former member of the Kelley Board and physicist with twenty
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years at the Naval Research Laboratory and NASA, headed the systems review
group at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Eugene
Dangle, the board's secretary, brought experience as a Technical Programs Officer
in the Headquarters Office of Program Plans and Analysis. Walter Jakobowski, Bill
Cunningham's Ranger Program Engineer, served ex-officio to help familiarize
board members with the project but, as Seamans made clear, not as a voting
member. As chairman, Seamans selected his own Deputy Associate Administrator
for Industry Affairs, Earl D. Hilburn. H
A self-made 43-year-old executive, Hilburn had acquired a reputation as an
effective manager in industry, most recently as vice-president and general manager
of the Electronics Division of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation. Seamans had picked
Hilburn to consolidate and oversee NASA procurement policies and practices,
particularly to encourage the use of incentive contracts instead of the cost-plus-
fixed-fee type. Almost immediately after Hilburn had joined NASA six months
earlier, _2 Webb assigned him the task of reviewing the contractual relationship
between Caltech, JPL, and NASA. The prevailing contract reflected JPL tradition,
which was to operate rather independently of its governmental sponsor under the
academically managerial protection of Caltech. Hilburn recommended including a
number of terms in a new contract to tighten NASA's control over the Laboratory
and, with Webb's backing, forced most of them through against vigorous
objections from Caltech and JPL. Now Hilburn, something of a b_te noire at the
Laboratory, was to command NASA's evaluation of Ranger 6, much to the
dissatisfaction of the scientists and engineers in Pasadena (Figure 80).
The NASA Headquarters review board-shortly to become known as the
"Hilburn Board "-convened on Thursday, February 6, in Washington. The next
day the board members met in Pasadena, and began one week of evaluating and
discussing JPL's Ranger 6 findings and recommendations. Hilburn, a manager
before he was a technician, soon found himself deeply troubled by the various
explanations under debate at JPL. The absence of a single "definitive cause" of the
television failure suggested to him that more than a simple technical problem was
involved. If JPL project and division personnel had overlooked a marginal
design-indeed a design flaw-in the umbilical connector on the Agena nose
fairing, might not other parts of the RCA television system and the JPL spacecraft
likewise be impaired? Project Manager Schurmeier and his JPL associates
remained convinced that the electrical arcing, triggered by a single unknown event,
had "cascaded" in the low pressure and density of the upper atmosphere so as to
burn up the television high-voltage power leads. But was it not just as reasonable
to suppose that two or more discrete failures resulting from design and testing
deficiencies had occurred nearly simultaneously?
On February 14, the day that JPL investigators issued their final report, the
members of the NASA Ranger 6 Review Board presented their preliminary
findings and recommendations to officials of the space agency in Washington.
Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden and Deputy Associate Administrator Walter
Lingle, along with Newell, Nicks, Cortright, Cunningham, and Jakobowski,
THE WORST OF TIMES 245
Fig. 80. NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Industry Affairs Earl Hilburn
listened intently to the presentation. The board, Hilburn reported, had uncovered
numerous deficiencies in the design and testing of the "split" television system
used in the Ranger Block III vehicles. This system was not entirely redundant, he
observed, having been hastily redesigned after the flight of Ranger 5. These
television systems also had recorded instances of inadvertent turn-ons at RCA
during tests. The Ranger 6 television system, furthermore, had not been checked
out at full power on the pad just prior to launch.
The test history of the Ranger spacecraft appeared hardly better. Torsional
vibration of the spacecraft and television system at JPL had been conducted with
the proof test models but not with the flight articles. JPL also preferred to conduct
mission tests using numerous hard wires to monitor the performance of the
spacecraft subsystems, another example, he continued, of procedures that in the
board's opinion jeopardized a thorough understanding of how the vehicle would
perform in space. _3 These conditions, along with the lack of any telemetry data
that pinpointed the failure, led the board to conclude that more than one cause was
responsible for the loss of the Ranger 6 television system.
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A quick technical fix, such as JPL's proposal for electrically "locking out"
the television system during ascent through the atmosphere, would therefore be
insufficient to guarantee success. Ranger, the board said, would have a very low
chance of achieving its objectives if NASA were to follow that course; much more
stringent measures were necessary. The RCA television system, the Hilburn group
concluded, had to be redesigned and retested, with a delay of twelve months or
more before the next flight. Moreover, the board wished to broaden its
investigation at JPL to include an evaluation of the JPL spacecraft, with further
recommendations to follow.
Dryden, who had remained silent throughout most of the meeting, advised
the board members that another prolonged delay for Ranger might well result in
NASA's canceling the project altogether. Under the proposed approach, Ranger's
lunar pictures would arrive too late to benefit Project Apollo measurably, and the
added costs of redesign and retesting might better be applied to the upcoming
Surveyor Project or Lunar Orbiter. He asked the board members to discuss the
preliminary findings and recommendations further with Newell's staff and the JPL
project team on February 19 and 20, in a meeting to chart recovery plans for
Project Ranger. t4
A PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
Unprepared for and startled by the asperity of Hilburn's oral report, the
members of Newell's office were truly distressed. If the board did not alter its
position, the cancellation of Ranger appeared a distinct possibility. In separate
memos, Cunningham and Jakobowski condemned the board's findings and
recommendations in the strongest terms. The usually reticent Jakobowski refuted
the findings point by point and openly urged positive lockout of the televison
system as the best approach for NASA to take. He judged the "ultra-conservative
approach" adopted by the board to be ill-founded and untimely, and he found the
manner in which the board presented its recommendations "to top management"
to be most objectionable. Newell had not been given the opportunity to rebut
Hilburn at the meeting. Now, he worried, management might "accept a pessimistic
report without even asking for the views of the Program team. ''_5 Nicks endorsed
Jakobowski's memo, as did Cunningham. "Ranger," Cunningham added, "is in
the unfortunate position of being not only in the public spotlight because of its
mission and its failures, but also in the Agency and Congressional spotlight
because of the continual publicity which started with the Kelley Board of Inquiry. I
honestly believe that it is possible for a program to be reviewed to death, and this
is very likely in the case of Ranger if the investigation is allowed to continue." _6
Newell was in no position to stop an investigation authorized by Webb,
Dryden, and Seamans, but he shared many of the same reservations expressed by
his subordinates. The project, he decided, must continue. In the two-day meeting
on February 19 and 20, Hilburn, Nicks, Cunningham, Schurmeier, and their
associates argued and discussed the various alternatives for proceeding with
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Ranger. After compromise on
approach was agreed upon":
1.
all sides, Cunningham reported, "a general
The Ranger 7 television system would be modified, reworked, and
retested at the RCA plant in Hightstown, New Jersey, while the
spacecraft remained at Cape Kennedy.
2. A proof test model of the modified television system would be
requalified, then returned to JPL for further tests.
3. Changes to the spacecraft would be limited to the wiring necessary to
accommodate the modified television system. Both the flight spacecraft
and television system would be retested at the Cape.
Although the exact changes and detailed plans remained to be completed, this
course would permit the launch of Ranger 7 at the end of May. _7 Newell,
meantime, urged Pickering to consider the recommendations of the Hilburn Board
"objectively" in arriving at a detailed plan. Until Headquarters approved all of the
retest and requalification procedures, he said, "the official flight schedule will
remain under study. ''ts
Still, for all of Newell's diplomatic intercession and the tentative
compromise on Ranger 7, Hilburn pulled no punches when on March 17, 1964, he
submitted the board's final report to Webb. "In view of the evidence that two or
more failures must have occurred within the spacecraft's TV subsystem," the report
averred, "the Board broadened its investigation to include an evaluation of any
general weakness in the Ranger design, testing philosophy, and procedures which
might have contributed to, or enhanced the possibilities of, in-flight failure." The
Board, the report continued, had found a good deal wrong: t9
1. The two video chains and their associated power and control
systems were unnecessarily complex... Furthermore, the two TV
systems were not entirely redundant; there were many boxes,
plugs, junctions, cables, and control circuits which were common
to the two chains and in which a single failure would lead to the
disablement of both television systems...
2. Hazardous conditions resulted from certain practices employed
in the design and construction of the spacecraft. These included
the use of a male umbilical connector, a multiplicity of circuits
through the umbilical, exposed terminals where a foreign particle
could produce a short circuit, and the use of unvented and
unsealed boxes.
3. Most of the Ranger testing was carried out in such a manner
that potentially dangerous situations which could have enhanced
accidental triggering of critical control circuits could not be
vigorously assessed. Because of approximately 300 wire electrical
connections between the operating circuitry of the Ranger
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spacecraft and its associated external test equipment, the ground
test conditions are quite apart from the true space flight
conditions, where only radio communications tie the spacecraft to
its ground control systems.
4. The Ranger 6 spacecraft contained a directional antenna...that
was never system tested with the high-power TV transmitters.
5. Prelaunch systems verification was incomplete (e.g., the last
operation of the complete TV subsystem on Ranger 6 was twelve
days prior to launch). This resulted from the necessity for
removing the TV payload from the bus to fuel the midcourse
motor, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's reluctance to risk
possible damage to the space vehicle after it was reassembled, with
the [pyrotechnic] squibs in place under the shroud.
Project officials at JPL and Headquarters had conceded only portions of the
second finding (one actually associated with the television subsystem and not, as
claimed, with the spacecraft). The rest of the findings, which concerned JPL design
and test philosophies, they had rejected. In substance and wording, those findings
strongly implied an oversight at NASA, malfeasance at JPL, or both. The JPL staff
had dissented with particular sharpness from the board's recommendations for
corrective action to modify and retest Ranger 7.
Although JPL had agreed to change the television system and discuss other
modifications, it had steadfastly refused for Ranger 7 to accept three important
changes in testing practices demanded by the Hilburn Board, viz.,
I. Eliminate all ground wire connections during vibration testing, and use
"absolute minimum wires" during mission testing.
2. Eliminate "microinspection" of certain components after environmen-
tal tests (JPL had agreed to do so only for Ranger 7).
3. Use minimum wires during prelaunch checkout.
Laboratory officials had insisted that, with the limited engineering telemetry
available on Ranger, wire connections to the spacecraft to sample subsystem
performance should be maintained in tests. In view of this disagreement, the
board, which had no authority to impose its will on Schurmeier's JPL project
office, urged NASA management to monitor closely all the Ranger 7 tests, target
the launch of Ranger 7 for the end of June "but hold the official launch date
'under study' pending evaluation of the validity and results of the Ranger 7 tests
in Pasadena," and detain Ranger 7 at JPL instead of the Cape until NASA
"concurs that the spacecraft is flightworthy. ''2°
James Webb received the final report but took no immediate action. The
disquisition posed disrupting procedural problems. On the one hand the news
media and the Congress expected word of the investigation's results and of
NASA's plans for Ranger. On the other hand public release of the report was
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liable to stir a massive wave of contention within the space agency. On March 26
Robert Seamans sent copies of the Hilburn final report to Pickering, DuBridge,
and the inventor, businessman, and chairman of the Caltech Board of Trustees,
Arnold O. Beckman. The classified report, Seamans explained in his covering
letter, was an "internal document not for public distribution or discussion with the
press..." Access was being limited to the three men while "we...consider very
carefully what our responsibility is with respect to reporting to the Congressional
Committees...and to the press. ''2t Under the terms of transmittal, the document
could not be shown to other JPL officials.
In Washington on March 31, Webb, also disturbed by the continuing
Caltech-JPL resistance to NASA direction, sent identical letters to Clinton P.
Anderson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, and George P. Miller, Chairman of the House Commmittee on Science
and Astronautics. Copies of the letter were telegraphed to Pickering and Beckman.
The four-page, single-spaced missive explained the work of the Hilburn Board and
reported on "the present assumptions regarding the Ranger 6 failure and our
current plans for future flights." Although excluding the board's recommenda-
tions, all five of the disputed findings were reproduced virtually word for word.
They indicated "a number of deficiencies in design, in construction, and in the
testing of this [Ranger 6] spacecraft..." at JPL. The Hilburn report itself, Webb
asserted, was classified Confidential. It had been prepared for NASA use and
represented only a portion of the available material. "Consequently, this report
will not be released, especially since it does not represent NASA's complete
judgment and final implementing plans.":z
But however the letters were intended, members of Newell's office worried
about Congressional demands for an investigation of Ranger based on the
debatable charges. In Pasadena, the letters sharply increased exasperation over the
seeming byzantine maneuvers of NASA Headquarters in its dealing with Caltech-
JPL.
ACTION AND REACTION
Copies of Webb's letters arrived in the Office of Space Science and
Applications the same day that they were posted to Capitol Hill. No one had been
prepared for them; indeed, it seemed inconceivable that letters containing the
Hilburn Board charges could have been sent forward without prior consultation, or
the chance to append documents of rebuttal. 23 It appeared as if Webb's office had
made a grievous administrative error or, worse, the Administrator had lost all
confidence in those at NASA responsible for Project Ranger. Morale plummeted.
On Monday, April 6, Newell consulted with Cortright, Nicks, and
Cunningham. At Newell's request, Nicks prepared for his signature a
memorandum to Seamans. It expressed strong reservations over sending the
disputed charges to Congress; charges in these letters, the memo averred, often
made no technical sense and thus would be "subject to misinterpretation." The
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action, moreover, had had a serious "impact on the morale in the Office of Space
Science and Applications and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. ''24 A lengthy
attachment set forth Office objections to the technical aspects of the board's
findings conveyed to Congress:
I. The two RCA video chains might have been complex, but the Hilburn
report implied that any system not entirely redundant was improperly
designed. "Even if the two TV channels had been completely redundant,
the spacecraft itself would have represented a non-redundant series of
systems of far greater complexity... A single failure in the attitude
control system, for example, could result in complete loss of television
data, as could the failure of a booster engine."
2. The report's description of practices employed in the design and
construction of the spacecraft conveyed "no other conclusion than that
the spacecraft was assembled with complete disregard for normal quality
control practices..." For example, "the method and degree of venting
unpressurized [electronic] boxes will always be a matter of engineering
judgment. Insofar as the Ranger flights are concerned, we have never
encountered a problem attributed to venting."
. JPL's use of wire electrical connections during spacecraft testing was
also a matter of judgment. Ranger communicated over great distances
on a wideband radio-frequency link which limited the telemetry bit rate.
Therefore, "because of this lack of capability to adequately moni-
tor...the spacecraft with the RF link, cables are required during
environmental tests." Care nonetheless had been taken to check for
sneak circuits in the ground equipment which might have caused or
obscured failures during testing.
. The Ranger 6 directional antenna was "not normally used during
'system tests;' " however, it was "a simple, fixed geometry, 1.2-meter (4-
foot) dish which is always functionally tested after installation to ensure
that it is transmitting properly, and video is transmitted by means of
this antenna with the spacecraft in launch configuration on the launch
vehicle." It was not radiated at full power within the shroud atop the
Agena for fear of damage to the spacecraft and launch vehicle.
. Although it was true that JPL never exercised the television transmitters
at a full 60 watts power on the launch pad, "their reasons seem very
sound. Should the midcourse motor squibs fire, igniting the midcourse
motor, it would cause complete destruction of the spacecraft, and if this
occurred on the launch pad, probably also the Atlas-Agena... On the
other hand, the low-power test which was performed functionally
checked out the complete "IV system, except for the application of high
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voltage..,whichhad beencheckedout a few daysearlier" in the
hangaratCapeKennedy.25
The Hilburn report, to be sure, did contain a number of charges based upon
inconclusive evidence and erroneous technical assumptions. No one could be sure,
for example, that "two or more failures must have occurred" aboard Ranger 6.
And, because of the limited engineering data available from Ranger's analog
telemetry, the hard wire electrical connections that JPL used between the
spacecraft and its external ground test equipment really made technical sense. The
board members knew along with everyone else that something catastrophic had
gone wrong, though whether it involved the spacecraft as well as the television
subsystem and the umbilical connector on the Agena nose fairing remained a
question mark. But it was also true that more spacecraft testing, including full-
power television tests without wire connections to the test consoles, could have
been accomplished as a doublecheck, and NASA and JPL officials had to
consider it.
A draft of Nicks' rebuttal to the Hilburn charges was shown to Robert
Seamans. Since Congress had already received the findings, he considered formal
criticism sensitive at this point. "We were authorized to put it in the files,"
Cortright later recalled, "but not to send it. ,,26 Seamans, in turn, took up the issue
with Webb. Leaders of the Office of Space Science and Applications, Webb
learned, would likely take issue with various aspects of the Ranger 6 findings in
any Congressional investigation.
And so, it seemed, they would. The Hilburn report, Nicks informed Newell
bitterly, not only contained inaccuracies, but, since it contained no military secrets,
it had also been classified in a highly irregular fashion. "Allowing only limited
distribution, such as preventing the Director of JPL from showing the report to his
staff, indicates clearly that NASA did not establish the review board for the
purpose of feedback to project personnel." If the only purpose of the investigation
had been to establish "a basis for a critical letter to Congress," Nicks concluded,
"we in the Program Office were naively misled initially into supporting it as a
constructive endeavor. ,,_7 At JPL, where the report iself had been viewed as a final
canard from Hilburn, the NASA investigation, the report and the letters to
Congress now appeared connected in a devious attempt to bludgeon the
Laboratory's management. 28 Exasperation gave way to outrage. Pickering
instructed JPL officials to refuse interviews with newsmen and issue no public
statements.
Publicly, Project Ranger was increasingly treated as a manifestation of the
differences between NASA and Caltech-JPL. Confusing reports and rumors
multiplied, especially in Southern California. "If Ranger 7 fails," the Los Angeles
HeraM-Examiner proclaimed, "management of the government owned laboratory
may be taken out of the hands of the California Institute of Technology...
Director William H. Pickering may be removed from the post he has held 10
years."29 But if NASA wished to separate JPL from Caltech, the Los Angeles Times
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added editorially, "it could do this without first resorting to a campaign of
defamation, which not only damages JPL but reflects unfavorably on one of the
country's very great schools of science and technology ... ,,30
Responding to queries at a news conference a few days later, Webb said
that his letter to Congress had at least been an administrative mistake. He had
been traveling when he completed and sent the letter back to Headquarters.
Presuming that Newell's office already had seen and approved the draft, he signed
it upon his return. For that he was sorry. Nonetheless, Webb concluded for the
newsmen, even though some at NASA and JPL "may...see problems created by
such a letter, I take it pretty seriously that we have responsibility for giving
[Congress] a report, and that is what I did. ''31 But the Administrator's explanation
and apology came too late to avoid serious problems on Capitol Hill, for on April
9, 1964, Congressman George P. Miller, chairman of the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, had announced that the Subcommittee on NASA
Oversight would investigate charges that the Ranger failures were "due to faulty
design and inadequate testing by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.'32
CONGRESS INVESTIGATES RANGER
A Congressional investigation of Project Ranger gave NASA leaders good
cause for apprehension. Although they considered California's Democratic
Congressman George Miller to be generally a friend of NASA and JPL, the
Congressman he designated to head the inquiry was Joseph E. Karth. From
Minnesota, Karth had few space interests to nourish or protect, and, despite his
generous comments after the flight of Ranger 6, he had been more often a strong
critic both of Caltech-JPL performance on Ranger and of the manner in which
NASA managed its solitary contract field center. 33 Webb immediately warned
Karth of the "unfortunate" timing of the Ranger hearings, and that the inquiry
might dangerously affect morale and the program. Webb particularly cautioned the
Congressman against taking the Hilburn report as NASA's final word on the
difficulties with Ranger. It was, he emphasized, "only one working document.'34
But the witnesses-for NASA: Webb, Seamans, Newell, Nicks, Cunning-
ham, and Cortright; for JPL: Pickering, Parks, and Schurmeier--quickly learned
that the Minnesota Democrat took the report at least as a significant preliminary
word. After the critical Ranger letter, Karth declared when he opened the four
days of hearings on April 27, "it was hardly reasonable to expect that...a
Congressional investigation was not in the best interests of the country and
Congress." The Subcommittee on NASA Oversight intended to review any
possible Ranger "technical deficiencies," but its "primary interest" in this hearing
would be devoted to "problems of management" at NASA and JPL. 35
The technical issues focused on whether the Ranger equipment had been
adequately tested before flight. Some critics, Karth contended, alluding to the
NASA investigation of Ranger in 1962, charged that instead of thorough testing
before launch, JPL relied on a general philosophy of" 'shoot and hope it works.'"
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That had never been the NASA or JPL approach, the Ranger witnesses countered.
If the Congressman had received the contrary impression, from whatever the
source, it was because of confusion about what constituted a proper test. True,
Ranger's high-gain antenna, for example, though tested separately, had not been
system tested with the high-power TV transmitters after installation on the
spacecraft. No such test was needed and, in any case, none could be reliably
conducted before launch in the hangar at Cape Kennedy. Even though the space
agency and JPL witnesses repeatedly insisted that the Rangers had been
adequately tested, however, they also conceded that the remaining Ranger
spacecraft would be subjected to additional tests, including a number of those
recommended in the Hilburn report. Cortright forthrightly summarized the
situation:
I believe that the project people both at JPL and in NASA
Headquarters felt that the testing program...was quite adequate
for this job. The reason we are looking at it with a second view
now, and instituting even additional tests, is that we don't know
what happened to Ranger 6, and we are trying to do everything
we can think of which might improve the system. 3_
The focus of the managerial issue was the responsiveness---or what Karth
suspected as the lack of responsiveness-of JPL to the direction of NASA.
Pickering flatly declared that, while JPL felt free to dispute NASA technical and
organizational judgments, the Laboratory always accepted ultimate decisions and
directions from Headquarters. The problem was to remain responsive to
Washington while maintaining the spirit of free inquiry characteristic of a
university laboratory. In fact, the new NASA-Caltech contract, Pickering
explained, permitted NASA increased control over JPL. 37 "It would be quite
unwise," Webb added in support of Pickering's observation, for subcommittee
members "to start out on an effort to convert this into a civil service
laboratory..." NASA and Congress must never "forget that a very, very large
proportion of [JPL's] work is entirely satisfactorily handled--in fact, is
outstandingly handled-and that there are men there who have done and are doing
work more technical, more complex, more difficult than is being done in almost
any other place by the human race.'38 The latest contract with Caltech, he assured
the legislators, afforded the space agency all the controls and authority it needed.
Despite Webb's praise of JPL and announced confidence for the future,
Karth was dissatisfied. "NASA is the contracting agency of the Government; [it]
should be, in fact, the boss of the program. NASA provides the money, and
therefore should have more to say about how this work is to be done, and by
whom it should be done..." And considering Ranger's disappointing flight results,
Karth supposed that at least NASA should have installed a strong technical team
in Pasadena, "to oversee or supervise, not just management practices at JPL, but
technical approaches as well." Webb had to say that closer control from NASA
might have produced better results, but he doubted it. Indeed, under such
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conditions JPL might have lost some of its best people. As to Karth's proposal for
a strong technical team at JPL, it was NASA policy, Webb asserted, to avoid that
kind of exceptional "intervention and monitoring" of its contractors. 39
All the same, the Karth subcommittee's report came down hard on the
management of Project Ranger by JPL and the Office of Space Science and
Applications. Relying on the portions of the Hilburn report made public, the
previous NASA investigation in 1962, and on the testimony, the subcommittee
charged that JPL had failed to establish rigid and uniform testing and fabrication
standards for the Ranger spacecraft. The Laboratory had also poorly organized the
project at the outset, then demonstrated an "embarrassing unwillingness" to
accept NASA direction and make necessary changes. NASA's supervision of the
work was judged inadequate because of a tendency at Headquarters to regard the
Laboratory as a field center instead of a contractor. But in specific practical terms
the Karth report scarcely threatened the Caltech-JPL relationship. It advised the
space agency to take four steps: provide "appropriate" supervision of JPL either as
a contractor or field center; install a general manager at JPL as a deputy director
responsible for flight projects such as Mariner and Ranger; reform the institutional
relationship so as to achieve responsiveness to NASA direction; and consider
executing a one-year contract with Caltech instead of a longer-term agreement/°
Save for settling the precise period of the contract extension, 4_ so far as
NASA and JPL were concerned all the other arrangements were going into effect,
including the recommendation for a general manager, one of NASA's
longstanding-and long resisted-demands of JPL. On June 29 Picketing
announced that, effective August I, retired Air Force Major General Alvin R.
Luedecke, General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, would replace
Brian Sparks as Deputy Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The
appointment, approved by NASA and Caltech, gave Luedecke general manager
responsibility for the day-to-day technical and administrative activities of the
Laboratory. 42
The Ranger inquiry, William Coughlin railed in Missiles and Rockets,
approached a whitewash. "One cannot lay the blame for this at the door of the
able Chairman... It seemed that his hands were tied by what appeared to be almost
a conspiracy to soothe the wounded feelings of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory."43
Science heaved a public sigh of relief. In the face of NASA's own original charges,
the journal mused, Webb's unexpected support of JPL in the hearings had led
many "to conclude that .... like the grand old Duke of York in the nursery rhyme,
[he] had marched his soldiers up the hill, then marched them down again. ''_ Of
course, the original NASA charges had only been the Hilburn report, which the
agency, including its director, had not endorsed. Considering that, Webb's support
of JPL should have surprised no one. Webb himself was certainly pleased with the
outcome. He told Representative George Miller that Karth had recognized "we are
dealing with an extremely delicate situation, much like walking down Fifth
Avenue in your BVD's." He for one was also gratified that Karth had resisted the
pressure to "look for scapegoats. ''45
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To Webb's mind, there were no scapegoats. There was a lunar flight project
at JPL still to be completed successfully. At this stage in the nation's evolving
space program, furthermore, he had little choice but to back the Caltech-operated
laboratory. He also had no reason not to, considering the JPL concessions: greater
control from NASA, a new general manager, acceptance of more spacecraft testing,
and greater attention to the RCA television system. Now it remained to be seen
how the Laboratory and NASA would fare with Ranger 7.
Chapter Seventeen
RANGER 7: A CRASHING SUCCESS
LL of Ranger's participants "very clearly understood" that personnel changes
were likely in Pasadena and Washington should Ranger 7 also fail, and the
Hilburn Board's contentions be proved accurate. The tension was correspondingly
magnified, and the pressure to succeed now "was unbelievable. ''_
REWORKING RANGER 7
In New Jersey, efforts at reworking Ranger's television system encountered
an unexpected snag. For Ranger Block III, JPL had virtually relied on RCA as an
extension of its Systems Division. For space-borne television applications, RCA
was the acknowledged expert, z RCA's Astro-Electronics Division was designated
the "subsystem supplier," and, subject to JPL approval and acceptance, authorized
by contract to design, fabricate, test, and deliver all of the television subsystems
and associated ground support equipment for Ranger. In Hightstown, New Jersey,
JPL television project engineer Donald Kindt and two assistants had monitored
the work, concentrating on the subsystem's functional performance. The impact of
Ranger 6 and the investigations that followed, however, radically changed
attitudes on all sides. At JPL, Schurmeier established a special "task team" to
conduct a detailed review of the RCA design changes planned for the television
subsystem, and "of the TV subsystem [proper] to assure ourselves that there are no
other areas of major concern."3
A special deputy was assigned to assist Kindt as the JPL engineers in
residence at Hightstown swelled from three to approximately twenty-five. RCA
likewise multiplied the engineers at work on a subsystem suddenly in the public
limelight, and its Astro-Electronics Division Ranger Chief Bernard Miller acquired
a deputy as well. 4 RCA leaders brought in more "specialists, even got people from
their Princeton Research Laboratory, which was separate from Hightstown, and
put them on, eliminated the car pools which took people home at 4:30, and really
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turned to." The project also created a special interlocking RCA-JPL problem/
failure reporting procedure, requiring the signature of Kindt as well as the RCA
reliability representative on every television problem or failure analysis report. 5
Finally, NASA Headquarters dispatched a special team of engineers to Pasadena
to oversee the testing of the Ranger 7 spacecraft at JPL. "I will expect these NASA
representatives," Oran Nicks instructed Cunningham, "to write their own reports
and not reassign to JPL personnel any tasks relating to their monitoring
functions.'6 Careers hinged on the next flight, and all the participants would settle
for nothing less than double-checking each other.
As recovery plans jelled, Schurmeier rescheduled the flight of Ranger 7 for
the lunar launch window of June 27 through July 2, 1964, which, along with
modification of the television subsystem and the basis for a spacecraft test
program, was approved by Headquarters. 7 But the launch of Rangers 8 and 9 had
to be postponed six months or more. NASA had committed two Mariner C
spacecraft for flight during the Mars launch opportunity in the fall of 1964. They
held priority, and they were to occupy the Atlas-Agena launch facilities at Cape
Kennedy from August through November. Then, on March 27, 1964, quality
control personnel at RCA opened one of the sealed electronic modules in the
modified Ranger 7 television subsystem. Inside, the inspectors found a small
polyethylene bag containing 14 screws and a lock washer.
RCA began an investigation immediately, and submitted the findings to
Schurmeier in Pasadena four days later. This incident, the RCA security office
reported, was an accidental one caused by the pressures of working around the
clock in three shifts seven days a week on the camera electronics, s But others in the
RCA project office, including supervisors, argued that this kind of "accident" was
highly improbable. From their point of view, a bag of screws simply could not
have slipped through the inspection process undetected. They believed that even
though there was no direct evidence, the incident had to be an act of sabotage-
with all that that implied for the preceding television failure. To make matters
worse, the quality control records for this module in the twelve-hour period when
it was sealed were missing.
If sabotage of the project could be established, all the Ranger 7 television
hardware would have to be reopened and thoroughly reinspected, which would
delay the flight at least a month and increase project costs some $500,000. 9 And
only four weeks remained before Mariner C would claim the launch facilities at
the Cape. Any delays, furthermore, would work to the benefit of the Soviet lunar
program. No Soviet lunar missions had been recorded since Luna 4 in April 1963.
NASA and JPL expected another launch momentarily, and credit for the first
closeup pictures of the moon's surface would belong to the first nation to take
them. A decision had to be made about the television subsystem-soon.
At mid-month, Schurmeier, who had expanded the investigation of the bag
of screws incident, sent his deputy, Gordon Kautz, to Hightstown for a final
evaluation. Kautz reviewed all the records and personally interrogated the RCA
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project participants. "It looked like sabotage .... " Kautz later mused, "[but] I had
the inherent and intuitive feeling that we didn't have any saboteurs there...I made
an assessment that this was indeed an accident-the people were so fatigued back
there that this had occurred." As Congress prepared to investigate Project Ranger
on April 22, Kautz told Schurmeier his findings and opinion. After a long
telephone conversation, Schurmeier agreed that the Ranger 7 television hardware
should not be reopened and reinspected. Work was to proceed on schedule. I°
ON THE TRAIL OF RANGER 6
All the same, the fact remained that no one at NASA, JPL, or RCA really
understood why the television cameras on Ranger 6 had failed to work. The
mystery remained a topic of concern inside the project and out. Cartoonist Chester
Gould dispatched detective Dick Tracy and the mechanical genius Diet Smith to
the moon's Sea of Tranquility in Smith's "space coupe" to find the answer for
themselves (Figure 81 ). Alighting beside debris in the crater formed by Ranger 6,
Diet Smith exclaimed: "It's easy to see why the cameras failed. They were never
turned on-look." Holding aloft a tangle of wires, the bemused detective replied:
"People won't believe us." Erroneous as the account was, Life magazine
remarked, "millions of Americans didn't find it unbelievable at all. ''_1 Another
popular rumor held that NASA and JPL officials had forgotten to take the dust
covers off the television camera lenses.
The turn-on of the television subsystem during ascent through the earth's
upper atmosphere haunted the JPL project office. Far more painful than Gould's
mocking cartoon, however, were the allegations contained in the Hilburn Board
report, and its presumption "that two or more failures must have occurred within
the spacecraft's TV subsystem. ''t2 That assertion directly contradicted opinion at
JPL and RCA. Even though the formal Ranger 6 investigations had failed to
DICK TRACY
Fig. 81. Dick Tracy Investigates, With Note From Burke to Schurmeier (Created by Chester
Gould © Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate)
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uncover any certain cause, something was responsible, and Schurmeier was
determined to know what it was. On March 23, a few days after NASA issued the
Hilburn report, he directed the Launch Vehicle Systems Section to continue with
the investigation at JPL._3
Maurice Piroumian, an electrical engineer who had migrated to America
from France after World War II, was placed in charge. Suspicions by this time had
shifted from the command switch and electronics within the television subsystem
to the male pins contained in the external umbilical connector on the Agena nose
fairing. This cluster of pins permitted different elements of the television subsystem
to be exercised and monitored on external power by means of a plug and extension
cord linking the spacecraft to the launch complex. The spacecraft switched to
internal power when the plug was pulled away at liftoff, and a small door then
swung closed over the pins and latched mechanically. But the pins had been placed
very close together, and a "hot" pin connected to the television's battery was
located 6.4 millimeters (0.25 inch) away from the pin of the sensitive television
command circuit. Twenty volts were present on the battery pin, and only 3 volts
were needed to actuate the television command circuit and step the switch. The
inadvertent turn-on, the engineers now reasoned, had been caused by something
bridging the gap between these two pins (Figure 82).
During the next few months, Piroumian and his team of JPL engineers,
working closely with others at RCA, concentrated on finding that mechanism.
Tests were conducted to see if the umbilical door could have warped during the
ascent so as to cross the pins, or, in the overcast above the Cape, if electrostatic
L
Fig. 82. Exposed Pins in the Agena Umbilical Connector
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charge and discharge could have occurred on the surface of the nose fairing, or
whether a shock wave of sufficient force to ionize gas had been produced during
the staging of the Atlas launch vehicle.
Of the three hypotheses, the shock wave theory was perhaps the most
intriguing. It was propounded by Alexander Bratenahl, a physicist in JPL's Space
Sciences Division, who had tied it to the peculiar manner of staging of the Atlas
launch vehicle. _4 Struck by the simultaneity of the staging sequence and the
television turn-on, Bratenahl reasoned that the two events had to be closely linked.
Telescopic movie films of other Atlas flights showed a large white cloud
momentarily envelop the rockets during main-stage engine shutdown and
separation.
Personnel at General Dynamics Astronautics, the Atlas manufacturer,
informed the physicist that 112 kilograms (250 pounds) of liquid oxygen were
released into the atmosphere when the oxygen lines were severed upon jettisoning
the main stage engines. Bratenahl's preliminary calculations indicated that this
much liquid oxygen dumped into the upper atmosphere could possibly have
generated a blast wave whose mechanical force could "buckle the umbilical door
and momentarily short the pins activating the command switch," or whose
"'ionization effects could have produced a high conductivity region around the pins
permitting the shorting." Bratenahl transmitted this supposition, endorsed by
Hans Liepmann of Caltech's Aeronautical Department and Robert Mackin of
JPL's Space Sciences Division, to Schurmeier in late May. _5
On June 29, Piroumian's investigators presented their findings to the JPL
project office. Schurmeier learned that, regrettably, all of the hypotheses had been
disproved. Though most RCA and JPL investigators favored the electrostatic
charge and discharge thesis, the experimental evidence was inconclusive. The
decrease in the dielectric strength of air with altitude made it highly unlikely that
appreciable spacecraft voltage could build up at the very high altitude where the
turn-on had occurred. Theoretical calculations prepared by James Kendall, Jr.,
Bratenahl's colleague in the Fluid Physics Section, had proved the shock wave
theory false. Lacking a positive cause after weeks of fruitless study, Schurmeier
terminated the investigation. _6 Apparently the failure of Ranger 6 was to be
relegated to that category of glitches that appear once but can never be duplicated
again in the laboratory.
Most scientists and engineers have experienced the tantalizing suspicion
that the solution to a problem must lie hidden in the data at hand, and that
disquieting state now afflicted Bratenahl. As Ranger 7 proceeded toward its launch,
he set aside other duties and pushed on with the investigation alone. He obtained
more movie film and had the frames enlarged. Careful restudy of the Atlas
separation sequence revealed brilliant luminous flashes sparking within the white
cloud of liquid oxygen surrounding the rocket. Another call to General Dynamics
in mid-July, and the physicist had his answer.
What he had at first believed to be a shock wave was in fact a powerful
detonation flash wave. The severing of the main-stage Atlas engines spilled not
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only 112 kilograms (250 pounds) of oxidizer into the atmosphere but 67
kilograms (150 pounds) of kerosene as well. The sustainer rocket engine, burning
all the while, ignited the vaporized mixture, which rapidly moved forward over the
missile at a rate of 180 meters (600 feet) per second. "The spherical shape of the
flash wave advancing against a Mach 3.5 flow," Bratenahl observed, "suggests
considerable energy in whatever is going on in the flash, otherwise the wave would
be badly distorted by this high-velocity flow field." And since the umbilical door
was mechanically latched rather than hermetically sealed, and normally bowed
outward, there was ample room for the plasma to enter and short the pins. The
sequence of Ranger 6 events strongly implied that this was exactly what had
happened: The Atlas engines had separated at 140.008 seconds after liftoff; the
television subsystem had turned on at 140.498 seconds, coinciding with the
advance of the flash wave. A subtle design error in an umbilical connector had cost
the project Ranger 6._7 Were the project still interested, Bratenahl added almost as
an afterthought, a few relatively inexpensive experiments could be conducted to
confirm this hypothesis. _8
Having satisfied his intellectual curiosity, Bratenahl took his time with the
report. The importance of his findings-discrediting as they did the allegations of
the Hilburn report-escaped him completely. So did the anxiety that beset other
scientists and engineers on the project. Thus, instead of bothering Schurmeier, he
sent the memorandum to the Space Sciences Project Representative, Charles
Campen, who was busy with preparations to receive and process Ranger 7's lunar
photographs. Delivered shortly after the flight of Ranger 7, Bratenahl's
memorandum got buried on Campen's desk, disappeared in the turmoil which
followed, and was all but forgotten. J9
PREPARING TO Go AGAIN
When the Congressional hearings drew to a close on May 4, 1964,
Schurmeier took stock of the project's expanded test program and of plans to
launch Ranger 7. The spacecraft, returned to JPL from Cape Kennedy, had had its
electrical system altered for the RCA payload. The television subsystem, modified,
tested, and accepted by the project office, had arrived a few days earlier. 2° Plans for
additional spacecraft testing had been outlined during the hearings, but the details
remained to be worked out. With the launch set at the end of June, barely seven
weeks remained to establish acceptable procedures and conduct the tests. That
schedule was too tight. On May 11, Schurmeier requested a delay of four weeks-a
move calculated to consume all of the time left before the Mariner Project claimed
Launch Complex 12 at the Cape. Homer Newell approved the delay immediately. 2_
Now no margin for error and subsequent recovery was available. Should another
serious problem be encountered, all of Ranger's flights would be postponed
indefinitely.
JPL engineers and NASA personnel ironed out details of the test program
for Ranger 7 in mid-May. Besides a "no wire" test, they approved a minimum
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wire test of Ranger 7 at JPL inside a thermal vacuum chamber. Also, procedures to
qualify and conduct a full-power test of the television subsystem with Ranger 7
fully fueled at Cape Kennedy were established, z2 All of this activity would be
monitored by the team of NASA engineers appointed earlier by Oran Nicks.
Making doubly certain that the test standards expected were in fact met,
Newell created a special ad hoc group to determine Ranger 7's flightworthiness,
authorize its shipment to the Cape, and, finally, approve the launch. Termed the
Ranger 7 "Buy-Off'' Committee, which meant the acceptance of the vehicle for
flight, its membership bespoke the importance Headquarters accorded this mission.
Chaired by Newell, the committee consisted of Edgar Cortright, Oran Nicks,
Herman LaGow-representing the Hilburn Board--Robert Garbarini, a Neweli
troubleshooter and director of engineering for the Office of Space Science and
Applications, and Francis Smith, Assistant Director of the Langley Research
Center. z3 On June 15 and 16, NASA's Buy-Off Committee convened in Pasadena;
after a review of the records, the committee members determined that Ranger 7
and its modified television subsystem had met or exceeded established acceptance
criteria. The committee authorized JPL to ship Ranger 7 to Cape Kennedy to
begin the final round of testing. 24
Ranger's experimenters, meanwhile, chose a lunar target for Ranger 7.
Maxime Faget, Assistant Director for Engineering and Development at the
Manned Spacecraft Center, had recommended flying Ranger 7 to the identical
Ranger 6 impact site so that the freshly-made crater might be observed and the
moon's surface hardness extrapolated from the crater's depth. 25 But lighting
conditions at that location were no longer acceptable. Using the Willingham-
Rindfleisch "figure of merit" scheme, Gerard Kuiper and his experimenter
associates selected a target i I degrees south of the lunar equator, along the
northern rim of the Sea of Clouds. Shadow contrast here would be optimum for
picture taking; what was more, this little-known mare region appeared suitable for
manned landings, and it was traversed by fascinating rays from the crater
Copernicus. Apprised of the target, Apollo officials in the Office of Manned Space
Flight offered no further comment, z6 Newell approved the selection, and in early
July the Ranger experimenters reconvened at JPL to participate in a final series of
television tests employing the Ranger proof test model.
The flight hardware had already begun final tests at Cape Kennedy. Ranger
7 completed a second "no cables" test on July 6, whereupon it was moved to the
launch complex and mounted atop the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle for countdown
tests. Three days later NASA's Buy-Off Committee reconvened at the Cape. After
an all-day meeting, committee members agreed that Ranger 7 and its launch
vehicle were "flight ready. ''27 They authorized the project leaders to proceed
toward a launch on July 27, the first opportunity in the five-day launch period. By
July 26, all of the flight machinery at the Cape was deemed ready, and so was the
new nerve center of the Deep Space Network.
For the first time, command and control would be exercised from the Space
Flight Operations Facility at JPL2g-a three-story, bunker-like, rock and concrete
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edifice that concealed spacious and functional quarters. Ranger's Space Flight
Operations Director Rygh took pride in the new control center and its large
operations hub, known as the net control area. Blackboards, pinboards, and
makeshift telephone links had disappeared. Instead, teletype printers displayed
Ranger's encoded telemetry. Keyboard tape perforators and tape readers
interpreted, verified, and dispatched commands. An operations voice control
system provided a "hands off" talk and listen capability on the communications
nets. Rear projection screens positioned before the controllers displayed pertinent
information. Closed-circuit television was available for viewing other data, and for
face-to-face discussions with Ranger's experimenters, and guidance and flight
analysis teams in nearby rooms (Figure 83 ).29
Fig. 83. Net Control Area in the New Space Flight Operations Facility
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By July 26, the Deep Space Network completed the last net integration and
operational preparedness tests. Everything was again ready. But the confidence of
early Ranger days was missing, displaced by an unspoken, gnawing anxiety. Had
every conceivable test been made? Had contingencies for every mischance been
devised? Ranger participants had thought all possibilities of failure eliminated
before. Failure this time would mean certain disaster for Ranger, with profound
repercussions for JPL and NASA. Virtually every project engineer and scientist
harbored his own particular concerns for this mission, including especially Gordon
Kautz, beset by second thoughts over the recommendation to proceed without
reinspecting all of the electronic modules in the RCA television subsystem. "That
recommendation," Kautz recalled looking back over a legion of flight project
choices, "was the most significant one I ever made. ''3°
THE FLIGHT OF RANGER 7
Newsmen from around the world gathered at the JPL auditorium for the
launch of Ranger 7-three days ahead of the scheduled lunar impact. There,
closed-circuit television permitted them to view the activity in the nearby control
center. George Nichols, replacing Downhower as the voice of Ranger 7, kept the
newsmen posted on the status of launch operations at Cape Kennedy. Across the
country, in the marble and glass NASA Headquarters building in Washington, the
small sixth-floor auditorium was again equipped to receive Nichols' account for
assembled officials and visiting dignitaries.
At 6:47 am EDT on July 27, 1964, countdown for the launch of Ranger 7
began. Newsmen were apprised of steady progress to meet the day's launch
window, which extended from 12:32 to 2:42 pm. Schurmeier monitored events
from the new control center at JPL, while project engineer Wolfe replaced him at
the Cape. The project manager, it had been decided, could ill afford to spend any
time on a plane returning to the West Coast after the launch when he might well
be needed for important decisions. Fifty-one minutes before liftoff, Atlas personnel
called a hold to replace a faulty telemetry battery. After an hour's delay the count
resumed, but halted again when engineers detected a malfunction in the Atlas
ground guidance equipment. This problem was not so easily resolved, and at 2:20
pm George Nichols told his audiences: "'We are sorry to announce the launch for
July 27 has been scrubbed." Though the weather at Cape Kennedy remained
favorable for another launch attempt the next day, the unexpected postponement
seemed a bad omen.
On Tuesday morning, July 28, the countdown recommenced at Launch
Complex 12 and proceeded smoothly. Exactly at 12:50 pm EDT, just a few seconds
into the launch window, Altas 250D roared to life and, slowly gathering
momentum, bore Ranger 7 upward into clear Florida skies (Figure 84). When the
Atlas mainstage engines shut down and were jettisoned a few minutes later, the
booster was enveloped by the resultant detonation wave. Ranger's telemetry
continued without perturbation; the television subsystem appeared to be safe and
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Fig. 84. Launch of Ranger 7
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operating properly. Above Antigua, Agena B 6009 separated from the Atlas and
ignited its engine, inserting the craft into the prescribed elliptical earth orbit.
Shortly thereafter the tracking station on Ascension Island reported all was well as
the vehicle arced eastward over the South Atlantic. At 1:20 pm, over the West
Coast of South Africa, the Agena engine fired again, injecting the spacecraft onto
its lunar trajectory. The deep space station at Johannesberg reported separation of
the spacecraft from its carrier rocket: Ranger 7 was on its way to the moon.
As flight controllers set to work determining the trajectory and comparing it
to the one desired, Ranger 7 extended its solar panels and high-gain antenna, and
acquired the sun and earth. Later in the afternoon, Picketing, Parks, and
Schurmeier met with newsmen to answer questions and inform them personally of
the mission's progress. The launch vehicles, Picketing said, had placed Ranger 7
on a very accurate trajectory which, if no adjustments were made, would cause the
spacecraft to graze the leading edge of the moon and impact on the backside.
Commands for the midcourse maneuver, to correct the flight path toward the
target in the moon's Sea of Clouds, were to be radioed to Ranger at 3:00 am PDT
the following morning. Though many hours still remained before this mission was
over, the JPL officials were now willing to concede a 50-50 chance of success. "But
the memory of the letdown in the final minutes with Ranger 6," Richard Witkin
reported in the New York Times, "was too fresh for anyone here to feel very
confident. ''n
Early Wednesday morning, on July 29, the coded maneuver commands
were transmitted to Goldstone in the Mojave desert and relayed to Ranger 7. At
the appointed hour the spacecraft responded, rolling and pitching into the desired
attitude. Ranger's midcourse engine ignited at 3:27 am PDT, slowing the
spacecraft and correcting its course to bring it down on the moon at a planned 2 I
degrees West Longitude, 11 degrees South Latitude, in the Sea of Clouds. At JPL
pleased flight controllers awaited the tracking data that would be used to predict
the precise point of impact. A few hours later Pickering, Parks, and Schurmeier
met again with newsmen in the JPL auditorium. Ranger 7's midcourse maneuver
had gone flawlessly, the elated project manager announced; "there have been no
anomalies whatever from launching up to now." The craft, he said, would crash
almost exactly on target at 6:25 am PDT Friday morning. Would the television
cameras work this time, a newsman asked. "Very definitely," Schurmeier
responded. "It is still a long time until Friday," Picketing hastened to interject,
but he agreed that the worst hurdles were over, and the odds for success had
improved measurably, perhaps to 80-20 instead of 50-50. 32
Cruise operations continued without a hitch on Thursday, with telemetry
confirming Ranger 7's health. Project experimenters, led by Gerard Kuiper, had
by now convened in the experimenters' room at the JPL control center, where they
watched flight controllers nearby, and kept their fingers crossed. Newell, Cortright,
and Nicks boarded a plane for Pasadena, there to join Picketing, Schurmeier, and
Cunningham for the final phases of the mission. In Washington, others would
"listen-in" at JPL inside the auditorium at NASA Headquarters. Lunar impact,
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Washington time, would occur at a respectable 9:25 am, and a number of
Congressmen had indicated their intention to join NASA officials and reporters on
this occasion. With James Webb on a long-delayed vacation overseas, George E.
Simpson, NASA Assistant Deputy Administrator, agreed to host this gathering on
the East Coast.
Ranger's engineers and scientists, on duty or off, got little sleep Thursday
night. By 6:00 am PDT on Friday morning, July 31, Newell, Cortright, and
Pickering had taken their places in the visitors' gallery in the Space Flight
Operations Facility. Below and in front of them, flight controllers at their consoles
monitored Ranger 7's incoming telemetry. Directly beneath them in a small
project office, Schurmeier and Rygh supervised the final events in the life of
Ranger 7. Unlike the preceding flight, the television cameras were to begin
warmup twenty minutes before impact instead of eighteen, and the period for
warmup had been halved, from three minutes to ninety seconds (Figure 85).
As Ranger 7 neared the moon, the attitude of the spacecraft with respect to
the surface was determined to be acceptable for picture taking. As before, Kuiper
advised Schurmeier that Ranger's experimenters wished nothing done to
jeopardize its chances. Schurmeier agreed; no terminal maneuver to improve
picture resolution would be attempted. At 6:07 am, George Nichols informed tense
newsmen and JPL employees packed into the auditorium that the command to
Fig. 85. Newell, Pickering, and Cortright Confer at the Flight Control Center
early on July 31, 1964
268 LUNAR IMPACT: A HISTORY OF PROJEC] RANGER
warm up Ranger's two full-scan television cameras had been radioed to the
spacecraft. Ninety seconds later he reported excitedly: full video power "strong
and clear" on the full-scan cameras. Applause erupted from the audience. In the
control center, standing behind the flight controllers with Kautz and NASA's
director of physics and astronomy programs John Naugle, Cunningham was
ecstatic. "It's too soon," Kautz warned. These pictures would be no better than the
ones obtained from earth-based telescopes. Naugle nodded, yes, wait.
They did not have long to wait. The command to warm up the four partial-
scan cameras equipped with telephoto lenses quickly followed at 6:10 am. Another
ninety seconds, and Nichols relayed the news from Goldstone: full video power
was reported on the partial-scan cameras. Inside the auditorium, applause turned
to cheers (Figure 86). Thereafter, Nichols raced to keep pace with what looked to
be burgeoning success: "Twelve minutes before impact, excellent video signals
continue... Ten minutes.., no interruption of excellent video signals. All
cameras appear to be functioning.., all recorders at Goldstone are 'go'... Seven
minutes ... all cameras continue to send excellent signals ... Five minutes from
Fig. 86. Cheering
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impact ... video signals still continue excellent. Everything is 'go,' as it has been
since launch... Three minutes.., no interruption, no trouble... Two
minutes.., all systems operating. Preliminary analysis shows pictures being
received at Goldstone... One minute to impact... Excellent... Excellent...
Signals to the end... IMPACT!" The hum of Ranger's chromatic telemetry
inside the auditorium abruptly ceased at 6:25 am PDT. The soft hiss of space static
that replaced it was drowned by the roar of approval from newsmen and
employees alike. Papers in the air; amid the shouts of many, a few openly wept.
(Figure 87). 33
At the Space Flight Operations Facility, controllers abandoned their
consoles for handshakes, backslapping, and more papers in the air. It was bedlam.
Rygh left the project booth and made his way through the jubilant throng to a
colleague, Bert Dickinson, who, probably more than anyone else, knew the
meaning of every Ranger telemetry measurement. They shook hands silently. "I
was," Rygh recalled, "emotionally choked up, and I don't get that way often."
"For Bud and Jim Burke, Gordon Kautz, and those of us who had lived Ranger
for so long, it was kind of a spiritual happening.'34 For all the Ranger leadership,
no other space flight mission at JPL would quite duplicate the sensation.
NASA and JPL project leaders soon left the net control area and adjourned
to the experimenters' room, where the elated scientists eagerly awaited delivery
Fig. 87. And Weeping
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from Goldstone of the first closeup pictures of the moon. Ranger's past trials, the
frequent differences between scientists and engineers, even institutional relation-
ships and the Congressional investigation, all were forgotten. Several cases of
champagne that Schurmeier had purchased for the flight of Ranger 6 were broken
open now, and together engineers and scientists toasted Project Ranger. Whatever
their individual feelings at that moment, they could be sure of one thing: Ranger 7
was a resounding, a crashing success. 3S.
Chapter Eighteen
KUDOS AND QUESTIONS
IDSUMMER 1964-the World's Fair in New York, lush prosperity, black
riots in Harlem and Rochester, the emerging "white backlash," an
intensifying Presidential campaign-the Republican candidate Barry Goidwater
promising to place direction of the space program largely in the hands of the
military-President Lyndon Johnson announcing the commitment of 5000 more
American advisory troops to Vietnam-and, in the middle of it all, Ranger 7: "We
had made a historical achievement," The New York Times asserted, "and
everything else for a while seemed small by comparison. ''_
NASA, the nation, and the world possessed the first closeup pictures of the
moon's surface on video tape and 35-millimeter film. This success, even more than
the first American manned orbital flights, it was widely believed, had redeemed
the country from the humiliation of Sputnik 1, and signaled its ascendence in
space exploration.
JUBILANT DAYS
Within an hour of Ranger 7's lunar impact, Newell and Pickering made
their way down the hill from the Space Flight Operations Facility to a press
conference in the JPL auditorium. At the entrance they were informed of an
important phone call--the White House was holding open a line, the President
wished to speak with them. Taking the call in a nearby office, the two men received
President Johnson's felicitations. Ranger 7, the President said, was a "magnificent
achievement." "On behalf of the whole country, I want to congratulate you and
those associated with you in NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and in the
industrial laboratories. All of you have contributed the skills to make this Ranger 7
flight the great success that it is... This is a basic step forward in our orderly
program to assemble the scientific knowledge necessary for man's trip to the
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moon. ''2 Would they, Johnson inquired, be willing to brief him on Ranger 7's
lunar findings the next day? They would indeed, he was assured.
Now joined by Project Manager Schurmeier, Pickering and Newell entered
the JPL auditorium to a standing ovation (Figure 88). "This is JPL's day, and
truly an historic occasion," Newell observed, adding, "the entire mission was a
textbook operation." "We have had our troubles," Pickering reflected, "...[but]
this is an exciting day." How did he view the Laboratory's future after the success
of Ranger 7, a newsman asked? "I think it's improved," Pickering replied with a
wide smile, evoking laughter and applause. JPL's director passed the laurels for the
success to Schurmeier and those directly involved with Ranger at JPL, NASA, and
in industry. Schurmeier, in turn, thanked Ranger's team of engineers and
scientists.
The focus of everyone's attention, however, was on Ranger's pictures, and
when they might be made available. Schurmeier tantalized the audience with hints
that the pictures were very good. All of the camera elements and ground recording
equipment had functioned perfectly. NASA and JPL officials had been in touch
with those at Goldstone who had seen polaroid contact prints, but beyond stating
Fig, 88. Newell and Pickering Shake Hands Before the Ranger 7 Pt,stflight Press Conference
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that the final pictures contained details never seen before, Schurmeier declined
further comment. Just as soon as the pictures were processed, the eager newsmen
learned, a number would be made public, it was hoped before the day was out. 3
The pleasure and jubilation were no less exuberant in Washington, where
other space agency officials, a large Congressional delegation, and reporters
listened to the proceedings from the auditorium at NASA Headquarters.
"Everyone here is happy as hell," an agency spokesman declared. NASA Assistant
Deputy Administrator George Simpson called Newell and Pickering after the press
conference to offer his own congratulations. Also on hand for the occasion, House
space committee chairman George Miller assured newsmen that Ranger 7 "puts us
well ahead of the Soviets in the exploration of space." Then, referring to the recent
Congressional investigation, he added, "I want to make it crystal clear that the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory is doing a splendid job." Elsewhere the news was the
same-and all of it was good. 4
Even as the early morning news conference proceeded at JPL, the Ranger 7
film footage was flown from Goldstone to the Hollywood-Burbank Airport. Under
guard, it was taken to nearby Consolidated Film Industries for processing. During
the next six hours positives were made from the master negatives, then duplicate
negatives from the positives. By late afternoon on July 31, the prints and slides
were rushed to the Laboratory in Pasadena. While the experimenters pored over
one set of pictures, Pickering, Newell, and members of the JPL Executive Council
examined duplicates. The crispness of detail in the later frames-exposing the lunar
surface in terms of a few meters instead of a few hundred kilometers-moved
everyone first privileged to see them. They were truly superb. Newsmen were
notified that selected pictures would be shown publicly by the experimenters in the
JPL auditorium that same evening.With the long sought lunar data in their hands,
it was the scientists' turn at center stage (Figure 89).
At 9 pm Picketing introduced the Ranger experimenters before a nationally
televised news conference. Principal investigator Gerard Kuiper opened the
presentation by explaining the magnitude of Ranger's success: "This is a great day
for science, and this is a great day for the United States," he declared. "We have
made progress in resolution of lunar detail not by a factor of 10, as [was] hoped
would be possible with this flight, nor by a factor of 100, which would have been
already very remarkable, but by a factor of 1000. "5 Kuiper proceeded to show and
discuss a representative assortment of slides from among the 4316 pictures
obtained. These cioseup pictures, he stressed, speaking as an astronomer, covered
but a limited area of the moon, making generalization difficult. However, the 1132
scan lines per frame, in contrast to the 500 or so lines found in conventional home
television sets, made the quality of Ranger's pictures "extraordinary" (Figure 90).
In the discussion period that followed, reporters peppered the experimenters with
questions. Having already had the pictures for two or three hours, the scientists
were pressed to furnish "the most significant findings" to come from them, and
asked whether one could be assured that Apollo astronauts could walk safely on
the moon's surface. Many more days of analysis remained before any formal
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Fig. 89. Experimenters Heacock, Kuiper, and Whitaker Examine Ranger 7 Pictures at the Flight
Control Center
conclusions would be advanced, Kuiper stated. All of the experimenters present
were impressed by the continuity of features from the large craters observable with
telescopes down to smaller and smaller ones. "I think the rounded features of the
large number of secondary craters are new," he added, "also their large number is
new."
As for the lunar surface, geologist Eugene Shoemaker ventured to guess, it
was "composed of debris- it is littered with debris." This material, Kuiper further
suggested in keeping with his own theory of the moon's evolution, was most likely
finely pulverized lava, of low density, although affected by a "rain of small
particles so that the upper few centimeters and maybe as much as 1/2 of a meter
would be modified by these impacts. ''6 The information gained from these
pictures, Shoemaker responded to another question, encouraged " the belief that the
moon's surface, in at least certain parts of the maria, will not represent a particular
problem [for manned landings] as far as roughness is concerned." But the actual
bearing strength, he cautioned, could not be measured without first putting
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something down on the surface. Nevertheless, the surface appeared at first look to
be compact enough to walk upon.
None of the theories concerning the moon's origin, Kuiper advised the
reporters, however, seemed to be affected by the pictorial returns from Ranger 7.
These pictures, he concluded, shed light on the evolution of the surface and its
history after the moon's formation, not on the origin of the moon itself. 7
Early the next morning, August 1, the "Redeye Special," a late evening jet
flight from the West to the East Coast, touched down in Maryland with Newell
and Pickering, who were shortly to see the President. On newsstands at the airport
the papers acclaimed Ranger 7 and its lunar pictures in superlatives--on the front
page and in editorials. Indeed, across the land, from the Seattle Post Intelligencer
to the Miami Herald, or the Boston Globe to the San Diego Union, the praise was
unanimous (Figure 91 ).s Overseas the foreign press had responded in a similar
vein, seeming to agree that the United States had at last forged ahead of the Soviet
"Howdy"
Fig. 91. "Howdy" (Courtesy Tom Little in The INashville] Tennessean)
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Union in space exploration. Even the Soviet press accorded the flight modest
plaudits, though pointing out that the U.S.S.R. had photographed the moon from a
spacecraft five years before. 9 The glowing accounts frequently heralded Ranger 7
as the greatest advance in space research since Galileo had trained his telescope on
the heavens; it was heady stuff._°
Later that morning the two space officials were ushered into the White
House Cabinet Room, where they explained for the President the Ranger 7
mission and the importance of its pictures to Project Apollo. President Johnson
learned that portions of the moon's Sea of Clouds were suitable for Apollo
landings, and that the design of the Apollo lander satisfactorily met observed
surface conditions (Figure 92). With newsmen in attendance, the President soon
queried Newell: He was satisfied with the return on the investment in Project
Ranger, was he not? Newell said he was delighted. "Elated?" Johnson prompted.
"Elated," Newell responded. Did the Ranger 7 "adventure" leave any doubts
about the wisdom of going to the moon? "Not in my mind, not at all," Newell
replied. "I would feel that we were backing down from a real challenge." He was
Fig. 92. Newcll and Picketing Brief President Johnson
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urged to continue. "We would lose leadership," Newell suggested. "In the world?"
the Chief Executive asked. "In the world," Newell averred, sustaining the
catechism. "This is a battle for real existence in the world, isn't it-for survival?"
Newell agreed that it was, and said he was now "hopeful" that Project Apollo
could proceed to a lunar landing on schedule. Responding to further questions,
Newell assured the President that Ranger 7 confirmed the planning and soundness
of America's civilian space program. "You don't expect a Congressional
investigation then?" Johnson said with a smile. _
Afterwards, an obviously pleased President addressed both men, offering
them his assessment of the progress achieved in space exploration and the thanks
of a grateful nation. "We started behind in space .... " he asserted, "[however] we
know this morning that the United States has achieved fully the leadership we
have sought for free men." Ranger, he went on, represented a weapon of peace
rather than one of military might, and "a victory for peaceful civilian
international cooperation..." Neither Newell nor Pickering was to be decorated
with medals, Johnson concluded, "but they do have, and all of their associates
from Mr. Webb down to the fellow who sweeps out the dust in the remote test
laboratory, the gratitude and the admiration of all Americans of all faiths, of all
parties, of all regions."_2
NEW INTEREST IN A NEW ERA
No longer a liability, Project Ranger had vindicated American space
policies and presaged accomplishments yet to come. A satisfied Representative
Joseph Karth, chairman of the Ranger investigating subcommittee, inserted
foreign editorial acclaim in the Congressional Record. _3 House space committee
Chairman George Miller, at a special Ranger briefing for members of the House of
Representatives on August 5, termed the mission "one of the greatest
accomplishments that NASA has ever made..." It was, he said, "really the
beginning." Addressing the legislators after Miller, Kuiper agreed that "a new era
has begun in the exploration of the moon." Ranger's pictures, he declared,
confirmed the design of the Apollo lander, indicated a smoother surface than had
been expected, and tended to discredit the "deep dust" theories of the lunar
surface. 14 That same day, NASA's long-delayed $5.3 billion appropriation for
Fiscal Year 1965 sailed through the Senate by a voice vote, while efforts to reduce
it were rebuffed 69-20 in a roll call. Senator J. William Fulbright decided against
submitting a prepared amendment to cut 10 percent of the funds earmarked for
Project Apollo, telling a reporter crisply: "The climate has changed."_s
Enthusiasm over the lunar pictures was just as pronounced at the Manned
Spacecraft Center in Houston. During the Ranger 7 mission a technical assistant at
the center had been detailed to JPL to obtain prints of any lunar pictures for
analysis by Apollo officials. But after the considerable improvement in resolution,
the quantity of pictures, and preliminary findings were announced at the
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experimenters' press conference on July 31, the Houston plans changed overnight.
Joseph F. Shea, the Apollo Spacecraft Program Director, and the Director of the
Manned Spacecraft Center Robert R. Gilruth announced that they would
personally visit JPL for a first-hand briefing by Ranger's experimenters. _6 Shea
and Gilruth subsequently informed newsmen that an Apollo landing appeared "a
lot easier than we thought." Much of the mare region photographed by Ranger 7,
Shea observed, looked "relatively benign," adding that the 0.93-meter (3-foot)
diameter pads on the legs of the Apollo lander would be able "to take hold" in
this type of terrain. _7 If previously Homer Newell's office and the project
experimenters had been left virtually alone to select Ranger's targets on the moon,
now Apollo officials claimed priority in the choice of future lunar targets for
Ranger. _
The Apollo group in the Office of Manned Space Flight at Headquarters
wanted Ranger 8, scheduled for launch in February 1965, to answer a new
question: Did lunar plains areas other than the Sea of Clouds exhibit similar,
gently undulating features where crater "rays"* were less prominent.'? Such areas
would be even more hospitable landing sites. In October, Air Force Major General
Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Deputy Director of the Apollo Program, queried Oran
Nicks on the matter. The target selected for Ranger 8 by the Office of Space
Science and Applications, he advised, "should be within the permissible Surveyor
and Apollo landing zones," and "in a ray-free marial region... ,,_9
In a letter to JPL a month later, Shea in Houston had another request: "Our
first suggestion" for targeting Ranger 8, he informed Schurmeier, "would be to
return to the impact site of Ranger 7." "Much could be deduced about the
mechanical properties of the surface from a crater produced by a known mass
traveling at a known velocity." If that were not feasible, he preferred a highland
site because "we believe the greatest gain in confidence would be achieved by
predicting and finding a poor [landing] site. ''2° The desires of the various Apollo
directorates, not to mention Ranger's own experimenters, had to be reconciled,
and for that purpose a meeting was convened on November 19 at JPL.
On the appointed date, Apollo representatives from the Manned Spacecraft
Center and the Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight joined JPL project
personnel, all five Ranger experimenters, and a contingent from Newell's office.
Schurmeier opened the proceedings, explaining that everyone's target preferences
were to be discussed; but the final list of candidate sites, he made clear, was to be
submitted by the Ranger experimenters and approved by Newell. When the
question of sites arose for discussion, the Ranger experimenters endorsed the
recommendations advanced by the Apollo group at Headquarters. Targeting
Ranger 8 in a "blue" or dark mare along the lunar equator, Gerard Kuiper
observed, should confirm the Ranger 7 findings supportive of Apollo, permit
*The ray systems photographed by Ranger 7 appeared to be largely composed of "secondary
craters" created by rocks and debris hurled outward across the lunar surface during the impacts that
made the primary craters.
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computation of the incidence of cratering in a ray-flee area, and improve
predictions of other similar regions on the moon. Shoemaker and Whitaker
concurred, as did Harold Urey, who suggested Mare Tranquillitatis as the most
likely candidate. If Kuiper's lava flows were in fact present on the moon, he added,
they should be observable here.
The representatives of the Manned Spacecraft Center conveyed word of
Shea's continued preference lbr a return to the point of impact of Ranger 7 or,
barring this possibility, aiming for a "rough" highlands site. Surveyor Project
personnel recommended sites of interest for Surveyor landings. The target
preferences of the Apollo group at Headquarters and those of Ranger's
experimenters, Schurmeier said in closing the meeting, appeared nearly identical.
Since the launch period extended from February 17 through February 24, and in
the absence of a consensus, it seemed advisable to consider a dark, ray-free area in
the early part of the launch period, and a Surveyor landing site if the launch were
delayed to the fifth or sixth day. Targets in these regions would be submitted
before Christmas to NASA Headquarters. 2L
On January 19, 1965, Newell notified George E. Mueller, Associate
Administrator for the Office of Manned Space Flight, of the Ranger 8 targets
approved by his office and NASA's Space Science Steering Committee. 22
Conforming to the recommendations discussed at JPL in November, they were:
Launch Date lunar Target Latitude Longitude
February 17 Mare Tranquiltitatis 13.5'_N 24.0°E
Feb rua ry 18 Mare Vaporum 14.5 °N t 2.0 ° E
February 19 Sinus Medii 0.5 _N 1.0°W
February 20 Secondary craters 4.0°N 15.0°W
near Copernicus
February 21 Surveyor landing 15.0 ° S 30.5°W
site No. 5
February 22 23 Crater Gassendi 18.0'_S 40.O°W
February 24 Domes near Crater Marius 12.0°N 56.0°W
Mueller responded immediately. Though in agreement with the stated
scientific objectives, he advised Newell that some of the aim points chosen for
Ranger 8 were not entirely satisfactory for the needs of Project Apollo. Latitudes
much closer to the moon's equator were preferred by the Office of Manned Space
Flight. "In light of this, 1 would like you to consider the possibility of changing to
,_23
the following targets...
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Launch Date Lunar Target Latitude Longitude
February 17 Mare Tranquillitatis 0.5°N 24.0°E
February 18 Highland region O°N 13.0°E
February 19 Sinus Medii 0.5°N 1.0°W
February 20 Mare region 1.5°N 14.5°W
February 21 Mare region 3.0°N 28.5°W
February 22-23 Ray-free mare 1.0°S 42.0°W
February 24 Oceanus Procellarunl 3.0°S 57.0°W
To Newell, Apollo's needs and wishes simply could not be denied. A few
days later he apprised Ranger's scientists and engineers of Mueller's request, and
of his decision to reconsider "targets within the proposed landing zone for the
Apollo LEM spacecraft" on February 6 at NASA Headquarters. 24 This time,
however, the meeting included Newell and Mueller, as well as Newell's science
chief John Clark, and Donald Wise of the National Academy of Sciences' Space
Science Board. The compromise list of Ranger 8 targets finally agreed upon
emphasized flat lunar areas that "are not only of interest to a better knowledge of
the moon, but provide the opportunity for observing sites in the current Apollo
landing zone: ,,25
Launch Date Lunar Target Latitude Longitude
February 17 Mare Tranquillitatis 3.0°N 24.0°E
February 18 Mare Vaporum 14.5°N 12.0°E
February 19 Sinus Medii 0 ° 1.0°W
February 20 Near Crater Gambart 4.0°N 15.0°W
February 21 Near Crater Reinhold 3.0°N 28.25°W
February 22_23 Oceanus Procellarum 3.0°S 44.0°W
February 24 Oceanus Procellarum 12.0°N 56.0°W
One week before launch, Ranger 8 had a destination. At the National
Academy of Sciences, however, Space Science Board Chairman Harry Hess and his
colleague Donald Wise viewed this targeting exercise and its outcome with alarm.
Hess wrote directly to Mueller, urging restraint in any more demands by Apollo
upon Project Ranger. 26 Ranger, Wise in turn counseled, was an unmanned
instrument that could profitably be directed to lunar regions other than flatlands:
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"It would be a great mistake to simply keep the Ranger 8 target list alive and use
[it] for Ranger 9." In the future, "for reasons both of pure science and landing
engineering," attention should be given to highland areas and the problems of
lunar "surface processes. ''27 Ranger's experimenters could no doubt agree with
Hess and Wise, even though they had begun to advance disparate conclusions
about the nature of the moon's surface.
HARD QUESTIONS FOR SPACE SCIENCE
In August 1964, Ranger's experimenters had begun assembling an atlas of
Ranger photographs and constructing their individual scientific findings. Perusing
the data as the work progressed, Kuiper marveled at the accomplishment: "To
have looked at the moon for so many years, and then to see this...it's a
tremendous experience. The whole thing was like a perfect symphony. ''28 No less
pleased for reasons of state, President Johnson announced the dispatch of Ranger
photographs to leaders of ! 10 countries on August 16, asserting that "men of all
nations recognize this as one of the greatest extensions of human knowledge about
the lunar surface to occur in many centuries. ''29 But how much the photographs
had actually contributed to Apollo or man's knowledge of the moon was now
opened to question.
On August 28, a month after Ranger 7's impact, the Interim Scientific
Results Conference convened at NASA Headquarters. _ Nicks chaired the meeting.
Ranger's experimenters, he informed newsmen, were to leave immediately for
Hamburg, there to present these scientific findings before the International
Astronomical Union. Gerard Kuiper, Eugene Shoemaker, and Ray Heacock were
on hand to discuss their results and answer questions. Harold Urey was unable to
attend because of an injury; Ray Heacock would discuss Urey's analysis. Ewen
Whitaker, already in transit to Hamburg, was also absent.
Kuiper displayed and discussed a number of slides of the moon taken both
from earth and from Ranger's full- and partial-scan cameras. He also showed a
five-minute motion picture. Composed of successive picture frames taken as the
moon rushed ever closer, the film gave the viewer the novel sensation of being
aboard the spacecraft as it plummeted to impact. Many of these pictures, Kuiper
asserted, revealed ridges and flows typical of lava fields. Geologist Shoemaker
agreed with Kuiper, and reaffirmed a prior observation benefiting Apollo. Even
though ray systems-secondary and tertiary craters-from the craters Tycho and
Copernicus criss-crossed this mare region, the lunar slopes appeared more gentle
and the surface "smoother than I dared hope. I think it is good news for manned
exploration.'3'
But Harold Urey, speaking through Ray Heacock, was not so sure that the
news was good for manned exploration or for the presence of lava flows on the
moon. To be sure, smaller and smaller ridges on the moon could be observed as
the resolution improved. What caused them, he asserted, could not be ascertained
from Ranger's pictures. Likewise, "the question of whether the lunar maria consist
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of lava or finely divided material is, in my opinion, unanswered by these pictures."
The bearing strength and depth of the surface material, certainly, could not be
determined. Earth-based measurements of the thermal conductivity of the outer
parts of the moon, he reminded the audience, contradicted predictions of a firm
and compact surface. These measurements were "very low," and could, as
postulated by Cornell astronomer Thomas Gold, be accounted for "by a soft,
spongy, fairy-castle structure for some depth.'32 The Apollo lander, the chemist
implied, could be in for trouble.
Answering questions afterwards, Kuiper and Shoemaker were pressed hard
by reporters to justify their opinions in light of Urey's skepticism. The layer of
fragmented material on the moon's surface, Kuiper maintained, would most likely
be "crunchy," as one might expect of pulverized lava, and probably no deeper
than 1.5 meters (5 feet). Shoemaker concurred, but extended the depth to a
possible 15 meters (50 feet) of compacted debris, depending upon the amount of
erosion that had occurred over time. Ranger's television experiment, he explained
again, was designed to provide information on the surface features, particularly the
roughness of these features. That much it had done, confirming the design of the
Apollo lander. The precise bearing strength of the surface remained to be
investigated by the Surveyor machines to follow Ranger (Figure 93 ).33
Science, Shoemaker concluded in response to further queries, advanced one
step at a time, and with each step new questions arose naturally in a continuous
exploratory process. "We are not going to solve the origin of the moon [even] with
Project Apollo ... And," he added for emphasis, "we will not solve the origin of
the moon with a hundred years of post-Apollo exploration." Oran Nicks
interrupted to bring an end to the conference. Other scientists around the world, he
said, would in due course have an opportunity to study these pictures and to
advance their own theories. "It is to be expected that there will be different
theories evolving from these data... That is the nature of science.-34
The International Astronomical Union meeting in Hamburg, Nicks
reported to Newell a few days later, "was truly an American show." The Ranger
photographs were the talk of the conference, and the showing of the approach
sequence film brought an ovation. Commission 16 of the Union also named the sea
photographed by Ranger 7 "Mare Cognitum," the sea that has become known, a
move greeted with approval on all sides. The Ranger papers had sparked lively
and altogether natural disagreements in the scientific discussions that followed. 35
But upon returning from Europe, Ranger's experimenters were jolted by an
article in the prestigious Saturday Review. Science editor John Lear charged that,
instead of assuring the safety of Apollo astronauts, Ranger's data confirmed the
dangers to man of ray-filled lunar maria. Scientific assertions to the contrary,
furthermore, raised the spectre of government-supported "instant science," in
which "a competent and if possible eminent scientist is captured by granting him
tax monies to finance his favorite type of experiments ... [and] he is called upon to
report findings he is not yet certain of." If he resisted this pressure, the scientist
was reminded of duty to country and science, and of the possible loss of federal
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Fig. 93. Shoemaker and Kuiper Answer Newsmen's Questions at the
Interim Scientific Results Conference
support. If the scientist complied, "his reports become the basis for more generous
appropriations by the Congress, the research he loves is supported more richly
than ever, and he may even be invited to the White House to shake the hand of the
President and answer politically loaded questions on which the future of the entire
planet is professed to hang. ''36
Whatever the political response of the President and Congress, Lear had
clearly misread announced findings favorable to Apollo landings as politically
motivated, and was unaware of past struggles simply to ensure a place for science
in Project Ranger. Though Homer Newell had encountered the Presidential
questioning, Gerard Kuiper, aroused and very irate, saw himself as the supposed
eleemosynary captive in this instance. Worse, Kuiper had granted Lear the
interview on which the article was based. In a bitter letter to Norman Cousins, the
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magazine's editor, the astronomer excoriated the interviewer, his thesis, and the
attack on federally supported science:
In the exhilarating hours after the Ranger 7 impact, I coined the
term "instant science" in a jocular fashion to imply the need for
scientists who had just received a mass of exciting new data to
come up with some reasonable comment in a short while for a first
news broadcast... I casually quoted it to Mr. Lear who, without
my knowledge, adopted it and wove it into a sinister pattern of
government-supported science, thereby completely missing the
meaning of the term... [Mr. Lear implies] that I have given him
information to the effect that scientists are under pressure to make
statements favorable to the continuance of large government
projects. This is complete fantasy. I have never myself been under
pressure from anyone in the formulation of my own recommenda-
tions and would obviously resist such pressure had it been
applied. 37
In the weeks preceding the launch of Ranger 8, doubts about the project's
value appeared more frequently in influential journals. Some commentators
misconstrued the objectives of Ranger, others found its support of Apollo to be
inconsequential: "Despite wide publicity to the contrary," The Wall Street Journal
advised readers, "it is becoming increasingly apparent that Ranger 7 and its
unprecedented closeup pictures of the moon have not yet solved the major mystery
in the way of manned landing: will the moon's soil support the space ship or
engulf it in a sea of dust? ''38 In the absence of incontrovertible findings, Ranger
7's contribution to planetary science was likewise suspect. Ranger might be "a
magnificent engineering achievement," The Christian Science Monitor asserted, but
what good were the visual data if no firm conclusions could be drawn? "The plain
fact is, three months after impact the photos themselves have added very little to
our knowledge... Scientifically ]they] rank well below the [non-visual] data
gathered by the early, less costly, space probes which revealed the Van Allen
radiation belt. ,39
Although disturbing to each of the scientific experimenters, this criticism
particularly perplexed and troubled the principal investigator, Kuiper. He
hardened the line on his own conclusions, and, seeming to make John Lear's
pontification a self-fulfilling prophesy, began a spirited public defense of the
project and of visual imaging for planetary science. With Ranger pictures in hand
at the International Conference on Earth Sciences in Boston on September 30, he
argued "with new forcefulness" that much of the lunar surface was eroded lava,
"sand-blasted" by high-speed particles from spacefl ° The adverse assessment of
the project in The Christian Science Monitor, for example, Kuiper now warned
Ranger coexperimenters privately, "points out the necessity for the scientific team
to come up with a strong and coherent Final Report, which will enable NASA to
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counter or prevent articles of this type... Clearly, the responsibility of the
scientist has increased when projects of the magnitude of Ranger are reviewed."4_
Having pushed so long and hard for a Ranger success, neither NASA, JPL,
nor the scientists, it appeared, could adequately explain exactly what that success
meant. With all other experimental instrumentation having been stripped from the
Block III machines in favor of the television cameras a few years before, Ranger
could be attacked as being of little value to science. Conversely, it could also be
faulted for failing to answer questions about the moon's surface of great interest to
Apollo. To the interested public, in fact, Project Ranger was fast falling between
the two stools: space science on the one side and Apollo support on the other.
Ranger's scientists would perforce share any fall in esteem-a prospect
Kuiper clearly found unsettling. And, like the engineer-managers before him, he
also found that tension and frayed nerves accompanied the notoriety and
excitement in projects of the magnitude of Ranger. Time remained, neverthless.
Additional closeup photographs of other lunar regions from Rangers 8 and 9 could
perhaps lend credence to one of the theories of the moon's surface and help dispel
the doubts of Ranger's worth to science and Apollo. Then again, they might
muddy the issue further.
Chapter Nineteen
THE RANGER LEGACY
S the new year began, in an open letter to The Christian Science Monitor,
Gerard Kuiper declared: "I definitely know of no better or cheaper way to get
high-resolution lunar photographs-if I did, I would propose it." Project Ranger,
he insisted, was unquestionably worth a final price tag of $270 million._ To be
sure, the solitary experiment remaining aboard the Ranger spacecraft, the visual
imaging television system, had fulfilled the lunar mission objective specified by
NASA. But the first closeup pictures had seemed to generate as much heat as they
did light. 2
ONE MORE FOR APOLLO
On January 4, 1965, NASA's Ranger 8 "buy-off" committee met in
Pasadena. The committee members found Ranger 8's test record to be "quite
clean," and they approved shipment of the spacecraft to Cape Kennedy. 3 At the
Cape during January, Ranger 8 and its Atlas-Agena launch vehicle methodically
moved through the prescribed series of prelaunch tests. The often frustrating
organizational and technical problems that had beset this process in earlier years
were gone; ground testing space flight hardware at the Cape, as at JPL, had
become routine. On February 2, NASA officials found the launch vehicle and the
spacecraft flight-ready. 4 Final tests began immediately to meet the first day of the
February lunar launch period.
As the hour of launch neared on February 17, the familiar drama was
repeated: project officials at the JPL Space Flight Operations Facility supervising
last-minute details; newsmen gathered for the occasion at the JPL auditorium;
early rising agency officials and dignitaries watching and listening from the NASA
auditorium in Washington. At 6:05 am EST, just a few minutes into the launch
window, the engines of Atlas 196D came to life. Before the cameras in a nationally
televised launch, the rocket majestically bore the 364-kilogram (808-pound)
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spacecraft moonward. Ranger 8's target was on the lunar equator in Mare
Tranquillitatis, the flatland region of prime interest to Project Apollo, and the
machine was expected to reach that destination in 65 hours.
Except for a curious drop in telemetry power during the midcourse
maneuver, Ranger 8 performed flawlessly, and its managers decided to exercise the
spacecraft completely. By a terminal maneuver at lunar encounter, the television
cameras could be pointed directly along the flight path. That would reduce the
smearing of the visual images while improving the resolution of the final closeup
pictures (Figure 94). Schurmeier and Cunningham advised the experimenters
accordingly. But the midcourse telemetry anomaly, JPL project scientist
Vrebalovich later recalled, caused "the experimenters to become engineers again,
and they decided against the terminal maneuver because it was too risky." The
project officials reluctantly agreed to the experimenters' decision. 5 Early Saturday
morning, on February 20, without any change in the attitude of Ranger 8, project
officials commanded Ranger's television cameras to warm up. Once again, as the
cameras came on and video signals began arriving at the Goldstone tracking
station, George Nichols described the rush of impending success. And again, at
1:57 am PST, lunar impact brought the Ranger audience in the JPL auditorium,
the flight control center, and in Washington to its feet with enthusiastic cheers and
applause. 6
Pickering, Schurmeier, Cunningham, and Cortright met with newsmen at a
2:30 am press conference in the JPL auditorium. It had been "a great satisfaction
to see the project go so smoothly," Pickering declared. Schurmeier noted that
Ranger 8 had landed within 24 kilometers (15 miles) of the preselected aim point
in the moon's Sea of Tranquility. "It was another textbook flight," he said. Then,
alluding to the loss of telemetry during the midcourse maneuver, he added, "Every
textbook I've read has had a few small errors." Reporters learned that Ranger's
pictures would be processed quickly, and some of them released at the
experimenters' news conference that same afternoon (Figure 95 ).7
At the experimenters' news conference Kuiper showed and discussed for
reporters a few representative pictures from among the 7137 provided by Ranger
8. The closeup pictures of Mare Tranquillitatis revealed surface features virtually
identical to those in Mare Cognitum. In fact, Kuiper observed with the last slide,
"If you did not know that this was taken with Ranger 8, you would think it was
one of the Ranger 7 pictures." The remarkable similarity between two different
lunar maria most impressed Ranger's scientists, who now supposed that "probably
all lunar maria are pretty much this way. ''8 However, there was one new
interpretation. Drawing on a supposition made by Harold Urey, the experimenters
had termed a feature appearing in many pictures from Rangers 7 and 8 "dimple
craters." This kind of crater resembled the sort of subsidence one found in the
sand of an hour-glass draining into a cavity below. Consequently, Kuiper asserted,
it could be speculated that a similar phenomenon applied in certain regions of the
lunar maria, much like collapse depressions on earth, with material dropping
beneath the surface (Figure 96 ).9
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Fig. 95. Kuiper, Heacock, and Whitaker Examine Ranger 8 Pictures at the Flight Control Center
In the brief question and answer period, newsmen asked Kuiper to explain
further the ramifications that dimple craters might be expected to have for the
safety of manned landings. These depressed areas, he responded, might be regions
of localized collapse, as often happened in lava fields. The surface itself, he
continued to maintain, probably had a bearing strength similar to rock froth,
melted and solidified in a vacuum. It should prove adequate to support manned
landings, although, he now added, it also could be "treacherous" in spots. Eugene
Shoemaker believed that dimple craters were nothing more than degraded
secondary impact craters, and that the model of a lunar surface composed of
fragmented debris had proved consistent; the similarity in fine detail especially
was "one of the most striking results" to come from Ranger 8. That could be
considered "very encouraging from the point of view of Project Apollo." But
Ranger's pictures alone, Harold Urey reiterated, could not answer these questions.
Until a Surveyor machine had made a soft landing, the actual bearing strength of
the moon's surface simply could not be determined with certainty._°
Had Ranger, therefore, "speeded the day when we know man can land on
the moon?" a reported inquired pointedly. Of course, Pickering responded;
Ranger had added "a great deal of information" about the moon. "What specific
areas of information had been added?" another quickly asked. Cortright answered
for Headquarters: "We actually didn't know whether there was any spot on the
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moon that was level enough and smooth enough for the Apollo spacecraft to
land," he stated. "On July 31 [1964] we found there was at least one [site]...
Today we know that there are at least two, and we have reason to believe that this
view ... is probably typical [of lunar maria]. The big question now is: 'is it hard
enough?' "_
The New York Times headlined this successful Ranger mission as one of
support for Apollo. _2 But what the Ranger pictures meant for man on the moon,
the Times concluded in an editorial the next day, was confirmation of uncertainties
that "strengthen still more the case for making progress slowly, without any
deadline on Project Apollo. ''_3 As for science, the experimenters' news conference
had only added to public skepticism; the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner summed
up the situation for its readers: "The Moon: Rock?... Dust?... Porous?...
Spongy?"_4 Virtually all the proponents of different lunar theories could and did
find support in the pictures. Indeed, the very close similarity of the surface detail in
the final pictures from both flights meant that no consensus was possible. Not now
at any rate.
Scientific consensus in Project Ranger was far from the mind of President
Lyndon Johnson on February 25, as he took his seat in a large conference room at
NASA Headquarters. Victorious in the November elections, his inauguration
already a warm memory, he was to be briefed on Ranger 8 and the current NASA
program (Figure 97). The former Congressional leader and prime mover of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act, Johnson was the first American President
ever to visit NASA Headquarters. Instead of summoning NASA officials to the
White House, the President explained afterwards, he had come over personally to
convey to them his sincere thanks. Their productive efforts, he said, were "an
example for all the rest of our Government and for public servants everywhere. ,,ms
Confronted with increasingly difficult demands at home and in Vietnam, the
Administration contemplated the moon and took obvious pride in the national
achievements represented by such space projects as Gemini, Mariner, and Ranger
(Figure 98). Next up was Ranger 9.
THE LAST ONE FOR SCIENCE
On February 27, 1965, one week after Ranger 8 landed on the moon,
project experimenters and officials met at JPL to select the lunar targets for Ranger
9. Ranger's capabilities and restraints for the lunar launch period of March 19 to
March 25 were first reviewed with Apollo and Surveyor representatives in
attendance, then the experimenters recommended that Ranger 9 be directed to a
lunar highlands region or other area of specific scientific interest. The Apollo
officials concurred, and suggested a landing at the edge of material ejected from a
crater in the lunar highlands. The proposals of Surveyor personnel, who hoped
that Ranger 9 might return to another mare for purposes of Surveyor landing site
selection, were overruled, t6
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Fig. 97. At Headquarters, NASA Administrator James Webb Explains Lunar Surface Model for
President Johnson and Vice-President Humphrey. Constructed From a Ranger 7 Picture. Scale Models
of an Apollo Lander and a Surveyor Machine Appear on the Surface (Courtesy World Wide Photos).
Ranger coexperimenters Heacock and Whitaker, designated to handle the
preparatory work for their colleagues, met again on March 2 to consider a set of
preliminary lunar targets. Their set emphasized large craters in the highlands.
Separate meetings with the other experimenters during the next few days produced
a firm list: 17
Launch Date Lunar Target Latitude Longitude
March 19 No agreement on a target
reached among the experimenters
March 20 No agreement on a target
reached among the experimenters
March 21 Crater Alphonsus 13.3°S 3.0°W
March 22 Crater Copernicus 10.0°N 19.5 °W
March 23 Crater Kepler 8.2°N 37.8°W
March 24-25 Schroter's Valley 24.5°N 49.0°W
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Fig. 98. "Successful Launch" (Courtesy Gene Basset, Scripps-Howard Newspapers)
When the list was submitted to Headquarters on March 10, Heacock had
already strongly urged Cunningham to accept it. The two preceding flights, he said
in a letter to the Ranger Program Chief, had made a "very valuable" contribution
to Apollo, "but this is not generally recognized or appreciated." Moreover, "two
impacts into mare areas have created a bad impression in terms of Ranger's ability
to provide useful [scientific] data." Therefore, he concluded, "it seems only
reasonable for NASA to allow the Ranger experimenters a free choice on this last
mission. From all the inputs I have received, the Crater Alphonsus would be an
almost unanimous first choice. ''_s On March 10 Nicks wholeheartedly endorsed the
targets recommended by Ranger's scientists, and Newell approved the selection a
few days later._9 Ranger 9 would fly to the lunar highlands for science-specifically,
into the Crater Alphonsus if launched on the first acceptable day of the March
period.
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But the March 21 date conflicted directly with the planned launch of the
first manned Gemini spacecraft. A precursor of Apollo, designed to test the space
rendezvous docking procedures needed for manned flight to the moon, Gemini
had priority. Gemini also required that the ground computers needed by Ranger at
Cape Kennedy be available for its use one full day before launch. Still, the Gemini
flight had already been postponed a number of times, and it might be delayed
again. In that event canceling the March launch of Ranger 9 could be a costly
mistake. On March 15 Associate Administrator Robert Seamans stayed the
Gemini launch for one day, to March 23, permitting Project Ranger a chance at a
single launch attempt on Sunday, March 21. 2o
At Cape Kennedy on March 18, Ranger 9 and its Atlas-Agena launch
vehicle moved smoothly through the final prelaunch tests. Half a world away, at
Baikonur in the Kazakhstan, U.S.S.R., two Soviet cosmonauts rocketed into space
aboard the Voskhod 2. Before descending from earth orbit the next day, one of
them, clad in a spacesuit and tethered to the spacecraft, floated in the void of space
and "successfully carried out prescribed studies and observations." In Moscow,
The New York Times reported, "a Soviet space official said 'the target now before
us is the moon, and we hope to reach it in the not too distant future.' " In
Washington, confidence in America's growing space capabilities was noticeably
shaken. 2_
Inclement weather swirled over Southern Florida, complicated launch
preparations for Ranger 9, and added further to the gloom. When the countdown
began early Sunday morning, angry clouds obscured the sky, and winds gusting to
13 meters per second (30 miles per hour) buffeted Launch Complex 12. Project
officials monitoring events from the flight control center at JPL, therefore, were
pleased to learn that the winds above the overcast were acceptable for the flight-if
only those at the surface would subside a little. The count was delayed. The winds
slackened. At 4:37 pm EST, as the launch window neared its close, the countdown
for the last Ranger mission concluded. The low-scudding overcast absorbed the
clouds of steam and smoke as Atlas 204D, Agena B 6007, and Ranger 9 rose
above the Cape and were quickly lost to view.
In the bright sunlight above the clouds, the Atlas-Agena performed
perfectly. Injected on its lunar trajectory, Ranger 9 moved irresistibly toward the
moon and the Crater Alphonsus. Named after a 13th-century king of Castile and
patron of astronomers, the 112-kilometer (70-mile) wide crater was of particular
scientific interest because its large central peak appeared to contain evidence of
vulcanism. In 1957 Dinsmore Alter, the Director of the Griffith Park Observatory,
had reported sighting fluorescent gas inside the crater, and a year later the Soviet
astronomer Nikolay Kozyrev had succeeded in obtaining spectrographs of these
emissions. Shortly after Project Ranger began, Urey had urged Newell to consider
Alphonsus a lunar target of moment for this very reason. 22 Any overt plutonic
activity inside the crater was likely to be revealed in closeup pictures.
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On Monday, March 22, Ranger 9 successfully completed the midcourse
maneuver and was correctly aimed into the crater Alphonsus. Other engineers and
scientists at JPL, meantime, finished modifying a Surveyor "electronic scan
converter" for use in Project Ranger. A last-minute idea agreed to by the
experimenters, this device could accommodate Ranger's pictures for broadcast on
commercial television across North America. It consisted essentially of two sets of
television vidicon tubes facing each other. One set read the images appearing on
its opposite number, effectively converting the lines per frame received from
Ranger's cameras into conventional numbers of lines per frame. When Ranger 9
approached the moon early Wednesday morning, March 24, the scan converter
was installed and checked out at the JPL Space Flight Operations Facility. 23
For this mission, Ranger's experimenters had also agreed to a terminal
maneuver to improve the resolution of the pictures. One half hour before impact,
at 5:31 am PST, Ranger 9 executed the coded maneuver commands transmitted
earlier from Goldstone. The spacecraft completed the necessary pitch and yaw
movements, repositioned its high-gain antenna- once again pointed towards
earth-and assumed the terminal orientation desired for picture taking. In von
Karman auditorium at JPL, Ranger coexperimenter Heacock took his place in the
broadcast booth to describe the pictorial events to the watching nation. At 5:48 am
PST, twenty minutes before impact, Ranger's television cameras were warmed up.
Moments later Goldstone announced the receipt of video signals. At the same time
pictures selected from among those being taken on Ranger's two full-scan cameras
filled television screens in the JPL auditorium and around the country. During the
next eighteen minutes Heacock described the prominent lunar features that sprang
into view as the spacecraft plummeted into the Crater Alphonsus. The
transmissions ceased at 6:08 am, when Ranger 9 crashed beside the 1050-meter
(3500-foot) high central peak within the crater (Figure 99). 24
Afterwards, Heacock made his way as best he could through excited and
inquiring newsmen to join his colleagues in the Space Flight Operations Facility.
In the net control area, Ranger flight operations personnel and engineers had
already left their consoles and were shaking hands and offering each other
congratulations. Although their pleasure in the moment was undeniable, the mood
was subdued. For them, Project Ranger had ended. 2-_
At the following news conference, Nicks read from Silverstein's guideline
letter that had established Project Ranger on December 21, 1959. The letter
prominently listed closeup photography of the lunar surface among the
experiments then planned for this unmanned scientific flight project, and that
objective had been met. But, Nicks told the newsmen: "What you couldn't see and
what we couldn't see in the beginning were some of the other things that Ranger
would do. It was not in the guideline letter, for example, that Ranger should
provide the capability for doing Mariner 2 to Venus [1962] in a very short time. It
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Fig. 99. Urey, Whitaker, and Shoemaker. in Foreground, Watch Ranger 9 Pictures "Live" at the
Flight Control Center
wasn't in the letter that Mariner 4 [1964], which is now on its way to Mars, would
be a direct descendant of Ranger and use much of its technology. It also wasn't in
the letter that Ranger should develop the attitude control system, the tracking
capability, the midcourse maneuver system, and the TV advancements which are
so obvious today." Pickering added his own thoughts to those already expressed:
"The project we reflect on today has been a long and difficult road since 1959. We
had our problems in the early days...[but] the achievements of the last three flights
have shown that Ranger [could] carry out these deep space missions under remote
command, that Ranger has indeed demonstrated the soundness of the basic system
design, and that the closeup photographs...have opened a new field of the
exploration of the moon. ''z6 Most could agree with these observations-including
Earl Hilburn, whose congratulatory telegram was to be found among others fast
arriving at the Laboratory, hailing the successful completion of the project. 27
The Ranger 9 pictures, Kuiper informed newsmen at the experimenters'
press conference later that same day, held no surprises for science (Figure 100). To
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Fig. 100. Urey, Kuiper, and Shoemaker Confer Before Ranger 9
Experimenters' Press Conference
be sure, dark "halo craters" on the floor of Alphonsus appeared of volcanic origin,
but besides that, and the similarity of other surface features to those in the lunar
maria, little else novel or unusual had appeared. Urey now agreed with his
colleagues on one point. The dark halo craters probably were "due to some sort of
plutonic activity beneath the surface," although he doubted their precise
counterparts existed on earth. But, he added, evoking laughter, until more chemists
were brought into the program, newsmen should not expect Ranger's experiment-
ers to achieve "any reasonable interpretation [of the surface] that we can agree on
(Figure 101 ).,28
Withal, the "live" television coverage of Alphonsus was popularly judged
Ranger 9's most impressive accomplishment. 29 Everyone in North America with
access to a television set had been able to watch the event and, as if holding a
visual subscription to the National Geographic, experience firsthand the thrill of
exploring the unknown. Relenting somewhat of its earlier opinion, The Christian
Science Monitor offered "awed congratulations to all those involved in giving the
public-'live,' in 'real time'-the sequence of pictures sent back by Ranger."
"High and historic drama," The New York Times added, terming the mission
"astronomy for the masses," and "the finest type of space research at this stage of
history."-_° The people had participated, though the meaning and the medium of
the experience remained scrambled. One local correspondent said it succinctly:
"For most of us the pictures didn't took like much, but the mere fact of seeing
them gave us a front row seat on science."3_
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President Johnson watched on a television set at the White House. Ranger
9, and the manned Gemini spacecraft launched successfully for a three-orbit
mission around the world during Ranger's flight to the moon, assuaged much of
the concern generated by the "spacewalking" Russian a week before. After the
impact inside Alphonsus, the President issued a public statement exuding fresh
confidence: "Ranger 9 showed the world further evidence of the dramatic
accomplishments of the United States space team ... Steps toward manned flight
to the moon have become rapid and coordinated strides, as manned space
maneuvers of one day are followed by detailed pictures of the moon on the next
(Figure 102). ''32 Called to the White House forthwith, James Webb briefed
President Johnson and the members of his Cabinet on Ranger's photographs and
their implications for Project Apollo. 33
On Friday, March 26, Schurmeier joined Seamans and Gemini astronauts
Grissom and Young at the White House. There, in special ceremonies presided
Ranger 9 Touch
\
Fig. 102. "Ranger 9 Touch" (Courtesy Tom Litlle in The [Nashville] Tennessean)
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over by the President, the four men were honored for their contributions to the
exploration of space. Webb unreservedly lauded Schurmeier's courage and
competence (Figure 103). Memories of past trauma, of Ranger 6 and its
aftermath, rose to mind. Hardly twelve months before Schurmeier had wondered if
the project would survive. Now, surrounded by throngs of cameramen and
reporters, decorated with NASA's Exceptional Scientific Achievement Medal, he
was acclaimed a hero.
RANGER: AN ANALYSIS
However much credit he deserved, Schurmeier would have been the first to
admit that he had benefited considerably from what the Ranger Project had forced
NASA, JPL, and leading space scientists to learn since Pickering had first urged
U.S. lunar flights in response to Sputnik. Prompted perhaps by the need for
caution in dealing with the U.S. Air Force, the service that possessed large launch
vehicles when Ranger began, and by a desire to maintain more control at
Headquarters, NASA leaders had at first attempted to manage Ranger through
committees, coordination boards, and other anemic administrative devices.
Experience soon drove home the point that project management had to be
delegated to a project manager at the pertinent field center, JPL. Experience also
made clear the advantages of bringing together agency scientists and engineers
both at Headquarters and in the field laboratory. And experience pushed NASA to
Fig. 103. Whitc House Awards Ceremony. Left to Right: Vice-President Humphrey, Ranger
Project Manager Schurmeier, President Johnson, NASA Administrator Webb
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extract from the Air Force the authority for the Ranger Project manager to direct
all of the work. 34
The first project manager, James Burke, did a good deal to point up the
meaning of the early experience for the NASA leadership. At first recognized only
as the spacecraft manager, he fought the battles for a hierarchically structured
project organization, sensible procedures for launch vehicle procurement and
launch operations, the chance to serve a single master at NASA-manned or
unmanned-and for the rights of the project manager and the experimenters. For a
considerable time, Burke also had his battles within JPL itself. Following
traditional JPL practice, the leaders of the Laboratory attempted to direct Ranger
through a small project office supported by an array of longstanding technical
divisions. The post-Ranger 5 investigations proved that this organizational form-
where technicians report to two bosses-tended to produce hard administrative and
technical problems for the project. Well-established JPL division chiefs, busy
tidying up details on the Sergeant missile program, tended to respond cautiously
rather than promptly to the first project manager.
Had Burke been more forceful and demanding, perhaps he could have made
the early Rangers work. He did occupy himself considerably with trying to carve
out an appropriate area of authority. The cost included having to delegate
spacecraft details to the Systems Division, where many of them were attended to
improperly. But Burke, youthful and informal, having never even headed a JPL
technical division, could not easily make headway against the established chiefs at
the Laboratory, not at least without decidedly more support from Pickering. It took
the post-Ranger 5 pressures from NASA Headquarters to curtail the autonomy of
the technical divisions and to centralize functions to assure quality and reliability
in the project. 35
Whatever Burke's lack of authority, he shared the tendency of JPL officials
to apply their experience in the Army missile program to the challenges of space
research. They did not embrace the cavalier "shoot-and-hope" approach of which
they were accused, but they did count on a sound design rather than on extensive
ground tests to guarantee spacecraft reliability. Actual "shakedown" flights were
expected to provide data on aspects of the spacecraft performance that could
otherwise be obtained only in elaborate ground test facilities. On the early Rangers
this tendency was reinforced because special test facilities for such spacecraft had
yet to be built when the space program began. But the erroneous weight limitation
crippled the original lunar spacecraft design, and heat sterilization of major
components compromised its performance. Flight failures resulted from coupling
all these difficulties with a hell-bent-for-leather approach to beat the Russians.
The desire to beat the Russians while minimizing costs clearly influenced
Burke and other JPL leaders to hold schedules inviolate, freeze the design of the
Block II lunar machines at the erroneous weight limit, and drop redundant
engineering features. Most NASA officials, for their part, countenanced, even
encouraged the headlong rush to demonstrate American technical supremacy.
Though the performance of the Block II seismometer capsule subsystem might be
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questionable and evidence of the undesirable effects of heat sterilization of
components mounting, they too approved launching on schedule. Homer Newell
summed up the urgency that moved scientists and engineers alike:
During the early years of NASA there was great pressure to catch
up with and excel over the Soviets. This was perhaps best typified
by Keith Glennan's instruction...that we should conduct ourselves
and our programs as if we were at war and intended to win it.
While this was never written down, we heard it, believed it, and
endeavored to carry it out. 36
The haste engendered by the "space race" syndrome was accentuated by
the ambitions of Burke and his engineering colleagues at JPL to build a planetary,
not merely a lunar spacecraft. Launches to the moon could be made monthly; to
the planets at much less frequent intervals. "We consciously set out to accustom
our people to meet fixed launch schedules in NASA's deep space program," Burke
recalled. "Celestial mechanics fixed the schedules. We knew we couldn't afford the
delays that the earth satellite projects often claimed." Of course, attempting to
make Ranger a planetary rather than a simpler lunar machine entailed high risks,
but the early Ranger was conceived and authorized as a fast-paced, high-risk
undertaking. The risks might not have been so great, it must be said, had Burke
not had to accommodate a number of space science experiments at the same time
that his engineers were attempting a radical advance in spacecraft technology.
Space scientists tended at first not to appreciate the requirements of the
engineering task, and their lack of appreciation seemed to have been mirrored
consistently in the NASA office of Newell and Nicks, who failed to perceive the
soundness of Burke's protests until Ranger was on the verge of disaster. The
unrestrained competition for the scarce commodities of spacecraft weight, space,
and power nearly brought down the project.
Burke knew the risks, accepted them-and paid the price. But he had the
satisfaction of staying on to see Ranger become the success he had always believed
it could be. The things for which he struggled-straightforward, unchanging
project objectives, experiments that could not be altered at a scientist's whim,
recognized authority and responsibility in and from all the agencies participating-
Burke won all these in defeat. NASA and JPL leaders granted all of them to his
successor, Schurmeier, who, with new test facilities and procedures, used them
skillfully to the advantage of Ranger.
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Ranger was accounted to have cost $267 million, 37 and observers wonder
whether the project was worth the time, the money, and the careers it claimed.
Perhaps not for sky scientists, whose experiments were left out of all but the ill-
fated Block I flights. Perhaps not, it seemed at the time, even for planetary
scientists. The lunar photographs supplied no decisive evidence about the
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formation, structure, or strength of the lunar surface. "Ranger's pictures are like
mirrors," the planetary scientist Thomas Gold mused after the flight of Ranger 9,
"and everyone sees his own theories reflected in them. ''3s So indecisive a scientific
outcome had virtually been ensured by the redirection of Project Ranger to serve
Apollo, the eventual elimination of all experiments save the television cameras
and, with the cancellation of Ranger Block V, of any nonvisual experiments to
probe the moon's surface composition and structure. 39
But, along with besting the Soviet Union in sending back to earth the first
television pictures of the lunar surface, Ranger had eliminated any doubts about
the adequacy of the design for the Apollo lander. It had also taught many space
scientists that in space exploration, engineering would often have to come first.
Homer Newell, Mr. Science at NASA, had learned that lesson and now patiently
explained to scientists and Congressmen alike the knowledge to be won from the
spectacular engineering task of Apollo. Who first stepped on the moon, he insisted,
was not the issue; the individuals could stay but a short time. The scientific
instruments they would use, those they would leave behind on the surface, and the
soil samples they would retrieve would all yield rich scientific dividends. He was,
as events were to prove, absolutely right.
No less important, the Ranger project itself had already quickened the pace
of planetary science. It had helped the research preferences of planetary scientists
assume a preeminent place in the councils of space science. It had made visual
imaging a basic exploratory tool of planetary science, an accepted antecedent to
the planning of further experiments. 4° Ranger's pictures themselves provided
detailed lunar maps and the means to construct three-dimensional lunar surface
models. Scientists observed for the first time craters from one meter to a few
hundred meters in diameter, and, from the makeup of the moonscape, deduced
evidence of vulcanism. The steady-state distribution of small craters was also
discovered, and detailed evidence was first observed for the aging and evolution of
individual craters and other surface features as a result of repetitive bombardment
of the lunar surface by solid particles. 4t In all, the television pictures acquired by
Rangers 7, 8, and 9 created the foundation of a provocative new discipline-the
science of the lunar regolith-the study of the fragmented debris that makes up the
moon's surface.
In Project Ranger, the Deep Space Network generated tracking data that
improved knowledge of the mass of the moon by an order of magnitude. From
these same data scientists found the radius of the moon to be 3 kilometers less than
the previously accepted value, and they discovered an offset between the
geometrical center of the moon and its center of mass-a discovery with profound
implications for understanding the lunar interior. 42 Kuiper correctly remarked
after the flight of Ranger 7 that lunar exploration had entered a new era; the
project had transformed the centuries-old study of the moon from subtle conjecture
to an experimental science.
Perhaps more than any other flight project, Ranger proved the technologies
and the designs for the automatic machines NASA would use for deep space
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exploration: attitude stabilization on three axes, onboard computer and sequencer,
directional scientific observations, midcourse trajectory and terminal maneuver
capability, and steerable high-gain antenna. With Ranger, NASA's Deep Space
Network perfected the two-way doppler tracking and communications system,
including the means to measure the velocity between the spacecraft and tracking
stations-the key to accurate trajectory computation. Television camera improve-
ments, such as fast erasing and shuttering technology, became available to other
projects. Ranger also broke new technical ground for NASA by using the Atlas-
Agena B launch vehicle, by the parking orbit technique, and, less happily perhaps,
by heat sterilizing spacecraft components. 43
In 1965 NASA officials also liked to claim that Ranger might possibly
benefit the commercial and scientific market places. *_ Knowledge gained in
building the impact-limiter capsule, they suggested, could be transferred and
adapted to deliver sensitive instruments for earth exploration, airdrop supplies to
disaster victims, and improve collision-proofing of vehicles and the packaging of
parcels. By 1976, only one case of such uses was known-the modification of
Ranger's single-axis seismometer and its capsule to function in earth gravity and
at various pressures, which has served the University of California's Institute of
Geophysics and Planetary Physics at La Jolla well for 13 years of seismological
observations on the ocean bottom, in midwater, and on land. 45 But however
strained NASA's suggestions of possible spinoffs, image enhancement through
digital computer processing was a decidedly impressive gift from Ranger to
commercial applications. This process removed spurious noise received with
Ranger's picture signal and enhanced contrasts in the photographs of the lunar
surface by shifting the mean intensity level and expanding it to cover the full range
of the gray scale from black to white. *s The technique profoundly affected diverse
disciplines including astronomy, lunar cartography, medicine, commercial
communications, and microspectroscopy. When applied to enhance X-ray
photographs, it was selected by Industrial Research Incorporated as the single most
important technical innovation of 1967 (Figure 104). 47
And Ranger repaid more than pictures and hardware. It taught the chief
participants, scientists and engineers alike, what demands could and could not be
compromised among those of schedule, performance, and costs. It taught them the
importance of hardware testing, and how to integrate scientific experiments into
flight projects. The development of the spacecraft, communications network, and
managerial techniques combined to make Ranger an essential prerequisite to the
nation's future instrumented exploration of the deep reaches of outer space.
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SOURCES
Instrumented space exploration has just begun. Few bibliographic aids to
historical research in this field have been published, and the bulk of the primary
source material resides, unevenly indexed, in the archives and retired records of
the responsible agencies.* In pursuing research for Ranger, 1 examined material at
various locations. The NASA History Office Archives in Washington contained
selected correspondence from a number of NASA offices, as well as special studies,
minutes of meetings, surveys, and planning documents. Correspondence and other
documents pertaining exclusively to Ranger, NASA relations with Caltech-JPL,
and space science activities were found in the retired records of the NASA offices
at the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. The minutes and correspon-
dence of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) are in the custody of
the National Science Foundation but housed for the most part in the National
Archives in Washington. Regrettably, many of the PSAC documents are still
classified, making them exceedingly difficult to view, much less to copy.
The retired records of the Project Office, Lunar Program Office, and the
Director's Office at JPL, and in certain instances the minutes of the Caltech Board
of Trustees at Caltech, yielded the information on the contractor's activity in
Project Ranger. Financial data were obtained in contemporary progress reports
and other material from the JPL project office and the NASA Financial
Management Division. A few of the NASA and JPL Ranger records, particularly
the investigative reports, remained classified when the research began; all of them,
however, had been declassified by the time the manuscript was completed.
*These documents at NASA and JPL are open to the accredited scholar. In April 1976 the NASA
History Officc published a useful directory, Research in NASA Histoo,. A Guide,'that is available on
request.
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Besides archival collections of paper and microfilm, personal interviews and
movie films added insight and helped me comprehend the Ranger era. I taped and
transcribed virtually all interviews. The person interviewed received a copy of the
transcript, and was encouraged to correct and amplify the text. NASA officials
answering questions prepared mostly beforehand were James Webb, Robert
Seamans, Homer Newell, Edgar Cortright, Oran Nicks, William Cunningham, and
Walter Jakobowski; those interviewed at Caltech and JPL were Lee DuBridge,
John Hunt, William Pickering, Alvin Luedecke, Clifford Cummings, James Burke,
Harris Schurmeier, Gordon Kautz, and Allen Wolfe.
As each person interviewed saw Ranger from a different level and
perspective, each contributed to my understanding of the project and its place in a
much larger, ongoing NASA program. I sensed what might be termed "purposeful
reticence" on only a few occasions; I was impressed generally with the candor of
the answers and the willingness of those interviewed to discuss issues that had once
stirred institutional sensitivities and anguish. Movie film, existing in the form of
JPL lunar and planetary program progress reports and postimpact news
conferences, also proved helpful. Though sometimes encumbered by a sanguine
sound track, they transported me back in time to view fabrication and test
procedures and meet some of the principals around the machinery and in the
facilities of the day.
Published sources used for the history of Ranger included commercial
books, trade and professional journals, government publications, and newspaper
articles. For the space sciences, J. Tuzo Wilson, IG Y, The Year of the New Moons
(1961); Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown (1961); Patrick Hughes, A
Century of Weather Service (1970); Homer Newell, High Altitude Rocket Research
( 1953); Lloyd Berkner and Hugh Odishaw, eds., Science in Space ( 1961 ); Samuel
Glasstone, Sourcebook on the Space Sciences (1965); Wiimot Hess, ed.,
Introduction to Space Science (1965); and Robert Jastrow, Red Giants and White
Dwarfs (1967), proved most illuminating. On the politics of research and space
exploration, I found J. J. Penick, Jr., et al., eds., The Politics of American Science
( 1965); Daniel Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science ( 1967); Jerome Weisner,
Where Science and Politics Meet (1965); Vernon van Dyke, Pride and Power
(1964); and John Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon (1970), especially
useful.
Surveying the creation of NASA and the midcentury state of missile and
space technology, I consulted Alison Griffith, The National Aeronautics and Space
Act: A Study of the Development of Public Policy (1962); Robert Rosholt, An
Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (1966); Herbert York, Race to
Oblivion (1970); Constance Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard." A History
(1971); Eugene Emme, ed., The History of Rocket Technology (1964); Michael
Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation (1969); and John Medaris with
Arthur Gordon, Countdown for Decision (1960). The trade publications,
professional journals, and colloquia used most often for this study included
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Missiles and Rockets, Astronautics, Journal of
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the British Interplanetary Society, Science, Journal of Geophysical Research,
Proceedings of the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium (1958-1961),
Annals of the International Geophysical Year (1959), and the science sections of
Time and Saturday Review.
Government publications proved indispensable. Congressional committee
and subcommittee reports for the annual NASA authorization and appropriation
hearings, as well as special studies, and investigative proceedings and findings,
recorded how the space agency and JPL, Ranger, and the space science program
fared in Congress. In the Executive Branch, special reports like A Statement by the
President and Introduction to Outer Space (March 6, 1958 ), Report to the President-
Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space (January 1 !, 1961 ), and PSAC, Report of
the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-In-Space (November 14, 1960), suggested preferred
directions for space research. Government-solicited opinion of private consultants,
such as that of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, in A
Review of Space Research, Publication 1079 (1962), and Space Research:
Directions for the Future, Publication 1403 (1966), improved on this knowledge.
The Report to the Congress from the President of the United States, U.S. Aeronautics
and Space Activities (1959-1965) reviewed annually the progress of and plans for
the nation's space program. Various NASA publications, the semiannual reports to
Congress (1959-1965) and Significant Achievements in Space Science 1965, SP-
136 (1967), also proved helpful. The annual NASA chronologies, Astronautics and
Aeronautics, provided rapid and valuable reference to the forces operating within
and upon the space agency.
Contemporary newspaper accounts, though sometimes at odds with the
primary records, often captured the drama and excitement of a moment, or shed
light on the motives and perceptions of Ranger's participants. For this purpose I
most often used The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post,
and local papers in Los Angeles and Pasadena. I also examined personal narratives
covering JPL activities prior to the Laboratory's association with NASA;*
regrettably, however, none that deal with the Ranger era exist. It is to be hoped
that Keith Glennan, James Webb, Homer Newell, Lee DuBridge, William
Pickering, and other NASA, JPL, and Caltech officials will consider writing their
memoirs in the near future.
Except for some of the published secondary sources, all documents used in
this history, wherever procured, were catalogued and entered by number in the
JPL History Office archives. This number appears in parentheses at the end of each
citation.
*Viz.. Theodore von Karman with Lec Edson, The Wind and Beyond (1967); Frank Malina, "The
Rocket Pioneers: Memoirs of the Infant Days of Rocketry at Caltech." Engineering and Science,
February 1968; "Origins and First Decade of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory," in Eugene Emme, ed.,
The History of Rocket Technology (1964); "America's First Long-Range Missile and Space
Exploration Program: The ORDCIT Project of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1943 1946,"
Spaceflight, December 1973; and William Pickering with James Wilson, "Countdown to Space
Exploration: A Memoir of _he Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1944 1958,'" a_ reprinted in Lab-Oratory,
1975/4.
Appendix A
LUNAR THEORY BEFORE 1964

The moon has long been a natural subject of inquiry. It is our closest
celestial neighbor, and, next to the sun, the most prominent of heavenly objects
viewed from earth. But the urge to examine the moon firsthand is heightened by
other conditions. Although the moon is one of thirty-two known satellites that
circle about the planets in our solar system, and other satellites are more massive,
the moon is unique among them: it obtains an orbital angular momentum about
the earth that exceeds the earth's rotational angular momentum, and no other
planet possesses a satellite whose mass is so great a fraction of the mass of the
primary body. One-quarter the size of the earth, the moon has one-eightieth as
much mass, and possesses one-sixth the gravity of the earth. It rotates and revolves
around the earth in equal periods, in a nearly circular orbit at a distance of
approximately a quarter million miles, and on a plane inclined 5 degrees to the
plane of the elliptic. Three principal theories have attempted to connect these
intriguing conditions and explain the moon's origin.
The oldest hypothesis postulated a binary earth and moon system in which
the two planets condensed from a single mass of interstellar gas and dust. This
process of formation implied a similar chemical and physical constitution, and
early in this century most scientists abandoned the idea because the relatively large
size of the moon did not correspond to the difference in density between the two
bodies, or to other important dynamical considerations. In 1954 Gerard Kuiper
modified and revived this theory._ He held that the earth and moon originated as a
double planet within a common gaseous envelope, and, since the heat generated by
the decay of radioactive elements had been much greater early in the life of the
solar system, the moon had undergone some internal melting, likely had a small
iron core, and had swept up dust and debris remaining near the earth afterwards.
Before Kuiper revived the double planet thesis, George Darwin, son of the
famous British naturalist, had in 1878 advanced an attractive alternative. Drawing
on the pronounced tidal effects exerted between the earth and moon, Darwin
speculated that the moon's mass had been ejected from a fluid and rapidly
spinning protoearth when centrifugal force and solar tides, acting on matter in the
earth's equatorial plane, exceeded the force of gravity. In time, the moon moved
out to its present orbit and attained its coincident period of rotation and revolution
as a result of tidal interactions between the two bodies. 2 In 1892 the Rev. Osmond
Fisher suggested that the Pacific Basin marked the point of this separation, and
that this material, having been drawn from the earth's mantle, explained the lower
density of the moon. 3 The hypothesis, however, could not satisfactorily explain the
cause for the moon's orbit at an inclination to the earth's equator. In 1930,
moreover, Harold Jeffreys mathematically demonstrated that, given the earth's
internal friction, damping of the required excessive tidal bulge would take place,
preventing any separation of material. 4
In the 1950s Harold Urey and Horst Gerstenkorn developed a third theory
that rapidly gained wide acceptance. They proposed that the moon had accreted
from gas and dust elsewhere in the solar system, was later captured by the earth at
a close distance, and then moved out to its present radius from the radius of first
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capture. 5 More plausible than the Darwinian postulate, this theory also held the
moon to be a primary body in the solar system, rather than a chunk of the earth's
mantle, and it attracted many planetologists who hoped to find undisturbed on the
moon clues to the formation of the solar system. Nevertheless, proponents of the
capture model faced unresolved time-scale questions relating to the moon's present
location and its gradual recession from the earth when contrasted with the
proposed time and manner of its acquisition. Grove Karl Gilbert and Alfred
Wegener, 6 and more recently Gordon MacDonald and others, suggested that the
capture process involved a number of smaller moons, and that the orbital elements
of the system changed at a rate proportional to the mass of the protomoons.
Ultimately the largest moon increased in mass and moved outward as it swept up
the smaller moonlets around the earth. 7
Each of the preceding theories postulated an overall structure of our satellite
that was hot-concentric and similar in form (though probably not in proportion)
to that of the earth, or warm-essentially undifferentiated, or cold-partially
heterogeneous but not layered. Corresponding scientific interest in surface
morphology, reflecting one or another of these viewpoints, likewise led to differing
explanations of the moon's features.
The most pronounced features on the visible sunbaked face of the moon
consist of the great circular ringed maria, or lunar plains, clustered about and to
the north of the lunar equator, and the intensely cratered ancient highlands to the
south. Craters of varying sizes are everywhere in evidence. In addition, crater rays
or streak systems can be seen associated with such major craters as Tycho and
Copernicus, radiating out in all directions across the surface. Secondary features
that appear under increased optical resolution include meandering cracks or
valleys known as rilles, domical structures, and various wrinkle-ridges in the plains
regions (frontispiece).
Two hypotheses sought to explain these conditions. The first, generally
accepted for many years, accorded plutonic processes a central role. _ Internal
vulcanism, it was argued, shaped the twisted surface, formed calderas, and filled
the lunar plains with darkened ash or lava flows. The second theory, first
considered by Robert Hooke in 1665, credited meteoric impact as the principal
agent responsible for sculpturing the surface morphology. Hooke conducted
experiments with a mixture of pipe clay and water into which he dropped musket
balls to form impact craters. But meteoric craters remained virtually unknown in
contemporary terrestrial experience, and the impact hypothesis did not prevail.
In the 19th century, several years after Darwin proposed his origin of the
moon, Grove Karl Gilbert reevaluated the impact hypothesis. Gilbert, the Chief
Geologist of the United States Geological Survey, observed in 1892 that lunar
craters simply did not conform in physical characteristics or in sheer numbers to
terrestrial volcanic craters, and he reasoned that the moon's primary features,
including the extensive maria, must be accounted for by impact cratering. 9 Alfred
Wegener in 1921 "_and L. J. Spencer in 1932 and 1933 _ performed more detailed
comparative studies that lent increased support to the impact thesis. These efforts
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culminated in the work of the industrialist-astronomer Ralph Baldwin in the
1940s._2 Baldwin demonstrated conclusively that not only do lunar craters bear
little or no physical resemblance to volcanic craters, but most lunar crater
diameters as a function of their depth correspond closely to those of known
terrestrial meteoric craters and artificial craters formed by explosive charges. Many
proponents of the Baldwin thesis also believed that the material of the mare plains,
rather than volcanic ash or magma, would be found largely composed of eroded
dust. _ Whatever the composition of the lunar soil, by 1960 the impact thesis was
generally accepted among planetary astronomers and geophysicists as describing
the primary process that shaped the lunar surface.
Beyond scientific advocacy purporting to explain the history of the moon
and its surface features, a secondary current of interest eddied about the possible
existence of life forms on the moon. This question, first seriously discussed after the
advent of the telescope in the 17th century, found scientific opinion favorably
disposed to the proposition. Some, such as Giovanni Riccioli, maintained,
however, that the inhospitable environment-the apparent absence of water and
any noticeable atmosphere-precluded higher life forms; he contended forcefully
that the moon must resemble an arid desert. Sentiment in favor of sentient life on
the moon, nevertheless, continued among authorities well into the 19th century. In
1780, for example, Sir William Herschel directed a communication to the fourth
Astronomer Royal, Nevil Maskelyne, asserting that "there is almost an absolute
certainty of the moon's being inhabited... ''t4 The Director of the Vienna
Astronomical Observatory, J. von Littrow, proposed in 1830 to establish
communications with Selenites on the moon by constructing large geometric
symbols on the Siberian steppes. _5
Opinion disposed to intelligent life on the moon began to ebb after the
"Great Moon Hoax" of 1835, _e and reversed completely in 1837 with the
publication of the definitive selenographic study Der Mond by Beer and Madler.
But speculation concerning possible life forms, if not on the order of "reasoning
Selenites" at least at a lower organic level, continued intermittently. In 1876 the
British astronomer Edmund Neilson attempted to establish that the moon did in
fact possess an atmosphere of sufficient density to support life. _7And in 1924 W.
H. Pickering, a Harvard College Observatory astronomer, reported observing
possible flora and fauna._S
When space exploration began in the 1950s, scientific thinking generally
concurred that organic matter probably was not present on the moon's surface,
though it might possibly be found as spores in certain protected locations. Perhaps
it could exist below the surface-a residue of some prehistoric period when the
moon possessed a reducing atmosphere or was contaminated by material from the
earth. The moon, after all, had acted as a gravitational trap for meteoroidal
material accumulated from space over many eons. Detection of terrestrial-like
organisms, for instance, would furnish strong support for the hypothesis of
panspermia-that reproductive bodies of living organisms exist throughout the
universe and develop wherever an environment is favorable. Opinion held, in any
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case, that care should be exercised not to introduce organisms from the earth that
might accompany man-made instruments sent to the moon, and thus spoil a major
scientific opportunity to discover and examine extraterrestrial life._9 By the same
token, assuming that lunar organisms might exist, Apollo astronauts returning
from the moon would have to be quarantined to prevent "back contamination" of
the earth.
The closeup pictures of the moon taken by Rangers 7, 8, and 9 could be and
were appropriated to support each of the theories of the surface morphology,
sharply escalating the scientific debate. It remained for other unmanned and
manned lunar missions in the 1960s and 1970s to furnish tentative answers to
many of these questions and settle the issue of life on the moon. Many more years
and more missions will be necessary before a firm explanation of the moon's
history is at hand. 2°
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SPACECRAFT TECHNICAL DETAILS
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Appendix E
BLOCK III VISUAL SCIENCE:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

The impacting lunar television investigation with Dr. Gerard Kuiper as
Principal Investigator has been selected by the Director of the Office of Space
Sciences as the scientific experiment of the Ranger Block III space missions.
A clear and mutual understanding of the functions and authorities of the
Principal Investigator, Project Manager, and Program Manager is required in
order to achieve optimum scientific benefit and effective integration of the
investigation with other portions of the project. This agreement stated herein
follows the intent of NASA Management Instructions 4-1-! and 37-1-I and adapts
or amplifies these instructions where necessary to meet the specific requirements of
this investigation and project.
This agreement is a statement of the intentions of the signatories, is not
binding upon their institutions or organizations, and involves no monetary
considerations.
APPLICABILITY
This agreement is applicable to the proposal entitled, "Principal
Investigator Program for Ranger Block III" numbered SC 7430 which was
submitted to the Office of Space Sciences and subsequently forwarded to the
Ranger Project Office, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, for execution and administra-
tion. The co-investigators are:
Mr. Raymond Heacock, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Dr. Eugene M. Shoemaker, United States Geological Survey
Dr. Harold Urey, University of California, San Diego
Mr. Ewen Whitaker, University of Arizona, Tucson
RESPONSIBILITIES
Project Manager
The Project Manager has the direct responsibility for complete .project
execution and as such is the focal point for all activities relating to the project. The
responsibility and authority of the Project Manager are described in NASA
Management Instruction 4-1-1. In the event of discrepancies between this
agreement and NASA Management Instructions 4-1-1 and 37-1- !, 37-1-1 governs.
In general, it is the responsibility of the Project Manager to achieve the optimum
balance between available resources and desired performance for each of the
systems associated with the project so as to accomplish project objectives in the
best possible manner. His major constraints are project objectives, total available
manpower, facilities and funding, and schedule. Specifically with respect to the
subject investigation and the associated interfaces, the Project Manager's
responsibilities as implemented through the project organization include:
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!. Optimizing scientific objectives in consonance with technical and
resources constraints.
2. Provide the design, fabrication, and integration of the television camera
system to execute the photographic mission as defined in the PDP.
3. Definition of project schedules, resources, risk, quality assurance,
operations requirements, and change procedures.
4. Giving appropriate consideration to the responsibilities and authorities
of the Principal Investigator in conducting his investigation.
5. Insuring that the Principal Investigator is provided with the necessary
documentation covering the design and performance of the TV camera
system and the pertinent spacecraft, trajectory, and flight operations
information.
6. Establish mission operations plan, and control its implementation and
execution.
7. Assuring that public information policy is established, and assuring
timely preparation of mission scientific results for public release.
Principal Investigator
The Principal Investigator has the responsibility and authority described
generally in NASA Management Instructions 37-1-1. Specifically with respect to
the subject investigation, he is responsible to the Project Manager. He will consider
decisions by the Project Manager as conclusive and will comply with them unless
he promptly appeals to the Program Manager.
Consistent with the project constraints and organization, the Principal
Investigator will conduct the following activities and, in the conduct of these, will
report to the Space Sciences Division Project Representative as the designated
representative of the Project Manager.
!. Define the optimum scientific objectives and functional requirements for
the television system.
2. Approve the TV camera system functional specifications as a satisfactory
interpretation of the scientific objectives and functional requirements.
3. Assure the adequacy of the qualification and acceptance test plans
insofar as they apply to the instrumentation required for this
investigation.
4. Participate in a) planning the functional testing and calibration of
prototypes and flight instruments, b) calibration tests required prior to
flight, and c) in analyses of the results of these tests.
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5. Establish the requirements on space flight operations for the kind and
degree of intermediate data processing required, and the format in
which the data is to be provided the experimenters.
6. Assist in establishing the scientific merit of the various space flight
options (standard or otherwise) that must be considered.
7. Participate as a consultant during flight operations as specified in the
SFOP.
8. Organize the efforts of, assigning tasks to, and guiding the other
members of his team of co-experimenters for the pre-flight, in-flight,
and post-flight phases.
9. Conducting a scientific analysis of the data obtained through his
investigation and disseminating the results. The Principal Investigator
shall be the sole arbiter of the recipients of the unanalyzed data, other
than his co-experimenters, those at JPL who perform the acquisition and
transformation of the data, and those within NASA who have an official
function to perform, for a period not to exceed three months after
completion of a mission.
10. Provide, within three months of the flight date, a scientific report of the
experimenter team describing the results obtained.
1 !. Meeting the established project requirements.
The Principal Investigator and his co-experimenters will have direct access
to information at the TV Subsystem Contractor's (RCA), but all contact must be
coordinated with the Space Sciences Division Project Representative; however, all
direction of the Contractor will be done solely by JPL.
Program Manager
The Program Manager has the NASA Headquarters staff responsibility of
insuring that all decisions on the project which will affect the scientific results of
the project are coordinated with the appropriate Headquarters program scientists.
Acknowledging this responsibility, it is agreed that the Program Manager will
assume the following specific functions relative to this investigation and project:
1. Serving as the primary contact for necessary Headquarters co-ordination
relating to the investigation.
2. Keeping the Director informed on project status.
3. Recommending to the Director actions to be taken on proposed changes
or modifications in this investigation.
4. Investigating appeals from the Principal Investigator and referring these
appeals to the Director for final decision.
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CHANGES
Significant modifications to the scientific objectives are to be forwarded by
the Project Manager to the Program Manager for referral to the Space Sciences
Steering Committee for review and to the Director, Office of Space Sciences, for
decision.
Changes to the complement of the investigator team desired by the
Principal Investigator should be forwarded to the Program Manager, with the
concurrence of the Project Manager, for referral to the Space Sciences Steering
Committee for review and to the Director, Office of Space Sciences, for decision.
Dr. Gerard Kuiper (signed)
Dr. Gerard Kuiper
University of Arizona,
Principal Investigator.
H. M. Schurmeier (signed
H. M. Schurmeier,
Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Project Manager.
N. W. Cunningham (signed)
N. W. Cunningham,
NASA Headquarters,
Program Manager.
Dated: il September 1963
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RANGER PERFORMANCE HISTORY

RANGER PERFORMANCE HISTORY
FLIGHT LAUNCH DATE LAUNCH VEHICLE SPACECRAFT
BLOCK I
t 8-23-6t 0 C,
2 I 1-18-61 O +
BLOCK [I
3 / -26-62 0 ID
4 4-23-62 • O
10-18-62 • 0
BLOCK YI]
6 1-30-64 • •
7 7-28-64 • •
8 2-17-65 • •
9 3-21-55 • •
BLOCK ZZ CANCELLED
BLOCK _ CANCELLED
PRIMARY EXPERIMENT
LEGEND
• SUCCESS
O FAILURE
4D PARTIAL SUCCESS ACHIEVED THROUGH EXEkCISE OF LMPORTANP SPACECRAFT SYSEEMS
+ NO TEST
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data in cislunar space... " 1958 NASA/USAF Space Probes (Able-l) Final
Report, (Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., February 18, 1959), Volume
1: Summary, p. 2. For the Army, it was "to establish a trajectory in the
vicinity of the moon, to make a significant scientific measurement, and to
advance space technology." Henry Curtis and Dan Schneiderman, Pioneer
III and IV Space Probes (JPL TR 34-1 I. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, January 29,
1960), p. 1.
11. ARPA Order No. 2-58, March 27, 1958, p. I.
12. 1958 NASA/USAF Space Probes (Able-l) Final Report (Space Technology
Laboratories, Inc., February 18, 1959), Volume 2: Payload and Experi-
ments, pp. 18ft.
13. 1958 NASA/USAF Space Probes Final Report, Vol. 1, p. I1.
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Space Administration (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp.
14-15. More than ever eager to claim American progress toward a lunar
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16. White House Press Release, Message of the President, subject: "United
States Aeronautics and Space Activities, January i-December 31, 1958,"
scheduled for delivery to the Congress February 2, 1959, pp. 10-11; also
1958 NASA/ USAF Space Probes Final Report, Vol. i, p. 84.
17. Curtis and Schneiderman, Pioneer III and I V Space Probes, p. 2.
18. J.L. Stuart, A Miniature Photographic Camera for Space Probe Instrumenta-
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Summary No. 3 for the period March 15, 1959, to May 15, 1959 (Pasadena,
California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology,
June 1, 1959), p. 84.
19. Thomas R. Atkinson, et al., Vidicon Camera and Tape Recorder System
Development (JPL Memorandum 30-4. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, June 8, 1959), p. 1; and
John R. Scull, A System for Lunar Photography and Data Transmission (JPL
TR 34-142. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, May 28, 1960), pp. 2-3.
20. Albert R. Hibbs and C. W. Snyder, "Results of Pioneer III Flight,"
Proceedings of the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium (Downey,
California: North American Aviation, Inc.), Vol. !, No. 4, January 12,
1959, pp. 48-50; and James Van Allen and L. A. Frank, Survey of
Radiation Around the Earth to a Radial Distance of 107,400 Kilometers
(Iowa City: State University of Iowa, January 1959).
21. Interview of Clifford Cummings by Cargill Hall, August 19, 1971, p. 2 (2-
2218).
22. Atkinson, Vidicon Camera and Tape Recorder System Development. There is
no question that this system was delayed in development: however, no
written documentation has been uncovered that completely accounts for
NASA's decision to replace the vidicon camera with the radiation
experiment.
23. First Semiannual Report to Congress of NASA, p. 17.
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25. S. Fred Singer, "Research in the Upper Atmosphere with Sounding
Rockets and Earth Satellite Vehicles," Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, Vol. If, No. 2, March 1952, pp. 62-63; also, cf. William R. Corliss,
NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary (NASA SP-
4401. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1971);
on heritage, see Patrick Hughes, A Century of Weather Service: A History of
the Birth and Growth of the National Weather Service, 1879-1970 (New
York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1970), Part II; also
William R. Corliss, Scientific Satellites (NASA SP-133. Washington:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1967), Chapter 1.
26. Cf., contemporary proposals for experiments in Proceedings of the Lunar
and Planetary Exploration Colloquium, Vol. 1, passim; also, United States
Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration,
Space Handbook: Astronautics and Its Applications, Staff Report, 85th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, p. 216. The quest to discover extraterrestrial
life remained largely in the province of life science, which, in this venture,
was closely allied with planetary science.
Knowledge of the origin and evolution of the moon's features, two British
astronomers declared in 1955, "can never be established with certainty so
long as men are confined to earth. Only when the first spaceships take off
for the moon, and we are able to view the surface at close quarters and
actually analyze the lunar crust, will this (particular) question be finally
settled." H. Percy Wilkins and Patrick Moore, The Moon (London: Faber
and Faber, 1955), p. 401. This general attitude was expressed most
forcefully by Thornton Page at a later date: "I like to think of myself as a
'big-telescope man'.., ground-based, of course ... but I have to admit that
getting outside the atmosphere for a better look, and bringing home
samples of astronomical bodies, beats anything the Palomar telescope can
offer." Thornton Page, "A View from the Outside," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 25, September 1969, p. 61. Arthur Clarke, on the other
hand, after reviewing the conflicting theories on the origin of the moon and
its surface features in 1951, already had mused: "one sometimes wonders if
the matter will be settled even when we have reached the Moon." Arthur C.
Clarke, The Exploration of Space (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951 ), p.
107.
27. Stuart, A Miniature Photographic Camera; Atkinson, Vidicon Camera and
Tape Recorder System Development," Exploration of the Moon, the Planets,
and Interplanetary Space (JPL Report 30-1. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, April 30, 1959),
Albert R. Hibbs, ed., pp. 18-20; Carl Gazley, Jr., and David J. Masson,
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"Recovery of a Circum-Lunar Instrument Carrier," Proceedings of the
Vlllth International Astronautical Congress, Barcelona, 1957 (Springer-
Verlag, Vienna, 1958), pp. 137-146; Merton E. Davies, A Photographic
System for Close-up Lunar Exploration (Rand Corporation Report RM-
2183. May 23, 1958); Merton E. Davies, "Lunar Exploration by
Photography from a Space Vehicle," Proceedings of the Xth International
Astronautical Congress, London, 1959 (Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 1960), pp.
268-278; and proposals and discussion in Lee Stephenson, "Making
Measurements by Hardlanding Vehicles," Proceedings of the Lunar and
Planetary Exploration Colloquium, Vol. !, No. 2, pp. 19-20 and passim; see
also, for example, B. B. Chew, "A Look at the Future Space Effort,"
Proceedings of the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium, Vol. 1, No.
2, p. 1; A Statement by the President and Introduction to Outer Space
(President's Scientific Advisory Committee, March 26, 1958), pp. 4-5;
William W. Kellogg, "Research in Outer Space," report of the Technical
Panel on the Earth Satellite Program, U.S. National Committee for the
IGY, as printed in Science, Vol. 127, No. 3302, April 11, 1958, p. 799; and
Proposal for a Lunar Probe (LMSD-49800. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Missiles and Space Division, June 12, 1959).
With increased federal expenditures for basic research in the years
immediately following the war, physics and the biomedical sciences did
splendidly. But, as Daniel Greenberg has noted, geologists and chemists
among other planetary scientists, had been "largely left out of this
affluence" and could claim no exclusive source of financial support among
government agencies, military or otherwise. Daniel S. Greenberg, The
Politics of Pure Science (New York: The New American Library, Inc.,
1967), p. 173.
The first Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium, sponsored by the
Rand Corporation, North American Aviation, and the California Research
Corporation, was held in Downey, California, on May 13, 1958.
Participants in succeeding months included Carl Sagan (U.C. Berkeley),
Harold Urey (U.C. San Diego), Dinsmore Alter (Griffith Park Observa-
tory), Eugene Shoemaker (U.S. Geological Survey), Gerard Kuiper
(University of Arizona), Albert Hibbs (JPL-Caltech), and Gerhardt
Schilling (Rand Corporation). The three principal objectives of the
Colloquium were: "( 1 ) to bring together people of common interest for the
exchange of scientific and engineering information; (2) to define the
scientific and engineering aspects of lunar and planetary exploration and to
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Coast through May 1963. (Proceedings of the Lunar and Planetary
Exploration Colloquium, Vol. 1, No. i, May 13, 1958, "Introduction.")
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Science Board noted in Science in Space (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1961 ), Lloyd V. Berkner and Hugh Odishaw, eds., pp. 429-
433.
See "Space Science Board, Report of Activities, June 1958-June 1959."
NASA Document, no date or author indicated. Cf., also, reports and
proposals appearing in United States Congress, Senate, Special Committee
on Space and Astronautics, Compilation of Materials on Space and
Astronautics, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, No. 2, April 14, 1958. SSB
members included Lloyd Berkner (Chairman), Harrison Brown, Leo
Goldberg, H. Keffer Hartline, Donald Hornig, William Kellogg, Christian
Lambertsen, Joshua Lederberg, W. A. Noyes, Colin Pittendrigh, Richard
Porter, Bruno Rossi, Alan Shapley, John Simpson, Harold Urey, James Van
Allen, O. G. Villard, Jr., Harry Wexler, George Wollard, Hugh Odishaw
(Executive Director), and R. C. Peavey (Secretary). Berkner and Odishaw,
Science in Space, pp. 429-433; A Statement by the President and
Introduction to Outer Space, p. 9.
Harold Spencer Jones, "The Inception and Development of the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year," Annals of the International Geophysical Year
(London: Pergamon Press, 1959), Volume i, p. 383.
Among these bodies were the ad hoc Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research
Panel (1946), with representation from United States agencies and
academic groups engaged in upper air research, the NACA Special
Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere (1946), an interagency group that
sponsored research and published tables of standard properties of the
atmosphere at high altitudes, and the Geophysical Sciences Committee
(1948) of the Research and Development Board in the Department of
Defense. History reviewed in John Townsend, "History of the Upper Air
Rocket Research Program at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, 1946-
1947," Appendix III, pp. 27-45, of Homer E. Newell, The Challenge to
United States Leadership in Rocket Sounding of the Upper Atmosphere, U.S.
Naval Research Lab unpublished document, August 28, 1957 (5-415);
Milton W. Rosen, The Viking Rocket Story (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1955), pp. 21-23; and Homer E. Newell, "Exploration of the Upper
Atmosphere by Means of Rockets," The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 64, No. 6,
June 1947, p. 454. For the NACA Committee and Geophysical Sciences
Committee see Calvin N. Warfield, Tentative Tables for the Properties of the
Upper Atmosphere t NACA Technical Note No. 1200. Washington: NACA,
January 1947), pp. 2-3; and S. Fred Singer, "Research in the Upper
Atmosphere," pp. 70-71; also David S. Akens, Historical Origins of the
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC Historical Monograph No.
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34. Joseph A. Shortal, History of Wallops Station (Comment Edition. Wallops
Island, Virginia: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1968),
"Part II: From Supersonic to Hypersonic Flight Research, 1950-1954," pp.
IX-17 (5-243).
35. See Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A
History (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 21, 97-98.
In space research, the Technical Panel observed when the IGY began, "a
satellite can be used to observe only three kinds of things, namely, photons,
particles, and fields." National Academy of Sciences Technical Panel on the
Earth Satellite Program, "Comments on a Continuing Program of Scientific
Research Using Earth Satellite Vehicles," January 7, 1957, p. 6 (5-1064b).
36. NACA Special Committee on Space Technology, Recommendations
Regarding A National Civil Space Program, October 28, 1958, p. I. The
proposed program to attain these objectives consisted of (1) geophysical
observation-the mapping of gravitational and magnetic fields and their
interactions with particles and radiations approaching earth from the sun
and outer space-and experiments with man and living organisms; (2)
continued upper atmosphere experiments with rocket sondes; and (3)
supporting ground-based research on such questions as "radiation effects on
materials, instruments, and living organisms, and means of radiation
protection," see pp. 5-7. See also, for example, contemporary remarks of
Hugh Dryden: "In my opinion the goal of the space program should be the
development of manned satellites and the travel of man to the moon and
nearby planets... " Hugh Dryden, "Space Technology and the NACA,"
text of an address before the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences, New
York, N. Y., January 27, 1958, p. 2 (5-140).
37. Proposed Development Plan for Able 3-4 (Earth Satellite, Lunar Satellite,
Deep Space Probe), June 1, 1959, p. 2-1 (2-2232).
38. Sky science could proceed without the large rockets, precise guidance, and
spacecraft capability required for planetary research, and made good use of
the technology available. For example, employing the smaller Thor-Able
launch vehicle, on March 11, 1960, NASA placed the spheroidal, spin-
stabilized Pioneer 5 machine on a space trajectory carrying it and a number
of sky science experiments successfully into a solar orbit between the earth
and Venus. See NASA News Release, subject: "Pioneer V Payload," March
8, 1960 (5-1035a); NASA News Release, subject: "Pioneer V Booster,"
March 8, 1960 (5-1035b); and Glenn A. Reiff, "The Pioneer Spacecraft
Program," Joint National Meeting, American Astronautical Society,
Operations Research Society, June 17-20, 1969 (5-1037).
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Interview of George E. Mueller (then Vice President of STL) by E. M.
Emme, NASA Historian, January 15, 1960. Also NASA News Release No.
60-265, September 1960, p. 2.
40. NASA memorandum from Robert Jastrow to Homer Newell, subject:
"Report on December 1 Meeting of the Lunar Science Group," December
11, 1959 (2-1933a).
41. NASA's Space Sciences Division, responsible for experimental applications
in space exploration, in 1958 was organized into six branches: Instrumenta-
tion, Meteorology, Fields and Particles, Planetary Atmospheres, Astronomy,
and Solar Physics. Townsend noted that "at the present time the division
consists of about 60 people, most of whom transferred from the NRL where
they constituted a group which has been conducting upper air research with
rockets for the past twelve years." NASA memorandum from John
Townsend to Homer Newell, subject: "Staff-Space Sciences Division
Relationships," February 6, 1959, p. 1 (2-1923a).
42. Robert Jastrow, Red Giants and White Dwarfs (New York: Harper & Row,
1967), p. 2.
43. NASA Memorandum for the File from Homer Newell, subject: "Telephone
Conference Report with Robert Cowen, Christian Science Monitor,"
January 6, 1965 (2-730).
44. NASA Memorandum for the File from Homer Newell, subject: "Miscella-
neous Notes," January 20, 1959, pp. 2-3 (2-1760); NASA approval noted
in Homer Newell, "Staff Conference Report," January 27, 1959. p. 1;
rationale for Working Groups in NASA Memorandum from Homer Newell
to A. Silverstein, subject: "Recommendations for a Lunar Science Group,"
August 26, 1959 (2-1929). First meeting of the NASA Working Group on
Lunar Exploration convened at JPL on February 5, 1959. Draft of a NASA
Memorandum for the File from William Cunningham, subject: "Working
Group on Lunar Explorations," January 15, 1965, p. 1 (2-651); see also,
Homer E. Newell, "Harold Urey and the Moon," The Moon, Vol. 7, Nos.
I/2, March/April, 1973, pp. I-5.
45. Cf. United States Congress, Second Semiannual Report of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, House
Document No. 361, 1960, p. 2; NASA Long Range Plan, December 16,
1959, p. 33; and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, A
National Space Vehicle Program: A Report to the President, January 27,
1959, pp. 3, 10 (2-798). The NASA Research Steering Committee for
Manned Space Flight, chaired by Harry Goett, Director of NASA's new
Goddard Space Flight Center at Greenbelt, Maryland, had concluded its
deliberations and released its planning recommendations. Reiterating a
suggestion advanced one year earlier by the Vehicles Group in the NACA
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Special Committee on Space Technology, the NASA committee urged a
lunar exploration program ending in manned landings on the moon. See
The Working Group on Vehicular Program of the Special Committee on
Space Technology, Interim Report to the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics: A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development
Program, April 1, 1958. p. 6 (3-15 Ic); and complementary JPL study, Allyn
B. Hazard, A Plan for Manned Lunar and Planetary Exploration, November
1959 (3-323). Virtually all of these early program plans and recommenda-
tions, from new launch vehicles to lunar and planetary missions, were in
large measure a response to the external challenge represented by
achievements of the Soviet space program. As Abe Silverstein observed in
testimony before Congress, large launch vehicles were required "so that we
could do what we thought the Administration and Congress had set as its
goal, namely, to make this country first in space." United States Congress,
House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1960 NASA Authorization,
Hearings before the Committee and Subcommittees Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4,
86th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 6512, 1959, p. 410; cf., similar JPL
sentiment in Ten-Year Plan (JPL Publication No. 31-2. Pasadena,
California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology,
December 3, 1959), p. I.
Proposal for Space Flight Program Study (Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, November 7,
1958) (2-620c); and interview of James Burke by Cargill Hall, January 27,
1969, p. 7 (2-1391).
Exploration of the Moon, the Planets, and Interplanetary Space (JPL Report
30-1. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute
of Technology, April 30, 1959), Albert R. Hibbs, ed., p. 2.
This predominant concern with the moon at NASA Headquarters, after a
planetary program had begun, caused JPL officials by the end of the year to
request a charter and name change to: Working Group on Lunar and
Planetary Exploration. Letter from William Pickering to Abe Silverstein,
December 17, 1959 (2-803). The request was agreed to by NASA. Letter
from Abe Silverstein to William Pickering, January 26, 1960 (2-318).
NASA Vega Flight Schedule of April 4, 1959, cited in United States
Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Review of the
Cancelled Atlas-Vega Launch Vehicle Development, December 1958-
December 1959, Report to the Committee, April 1960, p. 5.
Draft of NASA Memo for the File from Cunningham, "Working Group on
Lunar Explorations," January 15, 1965 (2-651); letter from Pickering to
Silverstein, December 17, 1959 (2-803).
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Letter from Val Larsen to Robert Jastrow, February 26, 1959 (2-829). J.
Arnold, E. Anderson, and M. van Dilla responded with a proposal to obtain
a gamma-ray spectrum of the moon's surface on March 17, 1959. JPL
Interoffice Memo from Albert Metzger to Cargill Hall, subject: "Comments
on Ranger Chronology," January 8, i 970. NASA contracted for design and
development of the small, single-axis, seismometer with a Caltech-
Columbia University team in July 1959. R. D. Gurney, et al., Final Report,
A Seismometer for Ranger Lunar Landing (Pasadena, California:
Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, May 15,
1962), pp. 1-2.
52. United States Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
The First Soviet Moon Rocket, Report of the Committee, 86th Congress, I st
Session, on H. R. 1086, 1959, p. 6.
53. See, for example, W. Sambrot, "Space Secret," Saturday Evening Post,
February 21, 1959; and United States Congress, House, Committee on
Appropriations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Appropria-
tions, Hearings before the Subcommittee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959,
pp. 196-197; also United States Congress, House, Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration, The Next Ten Years in Space, 1959-
1969, Staff Report of the Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, House
Document No. 115, 1959, passim; and Evert Clark, "Vega Study Shows
Early NASA Problems," Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 27,
1960, p. 62.
54. NASA memorandum from Robert Jastrow to Homer Newell, subject:
"Soviet Plans for Lunar Exploration," April 20, 1959 (2-1927).
55. Testimony of Milton Rosen, Abe Silverstein, and J. Allen Crocker in United
States Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1960, Hearings before the Committee
and Subcommittee on NASA Authorization, on S. 1582, 86th Congress, 1st
Session, 1959, Part I: Scientific and Technical Presentations, pp. 25-26,
121, 215. This NASA interest in lunar exploration also noted prominently
during the first National Conference on Space Physics held at this time,
April 1959. See the proceedings in The Journal of Geophysical Research,
Volume 64, No. 2, November 1959.
56. NASA Memorandum to the Files from William Cunningham, subject:
"Lunar Explorations," June 16, 1959 (2-1928).
57. Testimony of James D. Burke in the Report of the JPL Failure Investigation
Board, "Ranger RA-5 Failure Investigation," November 13, 1962 (2-459);
revised Vega objectives and launch dates that conformed to this directive
are affirmed in a letter from William Pickering to Abe Silverstein, July 10,
1959 (2-835).
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58. InterviewofEdgarCortrightbyCargillHall,March4, 1968(2-762).
59. NASAmemofromNewellto Silverstein,"Recommendationsfor a Lunar
ScienceGroup," August26, 1959(2-1929).Membershipof the Lunar
ScienceGroupin 1959included:
RobertJastrow,GoddardSpaceFlightCenter,NASA, Chairman
Harrison Brown, California Institute of Technology
Maurice Ewing, Columbia University
Thomas Gold, Cornell University
Albert Hibbs, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Joshua Lederberg, Stanford University, Department of Genetics
Gordon MacDonald, University of California, Los Angeles,
Institute of Geophysics
Frank Press, California Institute of Technology
Bruno Rossi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ernst Stuhlinger, Army Ballistic Missile Agency
Harold Urey, University of California, San Diego
U.S. Congress, Second Semiannual Report of NASA, p. 123.
60. NASA Memorandum for the File from T. Keith Glennan, July 24, 1959,
with attachments "Participants at 23 July Meeting," and "Excerpts from
the Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space for Use at the 23 July Meeting"
(2-2608). Rationale advanced by Glennan in support of this position
among his NASA associates at this time included (I) Vega launch delays
that appeared to preclude planetary missions in 1960-1961; (2)
proximity-the moon was much closer, the flight time was several days
instead of several months, and spacecraft would not require as great a
reliability; (3) a launch opportunity came up once each lunar month; and
(4) communications at lunar ranges were less complicated. Interview of
Homer Stewart by Cargill Hall, November 22, 1969. This NASA lunar
decision reiterated in the letter from Richard Horner to William Pickering,
December 16, 1959 (2-1935b); in the NASA Long Range Plan, December
16, 1959; and in the letter from William Pickering to Abe Silverstein,
August 4, 1959 (2-825).
61. Details reviewed in NASA, OSFD, "Staff Conference Report, Monday, 7
November 1959," p. i (2-1760); letter from William Pickering to Abe
Silverstein, November 9, 1959, (2-843); and in JPL Interoffice Memo from
John Keyser to Distribution, subject: "Minutes of the Vega Staff Meeting
November 25, 1969," November 30, 1959 (2-1016).
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62. JPL Interoffice Memo from Gumpel, Sloan, and Buwalda to James Burke,
subject: "Lunar Rough Landing Scientific Experiment," December 10,
1959; see also G. F. Schilling, Lunar and Deep Space Programs
(Washington: Office of Space Flight Development, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, September 14, 1959), p. 1.
63. See NASA, OSFD, "Staff Conference Report, Friday, 4 December 1959"
(2-1760). Cancellation order in TWX from Ralph Cushman to George
Green, December 14, 1959 (3-804); JPL Announcement No. 14 from
William Pickering to All Personnel, subject: "Cancellation of the Vega
Program," December 11, 1959 (2-801). The decision hinged on reliability
expected through extended use of Atlas-Agena B. See the testimony of T.
Keith Glennan in United States Congress, House, Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Review of the Space Program, Hearings before the
Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, No. 3, Part I, pp. 170-171.
A most comprehensive survey of Vega prior to cancellation is contained in
The Vega Program (JPL Report 30-6. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, August 3, 1959), Jack N.
James, ed.
64. Letter from Abe Silverstein to William Pickering, December 21, 1959 (2-
470). The NASA decision in late 1959 against attempting photography
from low-altitude lunar orbiters was made in reviews during early
December: "It is... a project of greater technological difficulty than the
rough landing projects, and ... the rough landing must be attempted before
the low-altitude satellite if we are going to move ahead as quickly as
possible on the lunar program." NASA memorandum from Robert Jastrow
to Homer Newell, subject: "Report of December 1 Meeting of the Lunar
Science Group," December 11, 1959 (2-1933a). NASA's two Atlas-Able
lunar orbiters remaining at that time-and scheduled for launch in 1960-
did not incorporate photography among the experiments in the spacecraft
payload.
65. Testimony of Homer Newell in United States Congress, House, Committee
on Science and Astronautics, Investigation of Project Ranger, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 88th Congress, 2nd Session,
No. 3, 1964, p. 45. Emphasis upon rapid development and flight schedules
was prompted by the Soviet lunar program noted above, and by an
optimism prevailing at JPL and NASA that Centaur-launched lunar soft-
landing missions would be possible in 1961 or in 1962. "The type of
mission described as a hard or rough lunar landing.., is dependent on the
length of time required to develop rugged instruments. Unless this time is
relatively short, vehicles with the capability of soft-landing a payload will
be available before the ruggedized (seismometer) instrument package is
ready." Space Program_ Summary No. 5 for the period July 15, 1959 to
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September 15, 1959 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, October 1, 1959), p. 69.
William H. Pickering, "Space--The New Scientific Frontier," an address
before the American Institute of Chemical Engineers Annual Meeting in St.
Paul, Minnesota, September 29, 1959, p. 5 (2-922); also, Pickering's
statements are cited in Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 23,
1959, p. 26; this position is restated in the JPL Ten-Year Plan (JPL
Publication No. 31-2. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, December 3, 1959), p. 2.
NASA Memorandum for the File from Homer Neweil, subject: "Trip
Report for the Visit to Jet Propulsion Laboratory on 28 December 1959 by
Homer E. Newell, Jr., Newell Sanders, J. A. Crocker, Morton J. Stoller,"
December 30, 1959, p. 2 (2-1935a).
However, Ranger almost wasn't Ranger. As a youth, Silverstein had owned
a dog by the same name. During an unmercifully long and active life, his
canine companion had demonstrated a talent for avoiding all human
direction and otherwise had proven himself intractable and cantankerous.
With a recollection of the obstinate beast still vivid to mind, Silverstein
strenuously opposed the choice. Interview of Clifford Cummings by Cargill
Hall, August 19, 1971, p. 1 (2-2218). Nevertheless, the name stuck at JPL,
and was soon picked up at other organizations drawn into the project. In
the absence of a more appropriate designation and with wide reference to
the Atlas-Agena lunar enterprise as Ranger, NASA Headquarters consented
to the appellation. On May 4, Cliff Cummings publicly announced the
name. Julian Hartt, "Ranger Spacecraft Details Revealed by JPL Official,"
Los Angeles HeraM-Examiner, May 4, 1960, p. 23.
Chapter Two
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!. Space Programs Summary No. 37-13, Volume I for the period November 1,
1961, to January I, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, February 1, 1962), p. 3.
2. John Troan, "U.S. Plans Three Robot Moon Probes in '62," Washington
Daily News, December 27, 1961, p. 3; also last paragraph of " Masterpiece
for the Moon," an editorial in The New York Times, January 19, 1962,
p. 30.
3. Cf. Marvin Miles, "U.S. Moon Shot May Top Russia's," Los Angeles Times,
January 14, 1962, p. F-l; prior U.S. lunar flight missions are discussed in
Chapter One and Appendix B of this volume.
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4. William E. Kirhofer, Post-Injection Standard Trajectory, Ranger P-34 (RA-
3) (JPL Engineering Planning Document 55. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, January 5,
1962).
5. Space Programs Summary No. 37-14, Volume H (U) for the period January
1, 1962, to March 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, April !, 1962), p. 5.
6. JPL Interoffice Memo from Albert Hibbs to Experimenters for the Ranger
TV Mission, subject: "Dissemination of Ranger-3 Photographs," January
4, 1962 (2-1221b).
7. "Functional Specification Ranger RA-3, RA-4, and RA-5 Spacecraft
Mission Objectives and Design Criteria," in Ranger Spacecraft Design
Specification Book, Spec. No. RA345-2-110 D (Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, December 9,
1960) (2-1095e).
8. Nicholas A. Renzetti, Tracking and Data Acquisition for Ranger Missions
1-5 (JPL TM 33-174. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, July I, 1964), p. 31.
9. It proved a valuable exercise because less than a month later the same field
repair was made on the Mercury-Atlas that carried Lt. Colonel John Glenn
into earth orbit aboard Friendship 7.
10. Space Programs Summary No. 37-14, Volume H (U) for the period January
1, 1962 to March 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, April 1962), p. 17.
I1. Space Programs Summary No. 37-14, Volume I for the period January 1,
1962, to March 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, April 1, 1962), p. 4; Renzetti, Tracking
and Data Acquisition for Ranger Missions 1-5, p. 3 !.
12. Space Programs Summary No. 37-14, Volume L p. 44.
13. Ibid., pp. 3-9; Space Programs Summary No. 37-14, Volume 11 (U), pp. 3-4;
Space Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume VI for the period March 1,
1962, to June 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, June 30, 1962), pp. 7-9; N.A. Renzetti,
Tracking and Data Acquisition for Ranger Missions 1-5, pp. 31-38; Ranger
3 Flight Final Statement, January 28, 1962 (2-2500); JPL Ranger 3
Technical Bulletins 1 through 4, January 29, 1962, through February 9,
1962.
14. Letter from James Burke to Oran Nicks, February 8, 1962 (2-258).
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15. JPLInterofficeMemofromJamesBurketo BrianSparks,subject:"Ranger
ProjectStatusReportNo. 44," February2, 1962(2-1314);JosephA.
Beacon,Flight Operations Management, Master's Thesis researched at the
University of Southern California, January 1969, pp. 38-39 (3-633).
16. Letter from James Arnold to Cargill Hall, August 9, 1973 (2-2391).
17. Gladwin Hill, "Ranger Crosses Path of the Moon; TV Attempt Fails," The
New York Times, January 29, 1962, p. 1.
18. "The Disobedient Rocket," Time, February 9, 1962, pp. 67-68.
19. Evert Clark, "Ranger 9 Flight Stirs Reliability Question," Aviation Week
and Space Technology, Volume 76, February 5, 1962, p. 30.
20. Quoted by Marvin Miles in "Three Causes Found for Ranger's Failure,"
Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1962, Part II, p. 2.
21. William E. Kirhofer, Post-Injection Standard Trajectory, Ranger P-35, (RA-
4) (JPL Engineering Planning Document 56. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, April 9, 1962 ).
22. Space Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume L pp. 4-8.
23. Tom Allen, "Race for the Moon," New York Sunday News, April 8, 1962;
see also, for example, Dick West, "Lunar Close-ups Expected Soon," Los
Angeles Times, April 22, 1962, Part H, p. 5.
24. N.A. Renzetti, Tracking and Data Acquisition for Ranger Missions 1-5, pp.
44-50; Space Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume L p. 3; Space
Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume VI, pp. 9-10; Space Flight
Operations Memorandum Ranger IV (Engineering Planning Document 91.
Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology, July 5, 1962); James D. Burke, Preliminary Operations Letter,
Ranger 4 (JPL Reorder 62-144. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology); JPL Ranger 4 Technical
Bulletins 1 through 3, April 24, 1962, April 25, 1962, and April 26, 1962.
25. Quoted in "Leap Toward the Moon," Time, May 4, 1962, p. 40.
26. Bill Becker," Ranger 4 Crashes on the Moon," The New York Times, April
27, 1962, p. !; Lu Spehr, "Ranger 4 Strikes on Dark Side," Pasadena Star-
News, April 26, 1962, p. I.
27. "Man on Moon by 1968, Astronaut Chief Declares," Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner, April 26, 1962.
28. This headline ran in the Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1962, Part I, p. 2.
29. "The Ranger Hits the Moon," an editorial in The New York Times, April
27, 1962, p. 34.
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"A Week of Space Triumph," Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1962, Section
C,p. 6.
Quoted in "Khrushchev Claims U.S. Missed Moon, but Scientists Refute
Him," Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1962, Part I, p. 1.
Statement by William Pickering confirming Ranger 4 impact on the Moon
(2-2412); see also, Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, Report of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U. S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress,
1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 12, 1963),
p. 75.
Chapter Ten
1. Letter from Homer Newell to Joseph Karth, April 10, 1962 (2-897).
2. Attending with Homer Newell were his deputy, Edgar Cortright, Chief
Scientist John Clark, Lunar and Planetary Program Director Oran Nicks,
and John Naugle, Alan Crocker, and John Nicolaides.
3. NASA Minutes of the First Senior Council for the Office of Space Sciences,
June 7, 1962, pp. 4, 8-9, 13 (2-1051).
4. For example, see Richard Witkin, "Project Apollo: Man's Race For The
Moon," The New York Times, July 30, 1962, p. I. The United States,
Witkin asserted, was expected to beat the Soviets to a manned landing on
the moon. But "whoever wins this race, it will be an event with no parallel
in history. Not even Columbus' opening of the New World or the Wright
Brothers' first flight had consequences as profound as may emerge from the
first lunar voyage." The comment is illustrative of the profound interest
and anticipation shared by many Americans.
5. John M. Logsdon, NASA's Implementation of the Lunar Landing Decision
(HHN 81, Comment Edition. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, August 1969), pp. 63-65 (5-259).
6. Office of Manned Space Flight, "Requirements for Data in Support of
Project Apollo" (Issue No. 1. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, June 15, 1962), pp. I, 17 (2-2064).
7. Holmes' methods in managing Apollo would soon lead him into a direct
confrontation with an equally strong-willed James Webb, who acted as
NASA Administrator in fact as well as in name. The showdown in time was
settled by President Kennedy-in favor of Webb.
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
The JPL position is formally delineated in Clifford I. Cummings, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory Lunar Program Guidelines (Engineering Planning
Document No. 22. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, August 15, ! 962).
See "After the Apollo Decision: What Science and Where?" and "Science
Reasserted in Project Ranger" in Chapter Eight of this volume.
"I propose," Burke had advised JPL leaders, "that we attack the third
problem [manned vs. unmanned lunar exploration] by first trying to find
out whether Newell and Holmes are as far apart as their subordinates seem
to be. If they are, I suppose we will have to try to convince Dr. Seamans and
Mr. Webb that there is a problem. If Newell and Holmes are not so far
apart, we should sit down with Cortright and Shea to arrive at some written
ground rules for the continued conduct of the Ranger Project." JPL
Interol_ce Memo from James Burke to William Pickering, Brian Sparks,
and Clifford Cummings, subject: "Ranger 6-9 Bus Experiments," April 18,
1962 (2-2539).
Cited in Lu Spehr, "Caltech Defends JPL Job," Star News [Pasadena], July
22, 1962, p. !.
Cited in "Congressman Criticizes Canaveral Space Failures," The Tampa
Tribune, July 25, 1962.
Mission description in Mariner-Venus 1962, Final Project Report (NASA
SP-59. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1965 ); H. J. Wheelock, Mariner Mission to Venus (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1963); and John Lear, "The Voyage of Mariner 2 to
Planet Venus," Saturday Review, January 5, 1963, pp. 87-91. The Soviet
Venera I Venus spacecraft had failed to transmit radio signals a few days
after its launch on February 12, 1961. A similar fate awaited the Soviet
Mars ! spacecraft launched shortly after Mariner 2, on November 1, 1962.
A Review of Space Research (Publication 1079, the Report of the Summer
Study conducted under the auspices of the Space Science Board of the
National Academy of Sciences at the State University of Iowa, June 17-
August 10, 1962. Washington: National Academy of Science-National
Research Council, 1962), pp. 1-22.
TWX from Oran Nicks to Brian Sparks, July 20, 1962, p. 4 (2-1174); see
also NASA Minutes of Seamans' OSS Review of 19 July 1962, prepared by
John Nicolaides, July 20, 1962, p. 2 (2-1759). Although new buildings were
under construction by 1962, many JPL employees remained in rented
trailers. There was simply no place to put contractor personnel who would
have to be detailed to JPL to learn about Ranger.
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16. Letter from William Pickering to Robert Seamans, subject: "Ranger Project
activities in support of manned lunar flight programs," August 15, 1962
(2-368).
17. While Pickering awaited a reply, on September 6, Cunningham issued the
ground rules for the extension of Project Ranger: Ranger flights 10 through
14 would carry an improved set of RCA television cameras in 1964; four
additional seismometer capsule missions (flights 15 through 18) were also
tentatively scheduled for launch in 1965. The schedule assigned the
objectives of the Office of Space Sciences first priority, support of Project
Apollo second. NASA memorandum from William Cunningham to Oran
Nicks, subject: "Ranger Mission Plans Following RA-14," September 6,
1962 (2-689). The Office of Space Sciences did not appear to contemplate
any changes whatever.
18. Letter from Robert Seamans to William Picketing, September 24, 1962 (2-
367).
19. NASA Memorandum for the Record from Oran Nicks, subject: "Ranger
Project Activities Discussion on 11 October 1962," November 15, 1962 (2-
2331); see also JPL Interoffice Memo from Clifford Cummings and James
Burke to William Pickering, subject: "Notes for October I1 Meeting of
WHP, Newell, Holmes and Seamans," October 9, 1962 (2-2585).
20. NASA memorandum from Joseph Shea to Oran Nicks, subject: "Plans for
Unmanned Lunar Orbiter Development," October 23, 1962 (2-431).
21. NASA memorandum from Homer Newell and D. Brainard Holmes to
Robert Seamans, subject: "Establishment of a Joint OSS/OMSF Working
Group," October 22, 1962 (2-351); also the letter from D. Brainard
Holmes to William Pickering, November 20, 1962 (11-95b); and NASA
News Release No. 62-251, subject: "Unit to Coordinate Manned and
Unmanned Space Flight," for release November 27, 1962 (!1-97). For
their part, Holmes, Shea, and Gilruth issued the Manned Spacecraft Center
General Management Instruction 2-3-1." Inflight Scientific Experiments
Coordination Panel (October 15, 1962). Created as a counterpart to the
Space Sciences Steering Committee in the unmanned program, the new
panel acted to coordinate all scientific experiments proposed for manned
missions, and was composed of members drawn from the Manned
Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas, with an ex officio member from the
Office of Space Sciences.
22. Official NASA Flight Schedule, September 19, 1961, as adjusted in Official
NASA Flight Schedule, March 20, 1962 (2-968).
23. NASA Memorandum for the Files from Oran Nicks, subject: "Trip to JPL
April 24-26 (1962)," May 2, 1962, p. 3 (2-335).
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24. JPL Interoffice Memo from A. E. Dickinson to Ranger-4 Distribution,
subject: "Status of Ranger-4 Flight Analysis," May 8, 1962, in United
States Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Investiga-
tion of Project Ranger, Hearings before the Subcommittee on NASA
Oversight, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, No. 3, pp. 489-492.
25. Space Programs Summary No. 37-16, Volume I for the period May 1, 1962,
to July 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, July 31, ! 962), p. 34.
26. Space Programs Summary No. 37-17, Volume VI for the period July 1,
1962, to October 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, October 31, 1962), p. 8.
27. JPL Interoffice Memo from Rolf Hastrup to George Hobby, subject:
"Consideration in the Establishment of Lunar Spacecraft Sterilization
Requirements," July 25, 1962 (2-1735).
28. TWX from William Pickering to Homer Newell, August 31, 1962 (2-1280).
The waiver was approved in TWX from William Cunningham to Clifford
Cummings, September 5, 1962 (2-1281).
29. JPL Interoffice Memo ERG # 146 from Rolf Hastrup to Clifford
Cummings, subject: "Recommended Changes in Lunar Sterilization
Policy," August 30, 1962, pp. I, 6 (2-1277).
30. Cf., letter from Clifford Cummings to Homer Newell, September 28, 1962
(2-1692).
31. Space Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume I for the period March 1,
1962, to May 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, May 31, 1962), p. 8; Space Programs
Summary No. 37-18, Volume I for the period September I, 1962, to
November I, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, November 30, 1962), p. 4.
32. NASA Agena Program Presentation, October 1, 1962, p. 1-6 (2-2269).
33. Harold Washburn, "Summary of Experimenters Meeting on Ranger 5,"
held September 25, 1962 (2-1284).
34. Nicholas A. Renzetti, Tracidng and Data Acquisition for Ranger Missions
1-5 (TM 33-174. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California Institute of Technology, July 1, 1964), p. 57.
35. JPL Interoffice Memo No. 103 from Brian Sparks to Senior Staff, et al.,
subject: "Support for the RA 5 Mission," October 1 I, 1962 (2-266).
36. "Ranger 5 Lofted on Lunar Course," The New York Times, October 19,
1962, p. I-2.
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Ranger 5 Flight Report (Engineering Planning Document 147. Pasadena,
California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology,
January 4, 1963); JPL Ranger 5 Technical Bulletin No. l, October 19,
1962; James D. Burke, Preliminary Spacecraft Operations Letter, Ranger 5
(JPL Reorder 62-405. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
December 6, 1962); NASA memorandum from Homer Newell to James
Webb, subject: "Ranger 5 Post-Launch Report No. 2," October 30, 1962,
with attachment: NASA Memorandum for the Files from Walter
Jakobowski, subject: "Ranger 5 Post Launch Report No. 2," October 26,
1962 (2-692); Space Programs Summary No. 37-18, Volume I, pp. 2-8.
Chapter Eleven
I. "An analysis of scientific measurements made by instruments on the
Ranger 3 lunar spacecraft shows that the intensity of gamma rays in
interplanetary space probably is as much as ten times higher than
anticipated ... " NASA News Release 62-212, October 15, 1962. Published
results in "Letters to the Editor," Journal of Geophysical Research, Volume
67, No. 12, November 1962, pp. 4878-4880; and "Detection of an
Interstellar Flux of Gamma Rays," Nature, Volume 204, No. 4960,
November 2 l, 1964, pp. 766-767.
2. Heat sterilization, in fact, was not even mentioned in the text of the JPL
report, though it appears in passing in an attachment, under questions
asked of those interviewed: "B. Does sterilization cause problems? Some
problems had occurred, but most interviewees were not very positive about
the connection." JPL document, "Ranger RA-5 Failure Investigation,
Report of JPL Failure Investigation Board," November 13, 1962,
Attachment, "Secretary's Summary of the RA-5 Failure Investigation
Board Activities," p. 2 (2-459). The outspoken Hastrup, however, does not
appear among those JPL personnel listed as interviewed. See "One More
Time" in Chapter 10 of this volume.
3. "Ranger RA-5 Failure Investigation, Report of JPL Failure Investigation
Board," pp. 2, 6.
4. Cited in United States Congress, House, Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Space Sciences and Advanced Research and Technology, 88th Congress,
1st Session on H.R. 5466, 1964, No. 3, Part 3a, p. 1606.
5. Letter from Homer Newell to William Pickering, October 20, 1962 (2-264).
6. NASA memorandum from Homer Newell to Albert Kelley, subject:
"Review of Ranger Spacecraft," October 29, 1962 (2-2470f).
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I0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
NASA memorandum from Oran Nicks to Albert Kelley, subject: "Review
of Ranger Spacecraft," October 29, 1962 (2-2470e).
Considering this aspect of the JPL equation, James Van Allen, the
renowned sky scientist and long-time friend of William Pickering, observed:
"They have tremendous esprit at JPL; it's almost offensive. It's like the
Marines." Cited in "Space Exploration: Voyage to the Morning Star,"
Time, March 8, 1963, p. 79; see also the letter from William Pickering to T.
Keith Glennan, November 20, 1958 (2-407a); and William H. Pickering in
Space Science Seminar (JPL Publication 30-10. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, August 28,
1959), Part I: "General Introduction," p. 16.
NASA memorandum from Albert Kelley to Homer Newell, subject:
"Ranger Board of Inquiry, Final Report," December 5, 1962.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Final Report of the
Ranger Board of Inquiry," November 30, 1962, p. 5. (2-2463).
Ibid., p. 4.
Condensed from ibid., pp. 6-1 I.
Condensed from ibid., pp. 12-15.
See "A Planetary Machine for Space Science" in Chapter Three of this
volume. For the most part, Pickering and his JPL associates concurred with
the NASA report, but they took strong exception to items that were
overlooked, and to those findings that seemed to hold the Laboratory
accountable for events it did not control. The delay in creating a Ranger
Program Office at NASA Headquarters, for example, was not mentioned,
nor was the fact that JPL had urged NASA to place further Ranger
spacecraft with an industrial contractor only to have that recommendation
turned down. Objections were also registered over some of the proposed
details for testing future spacecraft. See JPL "Comments on the Ranger
Investigation," February 7, 1963 (2-460a); also JPL Interoffice Memo from
Eberhardt Rechtin to Brian Sparks, subject: "Discussion of Rebuttal to
Kelley Report," February 20, 1964 (2-415 ).
JPL Engineering Change Order No. 3703 initiated by S. Rubinstein,
October 25, 1962 (2-1325).
NASA Memorandum for the Files from William Cunningham, subject:
"Ranger Program Objectives," December 21, 1963 (2-375); TWX from
Homer Newell to Robert Parks, December 21, 1962 (2-1336); letter from
Homer Newell to William Pickering, December 31, 1962 (2-316); letter
from William Pickering to Edgar Cortright, December 28, 1962 (2-329).
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17. JPL Announcement No. 85 from William Pickering to All Personnel,
subject: "Establishment of Lunar and Planetary Projects Office," December
18, 1962 (2-268); JPL Announcement No. 86 from William Picketing to
All Personnel, subject: "Ranger Project," December 18, 1962 (2-269).
18. See "Organizing for Ranger: JPL and Headquarters" in Chapter Two of
this volume; also, "Ranger's Man on the Ground: Harris McIntosh
Schurmeier," The New York Times, July 3 l, 1964, p. 6.
19. Harris M. Schurmeier and Allen E. Wolfe, "Ranger Design Program,"
December 17, 1962, p. l (2-2073).
20. Harris M. Schurmeier, untitled JPL document regarding review of Ranger
activities, April 22, 1964 (2-1850).
21. William H. Picketing, "Objectives of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,"
February 15, 1963 (2-965); JPL Interoffice Memo No. ll0 from Brian
Sparks to Technical Division Chiefs, subject: "Division Project Organiza-
tion," April 4, 1963 (2-1591); JPL Interoffice Memo No. 177 from William
Pickering to Senior Staff, Section Chiefs, and Section Managers, subject:
"Charter for Quality Assurance and Reliability Office," April 9, 1963 (2-
441 ); also James D. Burke, "Recommendations on Ranger," December 18,
1962 (2-1700).
22. However, they made no mention of the personnel turnover at JPL. NASA
News Release No. 62-268, subject: "Ranger Improvement Program,"
December 19, 1962 (2-934). That fact was reported quickly enough by the
aerospace trade journals. See, for example, "Successive Failures Precipitate
JPL Shakeup," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Volume 77,
December 24, 1962, p. 17.
23. Letter from Edgar Cortright to Joseph Karth, December 28, 1962, as
reprinted in U.S. Congress, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 1596-1598; and
letter from Homer Newell to William Picketing, December 31, 1962 (2-
316).
24. Letter from Harold Urey to Homer Newell, October 24, 1962 (2-2300). A
few days later geologist Frank Press, the Ranger seismometer experimenter
and Director of Caltech's Seismological Laboratory, submitted a statement
to Neweli and to Donald Hornig on the President's Scientific Advisory
Committee, which he said represented "the view held by many planetary
scientists." It recommended that NASA at least acknowledge scientific
parity for the nonvisual lunar experiments by immediately including three
more scientific capsule packages in Project Ranger:
We are aware of the competition between capsule experiments and
TV experiments. We are also informed about demands of the
Apollo program on the Ranger series. We have heard the
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argument that the Ranger capsule faces a lower probability of
success because of the complexity of the landing maneuver. We
feel, however, that information concerning the physical state and
constitution of the moon is of tremendous scientific
importance.., and also of high pertinence to the Apollo program.
If NASA considered the Ranger capsule missions vital when the unmanned
lunar exploration program began, Press and his cohorts thought it senseless
to discontinue them now. "Frankly speaking we cannot justify in our minds
the almost exclusive emphasis on TV in the remaining Ranger series in
view of the uncertain quality of the pictures and the limited scientific and
engineering results that Ranger TV will provide." Letter from Frank Press
to Homer Newell, October 22, 1962 (2-691). Taken together, all of the
unhappy planetary scientists who wrote and called and cabled NASA
Headquarters urged a rethinking of the priorities and objectives of the
unmanned lunar program. Cf., letter from G. H. Sutton, for M. Ewing and
others, to Homer Newell, October 23, 1962; letter from Harold Urey to
James Webb, October 29, 1962, cited in a letter from Hugh Dryden to
Harold Urey, November 14, 1962 (2-2330); letter from James Arnold to
Homer Newell, October 30, 1962 (2-1527a); cable from James Arnold to
Homer Newell, October 31, 1962 (2-1527b).
This sentiment was by no means universal, however. Other planetary
scientists preferred visual imaging over nonvisual experiments, and were
pleased with the television emphasis placed upon the future Ranger
missions. Of these, Ranger experimenters Eugene M. Shoemaker and
Gerard P. Kuiper were the most influential spokesmen. See the letter from
Gerard Kuiper to James Burke, December 4, 1962 (2-2166).
Letter from Homer Newell to Harold Urey, November 5, 1962, pp. 1-2 (2-
2299); see also United States Congress, House, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1962, Hearings before the
Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, Part 2.
In May 1961 Lloyd V. Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board of
the National Academy of Sciences, had proudly lauded the high-water mark
attained by space science before the first National Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Virtually every American space mission to
date had been directed to scientific pursuits, and the results were impressive.
Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., "U.S. Held Leader in Space Science," The New
York Times, May 28, 1961, p. 15. But the intervening approval of Project
Apollo and the first manned flights of the Mercury earth-orbiting spacecraft
had long since captured popular attention and fired hopes for surpassing
the Russians. Taken together with the unmanned lunar flight failures, and
despite Newell's general optimism, in little more than one year's time the
fortunes of space science had unquestionably nosedived.
414
26.
lUNAR IMPACI_ A HISIORY OF PROJECI RANGER
Explorer 35 (Interplanetary Monitoring Platform E), though placed in
lunar orbit on July 22, 1967, supported eight sky science experiments to
"obtain scientific data at lunar distances on the characteristics of the
interplanetary plasma and the interplanetary magnetic field," and was not
directed to explore the moon for either planetary science or Project Apollo
as a primary goal. NASA Mission Objectives for the IMP-E Mission, NASA
Archives S-861-57-06. Because of its selenocentric orbit, the flight is
sometimes referred to as a "lunar mission." See also "Sky and Planetary
Science" in Chapter One of this volume.
Chapter Twelve
1. JPL Interoffice Memo from Allen Wolfe and J. B. Berger to Ranger Green
Day Distribution, subject: "Minutes, Ranger Spacecraft Systems Review
(Green Day) Held February 8, 1963," February 13, 1963, pp. 1-2 (2-
1313); Space Programs Summary No. 37-20, Volume VI for the period
January 1, 1963, to March 31, 1963 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, April 30, 1963), pp. 6-9.
2. Ranger TV Subsystem (Astro-Electronics Division of the Radio Corporation
of America. Princeton, New Jersey: January 17, 1963) (2-174 i ).
3. Pertinent details of this "split" RCA television subsystem as finally
produced are contained in K. J. Stein, "Ranger TV Performed Near Design
Point," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Volume 81, August 17, 1964,
p. 100f; and Donald H. Kindt and J. R. Staniszewski, The Design of the
Ranger Television System to Obtain High-Resolution Photographs of the
Lunar Surface (JPL Technical Report 32-717. Pasadena, California: Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, March 1, 1965).
4. JPL Interoffice Memo from Harris Schurmeier to William Pickering,
subject: "Summary of Problem Areas Presented in Senior Staff Meeting
2/16/63," February 22, 1963 (2-1564); JPL Interoffice Memo from Harris
Schurmeier to Distribution, subject: "Ranger Project Guidelines," February
15, 1963 (2-1360).
5. Notes of an interview of Homer Newell by Cargill Hall and Eugene Emme,
March 5, 1968 (2-385).
6. See "Organizing for Ranger: Huntsville and the Air Force" in Chapter
Two, and "Launch Operations" in Chapter Five of this volume; also the
letter from Clifford Cummings to Edgar Cortright, December 22, 1960 (2-
1437); letter from William Pickering to Robert Seamans, June 9, 1961 (2-
1451); letter from Abe Silverstein to William Pickering, October 3, 1961
(2-1457); TWX from William Pickering to Don Ostrander, June 13, 1961
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(2-2373); "Statement of LOD Position Concerning Management of Launch
Operations for NASA Agena-B Program at AMR" (2-1256a); Minutes of
NASA AMR Agena Management Meeting of June 25, ! 962, prepared by C.
M. Cope (2-2069); JPL Report prepared by James D. Burke, subject:
"LOD/AMR Meeting of June 25, 1962," June 25, 1962 (2-1261); and JPL
Interoffice Memo from Harris Schurmeier to Distribution, subject:
"Headquarters Meeting on LOC Operations," August 8, 1962 (2-2405).
7. See NASA Agena Program Presentation, October 1, 1962 (2-2269).
8. Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, Report of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to the Committee on Science and
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